Erratum

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Can the International Audit Capability Model be applied globally?
A South African Case Study

Correction to co-author's detail,

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MANUSCRIPT SPECIFICATIONS

1. The preferred length of articles is about 5000 words.
2. Articles are to be submitted ready for the press: finally edited, stylistically polished and carefully proofread. Readability, fluency of style and clarity of exposition are essential.
3. The article should represent an original contribution to the current knowledge in the subject field AND/OR provide a comprehensive review of the current body of knowledge.
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12. Statistical and other tables should be labelled. Tables, as well as mathematical or similar symbols and expressions should be kept to a minimum.

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14. If applicable, full details of the origin of the article must be provided (e.g. a paper delivered at a congress).

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18. Page fees of R300 per page and graphics at R150 per graph are payable by authors.

**Note: Plagiarism is a serious offence and could result in actions against the author.**
In *Closing the gap between theory and practice with action research*, Christelle Auriacombe revisits the ever-challenging debate on how to turn research findings into practical meaningful information that could be applied in everyday practice. The most serious issue for researchers is that practitioners seem to pay little attention to research findings. Practitioners on the other hand feel that research findings are not always applicable to real-world situations. According to Auriacombe, research methods and techniques have become increasingly redundant when it comes to solving practical problems. “One of the main reasons for this is the huge gap between theory and research. In short research and thus theory, lacks relevance and usefulness when faced by problems in the real world (practice),” writes Auriacombe.

This article aims to conceptualise action research as a phenomenon and explores the possibilities that action research holds to close the theory-practice divide. The author states that action research aims to contribute to the development of theory, as well as to address the practical problems that people experience. But more importantly, and as a possible solution to the practicality dichotomy of research, the theory aims to develop the self-help competencies of people facing problems. “Action research therefore has the potential to help close the gap between theory and practice by bringing both the researcher and the practitioner as equals into the research process,” according to Auriacombe.

Auriacombe raises the question of why action research has thus far not had any remarkable success in this regard. Experienced scholars are of the opinion that the answer to this question lies in closer cooperation between researchers and practitioners. According to Auriacombe, this means that practitioners should be more directly involved in the research process.

In contrast to the traditional goal of evaluation namely to improve an intervention model, developmental evaluation or action research focuses on changing and adapting the intervention and thus has a developmental approach to the problems being addressed (Patton 2008:344). Auriacombe concludes by stating that research needs to fill the gap between theory and practice. “Action research provides this opportunity for practitioners and researchers to work closely together to build a cumulative body of knowledge for social change.”

Euro-American understandings and narratives of development produced the current global world order, where African-centred solutions to poverty and underdevelopment on the continent are ignored or inferiorised. In *David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage and its implication for development in sub-Saharan Africa: A decolonial view*, Damian Ukwandu conducts an interrogation of David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage to help shed light on the above dichotomy.

In providing a decolonial critique of David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, this article endeavours to highlight a variety of limitations inherent to the theories of development, which are not centred in the African context. Using the theory of the coloniality of knowledge in particular, the author aims to illustrate how the notion of increasing returns helped in the economic transformation of Spain and how sub-Saharan Africa could also benefit from this approach.
According to the author, the view helps to generate development knowledge and paradigms that are cognisant of the needs and aspirations of the continent, so that a solution can be found to the myriad of problems, such as poverty and unemployment. “There are alternative narratives on theories of development, as evidenced by the remarkable transformation of South-East Asian countries,” he notes. And, as such, the author argues that the continent will only be fully liberated after African-centred policies have been introduced.

In *Government interventionism and sustainable development: The case of South Africa*, Gerrit van der Waldt sets out to outline governments’ interventions in sustainable development by focusing on the South African Government, which has set itself the target to be restructured into a developmental state.

“This government sets itself the target to become a developmental state according to the strategic goals of its National Development Plan,” according to the author. This context is explored by focusing on the specific social, economic and environmental interventions the South African Government has effected to facilitate sustainable development.

Government interventions in sustainable development within the context of a developmental state, have recently gained particular significance among proponents of the New Public Administration. This context is explored by focusing on specific interventions of the South African Government to facilitate sustainable development within its society. “The basic assumption that serves as theoretical foundation for this article is that Government is the key actor in society to regulate, facilitate sustainable development and act as catalyst for such initiatives,” according to Van der Waldt.

In conclusion, Van der Waldt argues that capacity and competency of Government to implement these responses and frameworks effectively are, however, not always on par with international good governance practices. “Improved institutional capacity and effective political leadership can be singled out to support initiatives by government departments. Such initiatives will enable the departments to design and execute programmes that can further sustainable development,” he suggests. The author stresses the need for a totally new governance paradigm, a new way to think and act in balancing the so-called “pillars” of sustainable development.

The need for balanced and integrated development outcomes across the globe is generally accepted as a prerequisite for sustainable human progress. Yet, the ‘sustainability’ of developmental programmes is one of the most elusive goals of any government services delivery system. In *Measuring progress towards sustainable development in Africa*, Fanie Cloete argues that ‘sustainable development’ is an increasingly important umbrella concept to integrate various desired developmental outcomes of governmental interactions within its society.

The article attempts to provide an operational meaning to the term ‘sustainability’. The author distinguishes between various dimensions of sustainability and suggests a concrete measuring instrument to determine progress towards achieving these different dimensions of sustainable development outcomes in Africa. According to Cloete, sustainable development in Africa is a much more elusive target than in many other regions of the world. “This situation, has, however started to change for the better over the last decade, and indications of slow but steady improvements in developmental levels in many African countries are beginning to emerge,” notes the author.
In South Africa, a comprehensive system of monitoring and evaluation of governmental programmes was institutionalised since 2005 and have slowly started to take root in a top-down way, driven and coordinated by the Presidency. Cloete notes that this top-down model has now been emulated in a number of other African countries and seems to be the most effective strategy to fast-track the implementation of a more rigorous evaluation of the results of public sector interventions in those societies. Furthermore, a comprehensive draft set of sustainability indicators has further been developed in South Africa to measure the South African National Framework for Sustainable Development, but has so far not yet been implemented. “A new initiative to do that, is currently under way,” notes Cloete. The author concludes by suggesting that this exercise has the potential to establish a generic framework of sustainability indicators that would also be applicable with some customisation in other national contexts.

Benon Basheka and Albert Byamugisha in The state of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) as a discipline in Africa: From infancy to adulthood? pose four interrelated questions: How has the M&E field evolved in Africa and what local and global forces have been behind this evolution? Is M&E a discipline of study? What precisely is the state of the M&E discipline in African universities? What is the future of M&E in Africa? “Answers to these questions will provide useful insights into the muddy waters of the new discipline which has persistently been claimed by several other disciplines within public discourses,” note the authors.

Basheka and Byamugisha state that “since the early 1990s, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) has seen a steep climb within Africa—in terms of practice, profession and academic study. As a field of practice, specialised departments housing the practitioners now exist and the demand for evaluation of policies, projects, programmes and interventions remains on the increase. Legal and institutional frameworks for the practices of M&E are still weak”. They also note that as a profession, over 30 national evaluation associations under the umbrella body – the African Evaluation Association (AFREA) are in existence. As an academic field of study several universities now offer programmes in M&E; notwithstanding the focus and locus dilemma regarding the discipline. For the authors, scholarship regarding the state of the field is thus of utmost importance to coherently describe the ‘ups and downs’ of the new field which has become a ‘grown up child’ having jumped the infancy stage.

Shikha Vyas-Doorgapersad and Abel Kinoti state in their article Gender-based public procurement practices in Kenya and South Africa, that public procurement is a sector that allows governments to realise economic benefits through its financial-driven programmes. Their concern is whether this sector accommodates men and women equitably in terms of resource allocation and economic well-being. According to the authors, the literature indicates that women are not benefited on a large scale due to practical challenges that include lack of access to information regarding public procurement practices; knowledge regarding tendering processes; ownership; and financial access, to state a few. At the onset of the Millennium Development Goals (now part of the post-2015 Global Development Agenda), a few vital concerns still require attention, viz. what is the status of gender inclusiveness in public procurement practices? How can the public procurement practices be utilised in promoting women empowerment? The authors try to interrogate these concerns in a comparative approach aiming to assess the level or degree of gender-based equality and responsiveness in public procurement policies in Kenya and South Africa.
According to Joseph Maniragena and Harry Ballard in their article *An evaluation of service effectiveness of selected refugee service providers in urban and surrounding areas of the Cape Town Metropolitan Area*, thousands of refugees fleeing from surrounding war-torn and destitute African countries come to South Africa hoping to live in safety. Refugee service providers play a major role in providing services to help refugees to rebuild their lives and integrate into South African society.

They investigated issues facing refugees in South Africa, particularly in Cape Town, and how service providers assist them in overcoming the hardships of being unprepared in a foreign country. Their article followed a mixed methods approach, implementing both qualitative and quantitative research methods to explore services provided by three refugee service providers, namely the Agency for Refugee Education, Skills Training and Advocacy (ARESTA); Cape Town Refugee Centre (CTRC); and the Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town (SCCT).

Quantitative data was collected by administering a survey questionnaire to 120 refugees, all clients of the selected service providers, to obtain their perceptions about the services they receive. Semi-structured interviews with senior staff of two of the service providers provided insight into the services offered and challenges they face in assisting their clients. The study revealed that the majority of clients (75%) received assistance, and only 6.67% reporting not having received the requested assistance. However, some who had received services indicated too few services were on offer for them to choose from.

Reasons some refugees do not get services include lack of proper documentation and problems related to the non-availability of the services required by refugees. This is largely due to insufficient funding to provide needed services, and results in refugee service providers either serving only a few people or providing insufficient aid. Their article highlights good practices, suggests improvements and concludes with recommendations.

In *Shifts in the Zimbabwean Land Reform discourse from 1980 to the present*, Alouis Chilunjika and Dominique Uwizeyimana trace the developmental path of the Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe since its independence from colonialism in 1980.

In tracking the policy shifts in the Land Reform Programme, their article uses American scientist, Thomas Kuhn’s scientific knowledge development paradigm (1962), as introduced in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962). Kuhn narrated the transitions that normally take place in the scientific discipline and he coined such fundamental changes in approaches or underlying assumptions “paradigmatic shifts”. The concept of policy paradigms reflects a set of policy-related assumptions, concepts, values and practices. According to the authors, these paradigms provide all the inflectional forms of models or generally accepted dominant disciplinary perspective at a given time. In this article, the concept of policy paradigms is used to unravel the distinct policy declensions and conjugations that were experienced in the Zimbabwean Land Reform discourse since its independence in 1980.

In tracing the Zimbabwean land reform policy trajectory, four distinct phases or paradigms are identified. The first paradigm (the Lancaster House phase from 1980 to 1990) was characterised by the willing-buyer willing-seller policy. Hereafter, the government shifted to the compulsory land acquisition with fair compensation paradigm, which exhibited dominance in the land policy domain from 1990 to 2000.

The third paradigm, from 2000 to 2002, marked a radical and boisterous shift to compulsory land acquisition with no compensation whatsoever. This saw vast tracts of land
being repossessed by the Zimbabweans. Conversely, the authors note that the current land reform paradigm encourages partnerships and contractual farming between the black land owners and the formerly evicted white commercial farmers. “However, the absence of a robust major legislative framework makes it difficult to decode some policy outlines and forms of this current dispensation,” they note.

The authors conclude by stating that the land issue will remain an electoral issue until it is methodically and meticulously dealt with and resolved by both the ruling party and the opposition parties. “The missing link in these purported arrangements is the absence of political buy-in and support by the government, which by and large could manifest itself in the form of a robust legislative framework to substantiate and uphold these agricultural partnerships and contractual arrangements in the Zimbabwean agricultural sector”.

According to Kwame Asamoah, in recent years, the issue of poverty reduction in Ghana has become a central theme in major policy discourse. Despite the formulation and implementation of several policies to address poverty issues, poverty continues to persist and the living conditions of Ghanaians continue to deteriorate. Although capacity development is critical to poverty reduction, policy actors tend to overlook this important factor in addressing poverty in Ghana, notes the author. Using a qualitative research approach, Asamoah’s article, Rhetoric or reality? The role of capacity development in poverty reduction in Ghana, analyses the factors that militate against capacity development efforts towards poverty reduction, using Ghana as a case study. The data was analysed using content analysis. Asamoah found that poor leadership, lack of ownership of poverty reduction programmes, inadequate data, political corruption and inappropriate training, militate against capacity development efforts. The author recommends pragmatic measures to address these capacity development weaknesses.

Numerous police establishments around the globe, including the South African Police Service (SAPS), have augmented the quantity of female police officials in their staffing complement with the resolution of counteracting various of the police culture that accentuate their cynicism of and isolation from the public.

In Darker shades of blue: A ten year gender comparison of police culture attitudes in the South African Police Service, Jean Steyn asks whether the introduction of more women police officials in the SAPS [by the organisation] assisted in counteracting the above police culture traits.

More specifically, the study asks, “Are there signs demonstrating attitudes of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism amongst a random and representative sample of specifically categorised SAPS police officials?” If so, “Are these markers gender neutral as well as change in relation to Van Maanen’s (1975) and Manning’s (1989) stages of police culture socialisation: [1] choice- at the start of basic police training (January 2005); [2] admittance- at the end of ‘college’ training (June 2005); [3] encounter- at the end of ‘field’ training (December 2005), and [4] metamorphosis- nine years after concluding basic police training (June 2014)”?

Specifically, the study reflects on possible differences in the presence of, and/or changes in, these attitudes between male and female police officials. The author establishes that South African Police Service (SAPS) cadets that commenced their basic training at the six basic training institutes in South Africa (Pretoria, Chatsworth, Oudtshoorn, Graaff-Reinett, Phillipi and Bhisho) in January 2005, entered the organisation with predispositions in furtherance of
police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism. “The period of ‘college/academy training’ (January 2005 – June 2006) did not significantly counteract these tendencies, neither did the subsequent ‘field training’ (July 2005 – December 2005). Nine years on, and these attitudes intensified to an overall average of 69.85%,” according to the author.

The study further suggests that for the duration of the project (10 years), female trainees and their ensuing conversion to fully-fledged police officials, had mostly stronger values exhibiting police culture solidarity, police culture isolation and police culture cynicism, compared to their male counterparts. “These findings provide some credence for a ‘nurtured nature’ understanding to the requisition, preservation and firming of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism postures of police officials,” states the author. In conclusion, the author argues that the police culture of solidarity, isolation and cynicism is viewed as conscious/normal coping strategies utilised by both male and female police officials to minimise physical and psychological harm. “These coping police culture themes should be embraced rather than defied”.

Subsequent to its independence in 1966, the Botswana Public Service has contended with service delivery challenges and issues. Similarly to other developing and underdeveloped nations, the Botswana Government has reviewed and revised its service delivery processes and initiatives towards improving productivity throughout the public service sector. In Strategies for evaluating training and development initiatives in the public service, Theophilus Tebetso Tshukudu and Danielle Nel contend that numerous strategies and initiatives to mitigate and ameliorate poor service delivery had been initiated and implemented in the preceding five decades.

One of these initiatives comprised a performance management system (PMS). However, the execution and application of this initiative presented myriad difficulties and challenges, which are highlighted in this article. The authors delineate and discuss critical factors that could be utilised to improve performance management as a tool for developing and upgrading public service delivery in the Botswana Public Service sector. These crucial performance enhancement elements include, inter alia, the creation of a culture that enhances high performance; developing performance leadership; and creating a learning organisation.

Taking these elements into account, this article investigates performance management within the Botswana Public Service, by providing a theoretical and conceptual review of strategies for evaluating training and development in the public service. A model, based on a doctoral research project is proposed as a mechanism to evaluate training and development in the public service.

The authors conclude by stating that leaders should influence subordinates to accept a performance culture and assist them in adopting the correct behaviour to achieve goals. “The alignment of organisational strategic goals with those of departments, teams and individuals is essential for creating a high performing organisation”.

There has been increasing recognition that gender equality, in addition to being a human right is also critical for sustainable development progress. Ensuring women’s and men’s equal participation in governance processes, and their equal benefits from public services, are preconditions for the achievement of inclusive and effective democratic governance.

In Gender dynamics in Public Policy Management in Uganda and South Africa: A comparative perspective of gender mainstreaming in policy-making for the water sector,
Benon Basheka and Shikha Vyas-Doorgapersad argue that gender is a socio-economic variable that needs a special place in the policy management process within African democracies. They investigate the question of how gender dynamics is used to shape public policy management from a comparative perspective in terms of gender mainstreaming in public policy-making of the water sector policies in Uganda and South Africa. They address certain policy and management implications, aiming at bringing to the fore issues of gender as specifically applied to the subject of public policy.

The authors state the fact that women face different problems than men during the formulation of policies and are affected differently by various policies during implementation due to historically known disparities among the two social groups (men and women), and advocate a renewed approach in the inclusion of gender in matters of public policy-making in all sectors from the initiation of policies, through formulation, implementation, evaluation and finally the review.

The focus of their contribution is to measure gender-based mainstreaming in water policies in Uganda and South Africa (countries of the SADC region) by way of a desktop analysis of the countries’ gender policies. The authors have examined the water sector policy in the two countries and based on the analysis, provided a classification of gender mainstreaming in policy-making processes (Gm-PMP). This Gm-PMP classification suggests that gender must be considered at all levels of the policy process, should have its foundations in the departments/sections of the organisations, and also transcend all the levels of the organisational hierarchy.

The *African Journal of Public Affairs* (AJPA) promotes scholarship in Public Administration and Public Management. It affords academics and students of the Discipline an opportunity to publish their research and to test their results by affording readers of the Journal an opportunity to debate the issues raised in their contributions. AJPA creates an international forum for debates on various issues related to the public sector and to the Discipline.

Vol. 8 No 3 is dedicated to the research undertaken under the guidance of the Department of Public Management and Governance, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. The collection of 12 articles make a valuable contribution to the literature on aspects of public administration in Sub-Saharan Africa including South Africa, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana and Uganda.

The AJPA encourages scholars and practitioners to pursue endeavours of this collaborative venture within the Discipline of Public Administration and Management in Africa in order to address current issues facing Public Administration in Africa.

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Closing the gap between theory and practice with action research

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ABSTRACT

There is a strong belief that both researchers and practitioners have an important role to play in changing and bettering human conditions. However, behind the scenes there are heated debates about how research findings can be turned into practical meaningful information that could be applied in everyday practice. The challenge for researchers is to organise their endeavours in such a way that they produce benefits to practitioners. Even more important is for practitioners and researchers to develop a cumulative body of knowledge for change.

Research methods and techniques have become increasingly less useful for solving practical problems. One of the main reasons for this is the huge gap between theory and research. In short research and thus theory, lacks relevance and usefulness when faced with problems in the real world (practice). As is clear from the above the main aims of action research are not only to contribute to the development of theory or to address the practical problems experienced by people, but to develop the self-help competencies of people facing problems.

Action research therefore has the potential to help close the gap between theory and practice by bringing both the researcher and the practitioner as equals into the research process. The question is why action research has thus far not had any remarkable success in this regard.

“Despite this convergence of focus between development research and practice, a wide gap still exists: knowledge transfer between the two is limited, collaboration is limited and there is still a dearth of relevant knowledge.... Many efforts to bridge this gap have been initiated; almost as many have failed” (Ferguson 2005:1).

INTRODUCTION

The gap between science and practice has been a longstanding issue in social research. The most serious issue for researchers is that practitioners seem to pay little attention to research
findings. Practitioners on the other hand feel that research findings aren’t always applicable to real-world situations. The question remains how does one turn research findings into practical meaningful information that could be applied in everyday practice?

Experienced scholars are of the opinion that the answer to this question lies in closer cooperation between researchers and practitioners. This means that practitioners should be more directly involved in the research process. “The core premise of monitoring and evaluation is that services can be continually improved through informed decision making and social learning, leading to social and economic progress” (International Development Evaluation Association Internet Source Undated). It is clear that to be more effective in addressing global problems such as poverty, disease etc., we need to change our approach to programme development. To meet the complexities of our modern world new evaluation paradigms and innovative methods and techniques need to be developed.

In view of this Patton (2008:111–113) added the following goals of programme evaluation: accountability focusing on the failure to match targets and performance, monitoring for ongoing management purposes and programme development. It is from the latter of these goals that action research methodology is drawn. “Action research is understood to be an approach to research which aims at both taking action and research in a collaborative, emergent inquiry process that is simultaneously concerned with bringing about change in organisations, in developing self-help competencies in organisational members and in developing co-generated actionable knowledge” (Shani Pasmore in Holian and Coghlan 2013:399). Rovio, Arvinen-Barrow, Weigand, Eskola andLintunen (2012:584) add that action research “has been used in organisational settings to gain an understanding of task effectiveness, different variables and their interactions affecting task effectiveness, self-awareness of those involved in the tasks, as well as for exploring the effectiveness of new methods of task functioning”.

According to Carr (2006:421) initially, action research “was defined as a method that enabled theories produced by the social sciences to be applied in practice and tested on the basis of their practical effectiveness”. LeCompte and Schensul (1999 in Travers Gustafson 2013:53) see action research as “ethnographic research conducted in partnership with members of the community…with the specific purpose of bringing about structural or cultural change”.

The term action research in scientific literature is generally widely defined as noted above and freely used, yet it is not well conceptualised. This article aims to conceptualise this phenomenon and explores the possibilities that action research hold to close the theory-practice divide.

### THE ORIGINS OF ACTION RESEARCH

The origins of action research go back more than five decades. Lewin (1946 in Hart and Bond 1995:13) described action research “as a way of generating knowledge about a social system while, at the same time, attempting to change it” (Lewin in Hart and Bond 1995:13). He constructed the basis for a theory of action research in the mid-1940s and is generally seen as the father of this evaluation research approach (Lewin in Hart and Bond 1995:13). His research pointed out the importance of participation and democratic decision-making
Lewin (in Hart and Bond 1995:13) described action research as a process composed of cycles where the problem was first analysed; based on this analysis appropriate intervention steps were planned, implemented and evaluated. This notion of participation change, improvement and more recently empowerment forms the core of action research (Waterman, Tillen, Dickson and De Koning 2001:11). Despite the fact that Lewin is regarded as the father of action research, Collier was the first person using the term, action research, in an academic publication (Ahmed 2009:22).

Churchman (1979) built on the notion of cycles by introducing the concept of “system” and further developing the idea of reflexivity. Following Hegel’s work of 1870 he pointed out the importance of rigorous critical self-reflection in the evaluation process. Churchman (1979) insisted that the researcher must follow an iterative learning and feedback process (Midgley 2006:21). Other authors who made important contributions to the development of action research were Susman and Evered (1978:5) pointing out the dialectic process of knowledge generation whereby a circular process is followed by firstly gaining an understanding of the whole then its parts (Susman and Evered 1978:5). According to Susman and Evered (1978:5) some researchers do not see Lewin as the only forefather of action research since the perspectives of Ortega also stressed the importance of shared goals between the researcher and the researched. Since its original development action research was used and expanded by various research fields e.g. feminist, education, pedagogical and nursing (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008:195).

**CONCEPTUALISING ACTION RESEARCH**

The term “action research” is widely and freely used in scientific literature yet it is not well defined (Meyer 2000:8). Generally it is seen as part of evaluation research which involves both research and action. Carr (2006:425) argues that action research is “nothing other than a modern manifestation of the pre-modern tradition of practical philosophy through which our understanding of the study of practice was originally articulated and expressed”. It is also not easy to define the concept ‘action research’. As Waterman, Tillen, Dickson and De Koning (2001:11) state: “an embracing definition of action research remains elusive and existing definitions tend to focus on the description of characteristics” (Waterman, Tillen, Dickson and De Koning 2001:11). Most definitions in the literature mention the following features of action research: problem-focused, context-specific, democratic, participative, practical, evaluative action and change orientated; dynamic, cyclic, critical and reflexive.

It’s democratic/participative nature emphasises the different levels of equality between researcher and research participant(s) (Waterman, Tillen, Dickson and De Koning 2001; 11–12; Reason 1994; Wadsworth 2001; Beresford 1992 and Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett 1994). Therefore as Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008:196) emphasises the core driving force of action research is active participation of both the researcher and the participants as well as improvement of the social situation under study.
Action research bridges the theory-practice divide (Elliot 1991:69; Patton 1990:149; and Carr and Kemmis 1986:28). Fuller and Petch (1995) relate to this feature of action research by referring to the practitioner researcher. According to Johnston (2005:60), the action taken should bring about improvement in the situation and the research done should determine if it does. Action research is ideally suited to bridge the gap between basic and applied research or differently stated between theory, practice and research (Avison, Lau, Myers, and Nielsen 1999:94).

“For action researchers, theory informs practice, practice refines theory, in a continuous transformation. In any setting, people’s actions are based on implicitly held assumptions, theories and hypotheses, and with every observed result, theoretical knowledge is enhanced. The two are intertwined aspects of a single change process. It is up to the researchers to make explicit the theoretical justifications for the actions, and to question the bases of those justifications. The ensuing practical applications that follow are subjected to further analysis, in a transformative cycle that continuously alternates emphasis between theory and practice” (O’Brien 2001 Internet Source).

There are various perceptions regarding the role of action research as a vehicle for change. On one side of the continuum action research is regarded as a relatively powerful medium for change (Baum 1998:186; Parry, Gnich and Platt 2001:217). Parry, Gnich and Platt (2001:217) point out the inability of positivist research approaches to bring about change in the social problems confronting us and firmly believe that action research can bring about more effective change. On the other side of the continuum there are those that have a more sceptical view of the potential of action research to bring about significant change in policy and practice (Hirschon Weiss and Wittrock 1991; Whitelaw and Williams 1994; Beresford 1992; De Jong 2000:55; Hart and Bond 2000:101; McKeeganey 2000:14 and Fazey 2000:17).

One definition that incorporates all the above characteristics, except empowerment, is that described by Reason and Bradbury (2001:1) as: “…a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowledge in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes . . . It seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people, and more generally the flourishing of individual persons and their communities”. To provide a more comprehensive understanding of action research this definition should be extended to include the empowerment features of action research” (Waterman,Tillen, Dickson and De Koning 2001:11).

The empowerment process is further alluded to by Waterman,Tillen, Dickson and De Koning (2001) who state that action research is also “…educative and empowering involving a dynamic approach in which problem identification, planning, action and evaluation are interlinked. Knowledge may be advanced through reflection and research. Theory may be generated and refined, and its general application explored through the cycles of the action research process” (Waterman,Tillen, Dickson and De Koning 2001:11).

Grant (2007:272) adds the following dimension to our understanding of action research by stressing that the interaction between researcher and participants involves multiple levels of understanding. On the one hand the researcher(s) reflect on and interact with the developing process and their own development. On the other hand their action research also has a social dimension—the research takes place in real-world situations, and aims to solve real problems.
PRINCIPLES OF ACTION RESEARCH

From the above description of action research specific principles can be identified. Newton and Burgess (2008:26) suggest that the principles of action research should be simplified to measure only three criteria namely: Whether the study is knowledge generating; whether it is practical (improvement of practice); and whether it is emancipatory knowledge.

A simplified version of principles on which action research rests is that of Waterman, Tillen, Dickson and De Koning (2001:12) who emphasise that action research must always be critiqued on two inextricably linked features, namely a cyclic process and participation ranging from cooperation to collective action.

According to Myers (2000:8) the following principles are incorporated in most definitions of action research:

- Participation and collaboration.
- Democracy.
- Contribution to both social science and practice.

Waterman, Tillen, Dickson, and De Koning (2001:11) elaborate on these principles by adding the following:

- Action research has a learning base.
- It is problem focused.
- Change through action and improvement is an integral part of this approach.
- It follows a cyclic process.

These principles focus on Canonical Action Research (CAR) (Davison, Martinsons and Kock 2004). Iivari and Venable (2009:4) identified similar principles to those above though they added the principle of reflection. Although difficult to assess it should be noted that “critical reflection” or reflexivity is today seen as the core of the cyclical action research process (Dick 1998 in Auriacombe 2013:72). Reflexivity could therefore be regarded as a form of ongoing analysis where the researcher moves beyond the descriptive level of knowledge by making meaning of the assumptions underlying the analysis. The researcher therefore uses a critical reflexive process to develop new knowledge and direction to act upon. Therefore knowledge is informed by practice, and practice is informed by knowledge, in an ongoing cyclical process (O’Brien 2001 Internet Source). As Dick (1998 in Auriacombe 2013:73) states: “…the critical reflection is as important as the action” and action research “…pursues the dual outcomes of action (or in other words, change) and research (in other words, understanding)”.

The above principles of learning through reflection and change through action and thus, the improvement of the situation, aim to ensure that both researcher and the client examine what they have learned in an explicit, systematic and critical manner. This principle could be regarded as the core of the action research process and provides us with a more comprehensive understanding of the concept ‘action research’.

Rapoport (1970) added the principle of the researcher-client agreement and cooperation and Susman and Evered (1978) added the principle of the cyclical process and the principle of theory and a theoretical framework. The principle of theory and a theoretical framework means that all action research starts with some theory which is further developed in the research process.
When it comes to the measurement of the quality of action research studies, the above principles tend to complicate our judgement of whether these criteria were met or not. Anderson and Herr (1999:16) propose that validity depends on the type of action research namely outcome, process, democratic, catalytic, and dialogic validities:

- **Outcome validity** refers to the extent to which the outcomes of the research match the intended purposes of the research.
- **Process validity** is concerned with effectiveness of the research approach in addressing the research problem.
- **Democratic validity** is concerned with “the extent to which research is done in collaboration with stakeholders.
- **Catalytic validity** refers to the ability of the research process to deepen the understanding of the participants, and empower them to take action.
- **Dialogic validity** means that researchers participate in critical and reflective dialogue with practitioners and stakeholders.

### TYPOLOGIES OF ACTION RESEARCH

Several typologies have been devised in an effort to formally classify the various theoretical approaches to action research found in the literature. The above principles of action research form an inherent part of these typologies, for example level of participation, research methods and topic.

According to Waterman, Tillen, Dickson and De Koning (2001:11) one of the most well-known typologies based on modes of participation is that of Cornwall (1996). Table 1 presents the six different types of participation listed by Cornwall (1996).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 1: Forms of Action Research</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Co-option:</strong> where token representatives are chosen but have no real input or power in the research process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compliance:</strong> where outsiders decide the research agenda and direct the process, with tasks assigned to participants with incentives by the researchers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consultation:</strong> where local opinions are asked for but outside researchers conduct the work and decide on a course of action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cooperation:</strong> where local people/stakeholders work together.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Co-learning:</strong> where local people/stakeholders and outsiders share their knowledge, to create new understanding and work together to form action plans, with outsider facilitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective action:</strong> where local people set their own agenda and mobilise to carry it out in the absence of outside initiators and facilitators.</td>
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</table>

Source: (Adapted from Cornwall 1996)

Iivari and Venable (2009:4) identify four types of action research that coincides with that of Myers (2000:60–62):

- Action research focusing on change and reflection.
- Action science trying to resolve conflicts.
- Espoused and applied theories.
- Participatory action research emphasising participant collaboration.
- Action learning for programmed instruction and experiential learning.
The above typologies also correspond with that of Kemmis and McTaggart (2005:560–562). They however place more emphasis on the use of the action research approach by different professions such as teachers, in what they call classroom action research aimed at improving classroom performance, and industrial action research, aimed at improving organisational effectiveness. They also add action learning and soft system approaches to the typology of action research and thus increase our understanding of the dynamics of collaborative learning in action research (Kemmis and McTaggart 2005:560–562).

Kemmis and McTaggart (2005:560) identify eight key features. These are:

- “A spiral of self-reflective cycles, in which participants reflect on the problem, plan a change, take action, reflect on the results, reflect, return to further planning and so on;
- A social process, typically undertaken in education and community development settings, in which people explore the relationships between individual and social worlds;
- Participation: people critically explore their own knowledge and interpretations (of themselves and their actions) and how this affects/constrains their sense of identity and agency;
- Practicality and collaboration: Participants examine their own social practices (such as patterns of interaction and social organisation) and seek ways to make these more equitable and satisfying;
- Emancipation: Participatory action research aims to free people from, or at least reduce the restrictions imposed by unjust social structures which limit self-development;
- A critical approach: People challenge limitations imposed on them through social media – such as oppressive language, discourse, ways of working or relating to others;
- Reflexivity: Participatory action research is dialectical – participants examine reality in order to change it; ‘a process of learning by doing’; and
- Transformation of theory and practice: Neither is dominant. Participatory action research aims to develop each in relation to the other”.

According to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008:195) a different way of classifying action research is to do it according to the solutions strived for, e.g. practical, theoretical, policy, technical, participative or empowering. Similar to this Berg (2001:186) suggested that there are three modes of action research namely:

- Technical/scientific.
- Practical/collaborative.
- Emancipating/empowering/critical science.

Each mode has a specific goal. The goal of the scientific mode is to be based on a theoretical framework, test a particular intervention. The practical/collaborative mode seeks to improve practice and service delivery. The emancipating/empowering/critical science mode can assist practitioners in addressing fundamental problems. The modes suggested by Newton and Burgess (2008:21) correspond with those offered above namely:

- A knowledge-generating mode.
- Improvement of practice mode.
- An emancipatory/empowerment mode.
Myers (2000) presents one of the most elaborative typologies of action research. He distinguishes five types of action research namely:

- Positivist action research.
- Interpretative action research.
- Critical/pragmatic or realist action research.
- Participative action.
- Action science.

According to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008:196) action research is a cyclic process that could be divided into distinct stages. Various authors distinguish different stages ranging from the two stages (collaborative analysis and collaborative change) of Baskerville and Myers (2004) to the more elaborate model of Susman and Evered (1978) involving problem identification or analysis, planning, implementation or action taking, evaluation, adaptation and again implementation (Myers 2000:57).

Action research brings about change via a cyclical process generally consisting of four recurring phases: planning, acting, observing and reflecting (Kemmis and McTaggart 2000: 11–14). Susman (1983) distinguishes five phases (Figure 1).

In the first phase a problem is identified and information is collected by the problem or issue to be addressed for a more detailed diagnosis. This is followed by the development and implementation of a plan of action. Then the data is analysed to find potential solutions and based on the analysis, one possible solution or intervention is implemented. Then data is collected and analysed/evaluated, and reflected upon to find out whether the outcomes were successful or not. The problem is re-evaluated and the cyclical process starts again and continues to evolve until the problem is resolved.

According to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008:196) most of the action research models consist of a cyclical four-step process of planning, taking action, evaluating the action, leading to further planning. In this cyclic process action research produces different kinds of knowledge including practical and propositional. Theory may also be generated or refined (Waterman,Tillen, Dickson and De Koning 2001:11) however the most important contribution of action research is the involvement and improvement of real life problems (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008:195).

Every aspect of social research revolves around an individual with his/her life and a life world within a social context (Bentz and Shapiro 1998:4). The difference with the action research approach is that equal weight is given to research, action and evaluation or reflection. As Glesne and Peshkin (1992:11) state: “The role of the researcher in action research is that of facilitator who works collaboratively to involve the stakeholders in every aspect of the research process”.

Finally, initiating action researchers make no attempt to remain objective, but openly acknowledge their bias to the other participants. Therefore action research falls within the pragmatic, realist paradigm of the qualitative research realm (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008:196). This means that as depicted in Table 2 both a quantitative and qualitative research and an abductive reasoning approach (mixed methods or mixed methodology) could be used. However not all scholars will agree to this. This dispute is responsible for the main problems of action research in today’s practical set up.
To gain a better understanding of action research and what theories are prominent in this approach it is necessary to understand it within a specific philosophical framework. It is also important to get clarity on how this philosophical approach impacts on the methodology and methods used in action research. It is therefore important to note that research is done from the life world perspective (ontology) of how the individual researcher believes that research should be done (epistemology).

In the literature (Patton 2008:34; Myers 2000:60) action research has been depicted as deductive—research proceeds from theory to evaluation; inductive—developing theory from evaluation research e.g. grounded theory; or abductive—follow a pragmatic, participatory, user focused approach.

As Hart and Bond (1995:152) state: “… the different approaches to action research are based on the specific philosophical position of the researcher (positivistic, realistic or impressionistic) and thus on his/her ontological and epistemological stance.

- Positivists believe that there is a real world or truth out there that can be discovered scientifically and studied objectively/independently;
- Realistic means that the real world could be discovered by means of a systematic, interactive methodological approach and theory is generated;
- Impressionistic means that there is no real world or truth out there only a narrative truth;
- Ontology is the researcher’s ideas about the existence of and relationship between people, society and the world; and
- Epistemology is the knowledge or evidence of things in the social world. What are the principles and rules by which researchers decide whether and how social phenomena can be known, and how knowledge can be demonstrated.
These theoretical approaches also signify essential characteristics of action research and show how these differ according to the aims of the research and the way knowledge is produced”.

As is clear from the above each of the types of action research is influenced by corresponding philosophical approaches. Explanatory research rests on the positivist tradition. The foundation of interpretive research is based on discovering the meaning of a social phenomenon, while critical research is mainly concerned with change and empowerment (Newton and Burgess 2008:21). “It follows that each action research mode makes somewhat different knowledge claims and therefore relies on somewhat different configurations of validity” (Newton and Burgess 2008:26).

These complex and evolutionary characteristics of action research make it difficult to assess the value and outcome of it from a positivistic point of view. In fact when action research is tested against the criteria of positivist science, such as objectivity, it does not meet scientific standards. Therefore the positivists question action research as an approach that is able to meet scientific criteria. However when measured against an alternative philosophical approach such as interpretivism, critical action research, participative action research and action science, its scientific merit becomes clear (Susman and Evered 1978).

### Table 2: Participatory Action Research versus Traditional Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Participatory action research</th>
<th>Traditional research approaches</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem identification</td>
<td>Done by community or group experiencing the problem</td>
<td>Often done by outside person/external researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisions about how the research will take place</td>
<td>Done by community</td>
<td>Usually done by the researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods of gathering information</td>
<td>Wide variety of methods are used (group meetings, workshops, surveys, use of drama and song, kitchen table meetings, storytelling)</td>
<td>Usually interviews and questionnaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on collective/group response</td>
<td>Focus on individual responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adaptable to each community or situation</td>
<td>Usually very inflexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis and interpretation of data</td>
<td>Emphasis on group problem-solving and interpretation</td>
<td>Analysis done by external researcher often without consultation from the community/group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How results are used</td>
<td>Direct application where possible by community, planned action to push for change in the system</td>
<td>Not usually part of the process; a report is written to document findings with little ownership by people in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings of community group involved</td>
<td>Fun, lots of involvement and sharing, learning, enlightened process, informal</td>
<td>Perpetuates status quo; often makes no difference in the lives of people in the community; they feel exploited; process is stiff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Bernard 2000)
Interpretative action research is where theory emerges from the action research process. Critical action research combining action research with the critical social theory of Habermas (1984), aims at improving practice (education system). Participative action research involves research participants in the research process with the aim of empowering them. Lastly, action science aims to understand the difference between the behaviour of practitioners and their beliefs or world view and resting on the assumption that there is a discrepancy between what people say and what they do (Myers 2000:60–62).

CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

“Action research is about working towards practical outcomes and about creating new forms of understanding, since action without reflection and understanding is blind, just as theory without action is meaningless” (Reason and Bradbury 2001:2). According to Susman (1983:582) the lack of success of action research to bridge the gap between practitioners and researchers is mainly because of “…a crisis of epistemology due to adoption of a positivist model of science”. If a different philosophical approach such as pragmatism is used the hurdles raised by a positivist paradigm could be overcome. Susman (1983:582) also states that these hurdles include the following:

- Positivists believe that methods are value free.
- Research participants should be treated as objects of a study.
- The role of history is not important in the generation of knowledge.
- Knowledge of the inquirer can be excluded from an understanding of how knowledge is generated.

In contrast to this, supporters of action research believe that research should be (Susman and Evered 1978:589):

- Future oriented.
- Collaborative.
- Should bring about system development.
- Generate theory grounded in action.
- Be situational and contextual (Susman and Evered 1978:589).

According to Susman and Evered (1978:589) the above mentioned six characteristics of action research provide a corrective to the deficiencies of positivist science. These characteristics are representative of the methods and objectives of key developers and practitioners in the action research field.

It is clear from these characteristics that there is no short answer to the question “What is action research?” However, action research is generally seen as a democratic process concerned with the development of living knowledge to build theory and help people to address issues and challenges in their everyday lives and is grounded in a participatory world view (Reason and Bradbury 2001:2). In light of this, action research forges the strongest link with the realist, pragmatic paradigm of qualitative research and not with a positivistic one (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008:195). In fact, from a positivistic point of view action research could be heavily criticised. Most of the criticisms centre around the role of the
researcher and the principle of objectivity, the methods used to generate knowledge and validity of the findings. Not only can action research not be done from an objective stance but participants are as involved as the researcher in the process of meaning making and action taking (Waterman, Tillen, Dickson and De Koning 2001:3).

Emancipating from the “action turn” of Reason and Tolbert (in Kincheloe and McLaren 2005:314) the primary aim of action research today is not only to develop theory deductively or to contribute to knowledge in the field inductively but to take an abductive critical viewpoint aiming to provide a direct link between “…intellectual knowledge and moment-to-moment personal and social action, so that inquiry contributes directly to the flourishing of human persons, their communities, and eco systems” (Kincheloe and McLaren 2005:315). Thus the goal of action research is not only to assess, facilitate improvement and generate new knowledge and thus to contribute towards the goals of science, but also to improve accountability, performance and programme development as well as to provide opportunities for empowerment. In view of this action research should be seen as more than a research strategy for knowledge building. It could in fact be seen as an approach to the world that forges a link between practice and theory.

More specifically action research combines theory and practice through an iterative reflexive learning process involving researchers, practitioners and stakeholders. “Continuous learning (leading to people’s increased ability to solve problems) is one of the key features of participatory research. It is therefore crucial that the research design allows for systematic, regular and critical exchange and reflection upon both the research process and the results (learning and outcomes). A central aspect should be the meaningful participation by the different stakeholders in these activities” (Pound, Snapp, McDougall and Braun 2002).

Therefore it has the potential to overcome the division between practice and theory (Waterman, Tillen, Dickson and De Koning 2001:2). Even more so since action research involves mutual sense making and co-learning it contributes to both theory and practice and has the ability to lead to collective action and develop knowledge for practical use (Waterman, Tillen, Dickson and De Koning 2001:12). Each level of iteration in the action research process, and more specifically critical reflection on knowledge production and how this new knowledge relates to older knowledge and theory adds to the development of theory, and practice (Avison, Lau, Myers, and Nielsen 1999:95). As is clear from Figure 2, action research has the ability to, through a process of reflection and knowledge building, develop theory and bring practical meaningful information that could lead to accountable solutions for practitioners struggling with everyday social problems (Waterman, Tillen, Dickson and De Koning 2001:13).

In the design and initial stages of institutional change, conceptual and competence development and reflective learning need to be woven together in an iterative way. The change process should generate (as well as draw on examples of) relevant first-hand experience so that those involved can internalise the need for change. The inclusion of ‘real life’ experiences is critical. Developing capacity in participatory research approaches, including mainstreaming gender concerns, goes faster when research teams are interacting and testing methods in the field. This ‘real life’ experience reinforces and internalises the concepts and associated practices. Furthermore, by working together as a team, members can draw upon each other’s perceptions and skills. Systematic reviews of the work, led by a
facilitator in a supportive, innovative atmosphere, can help to build the competencies in an iterative way (Pound, Snapp, McDougall and Braun 2002).

**IN CONCLUSION**

In contrast to the traditional goal of evaluation namely to improve an intervention model, developmental evaluation or action research focuses on changing and adapting the intervention and thus has a developmental approach to the problems being addressed (Patton 2008:344). It is clear that to be more effective in addressing global problems such as poverty, disease etc., we need to cross the gap between theory and practice. Action research provides this opportunity for practitioners and researchers to work closely together to build a cumulative body of knowledge for social change.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


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David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage and its implication for development in Sub-Saharan Africa

A decolonial view

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ABSTRACT

The Euro-American predominance of understandings and narratives of development has produced the current global world order, where African-centered solutions and alternatives to the problems of poverty and underdevelopment on the continent are ignored or inferiorised. Drawing awareness from a decolonial view and deploying the concept of the decoloniality of power and knowledge itself, this article seeks to conduct a thorough interrogation of David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. According to Auriacombe (in Schurink and Auriacombe 2010:435 and Auriacombe 2012:98) “due to the different ontological and epistemological beliefs of researchers belonging to different paradigms, the criteria for trustworthy, credible research can never meet everyone’s approval”, therefore, given this reality, the aim of the article is to show that another worldview exists which could help Africa out of its development quagmire. Using the theory of the coloniality of knowledge in particular, this article illustrates how the notion of increasing returns helped in the economic transformation of Spain. It will also show how countries in sub-Saharan Africa can learn from the Spanish example about the importance of adding value to its natural resources. This article argues that the full liberation and development of the continent will only come to fruition with the implementation of African-centered policies, such as increasing returns and adding value to the natural resources which we export to other parts of the world. It is through this policy that jobs can be created and poverty alleviated on the continent, which will kick-start Africa’s journey towards overall development.

INTRODUCTION

Africa is rich in natural and human resources, and is in fact one of the most naturally endowed
continents in the world. Despite this, however, it is currently one of the poorest continents in the world (Ayittey 2005:46). Africa has rich soils that are suitable for agricultural cultivation, yet millions of people on the continent go hungry (Abubakar 1989:28). It has abundant water resources for irrigation, transportation and hydroelectric power generation, but still uses less energy than almost any of the major cities in the developed world (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012:20).

Carmody (2011:2) aptly describes the African development quagmire as a ‘paradox of plenty’, underscoring the fact that although Africa is a very resource-rich continent, the majority of its people continue to live in abject poverty and economic deprivation. The resources available on the continent are staggering: it contains 42% of the world’s bauxite, 38% of its uranium, 42% of its gold, 88% of its diamonds and 10% of its proven oil reserves (Bush 2007:32). South Africa alone has 88% of the world’s platinum, while Africa also has 52% of the world’s manganese, 54% of its cobalt and 82% of its chromium stocks (Gordon and Wolpe 1998:55). Despite all these natural resources, why does more than half the population of sub-Saharan Africa live on less than US $1.25 a day? (World Bank 2010:37).

This article attempts to highlight the fact that the theory of comparative advantage, which was developed by David Ricardo and which is indeed one of the intellectual building blocks of the current era of international trade and globalisation, is incapable of extricating the continent from poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment. Despite the fact that between 2000 and 2010, six of the fastest growing economies in the world were the African countries of Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Chad and Rwanda (The Economist 2011), this rapid economic growth has not benefitted ordinary Africans. This article interrogates the intellectual roots of David Ricardo’s theory and its relevance or lack thereof for alleviating poverty and reducing unemployment and underdevelopment on the continent. There is evidence in the literature, that in spite of the high growth rates recorded on the continent, poverty still persists, and in spite of its wealth of natural resources, sub-Saharan Africa has only managed to increase its per capita income from $429 to $639, which is a gain of $210, in over 60 years of independence (Mills and Herbst 2012:3). Deploying the notion of decoloniality of knowledge, this article will show that Africa may not escape this economic limbo if it continues to believe in the efficacy of theories and epistemologies which are wholly Western, Eurocentric and not rooted in the socio-economic realities of the continent. There are alternative narratives on theories of development, as evidenced by the remarkable transformation of South-East Asian countries.

**THE THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE**

David Ricardo was not the first economist to use the term ‘comparative advantage’, as there are references to the term as far back as the early part of the 19th century (Jones 1961:163; Irwin 1996:21). Robert Torrens made allusions to the concept of comparative advantage in his article entitled *Essay on the External Corn Trade* (Jones 1961:163). It was after this article that David Ricardo popularised the idea in his 1817 book entitled *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*. The idea appeared again in James Mill’s *Elements of Political Economy* in 1822 (Machlup 1977:15; Roberts 2006:20). It came to dominate international economic thinking and development policies when John Stuart Mills published

The benefit of free trade or international trade between countries in the modern world was first highlighted in the economics and development literature by one of the classical economists, Adam Smith, in his book entitled *The Wealth of Nations* (2003:20). Adam Smith referred to it as the concept of absolute advantages in production. This is how he explained it: “If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage” (Smith 2003:20).

The ideological foundations of the theory of international trade, which gave birth to the idea of comparative advantage, were very prominent in the writings of Adam Smith (Smith, 2003), who argued that all unutilised resources in a country must be allocated to the production of surplus foods for export, and that the surplus must be ‘vented abroad’ in order to generate much-needed income to enhance the development of local economies. Smith (2003:20) explained that: “When the produce of any particular branch of industry exceeds what the demand of the country requires, the surplus must be sent abroad, and exchanged for something for which there is a demand at home. Without such exportation, a part of the productive labour of the country must cease, and the value of its annual produce diminishes” (Smith 2003:20).

Following in the footsteps of Adam Smith and Robert Torrens, David Ricardo formulated his theory of comparative advantage (Jones 1961:163). David Ricardo (cited in Machlup 1977:15; Roberts 2006:20) used the examples of Portugal specialising in wine and England specialising in cloth to show the necessity for countries to focus on those goods in which they have comparative advantage over other countries. In the same vein, the country’s imports will be scarce goods. It is important to understand that Ricardo’s theory (cited in Boudreaux 2004:375; Jones 1961:163; Buchanan and Yoon 2002:400) of comparative advantage was premised on the following assumptions:

- There are two countries and two commodities.
- There will be perfect competition (both in commodities and factor markets).
- The cost of production is measured in terms of labour, and the value of a commodity is measured in terms of labour hours/days required to produce it.
- Labour is the only factor of production, and other factors, such as natural resources, are ignored.
- The cost of labour in both developed and developing countries is similar.
- Labour is perfectly mobile within a country, but perfectly immobile between countries.
- International trade between countries is not encumbered by any kind of barrier or tariffs.
- Production is subject to constant returns to scale.
- There is no possibility of technological changes altering the factors of production.
- A barter economy is the sole means of trade between countries.
- Full employment exists in both countries, ignoring the realities of life in many developing countries of the world, especially in Africa, which experience poverty, unemployment and underemployment.
Transport is not viewed as a factor of production (cited in Irwin 1996:21; Buchanan and Young 2002:400; Boudreaux 2004:375; Machlup 1977:15; Roberts 2006:20).

On the basis of some of these assumptions, David Ricardo (cited in Irwin 1996:21) developed his theory of comparative advantage, which he believed was inherent to Portugal’s production of wine and England’s manufacturing of cloth. This is how he explained it: “To produce the wine in Portugal might require only the labour of 80 men for one year, and to produce the cloth in the same might require the labour of 90 men for the same time. It would therefore be advantageous for her to export wine in exchange for cloth. This exchange might even take place notwithstanding that the commodity imported by Portugal could be produced there with less labour than in England. Though she could make cloth with the labour of 90 men, she would import it from a country where it required the labour of 100 men to produce it, because it would be advantageous to her rather to employ her capital in the production of wine, for which she would obtain more cloth from England, than she could produce by diverting a portion of her capital from the cultivation of vines to the manufacture of cloth” (cited in Irwin 1996:21).

DECOLONIALITY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Some scholars both in the developed and developing countries of the world question the relevance of the idea of the decoloniality perspective in the 21st century, when it is more than 50 years since most countries in sub-Saharan Africa achieved political independence from their European colonial masters (Ndlovu-Getsheni 2012:73). The valid truth is that the theory of decoloniality is still very relevant, because Africa is still mired in socio-economic doldrums and there is a need to decolonise, indigenise and Africanise many of the theories that shape the discourse and direction of development on the continent (Ndlovu-Getsheni 2012:73). Walter Mignolo (1995:28) is of the view that the decolonial view gives prerogative to the life encounters and worldview of those whom the French psychiatrist Frantz Fanon referred to as the ‘wretched of the earth’ (cited in Ndlovu-Getsheni 2013:2). This is how Walter Mignolo explained it: “The wretched are defined by the colonial wound, and the colonial wound, physical and psychological is a consequence of racism, the hegemonic discourse that questions the humanity of all those who do not belong to the locus of enunciation of those who assign the standard of classification and assign to themselves the right to classify” (cited in Ndlovu-Getsheni 2013b:2).

A discourse of development that is not decolonised presents paradigms and theories which may be a hindrance to the development of the continent. It is true that colonial administrations have been dismantled throughout Africa, but the reality on the ground is that coloniality is still very much present on the continent. Ramon Grosfoguel (2007:219) elaborated on this by stating the following: “One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonisation of the world. This led to the myth of a ‘post-colonial’ world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonisation of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under
the same ‘colonial power matrix’. With juridical-political decolonisation we moved from a period of ‘global colonialism’ to the current period of ‘global coloniality’. Although ‘colonial administrations’ have been almost entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organised into independent states, non-European people are still living under crude European/Euro American exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non-Europeans remain in place and are entangled with the ‘international division of labour’ and accumulation of capital at a world-scale” (Grosfoguel 2007:219).

The decolonial narrative is necessitated by resistance and the search for alternative narratives and theories, which takes into consideration the knowledge, encounters, views of countries which were casualties of slavery, colonialism and apartheid (cited in Ndlovu-Getsheni, 2013b:2). Decoloniality is deeply shaped by the perspectives, writings and epistemologies of prominent scholars like Ndlovu-Getsheni, Aime Cesaire, Frantz Fanon, Immanuel Wallenstein, Steve Biko, Amilcar Cabral, Kwame Nkrumah, Grosfoguel, Mignolo and others (Cesaire 1972:84; Fanon 1968b:32; Biko 1978:25; Mignolo 1995:34; Wiredu 1996:38, Grosfoguel 2011:5; Wallenstein 1991:15; Ndlovu-Getsheni 2013b:2).

A decolonial view on the discourses of development takes full cognisance of the deleterious effects of slavery, colonialism and imperialism on the conditions of life on the continent. The objective of this perspective is to unfurl epistemic views and perspectives interwoven in Euro-centric ideas and theories, such as the theory of comparative advantage. Through this process, the decolonial interrogation would help Africans to imagine alternative worldviews, theories, policies and ideas in the discourse of development. This is because coloniality is active in this century and it is the pre-eminent paradigm which shapes development discourses and policy making on the continent (Grosfoguel 2007:219). Ndlovu-Getsheni (2013b:10) explained it this way: “What Africans must be vigilant against is the trap of ending up normalising and universalising coloniality as a natural state of the world. It must be unmasked, resisted and destroyed because it produced a world order that can only be sustained through a combination of violence, deceit, hypocrisy and lies” (Ndlovu-Getsheni 2013b:10).

It is crucial that the author differentiates between colonialism and coloniality, in order to unveil a better understanding of the issues being discussed. A leading authority on decoloniality, Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007:242), described coloniality in the following words: “Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, inter-subjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects, we breathe coloniality all the time and every day” (Maldonado-Torres 2007:243).

The decolonial perspective preludes the appearance of a ‘decolonial turn’ (Mignolo 1995:34; 2005:33) which pivots on the dire need for the decolonisation of all knowledge which suffered under colonial exploitation, humiliation and deprivation (Ndlovu-Getsheni 2013b:7). It is directed towards the knowledge of those people who bore the brunt of the
brutal legacies of slavery, colonialism and apartheid. The concept is intended to achieve the total liberation of people in the developing world, who continue to live and suffer under ‘Western and European global matrices of power’ (Ndlovu-Getsheni 2013b:7). Maldonado-Torres (Torres 2006:114) explained the concept of a ‘decolonial turn’ as follows: “The decolonial turn (different from its linguistic or the pragmatic turn) refers to the decisive recognition and propagation of decolonisation as an ethical, political and epistemic project in the twentieth century. The project reflects changes in historical consciousness, agency, and knowledge and it also involves a method or series of methods that facilitates the task of decolonisation at the material and epistemic levels” (Maldonado-Torres 2006:114).

Aníbal Quijano theorised about the four strands of coloniality, and the one which is useful for this article is his concept of ‘the coloniality of knowledge’ (Quijano, 2000:220 and 2007:170). The aim of this type of coloniality is to underline the process through which Europe and European theories, such as the theory of “comparative advantage”, are classified as the unshared sphere of knowledge creation. This means that European narratives and theories of development, such as the theory of comparative advantage, whereby African countries are required to continuously produce and export raw materials ad infinitum, are only valid and useful for Europeans, and are not feasible in developing countries such as those in Africa (Suarex-Krabble 2009:8). Aime Cesaire (1972:84) vehemently denounced the idea of universalising European theories of development while ignoring the socio-cultural realities on the continent. This is how it is argued: “Provincialism? Absolutely not. I’m not going to confine myself to some narrow particularism. Nor do I intend to lose myself in a disembodied universalism. There are two ways to lose one self: through walled-in segregation in the particular, or through dissolution into the ‘universal’. My idea of the universal is that of a universal rich with all that is particular, rich with all particulars, the deepening and co-existence of all particulars” (Aime Cesaire 1972:84).

The Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano elaborated on the concept of coloniality of knowledge, when he held that: “Europe’s hegemony over the new model of global power concentrated all forms of the control of subjectivity, culture, and especially knowledge and the production of knowledge under its hegemony” (Quijano 2000:220). He explained further that this resulted in “simultaneous denial of knowledge production to the conquered peoples and repression of traditional modes of knowledge production, and on the basis of the superiority/inferiority relationship enforced by the hierarchical structure” (Quijano 2000:225).

The celebrated Nigerian intellectual, Claude Ake (1979:125) in his book titled Democracy and Development argued that one of the reasons for the failure of development being rooted in the African socio-cultural milieu is that the development paradigms and theories implemented by policy makers on the continent are Euro-American concepts, which are indifferent to the African condition. Ake’s (1979:125) narrative re-echoes the views of the Kenyan intellectual, Ali Mazuri (1968:82), who expressed discontent at the inability of Africans to disentangle themselves from the servitude of ‘alien paradigms’ or remove themselves from what Karl Marx sees as “false systems of political, social and moral concepts” created in order to maintain the knowledge domination of the leading world powers who have controlled the world through slavery, colonialism, imperialism and now coloniality (cited in Mazuri 1968:82). Ake (1979:125) hinted at the imperialist content and agenda of
the theories of development, which are embedded in ‘the social science paradigms’ and knowledge propounded in Africa through the educational system that African countries inherited at the time of their independence.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

Fully incorporated into the thesis of Ricardo is the classical mindset of a British economist, when England was already an industrialised country, in comparison to the situation in Portugal (Boudreaux 2004:375; Irwin 1996:21; Buchanan and Young 2002:400). If one closely examines Ricardo’s (cited in Irwin 1996:21) choice of products – wine (agricultural) and cloth (manufactured goods) – it is clear that England will reap all the benefits of international trade between it and the rest of the world, especially with regard to the poor developing countries of Africa (Mehmet 1999:49). In considering the ramifications of this theory for Africa’s development, it becomes apparent that the market is an unreliable tool for the protection of jobs and alleviation of poverty in Africa (Mehmet 1999:49). If countries in Africa implement the theory of Ricardo in its entirety and specialise in the continuous export of raw materials, they will not reap the benefits of international trade and will continue to be mired in endemic poverty, because countries such as England, which specialise in manufacturing, will create more jobs, increase their revenue and ultimately enjoy the fruits of globalisation and international trade (Boudreaux 2004:375; Jones 1961: 163; Buchanan and Young 2002:400).

For example, Reinert (2008:106) has identified three main flaws in Ricardo’s theory. The first shortcoming is that Ricardo formulated his theory without paying attention to historical analysis, technological change, increasing returns and synergies that are involved in trade (Irwin 1996:21). Secondly, like many who live in Africa already know, advancements in technology will not allow cocoa producers on the continent to make more profit than countries like Switzerland making chocolate and who add increasing returns to their business (Reinert 2008:106). Finally, the fact remains that Ricardo’s theory is only applicable to countries involved in manufacturing activities (Reinert 2008:106; Irwin 1966:21; Mehmet 1999:49). Developing countries in Africa which specialise in exporting raw materials are ultimately specialising in poverty, according to Reinert (2008:106), as diminishing returns will inevitably reduce the profit margin of poor countries. Colonialism and then globalisation were premised on these flawed ideological views of Smith and Ricardo, and the effect of colonialism on economic growth and development in Africa is apparent, as Africa remains the primary producers of raw materials and natural resources, while the creation of jobs and alleviation of poverty, which are the main tenets of development, have eluded the continent (Harvey 2005:29).

One of the renowned classical economists, Adam Smith, enthused about the virtues of international trade, and his theory greatly influenced David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage (Machlup 1977:15; Roberts 2006:20). Smith’s assertion that international trade will ultimately bring about development and prosperity for all nations was built on faulty foundations (Smith 1999:35; Machlup 1977:19; Mehmet 1999:50). It has been proven to
be a false and hollow promise, as many people in Africa are still experiencing poverty and underdevelopment, despite the hegemony of globalisation (Pezzoli 1997:560). Many researchers in the field of development are aware of the intractable problems of poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment, which are endemic in developing countries of the world, especially those in Africa (Timberlake 1985:35; Morgan and Solarz 1994:65 Ukwandu 2014:235). Myint (1970:235) observed that David Ricardo was silent or maybe naive with regard to the domestic impact of comparative advantage on poverty and employment in a developing country that specialises in agricultural products, while developed countries specialise in manufacturing and its ancillary benefits (cited in Mehmet 1999:50).

In reality, the theory of comparative advantage has a negative effect on job creation, exacerbates poverty and is akin to specialising in poverty and underdevelopment (Ukwandu 2014:233). This happens because, as mentioned earlier, concentrating solely on exporting raw materials will inhibit the ability of developing countries to add value to their resources, which will in turn diminish the revenues accruable to the countries from exports (Ukwandu 2014:234). Mehmet (1999:50) demolished the basic assumptions of Ricardo’s theory, suggesting that Ricardo’s analysis is static because it is based on constant costs, with no gains for productivity that may arise from technological advancements, and that there is free mobility of labour domestically, but not internationally. In conclusion, since the movement of capital is free globally, England, and indeed most of the developed countries of the world, will forever enjoy the comparative advantage inherent to manufacturing, which means more jobs and more technological and industrial development. All these advantages of the developed world in the global economy are to the detriment of poor and developing countries, such as those in Africa, where the majority of people still suffer as a result of poverty and deprivation (Mehmet 1999:50).

Another major limitation of Ricardo’s theory is that it is based on only two countries and two commodities. The reality proves the irrelevance of the theory to development in Africa, as the continent contains 53 countries which export many commodities to other countries of the world. Since Africa trades with many countries and in different commodities, it is therefore difficult for the theory to be applied to this continent (Machlup 1977:24; Roberts 2006:29).

In David Ricardo’s theory, the value of goods is shown in terms of the labour utilised in the production of the goods. An interrogation of the labour theory of value by various economists has revealed many flaws in this narrative (Mehmet 1999:50; Boudreaux 2004:375; Irwin 1996:28; Buchanan and Yoon 2002:400). In the real world, the value of goods and services is expressed in monetary terms and not in terms of labour costs (Boudreaux 2004:375). Another flaw of the theory of comparative advantage is that it overly concentrates on the supply of goods and services, while ignoring the demand side of the equation (Mehmet 1999:50). In an African context, it is apparent that the theory is steeped in a colonial and neo-colonial mindset and worldview, as it is geared towards the endless supply of mineral resources from developing countries, with no mention of the demands or needs of those countries (Ukwandu 2014:230).

In the author’s view, one immediately becomes aware of the weaknesses embedded in the theory of comparative advantage, based on insights provided by Mehmet (1999:55), and one can appreciate the argument of Reinert (2008:110) that countries which continue to export raw materials without adding value to these materials will experience poverty and underdevelopment for a long time to come. This is because these raw materials are
fluctuating around a boom-bust cycle, which results in the instability of foreign earnings (Mehmet 1999:55). The Ricardian theory of comparative advantage is not useful to developing countries of the world, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, who have suffered from what the Latin American intellectual Walter Mignolo (1995:8) called ‘the colonial wound’. This refers to the period of massive exploitation on an unprecedented scale of the developing countries of the world by the European colonial masters, who made little or no effort to enhance the development of those countries which were located mostly in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

There is massive poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment on the African continent, even though the theory of comparative advantage talked about full employment. The assumption of full employment shows its irrelevance to the socio-economic conditions prevailing on the continent, as the costs of production and labour continue to change in Africa, which has a very young demography. The theory is oblivious to the fact that African countries are very dynamic and constantly changing, and these changes include the labour force, capital, technology, and even the discovery of natural resources in these countries (Ukwandu 2014:233).

The Ricardian theory underscores the virtues and benefits of free trade, and enthuses about the unfounded idea of complete specialisation, whereby England will specialise fully in cloth, while Portugal will specialise fully in wine. The fact remains that this type of complete specialisation in international trade is unrealistic, and the narrative is therefore based on economic myth and fantasy. When this theory is compared to the interests and living conditions of people in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the weaknesses become glaring. The German economist List (cited in Reinert 2008:106) offered timely advice when he described the devastating effect of unfettered free trade, globalisation and specialisation on poor and developing countries that do not yet possess the technical and manufacturing wherewithal to compete with other developed countries. His warning was heeded in Asia, first by Japan and later by South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and, more recently, Vietnam. It would be a herculean task for countries in Africa to jumpstart economic growth, job creation, poverty alleviation and meaningful development and transformation by fully adhering to the tenets of Ricardo’s theory. This is how List (cited in Reinert 2008:106) expressed his doubts: “Under the existing conditions of the world, the result of general free trade would not be a universal republic, but, on the contrary a universal subjection of the less advanced nations to the supremacy of the predominant manufacturing, commercial and naval power (developed countries). A universal republic i.e. a union of the nations of the earth… can only be realized if a larger number of nationalities attain to as nearly the same degree as possible of industry and civilization, political and power” (Reinert 2008:106).

The dangers of an unguided and unregulated market during this age of globalisation, as advocated by proponents of free trade and complete specialisation, such as David Ricardo, were expressed by Polanyi (1957:73) and Harvey (2005). Polanyi (1957:73) warned about allowing the market to control all facets of human life, especially for those who live in developing countries of the world, such as those in Africa. He expressed his views as follows: “To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in demotion of society. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as victims of acute
social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation. Nature would be reduced
to its elements, neighbourhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety
jeopardised, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the market
administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for
shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts
in primitive society” (Polanyi 1957:73).

Rostow’s (1960) views contradicted the theory of David Ricardo, as he indicated that
foreign trade can only help to reduce poverty and accelerate development in underdeveloped
countries if those countries in the primary-producing sector are involved in the partial or
semi-processing of the primary product, through which they can maximise their profits
(Rostow 1960:56). This exposed the flaws in the narrative of Ricardo, and this practice of
setting African countries on the path of becoming perpetual exporters of raw materials can
be traced back to the period of colonial rule on the continent. During this period, British
colonial industrial development in African countries was designed to severely impoverish the
continent and its people. For example, in a country such as Ghana, fruits were harvested and
exported to Britain to be processed, bottled and subsequently re-exported back to Ghana
at a higher price (Offiong 2002:45). Cocoa was planted and harvested in Mozambique
and exported to Portugal, where it was processed and exported back to Mozambique as
chocolate (Offiong 2002:48). The same situation was found in varying degrees in Kenya,
Sudan and Ivory Coast, as well as most of colonial Africa. The fact that most African
countries during colonial rule were prevented from becoming involved in processing or
adding value to the natural resources produced in their countries contributed to the poverty
and underdevelopment of post-colonial Africa.

Myrdal (1956:27) argues that market forces will tend, cumulatively, to accentuate
international inequalities, and a quite normal result of unhampered trade between
two countries, of which one is industrial and the other underdeveloped, is the ignition
of a cumulative process leading to the impoverishment and stagnation of the latter. This
is another argument which accentuated the weakness of the Ricardian theory. Myrdal
(1956:28) is of the belief that international trade has some positives and negatives, and the
positives of international trade during the colonial era, even in the present global economy,
tend to accrue more to developed countries, while developing countries tend to accumulate
many of the negatives. In the case of colonial Africa, the only outcome of the trade was
unfavourable terms of trade between African colonies and their European colonial masters.
Mills and Herbst (2012:5) are of the view that it is very difficult for countries exporting only
commodities or raw materials to achieve development. This is because of the fluctuations
inherent in the prices of those commodities on the international market. Africa can only
achieve real development and reduce poverty and unemployment if the political leaders on
the continent find a way to add value to all the commodities produced in Africa.

THE SPANISH EXAMPLE: LESSONS FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES
ON THE ROLE OF INCREASING RETURNS IN DEVELOPMENT

This narrative of adding value is brilliantly articulated by Reinert (2008:106), who stated
that countries which specialise in the export of raw materials will find it difficult to achieve
development because of the law of increasing and diminishing returns. The concept of increasing returns will allow African countries to add value to the myriad of natural resources available on the continent. Adam Smith alluded to increasing returns in his pin factory analogy (Reinert, 2008:110). During the Middle Ages, Antonio Serra and Genovesi (cited in Reinert 2008:115) expounded on the role of increasing returns in the economic growth and development of parts of Italy, but emphasised that this has to be underpinned by good governance, since it was good governance within the city states of Italy that facilitated the growth of trade, commerce and investment, which led many of the city states to add value to their natural resources, as well as increasing their earnings, thereby stimulating economic growth and development.

Reinert (2008:106) gave an example of the rise and decline of Spain as incontrovertible evidence of the cause of poverty in Africa. In 1558, Spain’s Minister of Finance, Luis Ortiz, wrote the following to King Philip II (cited in Reinert 2008:108): “From the raw materials from Spain and the West Indies particularly silk, iron and conchinilla (a red dye) which cost them 1 Florin, the foreigners produce finished goods which they all sell back to Spain for between 10 and 100 Florins. Spain is in this way subject to greater humiliations from the rest of Europe than those they themselves impose on the Indians. In exchange for gold and silver the Spaniards offer trinkets of greater or lesser value; but by buying back their raw materials at an exorbitant price, the Spaniards are made the laughing stock of Europe” (cited in Reinert 2008:108).

The incontrovertible idea embedded in this letter to King Philip is that a finished product might cost up to one hundred times the price of the raw materials needed for the product. As Reinert (2008:106) noted, if efforts are devoted to adding value to the raw materials produced in Africa, many additional jobs and earnings could be generated. He explained that between the raw materials exported and the finished products, there are numerous economic activities that will help to reduce poverty, create employment and promote the technological advancement that is usually associated with this process. Some of these activities which Reinert (2008:115) mentioned include an industrial process that creates a knowledge economy, mechanisation and improved technology, division of labour and, above all, increasing returns. However, it is difficult for Africa to carry out these activities because poor governance has not allowed those in power to find a way to improve the lot of their citizens, due to the fact that the status quo favours them and their allies.

In light of the above, it can be argued that despite the abundance of natural resources in Africa, it will be difficult for African countries to achieve development because if one takes the concepts of diminishing and increasing returns into account, unless African governments add value to their natural resources through increasing returns, the continent is doomed to perpetual poverty and underdevelopment. However, adding value through increasing returns is not possible without good governance, and this is why this study argues that good governance is the missing link in Africa’s elusive quest for development. It is the practice of good governance that will enable African governments to realise that their poor governance is subjecting millions of Africans to penury and underdevelopment. In other words, good governance plays a vital role in Africa’s elusive quest for development.

Mills (1848 cited in Ukwandu 2014:233) outlined the merits and demerits of increasing and diminishing returns in the life of a nation in the following words: “I [comprehend] the elimination of diminishing returns to be not only an error, but the most serious one,
to be found in the whole field of political economy. The question is more important and fundamental than any other: it involves the whole subject of the causes of poverty... and unless this matter be thoroughly understood, it is to no purpose proceeding any further in our inquiry” (Mills 1848, cited in Ukwandu 2014:233).

There are modern advocates of the power of increasing returns, as opposed to diminishing returns, as the key to alleviating poverty, increasing employment and ensuring subsequent development for developing countries battling with poverty and underdevelopment, but which wholly rely on commodities as their main source of revenue (Marshall cited in Prendergest 1992:7; Krugman 1990:35). Marshall (cited in Prendergest 1992:7) argued that diminishing returns is one of the main causes of poverty in the developing countries of the world, as it focuses on a resource that cannot generate more wealth or jobs in the long run.

Mills’ (cited in Prendergest 1992:7) theory was given further credence by Marshall when he suggested that the best development policy includes levying more taxes on activities with diminishing returns, in order for the State to support and even subsidise those activities with increasing returns. He also advised that nations which want to be developed and prosperous should direct their production towards those activities in which technical and knowledge-related progress are to be found (Prendergest 1992:7).

Thunen (2009:40) postulated that in a map of civilized societies, activities with increasing returns are mostly located within the walls of the city, where there are different types of economic activities that generate more wealth for the city and its inhabitants, thereby facilitating the creation of jobs and reduction of poverty. He further explained that once one moves away from the city center, the use of capital and technology to generate wealth and employment decreases, and one is faced with activities with diminishing returns, such as fishing, hunting etc., which depend on the vagaries of weather to be sustainable. The view of Thunen (2009:40) is that as long as a society concentrates on activities with diminishing returns, it is impossible to reduce poverty and unemployment, as there is no technical progress embedded in these activities. He provides a template for African countries which seek real development, but this is still difficult without good governance, as these countries will continue to run into what Mills (1848, cited in Prendergest 1992:7) called ‘the flexible wall of diminishing returns’.

THE NOTION OF INCREASING RETURNS AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE POVERTY, UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

According to the Economist magazine (2011), eight of the world’s top 20 fastest growing economies of the past decade are in sub-Saharan Africa, and the list includes Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda and Tanzania. The major weakness of the theory of comparative advantage is evident in the fact that if the theory was relevant to African countries, the impressive GDP figures amassed by these countries would have led to total and overall development in their economies. The fact remains that despite almost a decade of economic growth, which relied heavily on the export of commodities; these countries are still mired in abject poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment. The reason for this is because they have been exporting their natural resources cheaply and
without adding value to those products, and it is impossible for real development to be achieved under such circumstances. African solutions to African problems are timely and much-needed in this scenario. It is the concept of adding value to natural commodities that will help African countries to exorcise the triple demons of poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment. The solution will come from neither Europe nor America, and will not be found by uncritically adopting their epistemologies and development paradigms, without tweaking them to conform to our socio-cultural milieus. This intellectual servitude will keep the continent in economic limbo ad infinitum.

In critically examining the full consequences of David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage from the decolonial perspective, it becomes very clear to policy makers, researchers and intellectuals in Africa that it is possible, and indeed urgent, that we break free from the shackles of European and American-centred theories of development, which are inimical to the holistic development of the continent. It is time to chart a new and different course of action. Africa must not continue to kowtow to every knowledge and insight dished out by Europe and North America. It is time to rethink and re-evaluate the development policies being implemented on the continent. Wallerstein (1991:3) elaborated on the benefits to researchers and policy makers in the developing countries of the world, especially those in Africa, of periodically reassessing their development policies and programmes. According to Wallerstein, it is vital that we in Africa sometimes ‘unthink’ some of our hypotheses and conjectures in view of the rapid changes taking place in the world. In his view, unthinking the basic fundamentals of our economic and social ideologies is vital in an ever-changing world (Wallerstein 1991:3). This is how he explained it: “It is quite normal for scholars and scientists to rethink issues. When important new evidence undermines old theories and predictions do not hold, we are pressed to rethink our premises. In that sense, much of nineteenth-century social science, in the form of specific hypotheses, is constantly being rethought. But in addition to rethinking, which is ‘normal’, I believe we need to ‘unthink’ nineteenth-century social science, because many of its presumptions which, in my view, are misleading and constrictive still have far too strong a hold on our mentalities. These presumptions, once considered liberating of the spirit, serve today as a central intellectual barrier to useful analysis of the social world” (Wallerstein 1991:15).

It is evident that the solution to the myriads of developmental problems afflicting Africa can only come from African intellectuals, policy makers and political leaders. National and continental liberation and development will only be feasible when we water the seeds of indigenous knowledge and find African solutions to African problems. Kwame Nkrumah (cited in Oppong 2013:35), the first President of the independent Republic of Ghana, articulated this view as follows: “We must seek an African view to the problems of Africa. This does not mean that Western techniques and methods are not applicable to Africa. It does mean, however, that in Ghana we must look at every problem from the African point of view... our whole educational system must be geared to producing a scientifically-technically minded people... I believe that one of the most important services which Ghana can perform for Africa is to devise a system of education based at its University level on concrete studies of the problems of the tropical world. The University will be the co-coordinating body for education research... Only with a population so educated can we hope to face the tremendous problems which confront any country attempting to raise the standard of life in a tropical zone” (cited in Oppong 2013:35).
The German intellectual List (cited in Reinert 2008:106) corroborated this narrative of Nkrumah when he opined that countries which specialise only in the export of materials, neglecting the policy of adding value to those commodities, will only be specialising in poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment. Jobs can only be created when African countries take a step towards adding value to the natural resources which they export, as this will create the synergy needed for industrialisation. As a result of African governments having neglected this principle and embarked on the unprecedented exploitation and export of natural resources, as prescribed by David Ricardo and his fellow scholars, economic growth has not translated into development in Africa. Africa can only create job opportunities for its citizens when it starts to add value to the raw materials it is exporting to the developed countries of the world. This concept of increasing returns, as List (1885, cited in Reinert 2008:106) suggests, is an important principle of good governance, which is absent in the African polity. The continuous export of raw materials without adding value to them will only lead to Africa specialising in poverty and economic stagnation, and what has been experienced in Africa after more than 50 years of political independence validates this view.

The notion of adding value to natural resources or beneficiation has been a pivotal component of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) since it came to power in South Africa in the 1990s. This is evidenced by the two critical components of its manufacturing and developmental policy:

“That developed countries exploit developing countries by buying cheap resources and then adding value to their own benefit. Coffee and cocoa/chocolate are two commonly quoted examples where the growers of the raw material receive very little relative to the value of the final product. Often the exporters of the raw materials later import the final product at much higher cost. The fact that many of our mines are foreign owned add to the view that the true value of minerals is not received by South Africa” (cited in Eunomix 2015).

The role of beneficiation in kick-starting economic growth, job creation and poverty alleviation was succinctly captured in the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP, 2014/15–2016/17) that was published by the South African government. The government advanced its reasons for beneficiation and adding value to the country’s vast mineral wealth as follows: “South Africa faces the challenge of diversifying away from mining and resource extraction towards a manufacturing, value-adding and job-creating economy. Minerals downstream beneficiation and minerals upstream (inputs) have been identified as a key ‘pillar’ of South Africa’s reindustrialisation push. The aim is to ensure that more value is added to domestic mineral products before export, so as to extract greater economic value and employment from the country’s remaining mineral resources, while at the same time using minerals sector demand to develop mining input industries (capital goods, consumables and services). Although South Africa is endowed with exceptional mineral resources, further downstream and upstream beneficiation has not fully reached its economic potential, mainly due to structural conditions within key value-chains” (cited in Eunomix 2015).

This proves that there is no way in which Africans can benefit from the present economic growth and development witnessed on the continent without adding value to the raw materials that the continent is exporting to other countries of the world (Economist 2011).
David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage will leave African countries still desperately poor, without jobs and development, in spite of the huge mineral wealth of the continent (Bush 2007:25; Gordon and Wolpe 1998:55). It is time for policy makers and researchers on the continent to chart a new and different course and implement policies that will unleash the manufacturing potential of the continent and its people.

The salient role of adding value and how this will contribute to the development of the continent can be seen in its multiplier effect on a tiny sector such as timber in South Africa. Swart (Cited in Ukwandu 2014:234) explained that a piece of wood used for the back of a shoe brush can sell for R1,60 at wholesale prices, but by adding value to the same wood by including bristles, the same wood will retail at R16 in the store. In other words, there is a 1000% increase in value. Many of the timber plantations in South Africa are forced to sell their timber without adding value to it, since the cost of the machines needed to undertake this task is very high, and without government support, it is impossible for them to add value to the product, which would increase their earnings and even create more employment opportunities. This lack of support by those in power in South Africa is found throughout the continent and stymies development in Africa. It is much more convenient for the policy makers on the continent to bemoan the evils of globalisation, colonialism and apartheid, but no one has raised the important question of what politicians have done with the resources available to them. Poor governance has not allowed Africa to take advantage of the resources on the continent.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

This article, in providing a decolonial critique of David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, endeavours to highlight a variety of limitations inherent to the theories of development, which are not centered on the African context. The view helps to generate development knowledge and paradigms that are cognisant of the needs and aspirations of the continent, so that a solution can be found to the myriad of problems, such as poverty and unemployment. Nabudere (2006:7) emphasised these goals: “Pursuing knowledge production that can renovate African culture, defend African people’s dignity and civilisational achievements, and contribute afresh to a new global agenda that can push us out of the crisis of modernity as promoted by European Enlightenment. Such knowledge must be relevant to the current needs of the masses, which they can use to bring about a social transformation out of their present plight. As there cannot be such a thing as the advancement of science for its own sake, those who pursue ‘science for its own sake’ find that their knowledge is used for purposes, which they may never have intended it for” (Nabudere 2006:7).

The celebrated Palestinian intellectual and a leading authority on post-colonial studies, Edward Said (1978:16), supported Nabudere’s view that Western-centric knowledge and epistemologies, such as David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, are not produced for their own sake. Instead, their sole purpose has been the enslavement, exploitation, control and administration of non-European populations. This is the main reason why the decolonial perspective is a theory that is embedded in the total liberation of African people from European intellectual tyranny.
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Government interventionism and sustainable development
The case of South Africa

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ABSTRACT

Governments have moral and legal obligations to intervene in society in order to direct, regulate, facilitate and act as catalyst for economic prosperity, social justice and ecological sustainability. The nature and scale of such interventions depend on various factors, which include the ideological reasoning of policy makers, the availability of natural resources, demographical and geographical realities, as well as trajectories for economic growth. On a global scale governments have to address serious challenges such as climate change, ecological dysfunction, and the depletion of natural resources. The global community is living far beyond its ecological means. It is expected that governments muster coherent policy responses to the highly complex environmental problems that society is facing currently.

The aim of this article is to outline governments’ interventions in sustainable development by focusing on a particular case, namely the South African Government. This government sets itself the target to become a developmental state according to the strategic goals of its National Development Plan. This context will be explored by focusing on specific social, economic and environmental interventions the South African Government has effected to facilitate sustainable development.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the respective branches of science have begun to weave together a picture of the intricate complexities concerning the delicate interaction between nature and human civilisation. A tsunami of recent scientific evidence confirms that this delicate relationship is under serious strain, which places critical question marks behind humankind’s stewardship of earth. Globally people experience immense challenges in terms of the climate, ecological dysfunction, and the depletion of natural resources. The global community is by far exceeding its ecological means. Human enterprise has already overshot the global carrying capacity by
more than 50%. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) warns that “human activity is putting such a strain on the natural functions of the earth that the ability of the planet’s ecosystem to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for granted”.

Confronted by a vast body of scientific evidence, decisive interventions would be expected of governments around the globe. However, the rather limited and uncoordinated efforts thus far failed dismally to deal successfully with the cumulative effects of human activity on the environment. Rees (in Costanza & Kubiszewski 2014:191) confirms that not a single national government to date has an “evidence-based, visionary, morally coherent policy response” to the highly complex environmental problems which society face. There is a need for a totally new governance paradigm, a new way to think and act in balancing the so-called “pillars” of sustainable development. However, the question springs to mind: How should one frame the interventionist role of governments in this process of sustainable development? How could governments’ initiatives worldwide be leveraged to maximise positive development outcomes in their society?

The aim of this article is to frame governments’ interventions in the process of sustainable development by focusing on a particular case, the South African Government. This government sets itself the target to be restructured into a developmental state. Government interventions in sustainable development within the context of a developmental state, have recently gained particular significance among proponents of the New Public Administration. This context will be explored by focusing on specific interventions of the South African Government to facilitate sustainable development within its society. The basic assumption that serves as theoretical foundation for this article is that government is the key actor in society to regulate, facilitate sustainable development and act as catalyst for such initiatives.

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONISM CONCEPTUALISED

Interventions of governments in civilisation are intricately part of the perceived purpose and role of the rulers in society. On one end of the socio-political spectrum liberal thinking may regard governmental intervention as interference or intrusion in citizen’s free spaces, whilst on the other end socialists may perceive such intervention as a necessity to establish order, stability, and equity in society. A literature review reveals that the notion of a government’s intervention features prominently in mainly three arenas – political, social, and economic. In the case of political interventionism, one country interferes with the internal affairs of another, such as its internal politics, and even deploys military force to establish order and stability in the foreign country (Rose & Miller 1992:175). Foreign political interventions may further include the use of methods such as sanctions, trade protectionism, and foreign relations (Pearson 1974:262). However, this arena of intervention falls outside the scope of this article.

Regarding social interventionism a government’s regulation is often the result of pressing societal needs, such as epidemics, natural disasters, and human destruction that demand a rapid response from government. It is evident that positions on social intervention depend on the specific issue at hand. Generally, interventions in the areas of a state’s healthcare and educational services are considered more ‘socially acceptable’ than arms production and the construction of a nuclear power plant (see McClelland 1996:89). Judgement of the desirability of social interventions further depends on the general legitimacy of a government.
If government officials are perceived as experts who aim to promote the common good and general welfare of society, such interventions would typically be regarded as more favourable (Parton 1994:14). However, where social interventions are viewed as paternalistic, autocratic, unethical, and only aimed at benefitting a certain societal grouping (i.e. elites), citizens would generally not welcome such interference (Bermant, Kelman & Warwick 1978:176).

The context of governmental social interventionism thus requires epistemological consideration, a new knowledge and metatheoretical basis for understanding the issue. It involves interventions in the lives of individuals in society and may infringe or attempt to alter individuals’ rights or choices. Interventions could also be regarded from a moral perspective: governments have a socio-political obligation and moral duty to design policies in the national interest.

It is evident that the majority of literature deals with governmental interventionism in an economic sense. Thus the discourse focuses on the nature of the relationship between a government and the market. As is the case with the social arena, government interventionism, economically speaking, requires context. At the one extreme of the ideological spectrum, neo-liberals may seek to reduce the state as a ‘defender’ of private property rights (Huffman 2013:15). Perspectives from a mid-range spectrum include capitalistic vantage points where protagonists such as Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes would probably argue against any government interventions in the economy whatsoever. At the other end of the spectrum, the clearer socialist, neo-Marxist thinkers would expect of government to assume full ownership and control of the economy. They would probably argue that government intervention in the economy of the state is necessary to correct market failures and to achieve a more equitable distribution of income and wealth among the citizens. In this regard Kropotkin and Woodcock (1996:97) argue that government intervention is a prominent feature of capitalism. According to them, “Nowhere has the system of ‘non-intervention of the state’ ever existed. Everywhere the state has been, and still is, the main pillar and the creator, direct and indirect, of Capitalism and its powers over the masses. The state has always interfered in the economic life in favour of the capitalist exploiter”. Kropotkin and Woodcock (1996:98) further insist that even in a truly laissez-faire capitalist system, the state would still be protecting capitalist property rights as well as hierarchical social relationships. In the same vein, Polanyi (1944:71) notes that while many ideological proponents of capitalism “thunder against state intervention (for the benefit of the masses), the fact is that capitalism itself produces the need for such intervention”.

The way governments intervene in society in general and its economy in particular, are highly diverse in nature. Such interventions may include regulatory interference by means of policies, by-laws, directives, and guidelines. It may also involve more facilitatory interventions such as strategies, programmes, and projects. Regarding the environment and general development, government interventions may entail physical input such as infrastructure development, spatial planning and by establishing green zones in cities and towns, as well as planning environmentally-friendly power plants (see Vermeulen & Kok 2012:186).

The nature of interventions in fact are so diverse that it might be useful to design a typology ranging from direct to indirect interventions, strong (i.e. prescriptive) and weak (i.e. guidance, facilitation) interventions, and hard and soft interventions. The ‘right’ way to intervene probably lies in striking a careful balance between an appropriate level or intensity of intervention. This level of intervention may, however, depend on various factors:
Given the conditions mentioned above, a particular government may, for example, decide to fast-track certain interventions or to scale down others. Government interventionism is thus highly sensitive to each specific case.

For purposes of this article, government interventionism is defined as an analysis of the nature, extent and types of systemic, socio-economic, policy, strategic and programmatic interventions of governments to leverage initiatives for sustainable development in a country.

Government interventionism in a developmental state

In the context of a developmental state, government interventionism gained specific meaning and application value. In the case of contemporary examples of developmental states such as Korea and Singapore, state intervention was the key to development and success in the ‘free market’ (Wade 2003). In developing countries that suffered the misfortune to be subjected to ‘free-market reforms’ (e.g. neo-liberal Structural Adjustment Programmes) rather than following the interventionist models of the Far East, the results have been destructive for their economy (Chomsky 1996).

Considering the nature of government interventionism within a developmental state against the backdrop of a spectrum of extremities, the state either reveals itself as fragile, absent, erratic or inept (Stiglitz 2003:34), or it unveils a ‘strong’ or ‘hard’ state character (Fukuyama 2004:ix). The intensity and scale of such interventions should thus be considered according to the particular nature of the state. It is important to note that a developmental state belongs to a category of state types, which intervene in the affairs of society, and particularly in the economy (Koehler & Chopra 2014:26). According to Gumede (2009:1), a developmental state generally refers to the model many of the East Asian nations (the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’) pursued after the Second World War in an attempt to modernise their economies rapidly. The basic model of the East Asian developmental state implies that the state sets specific goals for development and mobilises society to achieve industrial modernisation. Developmental states thus employ active development strategies, and in particular, specific industrial policies. Such states set clear policies and goals for their economy with regard to export promotion, investment in human capital and credit allocation through development banks (Bora, Lloyd & Pangestu 2000:29). According to Gumede (2009:2), the financial sectors played a crucial role in funding development strategies. A developmental state thus plays an active role in guiding economic development and using the resources of the country to meet the needs of the people (Van Dijk & Croucamp 2007:665). It uses all available resources (i.e. natural, state, human, and financial) to address social challenges and facilitate economic growth (Leftwich 2007:133; Edigheji 2010:15).

The peculiarity of the government’s interventionism in a developmental state particularly concerns the large scope and level of intervention in the economy. It also applies to state
ownership and the state’s control of the industry. This can also entail privatisation and the nationalisation of industry, including mines. Richards (1989:9) cautions that nationalisation simply means replacing a private owner with a state one, with little real improvement for society at large. He continues to argue that bureaucratic (governmental) control does not mean that governmental structures suddenly have provided the cure for societal and environmental problems. Also in the case of privatisation, Kerr (2006:14) does not hesitate to call privatisation a “rip-off of the general public for the benefit of the wealthy”. According to him, “Privatisation of public services involves a massive transfer of wealth from taxpayers to the pockets of private business interests”. It is evident that not all types of interventions yield positive results. There may be short-term benefits, but less-desired consequences for the longer term.

As indicated above, the nature of interventions is case-dependent. There are, however, a number of typical options available to governments that aim to intervene in a developmental state. These options include the following:

- **Legislation and regulation:** The focus here is on price control in main utilities such as telecommunications, electricity, gas and rail transport.
- **Direct state provision of goods and services:** This may include bus services, water provisioning, and housing.
- **Fiscal policy intervention:** This entails the level of demand for different products and also the pattern of demand within the economy, which may include indirect taxes, subsidies, tax relief, ‘sin tax’ on damaging substances, and welfare payments.
- **Public awareness:** Examples are labelling on cigarette packages with health warnings to reduce smoking, nutritional information on foods to facilitate healthy eating habits, and information campaigns on the dangers of certain addictions.

The combined scholarly efforts of Edigheji (2007), Hjort (2008), and Fukuyama (2008) revealed three basic dimensions and intents of developmental states. These dimensions and intents are reflected in Table 1 and provide a useful framework to gauge interventions from government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
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<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
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<td>• Facilitation of wealth redistribution</td>
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<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>• Nation building and national identity</td>
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It should be noted that interventionism by the government in a developmental state is multi-faceted and multidimensional (political, economic and social). These dimensions are
supported by governmental intent, all contributing towards the achievement of the state’s particular developmental goals.

**SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPT AND APPLICATIONS**

Thiele (2013:1) states that sustainability is one of the very few values – such as democracy and human rights – that enjoys near universal (global) recognition. Issues such as climate change, natural resource depletion, and failing states, brought sustainability to the forefront of the current discourse in governance in general and New Public Management in particular.

Sustainability is a highly dynamic and multidimensional concept. It has multiple applications, which relate to various dimensions: environmental, material, ecological, social, economic, legal, cultural, political and psychological. These dimensions are highly interrelated and interdependent, which makes an integrated approach from government imperative. The lack of such an integrated approach has serious consequences; governments may intervene in some dimensions (i.e. political and economic) and neglect others. Even though the factors facilitating and constraining the various dimensions of sustainable development are generally known, it follows a largely unpredictable and evolutionary path (Payne & Philips 2010:6). In an increasingly ‘global community’ where countries are interdependent, people worldwide are affected by the actions or inactions of other countries (Hopper 2012:206). The consequences of political decisions and policies of a particular country transcend borders and affect future generations. These decisions require a combination, an integrated and balanced response, to ecological health, economic welfare, and social empowerment (Thiele 2013:9).

In an environmental and developmental frame, sustainable development implies the least amount of negative consequences on people and on the planet. The concept of sustainable development generally gained popularity during the 1970s with the Club of Rome’s report, *Limits to Growth*. This report can be regarded as the foundational document to stimulate thought on sustainability, the environment, and development. The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) placed the notion of sustainable development firmly on the global agenda with its *Brundtland Report*, published in 1990. The WCED clarified sustainable development as “... development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. The United Nations’ Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (1992) is further regarded as the first major event that coordinated developmental efforts of countries, scientists and social service organisations worldwide. In addition, the United Nations’ *Agenda 21* provides a comprehensive list of activities that the world community needs to undertake in order to ensure sustainability.

Figure 1 reflects the three so-called ‘pillars’ of sustainable development. Where the social dimension intersects with the environment, for example, the key driver should be whether society finds the environment bearable to live and prosper in. In the areas where the economic dimension meets the environment, the key question is whether economic growth is viable given the declining levels of natural resources. Where the social dimension interconnects with the economy the question is whether prosperity is equitable. Sustainable development (SD) lies at the centre, the point where the social, economic and environmental dimensions overlap their boundaries.
The Venn diagram above provides another useful framework to guide governments' interventions in working towards sustainable development. In order to pursue sustainable development, governments should intervene through well-designed strategies and programmes to facilitate a balance between the country’s social, economic and ecological needs. Governments should furthermore facilitate cooperation between all stakeholders and role-players involved in the social, environmental and economic arenas in this process.

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Especially over the last three decades a significant change became evident in the way issues of sustainable development are approached. For example, it is clear that there is a movement away from development aid and assistance, to countries experiencing development challenges to a better coordinated and integrated ‘global compact’ (see Thérien & Pouliot 2006:55). Furthermore, top-down decision-making is largely replaced by multi-sector and multi-stakeholder engagement (Rapley 2007). A more systemic and integrated approach is followed rather than a focus on single issues. It is also evident that governments pursue a more proactive, resilience approach, rather than a traditional reactive methodology of ‘damage control’ (Porter & Van der Linde 1995; Preston 1996). On a global scale, countries thus collaborate increasingly and establish treaties for cooperation to deal with the complexities
brought about by the process of sustainable development. Some of the most prominent initiatives, in no particular order, include the following:

- Earth Summit, 1992 (Rio Declaration)
- Earth Summit and Agenda 21 and Local Agenda 21, 1992
- World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002
- Earth Hour
- Environment Performance Index (EPI)
- Sustainable Societies Index (SSI)
- The Happy Planet Index
- Ecological Footprint Analyses (EFA)
- World Economic Forum Competitive Reports
- World Economic Forum Sustainability Reports
- Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)
- Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)
- Kyoto Protocol, 1997
- World Development Indicators
- World Energy Report
- Human Development Index
- World Watch Institute
- Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reports
- Millennium Development Goals, 2000

Regarding the African continent, specific governmental interventions in the context of sustainable development can be pointed out:

- The Monrovia Strategy, 1979
- The Lagos Plan of Action, 1980
- The African Charter of Popular Participation for Development (ACPPD), 1990
- The United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa (UN-NADAF), 1991
- The Cairo Agenda for Action, 1995
- The African Union (AU) Programme for Sustainable Development, 2002
- NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development), 2011

From these lists of interventions it becomes evident that a wide variety of initiatives are already taken – some with significant successes, and others with limited effectiveness. In the following section the focus shifts to particular interventions taken by the South African Government to facilitate and regulate sustainable development, and to act as catalyst for this process. As indicated above, the circumstances and environmental conditions of countries differ. Thus an integrated and coordinated approach should be followed to address global environmental challenges. South Africa is no exception to this rule.
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONISM IN SOUTH AFRICA: TOWARD A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

Global society increasingly faces serious world-scale problems, such as climate change, pollution, financial crises, depletion of natural resources, and poverty. Under such difficult circumstances, each country recognises that collaboration and coordination are crucial for an adequate response. This also applies to South Africa where the government partakes in global initiatives aimed at sustainable development, as highlighted above.

As stated previously, a government’s interventions within the context of a developmental state enjoy particular significance. South Africa has committed itself to building a developmental state. The aim is to facilitate economic development by mobilising the resources of society and directing these towards realising the goals set out in the National Development Plan: Vision 2030, as well as the State of the Nation Address (SONA 2013). The African National Congress (ANC) as the ruling party in Government, has expressed the desire to transform South Africa into a ‘developmental state’ with the ‘people’s contract’ as a prominent feature of this transformation process (Edigheji 2007:1; Duvenhage 2009:12). To be developmental implies equity, justice, enabling a rapid growing economy and improving the quality of life of all South African citizens (Edigheji 2007:3). Edigheji (2007:7) adds that the capacity of Government is critical as the formulator and implementer of the state’s developmental agenda. Furthermore, Government identified 12 Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) outcomes for 2009–2014. These outcomes have measurable outputs and optimal activities, and form a coherent developmental agenda. The aim is to transform South Africa into a developmental state capable of delivering effective basic services and national development (The Presidency 2010). It also is evident that South Africa needs a comprehensive response to deal with sustainability in a developmental state context in terms of the three dimensions (i.e. “pillars”), namely social, environmental and economic.

In her seminal article, “Leverage Points: Places to Intervene in a System” Donella Meadows (2010) assessed the power that points of leverage exert to create change in a system. Meadows (2010:42) argues that governments have to “push in the right direction; small actions can make big differences”. In the same vein the following sections in this article explore some of the social, economic and environmental leverage points of the South African Government in the context of sustainable development. A leverage point indicates where the least amount of energy input yields superior outcomes; thus in nature a sustainable economy in society. These points are meant to stimulate economic prosperity, social justice and ecological sustainability. The corresponding interventions should be seen against the backdrop of the Government’s agenda pointing the way towards a developmental state.

Social interventions

The South African Government plays a significant role as catalyst for and regulator of sustainable development. As a catalyst, Government’s role is to facilitate social development particularly by setting policy parameters, allocating and utilising resources, and establishing global networks and partnerships. South Africa boasts an extensive social welfare system that comprises a variety of social grants and transfers. It services approximately 16.7 million people per month from an estimated population of 52 million people (National Treasury
The country also spends a significant amount on education and health care, with 6.9% and 4.1% of GDP respectively having been budgeted for the 2014/5 fiscal year (Burger 2014).

In developing countries such as South Africa, it is usually the poorest of the poor that suffers the most due to hazardous developments. In this way the poor are continually disadvantaged by market-driven environmental choices. Often developers purchase sites in destitute areas due to the low cost and then start “dirty” development in the area. To deal with these and related issues, the South African Government has developed a comprehensive statutory and regulatory framework to address the various dimensions and aspects of development in the country. Below is a brief list of some of the most significant pieces of legislation in this regard.

- Petroleum Products Act 120 of 1977
- Agricultural Pests Act 36 of 1983
- Agricultural Products Standards Act 119 of 1990
- Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995
- Genetically Modified Organisms Act 15 of 1997
- National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998
- Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998
- National Forests Act 84 of 1998
- National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999
- Meat Safety Act 40 of 2000
- Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002
- National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004
- National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004
- National Energy Regulator Act 40 of 2004

It is evident that South Africa has a comprehensive statutory framework to deal with the most significant dimensions and issues regarding sustainable development. The capacity and competency of Government to operationalise these policies successfully, however, do not always live up to expectations. Measured in terms of the appropriate vision, commitment, policies, institutional capacity, and the maturity of the democracy, the delivery of a democratic developmental state at best still must be considered ‘a work in progress’ (Gumede 2009:8). Given the country’s history and pressing developmental challenges such as the divide between the poor and affluent, one may argue that the country is still en route to become developmental (see Shawa, Cooperb & Antkiewicz 2007; Burger 2014).

**Economic interventions**

According to Nobel Prize winning economist, Joseph Stiglitz (2015), a successful South African economy requires the government’s intervention. He points out that no great economic success in history has been achieved without direct government intervention. This provides a variety of rationales for a government’s intervention, for example, economic stability, allocation of resources, distribution of income and wealth, regulation of monopolies.
and oligopolies, and externalities. Stiglitz (2015) further asserts that the recent international financial crisis revealed flaws in Adam Smith’s argument that markets are ‘self-directing’ and ‘self-regulating’. As Stiglitz contends, “If shareholders cannot hold their companies to account then it is left to government to be the ringleader!”

These arguments support the need for the South African Government to intervene in the economy by means of industrial policy, regulation and a wider variety of monetary tools. Government should coordinate the various levers of the economy. This means promoting development through subsidies and incentives, fixing of interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and facilitating industrial competitiveness. In this regard the establishment of the National Planning Commission to direct government interventions is an important step forward. Government also aims to address inequality and gross national income by facilitating economic stability (Heller 2001:134; Gumede 2009:95).

In addition, the South African Government has made significant strides to convert to a ‘green economy’ (Salamon & Anheier 1997:9). A green economy may offer a developmental path that reduces carbon dependency, promotes the efficient usage of resources and energy, and lessens environmental degradation. The green economy refers to two inter-linked developmental outcomes for the South African economy. On the one hand, it means a growing economic activity (which leads to investment, jobs and competitiveness) in the green-industry sector; on the other hand, it implies a shift in the economy as a whole towards cleaner industries and sectors with a low environmental impact as opposed to its socio-economic impact (Barbier 2010). For this purpose, in 2011, the government entered into the Green Economic Accord, which aims to create 300 000 jobs in the next 10 years through investment. A green economy is further prioritised as one of the key economic drivers in the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2009–2014 (Outcome 4 and 10), the President’s State of the Nation Address (Feb. 2015), as well as the Minister of Finance’s budget speech (2015). All government departments are to develop programmes that aim to:

- benefit the environment, economy and society;
- promote growth while reducing pollution and greenhouse gas emissions;
- minimise waste and inefficient use of natural resources;
- maintain biodiversity; and
- strengthen energy security.

Other specific (socio-)economic interventions include the following:

- **Provincial Growth and Development Strategies**: These are critical instruments to guide and coordinate the allocation of national, provincial and local resources and investments from the private sector to achieve sustainable developmental outcomes in provinces.
- **Integrated Development Planning and Community-based Development**: Designed by municipalities, these plans must incorporate the development needs of all communities.
- **The Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF)**: These are statements of Government’s strategic intent regarding development and economic vision.
- **The Stellenbosch Resolutions, 2002**: This refers to the ANC’s Policy Conference during which direct interventionist and developmental approaches were emphasised. Outcomes of the Conference include the establishment of the Mining Charter (2004) and the adoption of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003.
• *The Polokwane Resolutions, 2007:* The ANC’s 2007 Polokwane Conference adopted a series of resolutions aimed at increased state intervention. The Polokwane resolutions saw a radical departure from conservative macro-economic policies, in favour of developmental and interventionist policies.

• *The New Growth Path:* Designed in 2011, the aim of this strategy is for the state to accept a leading role in directing investment and providing investment incentives (NGP 2011). The emphasis is, therefore, largely on the interventionist state which directs economic activity.

• *National Strategy for Sustainable Development (NSSD):* The Framework is premised on five strategic priorities: enhancing systems for integrated planning and implementation; sustaining current ecosystems and using natural resources efficiently; working towards a ‘green economy’; building sustainable communities; and responding effectively to climate change.

• *The Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (ISRDS):* This strategy aims to improve opportunities for development, as well as the general well-being of people living in deep rural areas.

• *Local Economic Development:* In order to adhere to their developmental mandate, local governments have to act as catalysts for opportunities of local socio-economic development. From the perspective of sustainable development it is critical that municipalities strike a healthy and delicate balance between the economic and developmental needs of the community and that of the environment. This applies especially to areas such as spatial planning, resource management, strategies to protect the environment, as well as to dispose of waste and control pollution efficiently.

**Environmental interventionism**

Since 1992, clear signs emerge that the South African Government is committed to facilitate sustainable development within the country. Two international conventions were ratified in 1992. The first one was the Basel Convention (ratified in May 1994), and the second the Convention on Biological Diversity (ratified in September 1995). Over and above these two conventions, South Africa signed the Convention on Desertification, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the World Heritage Convention.

Various Agenda 21-related initiatives have been taken in South Africa under the auspices of the Committee for Sustainable Development, established in 1997. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped South Africa to adopt the UNDP Capacity 21 programme. The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism acted as champion for this programme. The Department, with the assistance of the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives and USAID, organised an African Regional Seminar in 1995, with the theme “Towards Urban Reconstruction and Development”. The Seminar focused primarily on the experiences of countries outside Africa that also have implemented Local Agenda 21 initiatives. Specific environmental initiatives include the following:

• The construction of a $21.8-billion, 5 000 MW solar park in the Northern Cape Province as part of an impetus to stimulate the industrialised economy and reduce poverty without increasing the carbon footprint.
• The World Bank granted Eskom a $3.75-billion loan, both to help build the country’s largest coal-fired plant, Medupi, and to finance renewable energy projects such as solar-power plants and wind farms.

• The electricity utility agency, Eskom, has implemented a solar water-heating programme, in which consumers who replace electric geysers with solar-powered ones are given a rebate.

• The Government launched a drive to install low-energy lighting in its buildings, which will save approximately $845-million in electricity costs per annum.

• Private sector investment in renewable energy plants is encouraged through feed-in tariffs. According to the World Wind Energy Association, South Africa is the first country in Africa to introduce a feed-in tariff for wind energy.

• Government also introduced an emissions tax (Sept 2010) on new passenger cars and light commercial vehicles. South Africa is reported to be the first country in the world to include the latter in such a regime, which aims to encourage individuals and businesses to buy smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this article was to outline governments’ interventionism regarding sustainable development by focusing on the South African Government. It is evident that within the framework of a developmental-state agenda, the South African Government has designed a comprehensive response involving particular interventions in the social, economic and environmental dimensions associated with sustainable development. It is further clear that South Africa partakes in various international treaties, protocols and interventions to facilitate sustainable development, whilst the government nationally also has established a comprehensive statutory and regulatory framework. The capacity and competency of Government to implement these responses and frameworks effectively are, however, not always on par with international good governance practices. Improved institutional capacity and effective political leadership can be singled out to support initiatives by government departments. Such initiatives will enable the departments to design and execute programmes that can further sustainable development.

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Measuring progress towards sustainable development in Africa

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ABSTRACT

The ‘sustainability’ of developmental programmes is one of the most elusive goals of any government services delivery system. ‘Sustainable development’ is an increasingly important umbrella concept to integrate various desired developmental outcomes of governmental interactions with its society. The concept is still a fuzzy one that frequently generates controversy. This article attempts to give an operational meaning to the term ‘sustainability’. It also distinguishes different dimensions of sustainability and suggests a concrete measuring instrument to determine progress towards achieving these different dimensions of sustainable development outcomes in Africa.

According to Bhamra (2015:1), “...social, economic, environmental and governance systems cannot be treated in isolation. For the systems to be concurrently aligned in the development paradigm, the first step is to develop a meta-metric framework that identifies indicators and their respective roles in the development processes. A clear comprehensive metric system that not just focuses on economic indicators but includes social, environmental and governance systems is a pre-requisite“.

This article starts off with a brief conceptualisation of development and of sustainability and then proceeds to summarise the main international approaches to sustainable development, and the way in which it is applied in Africa. The article concludes by identifying the main elements of a systematic generic instrument to measure sustainable development outcomes, focusing on the African context.

INTRODUCTION

This article firstly contextualises the interface between development and sustainability where development is conceived as an outcome of governmental interventions to empower people to consider feasible options in their lives and to make informed choices for a sustainable future.

This paradigm shift conceives sustainable development from an economic transformation in society perspective to a social, later environmental and eventually an integrated
improvement in all societal sectors over a long term period. The article highlights the following sectoral dimensions of sustainability: demographic sustainability, social sustainability, cultural sustainability, technological sustainability, economic sustainability and financial sustainability, environmental sustainability, political sustainability, institutional sustainability and managerial sustainability in order to provide an integrated perspective of effective sustainable development. This is followed by an overview of the application of the main approaches and measures of sustainable development globally, in Africa in general, and in South Africa in particular. The focus on sustainability assessment in this article includes all of these dimensions in order to achieve an accurate perspective on the durability of the envisaged policy interventions. The article also lists core sustainability indicators for South Africa to assess the progress towards achieving sustainable development in South Africa and concludes by identifying the main elements of a systematic generic instrument to measure sustainable development outcomes, focusing on the African context.

CONTEXTUALISING DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY

Although the two concepts of development and sustainability are increasingly linked, they are totally separate concepts that denote totally different phenomena. “Developmental policies are public policies which succeed in empowering people to exercise choices (Sen 1999), especially regarding the quality of life that they would prefer to maintain. The objective with sustainable development in this sense is to empower citizens to aspire to a self-sustaining improvement in medium to long term life quality. This implies inevitably a coherent systemic integration of development initiatives, resulting in a structural, functional and cultural consolidation of a new way of life. It culminates in the creation of a developmental culture in society, and implies not only short term progress towards empowerment for increasing quality of life, but also longer term durability of those higher standards of life” (Cloete 2007).

Development is conceived for purposes of this article as an outcome of governmental interventions in society that succeed in empowering people to consider feasible options in their lives and to make informed choices for the future (Cloete & Auriacombe 2013). These choices relate to any action, from satisfying individual basic needs to consolidating collective middle class lifestyles to eventually being able to fulfill higher level personal and collective needs, desires and goals.

Sustainability is based on the original idea of a more appropriate use of environmental socio-economic resources to enable future generations to also enjoy those resources instead of exhausting them in the short term by the current generation (Bell & Morse 2003:2). The concept was immortalised by the Brundtland Commission (1987), and has since been then the generally accepted definition of sustainable development. This conception of sustainable development is perfectly accurate and valid applied to economic conservation and the use of environmental and other resources, and is the logical result of the global approach to development in the middle of the 20th century, especially just before and after the second world war until the end of the 1960s. Development was during this period consistently regarded as sustainable macro-economic growth patterns across society that were supposed to result in a relatively linear fashion in sustainable micro-level socio-economic improvements in quality of life (Thorbecke 2006, Todaro & Smith 2011, UNECA 2012:4).
This conception of development changed dramatically from the 1970s when systematic programme evaluations started to provide evidence that macro-economic growth does not lead automatically to improvements in conditions of life in the absence of explicit supplementary micro-level social and socio-economic development programmes that focus more on people and not on money. Development foci then shifted to first trying to make ‘war on poverty’ by satisfying the ‘basic needs’ and later the ‘fundamental needs’ of individuals (Maslow 1943, Max-Neef 1991 & 2005) and to redistribute resources more equitably to poor communities (Pant 1974, Korten 1984, Thorbecke 2006, UNECA 2012:4).

The fact that balanced growth in multiple sectors is needed for development stability and durability over time began to dawn towards the end of the 1970s when the emerging negative cumulative impacts of the global oil and ozone crises and the effects of global warming on the world’s poor became evident (Schoenaker, Hoekstra and Smits 2015). The UN Commission on the Environment and Development was established in 1983 and in 1987 it commissioned a report on the then state of the environment and its implications for development (Brundtland 1987). This report coined the term ‘sustainable development’: “Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The concept of sustainable development does imply limits—not absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities” (par 27), and “Meeting essential needs requires not only a new era of economic growth for nations in which the majority are poor, but an assurance that those poor get their fair share of the resources required to sustain that growth. Such equity would be aided by political systems that secure effective citizen participation in decision making and by greater democracy in international decision making” (par 28).

The above quotes from the Brundtland Commission stated very unequivocally that the only strategy to achieve sustainable development is through a synchronised developmental approach in all societal sectors, including the social, cultural, technological, political, institutional and managerial dimensions of society. However, because the main rationale behind the appointment of the Commission was the worrying emerging impact of the so-called ‘greenhouse effect’ on future human activities, the Commission’s socio-economic resource-focused definition of sustainable development became the dominant conception of it, ignoring in the process the other supplementary dimensions of sustainable development that do not have direct resource use implications.

This paradigm shift in the conception of sustainable development from an economic transformation in society to a social, later environmental and eventually an integrated improvement in all societal sectors over a long term period, also had a crucial parallel impact on the conception of development itself. The primary goal of development as an improvement in objective quality of life was in the 1990s fundamentally changed when Amartya Sen (1985, 1999) pointed out that development can be either an objective improved outcome or a subjective change in attitude or both. He reconceptualised development as ‘choice’, or a fundamental individual empowerment to be able to choose what one wants to do. This approach resonates with the ‘public choice’ approach to economics and governance, but must be contextualised within Sen’s emphasis on the intervening role of the state to protect vulnerable segments of society from exploitation by the affluent (Thorbecke...
From this perspective, poverty is the individual and structural absence of freedom of choice, while development implies the availability of choices to exercise how one wants to spend one's future. These potential choices need not necessarily materialise in the form of improved quality of life, but need only be the availability of opportunities in an enabling environment that allows for the individual freedom to exercise feasible choices and to decide what you want to do.

Sen’s new conception of development confirmed the crucial catalytic intervening role of the state in sustainable development, as the Brundtland Report has mentioned in the quote above, and has been taken further in the form of a ‘new institutionalism’ approach (Thorbecke 2006:21). Sustainable development does not occur spontaneously by itself. It needs a combination of conducive factors, participation of various stakeholders and beneficiaries and monitoring and steering by public sector governance agencies in order to materialise and consolidate. It is therefore important to also emphasise the supportive governance dimensions of sustainable development that include political, institutional/organisational and managerial perspectives on sustainability (UNECA 2012:4). Christopoulos, Horvath & Kull (2012) formulate the argument for improved international governance of sustainable development as follows: “Sustainable Development…and its pillars are well known, and the need for integrating the social, economic and environmental aspects in development is widely accepted. A topic currently gaining momentum is the improvement of the institutional framework, as called for through the ongoing global processes”.

The main sectoral dimensions of sustainability that can be identified, include **demographic sustainability**, which consists of the achievement and maintenance of desired trends in human, fauna and flora populations that are stable and durable within a specified long-term time frame (Cloete 2007). **Social sustainability** can be conceptualised as the achievement and maintenance of an empowered citizenry that constitutes stable and cohesive communities striving towards a continuous improvement in achieving individual preferences and collective interests within a specified long-term time frame (Cloete 2007). UNECA (2011:23) summarises it still in pre-Sen terminology as “.. continuous improvement in the social well-being and quality of life”. It is typically measured by human and social development indicators.

**Cultural sustainability** comprises the achievement and maintenance of stable and durable systems of values, customs and practices expressing, promoting and developing the cultural identity of individuals and groups in a community or society (Cloete 2007), while **technological sustainability** is the achievement and maintenance of effective and appropriate stable technological systems enabling, supporting, facilitating and promoting societal activities in different sectors durably within a specified long term time frame. Sagar and Majumdar (2014) have put forward a very compelling argument for the optimal use of technology and innovation as a strategic strategy to achieve sustainability, especially in developing nations: “While there is no simple way to address these major sustainability challenges, given their scale and the interweaving of the drivers with the very fabric of our economic, social, and human existence, technology has the potential to play a major role in this process (see for example UNMP 2005). This is particularly important for developing countries, given that these challenges are pressing and urgent there. Yet leveraging the potential of technology for addressing sustainability challenges in developing countries is not a trivial exercise, given the uncertainties and the complexities of the technology innovation...”
process in general and in relation to the sustainability transition, especially in the developing-country context”.

**Economic sustainability** can be seen as the achievement and maintenance of a sound, stable and growing/expanding economic system that meets the needs of its society or has the potential to develop towards higher levels in an efficient and durable way within a specified long-term time frame (Cloete 2007). UNECA (2011:35) also summarises it as “...maintaining and sustaining a high real growth rate of the economy to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)”. The main requirements for sustainable businesses are well-summarised in UNEP (2007). Typically, indicators include growth rates of GDP, balance of payments, exports and imports; savings and investments; agriculture, manufacturing, debt and the structure of the economy (UNECA 2011:36).

**Financial sustainability** would then imply not spending more than you earn over time, and preferably not reducing assets or capacity, but rather building them up in a durable way within a specified long term time frame (Cloete 2007).

In the light of the above arguments, **environmental sustainability** can now be redefined as the achievement and maintenance of stable ecological and bio-diversity systems durably within a specified long-term time frame Cloete 2007), although UNECA (2011:44) still summarises it in the Brundtland Commission’s original terminology as the “...maintenance of the integrity of different environmental media and systems to ensure that their functions and beneficial uses are upheld for present and future generations”. Environmental sustainability indicators typically measure continuous improvements in the state of the atmosphere, soil and water (UNECA 2011:44).

As an important enabling dimension, **political sustainability** refers to dedicated democratic political commitment: continuous democratic support by political decision-makers for the programmes concerned, not only through consistent rhetoric, but also backing their words up by consistent democratic governance actions. Political sustainability is therefore the achievement and maintenance of a stable, effective political vision, commitment and support based on legitimate, transparent, democratic processes operating in a durable way within a specified long-term time frame (Cloete 2007). Closely linked to this is **institutional sustainability**, which can be conceived as the achievement and maintenance of stable, effective and efficient institutions that have a good record of achieving strategic policy objectives durably within a specified long-term time frame and of learning from past failures and successes (Cloete 2007). UNECA (2011:60) summarises this dimension as the creation and maintenance of an enabling “…environment of well-defined and responsive institutional and strategic frameworks”.

From an organisational and managerial perspective, sustainability can be seen as the institutional and functional durability of public policy programmes. Sustainability in this sense refers to the durability of services of a required quantity and at a required level of quality over an extended period (Cloete 2007. See also Gallopin 2003:35). It therefore implies a thorough assessment of all resource implications of service delivery, the incorporation of the results of such assessments into the design of service delivery strategies, and continuous access to the resources needed for sustainable services delivery (Cloete 2007). Following on this, **managerial sustainability** then logically comprises the achievement and maintenance of a combination of strong and committed leadership, clear and unambiguous strategic policy objectives, a broad-based consensus about these objectives, effective operational
policy implementation, coordination, monitoring, assessment and redesign, all durably within a specified long-term time frame (Cloete 2007). Sustainability in this sense also refers to the overall capacity of the organisation to deliver such services and adapt to changing circumstances over an extended period of time, maintaining and improving the services concerned. The World Bank (1992) regards sustainable development as “development that lasts”. Sustainability also includes the notions of flexibility and resilience in the face of setbacks (Snowden 2012, Bhamra 2015, Glemarec & De Oliveira 2012). Sustainability is therefore a manifestation of complexity and can only be assessed coherently from a trans-disciplinary perspective (Masis 2009, Du Plessis 2012, Du Plessis, Sehume & Martin 2014, Florin & Dedeurwaerdere 2014).

In 2012, the ‘Hakone Vision on Governance for Sustainability in the 21st Century’ was drafted. It “…calls for a fundamental restructuring of the IFSD that (i) clearly articulates the ‘aspirations’ of governance for sustainability including objectives and underlying values and norms, (ii) allows for meaningful and accountable participation by a wide range of ‘actors’ to develop solutions ‘from’ people ‘for’ people and (iii) creates an ‘architecture’ to include better configuration of actors, actor groups and their networks, as well as improved institutions and decision-making mechanisms” (Kanie, Betsill, Zondervan, Biermann & Young 2012. See also Swilling & Annecke 2012 and World Bank 1994).

This integrated perspective on effective sustainable development can be illustrated as follows:

Figure 1: Integrated systems approach to sustainability

![Integrated systems approach to sustainability](source: NFSD 2008:15)

**THE GLOBAL MEASUREMENT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT**

The first explicit international initiative to emphasise the importance of governments not only achieving developmental outcomes but to consistently maintain these outcomes and even improve them over a longer term time frame in order to maintain a stable improvement trend, was the so-called Rio Conference of the UN in 1992 (UNECA 2011:15). The Rio Conference adopted the 1987 Brundtland Commission’s conception of ‘sustainability’ as
summarised above. One of the most original contributions of the Rio Cterm development improvements imply integrated, synchronised and balanced developmental outcomes in different sectors, and not only isolated economic, social, environmental and democratic developmental progress in a country, and the initiation of global implementation plans to achieve these outcomes.

The Rio Conference was also the culmination of a number of other related initiatives that already started in the 1970s, eg the Social Indicators Programme of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which integrated the environment in urban development systems (OECD 2000, 2001, Strange & Bayley 2008), and the creation of the Human Development Index by the UNDP to measure different facets of human and social development. The Rio Conference, however, concluded in 1992 that “...(m)ethods for assessing interactions between different sectoral environmental, demographic, social and developmental parameters are not sufficiently developed or applied. Indicators of sustainable development need to be developed to provide solid basis for decision-making at all levels and to contribute to a self-regulating sustainability of integrated environment and development systems” (UN 1992: Agenda 21 – Chapter 40).

After the 1992 Rio Conference, the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) approved in 1995 a project to develop a generic set of indicators for Sustainable Development (UNECA 2011:15). The most authoritative ongoing international experiments in measuring sustainability still occur in the UNCSD. The UNCSD was created in December 1992 to ensure effective follow-up of the UN Rio Conference on the Environment and Development, and to monitor and report on the implementation of those agreements at the local, national, regional and international levels. Its main objective is to make indicators of sustainable development accessible to decision-makers at the national level (UNECA 2011:15).

In 1996 the UNCSD started to promote the linear Pressure-State-Impact-Response (PSIR) model of the OECD, and developed a working list of 134 indicators that was distributed to selected countries worldwide for voluntary testing to measure global and national progress towards sustainable development (UNCSD 1996, 2001:312–313). The model’s logic is that social and economic driving forces underlying human actions put pressure on the ecological system, bringing about changes both in the natural human environments (Cloete 2007). These changes have longer term impacts again both in the natural and human environments that necessitate more human intervention in response to these impacts to redress these negative consequences for sustainable development. The UNCSD, however, relinquished it five years later in favour of another approach, not because the model was flawed, but because it was in fact too rigid and sophisticated and needed data that just was not available, especially in developing countries (see also Bell & Morse 2001 for an analysis of some of the complexities involved in this approach, and Rotmans & De Vries 1997 for an interesting application of the PSIR model in a context of global change) (Cloete 2007).

In 2001 the UNCSD changed its approach to a non-linear, open ended ‘shopping list’ of product output and outcome indicators in the form of a systematic framework of four dimensions of accumulated capital (social, environmental, economic and institutional – see also Serageldin 1996 for a slightly different set of accumulated capital: natural, human, social and economic). The UNCSD indicator framework uses an integrated approach to sustainable governance and deals with both selected resource inputs and product outputs
and outcomes. It also contains indicators based on both normative and utilitarian issues relevant for an exercise of this nature. The most glaring weakness in the framework, however, is its superficial treatment of process-related indicators of efficiency and productivity. This is a serious flaw that needs to be remedied in future (Cloete 2007).

Another strategic development at the turn of the century that influenced the work of the UNCSD was the adoption by the UN of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Programme in 2000. It was an attempt to halve poverty in member countries by 2015 (UN Millennium Declaration 2000). “The UN Millennium Plan is basically a pro-active political strategy document, in contrast to the CSD framework that comprises a reactive, expert-driven, technocratic programme to measure sustainable development. The Millennium Plan incorporates most elements of the CSD framework, but comprises rather an abbreviated selection of certain elements from it” (Cloete 2006). The MDGs focus primarily on social and environmental issues and international partnerships to promote development in general. The eight main strategic MDGs aimed to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development. Ironically the MDGs ignore the integrated sustainability focus that had developed over a long time within the UN framework, as summarised above.

In 2014 progress towards achieving these main goals was mixed (UN 2013, UN MDG Report 2014:5–6). The number of extremely poor people and people without access to clean water were more than halved, but undernourishment and access to sanitation were only significantly improved. Gender parity in education was largely achieved but dropout rates remain high. Women in public positions improved. Child mortality was reduced by half and maternal mortality nearly by half. Malaria and TB deaths were halved and access to antiretroviral therapy (ART) for HIV-infected people increased dramatically. Ozone depleting substances have been nearly eliminated and terrestrial and coastal marine areas under protection have been increasing, but carbon dioxide emissions increased dramatically while more forests were lost, species endangered and fresh water became scarcer. International development cooperation, however, seemed to have improved (UN MDG Report 2014:5–6. See also WHO 2010 and UNIDO 2011).

In 2012 the UN Rio+20 meeting resolved to expand the relatively successful MDG programme into a fully-fledged Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Programme for the period 2015–2030 (UN 2012, UNDP 2012, Vandeweerd 2013, UN WG on SDGs 2014, UNEP 2015). The new programme contains a detailed series of indicators to measure progress towards achieving the 17 relatively ambitious stated SDGs below and an accompanying 169 targets by 2030 (UN WG on SDGs 2014:6, Le Blanc 2014:4):

“GOAL 1 End poverty in all its forms everywhere
GOAL 2 End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
GOAL 3 Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
GOAL 4 Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
GOAL 5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
GOAL 6  Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
GOAL 7  Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
GOAL 8  Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
GOAL 9  Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation
GOAL 10  Reduce inequality within and among countries
GOAL 11  Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
GOAL 12  Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
GOAL 13  Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
GOAL 14  Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
GOAL 15  Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
GOAL 16  Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
GOAL 17  Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development”.

The sustainable development indicators that have been used in the MDGs project and that are suggested for the SDGs one, are based on the UNCSD indicator framework. This is the most authoritative indicator framework for this purpose and should produce good results. However, Le Blanc (2014) assessed the envisaged SDG programme and states that “the proposed goals and targets can be seen as a network, in which links among goals exist through targets that refer to multiple goals... Our mapping also reveals some missing links among goals, compared to what our knowledge of the biophysical, social and economic systems would suggest”. Langford (2012) concluded that “(t)he Rio Declaration 2012 establishes a number of criteria for this purpose but they remain at a general level and gloss over some hard trade-offs”. He developed a series of additional criteria to test the suitability of indicators that are used to measure progress towards achieving the SDGs (2012:19). The latest version of the SDG indicator set that the UN is considering is available in its recent report on the topic (UNSDSN 2015).

An interesting application of the CSD indicator framework is in Brazil, where the most comprehensive National Sustainable Development Programme developed so far, can be found (Brazil 2004). In contrast to Argentina, the Brazilian government has developed and started to implement its programme in a pragmatic, bottom-up experimental approach over a number of years (Brazil 2002), and has only now realised the need for a systematic integrated measuring instrument. The strength of the Brazilian approach is that it is driven and coordinated by the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, and resulted in a very effective linkage of strategic sustainable development goals with governmental action plans and budgetary allocations for those action plans (Brazil 2002:46). A strong policy research and assessment culture in that Ministry (with the assistance of 400 full-time researchers), also provides systematic data compilation and evaluation capacity for the government, that can be used for strategic and integrated policy review and redesign experiments (Cloete 2007).

This organisational culture has resulted in the incremental emergence of a comprehensive integrated national sustainable development policy and programme monitoring and evaluation system that is very advanced even compared to those of highly developed nations in the first world. The social and economic dimensions are, however, dealt with in much more detail than the environmental and institutional dimensions of Brazilian society. The expansion of the Brazilian indicator framework in these sectors and the more effective integration of these sectors with the social and economic ones are at the moment the focus of attention (Brazil 2002:64, Cloete 2007).

The most recent progress in the conceptual development of systematic sustainable development frameworks can be found in Latin America. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in Santiago, Chile has pioneered a programme on sustainability assessment that resulted in a conceptual systems model for sustainable development that is also applicable in other developing contexts (Gallopin 2003, Cloete 2007, Martinez 2007). Gallopin’s model conceptualises sustainability as the durability of what he calls the essential identity of a whole socio-ecological system over time (Gallopin 2003:15, 19, 35). This implies the interaction between all sectors of human society and the natural environment within which humans live. Gallopin contrasts strong sustainability (where minimum critical values or capital must exist in each separate sector of society and the natural environment), with weak sustainability (where manufactured capital may in some cases be substituted for natural capital (Gallopin 2003:16). Sustainable development is conceptualised as systematic improvements in a desired direction over time (Gallopin, 2003:35; Cloete 2007).

ECLAC also assisted the government of Argentina to develop the most comprehensive systematic national Framework of Indicators for Sustainable Development yet devised for a single country, based on the UNCSD indicator framework (Argentina 2005). This report takes the systematic assessment of sustainability indicator one step further by not only identifying concrete policy indicators for social, economic, environmental and institutional development, but also explicit indicators to measure the inter-relationships among these sectors (Argentina 2005:103, 2009). In contrast to other attempts that developed recommended integrated frameworks of indicators (eg OECD 2000 & 2001, EC 2001), this exercise has resulted in an authoritative measuring instrument that was designed on the request of the government of Argentina (and published under the name of the President of the Nation), for application throughout the Argentinian public sector (Cloete 2007). This instrument has provided the
Argentinian government with a potential regulatory framework blueprint with the authority and the legitimacy to drive national sustainability strategies in that country in a coherent and effective way if it is applied appropriately (Cloete 2007).

The ECLAC approach to measuring sustainable development is the most sophisticated framework that has been developed yet. However, it is a complicated measurement tool that requires highly sophisticated datasets of UNCSD-type indicators. Its main advantage is the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach that measures only two variables systematically at a time, and that can therefore theoretically produce much more accurate results regarding the impact of one variable on another. It is a measurement approach that is probably only feasible in highly developed contexts that already have accurate, reliable, tested specialised datasets on the respective issues that are to be measured, available.

Other interesting international attempts to develop systematic indicators for measuring sustainability include those of Hart (1999), Hezri (2004), Hueting & Reijnders (2004), Prescott-Allen (2001), the OECD (2000 & 2001), the European Commission (European Commission 2001), Agenda 21 (UN-Agenda21 1992), Kirkpatrick, George & Curran (2001), the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (nrg4SD 2004a&b), the Community Indicators Project, Redefining Progress (RP 2002), SDI (2002), the International Institute of Sustainable Development’s Dashboard of Sustainability (IISD 2000, 2002), the International Conservation Union’s Barometer of Sustainability (IUCN 1997), and the World Bank’s Performance Monitoring Indicators (World Bank 1996) (Cloete 2007). The United Kingdom’s indicators are relatively comprehensive (UK DEFRA 2014), as is the UN’s sustainable development measurement approach in Europe (UNECE 2009), while a recent innovate addition to this literature is Bhamra (2015) on the development of a general resilience framework to measure sustainable development.

Schoenaker, Hoekstra and Smits (2015) summarised, compared and assessed 55 sustainable development measurement systems that have developed over the last four decades internationally. It is the first and most comprehensive assessment of such measurement frameworks. Their summary provides the details of the initial economic measurement frameworks that dominated this scene until the early nineties, and were then replaced by more refined, integrated sustainability measurement frameworks especially since about 1995, based on the important work done by the UNCSD.

One of the most crucial new conceptual models towards a more integrated system of measurement manifested in the Stiglitz–Sen–Fitoussi Report published in 2009 (Stiglitz et al. 2009). It comprises “...the report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress which was led by Nobel prize winners Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen, as well as the prominent French economist Jean-Paul Fitoussi. The main aim of the commission was to identify the limits of GDP as an indicator of economic performance and social progress, and to assess the feasibility of alternative measurement tools”. This report led to a report by the OECD and EU Conference of European Statisticians (EUCES) on how to refine the measurement of sustainable development, which is the most recent and authoritative model for this purpose, competing with the UNCSD approach. It identifies 20 cross-sectoral themes based on the three pillars that constitute the foundations of the Brundtland report’s narrow conception of sustainable development that excludes the institutional and governance cluster (EU 2013, UN 2014). There is clearly a need for further harmonisation of these competing approaches to the measurement of sustainable
development. This process is in progress through high-level discussions at international level among the different stakeholders on this issue. The UNCSD approach still seems to be more relevant, given its wider focus that incorporates the crucial institutional governance cluster of indicators in a much more balanced way.

MEASURING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

This section will assess very briefly the progress with and measurement of sustainable development in general on the African continent and then in South Africa in particular.

Measuring sustainable development in Africa in general

Development in Africa has always been very problematic, given the colonial legacy of most nations on that continent which resulted in disfunctional international boundaries across the continent and large degrees of skewed and underdevelopment and even exploitation in many countries. This situation was aggravated by successive authoritarian regimes after decolonisation in most African countries which mismanaged resources and development programmes for the benefit of a small group of ruling elites only. Although this situation has improved since the 2000s, bad governance still plague many African countries (Financial Times 2013, Okolo 2014, Africa Progress Panel 2015).

The 2012 UNECA Report on progress with sustainable development in Africa (2012:6–7) summarised the main problems that the 2002 WSSD identified, as:

1. “A fragmented approach towards sustainable development that de-coupled environment and development.
2. Lack of integrated national policies and approaches in the areas of finance, trade, investment, technology, and sustainable development.
3. Continuing unsustainable patterns of consumption and production.
4. Inadequate financial resources and technology transfer from developed countries”.

The report concluded that “(f)irst, there was an urgent need for more countries to convert international obligations into national policy on sustainable development. Second, the transition from normative standards to operational programmes needed to be associated with the creation of new knowledge (through scientific and technological research and the integration of indigenous knowledge) as part of a larger societal problem-solving process. Thus, there was a much greater need for the application of new knowledge and innovative means, and for the reorientation of technology to respond to sustainability challenges” (UNECA 2012:7).

At the time of the Johannesburg Summit (2002), 95% of African countries had already ratified the Rio Conventions on Biodiversity, Climate Change and Combatting Desertification while a whole range of African countries were actively pursuing different sustainable development activities. The transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2001, and the establishment of NEPAD created stronger implementation capacity: “…the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),…an AU programme that came into being in 2001, is a
pledge by African leaders to address the continent’s multi-faceted development challenges for the achievement of the MDGs and sustainable development. It recognizes that poverty eradication and improved living conditions for the majority of the population are essential for sustainable development. NEPAD outlines the responsibility of African leaders to articulate national and regional priorities and to manage development by engaging Africans in leading and owning their development” (UNECA 2012:7).

However, the 2012 UNECA report found that a series of obstacles still prevents African countries ten years later to make significant progress with sustainable development (see also UNDESA 2008). The report’s main findings on each of the four sustainable development pillars are the following:

- **Sustainable Institutions and Good Governance:** “The dark years of personalized power, prevalence of unaccountable and authoritarian governments, violation of human rights, rampant corruption, absence of the rule of law, massive state intervention in the economy and lack of decentralization of responsibilities and resources are receding in Africa. The region is today making strides in the building of democratic institutions and will continue to pursue efforts aimed at good governance within the context of the activities of AU (and) the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)” (UNECA 2012:10. See also Financial Times 2013a).

- **Sustainable Economic Development:** “…(O)ver the past decade, the unweighted average growth rate was about the same for Africa and Asia. Given current prospects, there is a strong likelihood that Africa will surpass Asia in growth in the next decade… In 2010, Africa’s average growth rate rose to 4.9 per cent, from 3.1 per cent in 2009. … The political developments in North Africa were projected to have a depressing effect on the continent’s growth, leading to a fall to 3.7 per cent in 2011, with the possibility of accelerating to 5.8 per cent in 2012. Despite the return to growth, generally the region still faces enormous development challenges…this will require significant policy shifts, as well as financial and technical resources, to … avoid a rise in poverty levels” (UNECA 2012:12). De Loitte (2012) confirmed this assessment: “Africa’s middle class has tripled over the last 30 years, with one in three people now considered to be living above the poverty line—but not among the wealthy. The current trajectory suggests that the African middle class will grow to 1.1 billion (42%) in 2060. As African economies are growing (7 of the 10 fastest growing in the world are African), the wealth is trickling down and Africa now has the fastest growing middle class in the world”. The Africa Competitiveness Report (2013) contains useful data on progress with African development.

- **Sustainable Social Development:** “The key elements in the analysis of sustainable social development include the extent of social sector development, poverty eradication, and the level of inequality. The region recorded a number of success stories in the achievement of the MDGs and is on track. A number of countries made good progress, but overall progress is somewhat slow. Nonetheless, the evidence is strong and encouraging that, with the right policy mix, efficient use of resources, improved governance and enhanced and sustained international support, the region will achieve many of the MDGs” (UNECA 2012:14).

- **Sustainable Environmental Development:** “More than 30 per cent of global dry lands are located in susceptible dry land regions in North Africa, the Sahel and the southern
part of Africa. They cover almost two billion hectares in 25 countries, representing 65 per cent of the continent’s land mass. Over 400 million people live in the dry lands, the majority of them the rural poor with an annual population growth rate of three per cent. The dry land is under threat from deforestation, soil erosion, nutrient mining, recurrent drought and climate change, potentially resulting in land degradation and desertification, and aggravated poverty.

In spite of the progress in the implementation of commitments around the environmental pillar, there are monumental challenges requiring urgent attention. Among the most visible is the challenge of achieving balanced integration of the three pillars of sustainable development in planning, budgeting and implementation of plans and programmes. There is a pressing need for national and sub-regional economic policies adequately to address environmental consequences. Mechanisms and administrative systems dealing with environmental issues are still weak. There is still insufficient public awareness about the real causes and magnitude of environmental problems and the consequences of not dealing with them. Also worthy of mention is inadequate forecasting of emerging environmental problems” (UNECA 2012:22).

The authoritative UNECA report on sustainability in Africa concludes that “...little progress has been made to foster a balanced integration of the pillars in national and subregional integration strategies, however. In order to exploit fully the benefits of interlinkages, the region needs appropriate institutional and strategic frameworks and supporting systems that promote a holistic and integrated approach to development challenges. Global, regional and national level strategic responses to the MDGs provide invaluable opportunities to harness the synergies of the pillars of development. This report calls for strengthened interlinkages among the pillars in order to achieve the goals of sustainable development” (2012:26). This conclusion emphasises in no uncertain terms the need for more effective good governance and management in African countries in order to ensure that sustainable development on the continent is fast-tracked. The report suggested detailed recommendations for improving measurable, integrated, sustainable development in Africa, all built around better leadership, management and governance in African countries (UNECA 2012:30. See also Ahmed & Hanson 2011 a&b, Swilling 2011 & 2013, Master of Finance 2014, Mutunga, Zulu & De Souza 2012, Borchert 2015, Africa Progress Panel 2015, ISS 2014).

In addition to the UNCSD Sustainability Framework which is the most authoritative measuring index for this purpose in Africa and which is used by UNECA, additional useful sustainability indices include the general Afrobarometer, the Mo Ebrahim African Governance Index and Alison (2014) questioning good governance progress in Africa, the African Sustainability Barometer (Financial Times 2013b) for gauging the sustainability of business operations in Africa, and the general Democracy Index of the Economist (2014).

Measuring sustainable development in South Africa

The draft South African National Framework for Sustainable Development (NFSD) was published in 2007 (NFSD 2007). This was the first attempt to develop such a holistic policy framework for this country. It was necessitated by the resolutions taken during the so-called Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development during 2001. Annex 2 of that framework
contains a series of indicators to measure progress towards sustainable development goals in different sectors in South Africa.

The approach that was followed in the report was based on the CSD model, identifying the four main sectors within which sustainability would be pursued. These are the social, economic, environmental and institutional sectors. Dynamic indicators were conceived, indicating either positive or negative changes in policy outputs and outcomes over a specified period. The use of a combination of dynamic indicator ratios based on both stand-alone indicators and composite indices that reflect change over time is an important strategic departure from the traditional use of stand-alone, static, snapshot indicators that provide a picture of a given moment in time and which is outdated immediately after the measurement is taken (Rabie 2014). The different types of indicators used, accommodate and reflect the complexity of the phenomena under investigation.

At the time, these indicators, however, still had to be synchronised with the general National Indicator Initiative (NII) which formed part of the Government Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System (GWM&ES) coordinated by the Presidency (SA-GWM&ES 2005). Unfortunately this never happened because of bureaucratic competition between the Presidency and the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) (the lead department of the NFSD). In the end, the final approved NFSD did not contain any additional sustainability indicators (NFSD 2007. See also Cloete 2007, Cloete, Møller, Dzengwa & Davids 2003).

### Core Sustainability indicators for South Africa

The following list of potential indicators to assess progress towards achieving sustainable development in South Africa is contained in Annex 2 of the 2007 draft of the NFSD (see also Cloete 2005 & 2006 for background working papers that lead to the development of this list of potential indicators):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential social sustainability indicators</th>
<th>Potential economic sustainability indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Change in % of population living below poverty line</td>
<td>• Change in real per capita growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Change in gender adult literacy ratio</td>
<td>• Change in municipal financial viability ratio</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in Gini-index of income inequality</td>
<td>• Change in capital formation/GDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in % of total income &amp; expenditure of 5th quintile</td>
<td>• Change in debt to GNP ratio</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in ratio of average female wage to male wage</td>
<td>• Change in balance of trade in goods and services</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in % of black senior &amp; middle managers/ professionals or ownership of public organisations &amp; businesses</td>
<td>• Change in role of investments in GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Change in % of poor households (&lt; R1 100 pm) access to free basic services: water, sanitation--including solid waste removal, health &amp; electricity)</td>
<td>• Change in tax collected as a percentage of GDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in nutritional status of children</td>
<td>• Change in consumer price index</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in mortality rate under 5 years old</td>
<td>• Change in changes in land tenure and land utilization patterns</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in life expectancy at birth</td>
<td>• Change in annual energy consumption per capita/ GDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in contraceptive prevalence rate</td>
<td>• Change in proportion of renewable energy sources of total supply of primary energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in general waste produced per income group per year</td>
<td>• Change in general waste produced per income group per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential environmental sustainability indicators</td>
<td>Potential institutional sustainability indicators</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Change in emissions of greenhouse gases as ratio of GDP/per capita</td>
<td>• Existence of a National Sustainable Development Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Change in consumption of ozone depleting substances</td>
<td>• Change in democratic participation and accountability: degree of free and fair elections (including voting %) and public acceptance of results, political competition, composition (GWM&amp;ES, WB-KKZ, Mil 12-gender, IPU) &amp; accountability of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Change in concentration of criteria air pollutants in urban areas</td>
<td>• Change in instability (legitimacy of government): democratic nature of transitions of power, levels &amp; nature of political protest, political &amp; ethnic violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Change in ratio of fertilizer and pesticide consumption to agricultural produce</td>
<td>• Change in ethics: Codes of conduct, existence and effectiveness of institutional arrangements to deal with corruption, number of corruption cases, sources of exposure of corruption, protection of whistleblowers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Change in land affected land degradation and desertification</td>
<td>• Change in regulatory quality: ease of access to services and opportunities, individual and company tax policy and patent rights protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Change in land productivity versus potential</td>
<td>• Change in unemployment rate: narrowly or widely conceived</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in arable and permanent crop land area</td>
<td>• Change in waste recycling and re-use</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in wood harvesting intensity</td>
<td>• Change in access to public transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in exploitation of fossil fuels for the generation of energy</td>
<td>• Change in internet connections per 1 000 of the population</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Change in algae concentration in coastal waters</td>
<td>• Change in electricity network coverage</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Change in water supply ratios: private homes, businesses, agriculture and industry</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Change in main telephone lines per 1000 inhabitants</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Change in pc’s per 1000 of population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Change in road &amp; rail infrastructure per capita</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Change in expenditure on research and development as a percent of GDP</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
As a result of the lack of interest of the South African Presidency in 2007 to include explicit sustainability indicators into its final National Development Indicator set, the above draft indicators were never fully developed in terms of the conceptual dimensions of sustainability summarised above. The institutional indicators suffered the most as a result, because they only included a rough adaptation of the World Bank’s governance indicator indices (Cloete 2006). A more comprehensive set of indicators to measure the different dimensions of sustainability has since been developed by the author (Cloete 2007). These indicators are generic and applicable with slight refinements in different national contexts.

In 2011, however, the South African Cabinet approved a three year National Strategy for Sustainable Development and Action Plan:2011–2014 that provided a programme of action to promote 5 strategic priority areas of the NFSD during this period (NSSD1 2011). This strategy includes a restructuring of the South African governance system and building capacity to clarify roles in attempting to achieve the NSSD1 goals. The document also contains a range of indicators for the 5 identified strategic priorities which are integrated planning and implementation systems, sustaining ecosystems and natural resource utilisation, a green economy, sustainable communities and responding to climate change. These indicators are still very unsystematic and incomplete. They need to be significantly revised and integrated into the existing development Indicators of the Presidency as well as the environmental indicators of the DEA, which still exist separately and parallel to the NSSD1 indicators. The governance of sustainability in South Africa is therefore still largely inadequate.
The South African government has also recently initiated another attempt to develop explicit sustainability indicators (NPC 2011). This exercise is currently in progress and constitutes an important project within the UN’s new SDG programme. Its outcomes are regarded with high anticipation by specialists in this field.

CONCLUSIONS

The need for balanced and integrated development outcomes across the globe is generally accepted as a prerequisite for sustainable human progress. The 1987 Brundtland Report kick-started a major initiative championed by the UN to achieve this strategic global goal. This initiative is gaining strength, as the positive and negative global impacts of human activities across the world in social, economic, environmental and institutional sectors of society become clearer. Under the auspices of the UN, there is a clear international trend developing towards the measurement of progress towards achieving sustainable development in different sectoral dimensions. Sustainability assessment has to focus on all of these dimensions in order to achieve an accurate perspective on the durability of these envisaged policy interventions. An emerging good practice is further to assess sustainable development more accurately within a complexity and resilience paradigm.

Sustainable development in Africa is a much more elusive target than in many other regions of the world, because of the developmental backlogs and unfavourable conditions that still exist in most African countries as a result of colonial exploitation and post-colonial bad governance and management in many countries on the continent. This situation, has, however started to change for the better over the last decade, and indications of slow but steady improvements in developmental levels in many African countries are beginning to emerge. This is, however, unfortunately still not the general norm, and some African countries are still in very weak positions as a result of intractible internal and external conflicts, and bad governance and management that still result in continuous socio-economic exploitation of the masses and environmental exploitation of the natural environment by governing elites, causing extreme poverty.

Sustainability assessment is a fast developing, emergent sub-field of higher order evaluation management. The measurement of sustainable development across the globe has established a strong foundation with the work of the UNCSD, ECLAC and, more recently also with the work of the CES in the EU. However, current sustainability indices still differ much in terms of focus and approach, and in most cases tend to focus primarily on socio-economic and environmental sectors and neglect the different institutional dimensions of good governance and management that are needed to stimulate and manage balanced, integrated development in the main societal sectors.

The systematic monitoring, measurement and evaluation of any programme performance further require a number of enabling conditions, among which the existence of reliable, regularly updated, quality data on the issues concerned is an important prerequisite. This requirement is infrequently met in developing nations, especially in Africa. The result is that effective sustainability measurement in Africa in general is still largely at the rhetorical level, with the important exception of South Africa, where a comprehensive system of monitoring and evaluation of governmental programmes has been institutionalised since 2005 and has
slowly started to take root in a top-down way, driven and coordinated by the Presidency. This top-down model has also now been emulated in a number of other African countries and seems to be the most effective strategy to fast-track the implementation of a more rigorous evaluation of the results of public sector interventions in those societies.

A comprehensive draft set of sustainability indicators has further been developed in South Africa to measure the South African National Framework for Sustainable Development, but has so far not yet been implemented. A new initiative to do that, is currently under way. This exercise has the potential to establish a generic framework of sustainability indicators that would also be applicable with some customisation in other national contexts.

The dedicated implementation by the UN of its new SDG programme also has the potential to fast-track progress towards the achievement of these goals by 2030, although a range of enabling conditions will have to be met before full goal achievement will be possible.

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The state of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) as a discipline in Africa
From infancy to adulthood?

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ABSTRACT

Since the early 1990s, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) has seen a steep climb within Africa—in terms of practice, profession and academic study. As a field of practice, specialised departments housing the practitioners now exist and the demand for evaluation of policies, projects, programmes and interventions remains on the increase. Legal and institutional frameworks for the practices of M&E are still weak. As a profession, over 30 national evaluation associations under the umbrella body—the African Evaluation Association (AFREA) are in existence. As an academic field of study several universities now offer programmes in M&E; notwithstanding the focus and locus dilemma regarding the discipline. Scholarship regarding the state of the field is thus of utmost importance to coherently describe the ‘ups and downs’ of the new field which has become a ‘grown up child’ having jumped the infancy stage. This article examines four interrelated questions: How has the M&E field evolved in Africa and what local and global forces have been behind this evolution? Is M&E a discipline of study? What precisely is the state of the M&E discipline in African universities? What is the future of M&E in Africa? Answers to these questions will provide useful insights into the muddy waters of the new discipline which has persistently been claimed by several other disciplines within public discourses.

INTRODUCTION

This article provides an overview of how the M&E field developed in Africa and it also discusses the local and global forces that provided momentum to this development. The
article begins with a conceptual debate on the terminologies of M&E and provides the context in which these terminologies are used in Africa. The article investigates the current state of the M&E discipline in African universities and contextualises the locus and focus before the article turns to the trends and future direction of the teaching of the field.

**BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE**

According to Auriacombe (2013:717), “…in order to gain a better understanding of what evaluation is all about it is necessary to look into the historical background of evaluation research (cf. also Auriacombe 2009:161). Globally, the international status of M&E research remains theoretically and methodologically influenced by the American tradition. The United States (US) is regarded as the motherland of the field in terms of its trends, number of authors and their academic and professional influence, degree of professionalisation, focus of academic programmes, legislation and institutionalisation of evaluation, development of models and approaches for evaluation, evaluation capacity building initiatives, evaluation standards and guiding principles, number and attendees of evaluation conferences and workshops, publications and their impact factor, guides and evaluation handbooks. The American Evaluation Association (AEA) for example remains the most dominant evaluation society in the world with membership that has grown from just over 3000 members in 2001 to approximately 7000 by mid-2015. The association has members from every state in the US and in more than 60 foreign countries. In October 2005, AEA together with the Canadian Evaluation Society (CES) held a joint meeting in Toronto where some 2500 evaluation practitioners assisted in four days with more than 525 concurrent sessions dealing with evaluation themes and issues.

Stockman and Meyer (2013:26) submit that the development of theoretical and methodological approaches and models in evaluation research is often dominated by American authors. Their training programmes for evaluators have expanded to cover the non-university sectors with many schools, state institutions, companies and different national professional associations offering such courses. Other countries however, equally have noticeable developments regarding evaluation. In Europe, professionalisation of evaluation has progressed to different levels across countries with Sweden, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, Norway, France and Finland currently topping the list. Recent rankings further point to impressive developments of the field in Switzerland, Japan, Spain, Italy, Israel and Africa. In 2011, the International Organization for Cooperation in Evaluation (IOCE) identified 117 evaluation associations, 96 of which were national organisations located in 78 different countries. By 2013, the number had increased to 145 (IOCE 2013:2 and BaTall 2009:7).

In Africa, the oldest evaluation association was established in 1997 in Ghana, while the African Evaluation association was itself established in 1999 with the heyday period of intense professional associations reported between 2000 and 2004. Domestic and global forces played a role in this growth. Globally, Mertens and Russon (2000:275) proclaim that the emergence of many new regional and national organisations illustrated the growing worldwide recognition of the importance of evaluation. Before 1995 there existed only five regional and/or national evaluation organisations in the world but by 2000 there were
more than 30 - a 500% increase in a 5-year period. Much of this growth was occurring in developing countries, particularly in Africa (p. 275). Malefetsane, Lungepi and Tembile (2014:5) educate us that in Africa, evaluation has been on the increase; a trend predicted to continue especially with political recognition of the utility of evaluation to good governance. De Kool and Van Buuren (2004:173) conceded that the rise to New Public Management (NPM) which was constructed around key philosophies that emphasised outputs and outcomes, transparency and accountability, created a demand for M&E in Africa.

NPM was intended to overcome the shortcomings of public sector administration through the adoption of market-based operations, private sector values and techniques of management as well as through changing the role of government from acting as the principal vehicle for socio-economic development to guiding and facilitating that development (Chani 2013:12). NPM was characterised by accent on results both in planning and in evaluation of programmes and people, service to the public with a special concern for quality, citizens as clients, delegation of authority as close as possible to the level of action and empowerment of employees, greater attention to cost through comprehensive auditing, contracting out, and introduction of competition, as well as private sector techniques for motivating employees such as merit pay, mission statements and quality circles (Dwivedi and Williams 2011:31). The shift toward more performance measurement and quantification led to an increased interest in measuring the worth of policies, projects, programmes or various interventions. M&E as a result grew in popularity among the developed countries to determine how policies, projects, programmes and interventions were working or not working.

Dabelstein (2003:365) avers that while evaluation institutions exist in many developing countries, most have little impact on policy and management decisions due to the lack of demand: credible evaluation is a function of good governance, i.e. demand for accountability more than of institutionalisation of evaluation and/or professional capacity. Matsiliza (2012:67) recently demonstrated how the process of policy evaluation and monitoring; if well undertaken; could promote political and administrative accountability in the public sector in addition to measuring performance and efficiency of different interventions. Despite this utility Khan (1998:315) reports how some parts of the developing world, such as Africa, find themselves with top political leadership who are unaware of the benefits of M&E. This perception sounds plausible and most academicians in public administration equally lack a thorough understanding of the field itself.

Toulemonde (1999:157) supports reinforcing an evaluation culture through intense and sustained communication about evaluation. This in itself centres around deliberate efforts on capacity building. He argues that developing and implementing evaluation activities, processes, structures, and systems that sustain high-quality evaluation practice needs to remain vibrant activities. M&E systems however, are not easy to introduce and sustain (Khan 1998:324). Meanwhile, Dabelstein (2003:369) rightly reminds us that when evaluation capacity is judged to be insufficient, activities should be carried out simultaneously to support the development of the necessary capacity in countries where the need has been identified. The role of universities in building the needed evaluation capacities becomes necessary in this context. Unfortunately, few publications exist on the continent devoted to tracking the journey of the field yet it is the kind of story that needs to be told from an African point of view and by Africans. Politicians, academics, students and practitioners need a coherent description of how the field has evolved and where it is headed. According
to Auriacombe (2013:717), “…in order to gain a better understanding of what evaluation is all about it is necessary to look into the historical background of evaluation research (cf. also Auriacombe 2009:161).

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTEXT

Conceptually, M&E is widely used in African discourses unlike international literature where evaluation or programme evaluation is used. Patton (2003:90) observed the confusion relating to the definition of M&E. In its ordinary usage, monitoring means observing the progress of an intervention and is continuous. Evaluation is an activity that judges the worth (Scriven 2007:7); and builds on monitoring although it can also feed into monitoring. Evaluation assesses the value or worth of a programme (Farell et al. 2002:8) and it relates to a set of research questions and methods geared to reviewing processes, activities and strategies for the purpose of improving them in order to achieve better results (Kahan & Goodstadt 2005:11). Patton (2008:3) cautions how evaluation is different from research. Auriacombe (2013:716) states that, “Various attempts have been made to classify evaluation methods. Although these attempts were aimed at simplifying the confusing array of available methods they tend to further confuse our understanding of the evaluation field”.

Stockman (2011:14) suggests that evaluation in its general form should be regarded as an assessment or judgement of a circumstance or object on the basis of information. The information is gathered, analysed and assessed for a specific end, namely to make a decision. This assessment is a systematic investigation of the worth of a programme or project for the purpose of reducing uncertainty in decision making (Mertens 1998:219). It uses social research techniques for assessing how an intervention was conceived, formulated, legitimated or approved, implemented and whether the intended purpose has been attained. Evaluation should be regarded as the systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results (OECD 2002:5).

Contextually, M&E is used from three strands. Firstly, as a field of practice whose origin is as old as mankind. Stockman (2011:14) in support of this view states that “the meaning associated with the term evaluation can be retraced well back into the history of mankind. If for example someone tried roasted meat to see if it tasted better than raw meat and whether or not it was more easily digestible, or if someone set out to discover whether certain fungi or plants were edible or not, or if the work that needed to be done could be carried out more easily and more precisely with one tool than with another, he was in fact conducting a simple form of evaluation”. In the modern usage of the term, the term practice implies that the field attracts people to work in it on a full-time basis to earn a living. Such people are in government departments of M&E, civil society organisations, consultancy and academia.

Secondly, M&E is used as a profession. Stufflebeam and Coryn (2014:6) regard it as a distinct profession and defend how evaluation is supportive of all other professions and in turn is supported by many of them arguing that in fact no profession could excel without evaluation. Services and research can lead to progress and stand up to public and professional scrutiny only if they are regularly subjected to rigorous evaluation and shown to be sound. Also, improvement-oriented self-evaluation is a hallmark of professionalism.
Programme leaders and all members of any profession are obligated to serve their clients well. This requires that they regularly evaluate, improve, and are accountable for their contributions. In the sense of assessing and improving quality and meeting accountability requirements, all professions (including evaluation) are dependent on evaluation. Wikipedia defines a profession as a vocation founded upon specialised educational training, the purpose of which is to supply disinterested objective counsel and service to others, for a direct and definite compensation, wholly apart from expectation of other business gain. Major milestones which mark an occupation being identified as a profession include the following:

- an occupation becomes a full-time occupation
- the establishment of a training school
- the establishment of a university school (department)
- the establishment of a local association
- the establishment of a national association
- the introduction of codes of professional ethics
- the establishment of state licensing laws

Thirdly, M&E is an academic discipline. Unlike other disciplines however, evaluation is still young and is often claimed by several other disciplines. Evaluation draws concepts, criteria, and methods from such other fields as philosophy, political science, psychology, sociology, anthropology, education, economics, communication, public administration, information technology, statistics, and measurement. Clearly it is important for evaluators to recognise and build on the symbiotic relationships between evaluation and other fields of study and practice (Stufflebeam and Coryn 2014:6).

The three strands of M&E sometimes brings about the ‘chicken-egg dilemma’. There is hardly any science of what comes first. The academic study for example can propel practitioners to form professional associations. The professionalisation efforts on the other hand can encourage new entrants into the evaluation profession and because such entrants lack academic qualifications their desire for academic qualifications is fulfilled by universities establishing courses of study. This seems to have been the case in Africa. When the practices need to be documented and a common body of knowledge developed (models, principles, theories and concepts of evaluation), scholars take an important role in this endeavour. This in effect calls for the blending of theory and practice.

**EVOLUTION OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION IN AFRICA**

Preskill and Boyle (2008:1) regard the first decade of the 21st century as the years that marked an important evolutionary stage in the evaluation profession’s history. This section of the article examines those forces responsible for the growth of M&E in Africa. The main body to have globally set the agenda for greater professionalism in evaluation was the Expert Group on Evaluation of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) created in 1982 and it subsequently became the DAC Working Party on Evaluation. In March 1987 a conference organised by DAC to give donors and beneficiaries the opportunity to discuss evaluation provided an...
important pioneering work for evaluation in Africa. It discussed and documented the dire capacity gaps that bewildered developing countries; Africa inclusive.

Within Africa, the Abidjan seminar of May 1990 whose objectives included clarification of evaluation needs as perceived by the countries themselves and designing modalities of strengthening self-evaluation capacity was the next important milestone in the evolution of evaluation. This was moving side by side with the global developments. Mertens and Russon (2000:276) reports on the November 1995 American Evaluation Association (AEA) and the Canadian Evaluation Society (CES) cosponsored an international conference in Vancouver, British Columbia whose theme was Evaluation for a New Century—A Global Perspective which set the agenda for revolutionalising evaluation in other countries including Africa. Delegates were from 50 countries throughout Africa, Asia, Australia, Central America, Europe, New Zealand, and South America. The conference provided up-to-date and relevant information in a variety of sectors and after the conference several national evaluation organisations were born.

In 1997, a discussion on EVALTALK, the AEA-sponsored listserv, about the international nature of the evaluation profession (Mertens and Russon 2000:276) took place. The creation of national evaluation organisations was a major topic of discussion. In 1998 during the AEA conference a further debate relating to the creation of a worldwide evaluation community was undertaken. The organisations represented on the discussion panel were American Evaluation Association (AEA), Canadian Evaluation Society (CES), the Associazione Italiana de Valutazione (AIV), the Australasian Evaluation Society (AES), the Kenyan Evaluation Association (KenEA), and United Kingdom Evaluation Society (UKES). The proceedings of the panel were published in a document entitled Creating a worldwide evaluation community although the panel cautioned about the need to move slowly with this initiative due to diversity issues raised by participants.

Within Africa, a second Abidjan conference was held in 1998 involving officials from 12 African countries and 21 international development assistance agencies to deliberate on M&E. Participants acknowledged that M&E capacity development was an integral part of a more extensive initiative for good governance and effective public resources management. Institutional support at the continental level, and more training in evaluation designs, methodologies and practices, were considered fundamental to any efforts aimed at strengthening M&E capacity on the continent. Participants recommended establishing various databases, including one of evaluators (practitioners, consultants, officials in charge of M&E, bodies of inspectors and auditors, and private sector firms) who would form the African Evaluation Association (AfrEA). Establishing a database for collecting lessons learned and examples of good practice in M&E was also agreed upon. Shortly after this conference, AfrEA was launched.

In September 1999, the inaugural AfrEA Conference attended by over 300 evaluators from 35 countries was convened in Nairobi-Kenya under the auspices of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) with the assistance of the Kenya Evaluation Association, the Kenyan Graduate Mobilization Programme, African Development Bank, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Family Health International, United Nations Development Programme and United Nations Habitat. Financial support was received from the African Development Bank, Danish International Development Agency, International Development Research Center (Canada), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNICEF. The conference
committed to developing indigenous evaluation capacity through providing high-level training throughout Africa by means of national professional associations and peer-to-peer training. In a longer-term, it was expected that evaluation associations would collaborate with their governments to create national evaluation policies and capacities.

On February 18–20, 2000, the WK Kellogg Foundation (WKKF) supported a residency meeting held in Barbados, West Indies. Represented were all of the organisations from the association Presidents Panel plus AfrEA, la Asociación Centroamericana de Evaluacion (ACE), the European Evaluation Society (EES), the Israeli Association for Programme Evaluation (IAPE), La Société Française de l’Évaluation (SFE), the Malaysian Evaluation Society (MES), Programme for Strengthening the Regional Capacity for Evaluation of Rural Poverty Alleviation Projects in Latin America and the Caribbean (PREVAL), Reseau Ruandais de Suivi et Evaluation (RRSE), and the Sri Lanka Evaluation Association (SLEvA). Participants from the University of the West Indies, the Caribbean Development Bank, and the United Nations Capital Development Fund were present. Mertens and Russon (2000:277) reports how the group worked through some very difficult issues relating to trust before identifying purposes that might underlie a partnership of regional and national evaluation organisations, broad organisational principles that might guide a partnership, and an extensive list of activities that might be undertaken by a partnership.

Within Africa, there was the 2000 Johannesburg Workshop and Seminar which in itself was a follow-up of previous continental and global initiatives. There were 56 participants from 11 countries including Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The workshop fostered networking among M&E practitioners and for sharing knowledge on M&E in the context of improved governance, accountability and effective development delivery and results. The objectives of the Workshop were five-fold to:

- Define the requirements and capabilities of M&E in the context of good governance and accountability for better results.
- Familiarise the participants with the development, requirements and uses of M&E systems.
- Present ways of designing and conducting cost-effective evaluations of issues such as human development, gender, human rights, governance and corruption, environment and infrastructure, through new approaches including participation and the sharing of local knowledge.
- Build professional teams using national M&E associations and networks.
- Develop a collaborative strategy and infrastructure for a pan-African M&E network, which could review and evaluate sound practices with a view to adopting them in Africa.

The workshop was hosted by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) representing national governments, non-governmental organisations, universities, research institutions and the private sector, and 32 participants from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies – the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International Development Research Center (IDRC), Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Norway and the Netherlands. A task
force from AfDB, DBSA, the Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office of UNICEF and the World Bank organised the conference, and acted as facilitators and resource persons, together with a small number of donor representatives.

On 1–4 December 2004 the African Evaluation Association, in collaboration with the Public Service Commission of South Africa, held its Third Conference in Cape Town, South Africa, with the theme ‘Africa Matters, Evaluation Matters: Joining Forces for Democracy, Governance and Development’. More than 500 delegates attended with the African continent alone having 420 delegates attending the majority being from West African countries. Both academics and practitioners of evaluation attended this conference. The timing of the conference coincided with the growing demand for accountability and universities were in the process of designing short and graduate courses in evaluation. Several other conferences and workshops were held on the continent to drum up support for evaluation and propelled the field to where it is currently. Some more important key milestones in the evolution of evaluation are needed. In June 2006 a conference of 35 M&E experts from the public, private, civil society sector and development practitioners working in Tanzania was conducted. A Steering Committee of the Tanzania Evaluation Association was nominated during the conference to spearhead the establishment of the Association in Tanzania. Committee members were drawn from public, private and civil society institutions which had work activities related to evaluation.

The International Organization for Cooperation in Evaluation launched an Inaugural Assembly in Peru at the end of March 2003 as the “world umbrella” evaluation association and networks. Representatives were from 24 evaluation groupings in Latin America, Africa, Australasia, North America, Asia, Europe and the ex-Soviet Union. Support for the Assembly was received from WK Kellogg Foundation, UNICEF, the World Bank, UK Department for International Development, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Global Green grants Fund as well as from the AEA, the Canadian Evaluation Society and other national and regional groups who sent their representatives to attend the assembly. Meanwhile, the International Development Evaluation Association (IDEAS) was created with the support of the World Bank and the DAC Network on Development Evaluation and it had its first conference in New Delhi in April 2005. In October 2005, AEA together with the Canadian Evaluation Society (CES) held a joint meeting in Toronto where some 2500 evaluation practitioners assisted in four days of the 525 concurrent sessions.

The Australasian Evaluation Society was among the earliest regional associations with a membership estimated above 700 from the region mostly from Australia and New Zealand. AES collaborated with the Malaysia Evaluation Society and the Sri Lanka Evaluation Society to scale evaluation capacity through numerous professional activities. As noted before AfrEA was created in 1999. At that time only about 18 evaluation associations or networks existed in six African countries but presently the number is more than 30 associations with a common goal of promoting evaluation on a national basis in their respective countries. In Europe, the European Evaluation Society (EES) was founded in 1994 in The Hague and started its work in 1996 with a goal to promote theory, practice and utilisation of high quality evaluation. The association brought theory closer to practice by bringing together academics and practitioners from all over Europe and from any professional sector, thus creating a forum where all participants could benefit from cooperation and bridge-building. Within Europe, national evaluation associations and networks exist in Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the UK.

In October 2004, the Latin American and Caribbean Evaluation Network (ReLAC) was launched in Peru and included the Brazilian Evaluation Association, the Central American Evaluation Association and networks from Chili, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. ReLAC held its second biennial conference in Colombia in May 2007. Meanwhile, the International Programme Evaluation Network (IPEN) founded in 2000 mainly composed of evaluators from the former Soviet Union countries was yet another global effort that contributed to professionalising evaluation in Africa.

Since 1999, AfrEA has held major international conferences: AfrEA I (1999) and II (2002), Nairobi, Kenya, AfrEA III (2004), Cape Town, South Africa, AfrEA IV (2007), Niamey, Niger, AfrEA V (April 2009) in Cairo, Egypt and the VI Conference held in Accra, Ghana in January 2012, and finally the VII conference was recently held in March 2014 in Cameroon. Impressed by the developments in evaluation on the continent and the global developments, a new joint effort was conceived. Launched in 2010, the Centres for Learning on Evaluation and Results (CLEAR) brought together selected and recognised academic institutions or think-tanks with other organisations, such as foundations and multilateral and bilateral organisations, in a global knowledge and M&E capacity development delivery partnership.

CLEAR is a global team which aims to improve policy through strengthening M&E systems and capacities. The academic institutions and think-tanks house the Clear Centres, while the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank group hosts the programme’s global hub. The Anglophone Africa centres are with the University of the Witwatersrand (WITS) located in Johannesburg, South Africa which works in partnership with the Kenya School of Government (KSG), and the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) in Ghana. The Francophone centre is the Centre Africain d’Etudes Superieures en Gestion (CESAG) located in Dakar, Senegal and works in partnership with the International Institute for Water and Environmental Engineering (2IE), Burkino Faso. The programme is envisaged to run through 2018. In March 2012, a conference organised by the Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results for Anglophone Africa (CLEAR) in partnership with the Department of Performance M&E (DPME) in South Africa brought together government agencies from Benin, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda who are mandated to lead the implementation of M&E systems across their governments to varying degrees. Several other M&E workshops, seminars and conferences have taken place on the continent and more will continue to be held.

**IS M&E A DISCIPLINE OF STUDY?**

Evaluation professionals acknowledge that their field is a discipline although one hastens to add that this is not yet fully established like law, medicine, and psychology among others. On what basis is such a claim made? Balkin (1996:953) regards the term ‘discipline’ from the Latin words *discipulus*, which means pupil, and *disciplina*, which means teaching (noun). A pupil is equated to a student and using this definition, M&E in Africa is already in adulthood though has not yet reached total maturity. Several students/pupils exist in various universities studying M&E. Related to it is also the word ‘disciple’ as in the disciples of Jesus and the
field has various disciplines scattered in academia, consultancy and the world of practice. He argues that academic disciplines are a source of authority within particular groups which think alike through training and discipline.

Krishnan (2009:9) gives six tenets or characteristics of disciplines although Eagleton (1983:47) caveats them arguing that not all disciplines must have all the characteristics. Relying on an example of English literature which lacks both a unifying theoretical paradigm and method and a definable stable object of research, it still passes as an academic discipline. For a discipline, Krishnan (2009:9) identifies the following features:

- disciplines have a particular object of research (e.g. law, society, politics), though the object of research may be shared with another discipline;
- disciplines have a body of accumulated specialist knowledge referring to their object of research, which is specific to them and not generally shared with another discipline;
- disciplines have theories and concepts that can organise the accumulated specialist knowledge effectively;
- disciplines use specific terminologies or a specific technical language adjusted to their research object;
- disciplines have developed specific research methods according to their specific research requirements; and maybe most crucially
- disciplines must have some institutional manifestation in the form of subjects taught at universities or colleges, respective academic departments and professional associations connected to it.

As a technical term Krishnan (2009:9) argues a discipline implies the organisation of learning and the systematic production of new knowledge and often disciplines are identified with taught subjects, but clearly not every subject taught at university can be called a discipline. Basheka (2013:311) while advocating for the science of public procurement maintained that science or discipline of study needs to have a high potential of classifying its subject matter into discrete variables which imply developing a core knowledge area and developing theories. M&E has articulate variables of its study and a number of models, approaches, theories and principles have been formulated. Wikipedia, further defines a discipline as a focused study in one academic field or profession and such discipline incorporates expertise, people, projects, communities, challenges, studies, inquiry, and research areas that are strongly associated with a given discipline. Individuals associated with such academic disciplines referred to as experts or specialists must be present. On this basis, it appears correct that the field of M&E is truly a new discipline.

Krishnan (2009:10) further informs us that a new discipline is usually founded creating a professorial chair devoted to it at an established university. On this checklist, evaluation in Africa is in its infancy as there are few or no established chairs in African universities. When M&E is evaluated based on the six tenets earlier identified, there are strong supportive reasons to claim the field’s disciplinary nature. Disciplines have a particular object of research though the object of research may be shared with another discipline. Evaluation now has its object of research which broadly entails evaluands of different forms-policies, programmes, projects and interventions. Evaluation also now has a clear process, planning, implementation and utilisation. Moreover, it shares some objectives with other disciplines like social research. While undertaking its analysis, evaluation uses knowledge from other disciplines like social
research and the content is influenced by the evaluand. Evaluating the impact of a transport policy would for example benefit from the field of transport economics. Evaluation so far has some body of accumulated specialist knowledge referring to their object of research. This body of knowledge is however evolving and adopts a multidisciplinary approach.

In evaluation research, as Stockman (2011:29) wants us to believe, there are approaches and models, but strictly speaking, in his view no theories in the scientific sense of the word. This conclusion contradicts the claim that evaluation is now a scientific field for theories are sets of concepts and to scientifically claim there are no theories is to wrongly suggest that evaluation research has no variables of study (independent and dependent variables). Scriven (2004:12) also claims that “it’s possible to do very good programme evaluation without getting into evaluation theory or programme theory”, and declared that “the most popular misconception amongst currently politically correct programme evaluators is the evaluation of a programme (a) requires that you have, or (b) is much benefited by having, a logic model or programme theory”. Meyer (2002:2) defends the use of sociological theory in evaluation research.

Donaldson and Lipsey (n.d) counsel us that reference to theory is widespread in contemporary evaluation literature, but what is meant by theory encompasses a confusing mix of concepts related to evaluators’ notions about how evaluation should be practiced, explanatory frameworks for social phenomena drawn from social science, and assumptions about how programmes function, or are supposed to function. Considering the role of theory in research, good evaluations will be judged on how well they adopt a relevant theory to explain, describe, understand and predict the variables of study. These assertions will affect the desire for the discipline of evaluation to be regarded as scientific and sciences are characterised among others by their capacity to test theories. Every profession needs a unique knowledge base and for us, evaluation theory is that knowledge base (Shadish 1998:1).

As Krishnan (2009:9) suggests, disciplines use a certain language which tends to be known in most cases by people in that field. Evaluators have developed their own language centered not only on the evaluands (matters to be evaluated) but classifications of the evaluators as well as the fundamental principles that guide every evaluation. Their language also gives them the criteria followed when undertaking any evaluation. While disciplines develop specific research methods according to their specific research requirements, the evaluation discipline still utilises some methods from social research. Disciplines must have some institutional manifestation in the form of subjects taught at universities or colleges, respective academic departments and professional associations connected to them. On this benchmark evaluation has developed its subjects that are taught in universities but establishment of respective departments is yet to be embraced in all universities. There are even variations on the subjects taught at universities—the focus and locus challenges. Evaluation now has professional associations connected to it making it fulfill the discipline requirement.

Wikipedia reports that while disciplines in and of themselves are more or less focused practices, scholarly approaches such as multi-disciplinarity, inter-disciplinarity, trans-disciplinarity, and cross-disciplinarity, which integrate aspects from multiple disciplines are acceptable and help in addressing any problems that may arise from narrow concentration within specialised fields. The field of M&E enjoys a multidisciplinary approach. Scriven (2004:185) in support of this fact argues that trouble communicating across disciplines due to differences in language and/or specified concepts has made M&E evolve as “trans-
disciplinary” field. He contends that evaluation would constitute a discipline, albeit “trans”, in that it meets the tenets of adhering to a discipline. This trans-disciplinary field does not mean that there is no overarching cogency to M&E.

Elkins (2006:2) clarified that M&E as a discipline must favour pragmatism, for instance by explicitly recognising resource constraints that exist in development assistance programming, and practical ramifications of the challenges. State-of-the-art tools and methods in the social sciences, for instance, ideally should inform programme M&E design and implementation, but in pragmatic terms no efficient full-scale programme can responsibly allocate resources adequate to support social-science-caliber research. On his part, Golding (2009:2) suggests that because there are various important but complex problems, phenomena and concepts that resist understanding or resolution when approached from single disciplines, a multi-disciplinary approach is needed. While disciplinary depth is essential for investigating these complex issues, they also require what Howard Gardner calls a “synthesizing mind” (2006:3). They require investigators who can engage in interdisciplinary translation and synthesis, as part of multidisciplinary teams or individually, in order to develop more complete pictures than would be possible from any one disciplinary perspective. As Lyon (1992:686) shows, this is not a deviant exception, but a common path for the modern academic.

The use of an integrated scientific approach where different disciplines supply unique specialties to our understanding of the evaluation enterprise while maintaining their disciplinary focus is a proper approach for building the evaluation experts of today and the future. Boix Mansilla and Durai (2007:219) regard interdisciplinary understanding as the capacity to integrate knowledge and modes of thinking in two or more disciplines or established areas of expertise to produce a cognitive advancement – such as explaining a phenomenon, solving a problem, or creating a product – in ways that would have been impossible or unlikely through single disciplinary means. At a broad and generalised level the methodology question tends to bring up some of the old debates that still prevail in the social sciences and which relate to the old dualities in terms of how knowledge is best constructed and validated. It leads to the so-called dualities between the objective and the subjective, positivistic and interpretative approaches. Fortunately, the sharp dualities and positioning have faded away and given way to the use of pluralistic methods, more options than directives, with mixed-methods seen as acceptable (Greene and Caracelli 1997:5–18).

One of the great challenges in developing evaluation as a discipline is getting it recognised as being distinct from the various other disciplines to which it applies. Davidson (2002:3) suggests that a more difficult yet equally important task is to articulate clearly to the outside world—to clients and to other disciplines—what it is that makes evaluation unique. Golding (2009:3), reasons that we must educate for both disciplinary and interdisciplinary expertise to address complex problems in society. Interdisciplinary education must supplement disciplinary teaching and learning so students can learn how to respond to challenges that transcend disciplines, work in the confluence of multiple disciplines, and develop research trajectories that do not conform to standard disciplinary paths. Interdisciplinary subjects are pivotal for this interdisciplinary education, teaching how to understand, navigate and employ multiple and often contrary ways of knowing. In these subjects students develop a meta-knowledge about different disciplines, methods and epistemologies, and learn how to purposefully and reflectively integrate and synthesise different perspectives in order to advance understanding and solve problems. With the foregoing debate, M&E qualifies
among those subjects which claim to be disciplines of study within universities. What then is the status of this study in African universities? The next section turns to this debate.

**WHAT IS THE STATE OF THE M&E DISCIPLINE IN AFRICA?**

The purpose of this section is to examine the current academic programmes in the field of evaluation, their locus (location in universities) and focus (their methodological orientation). The focus will be on long-term academic courses as opposed to short-term training courses. Tarsilla (2014:6) gives lessons learned on what has worked and not worked in evaluation capacity development in Africa, with a conclusion that short-term training initiatives targeting individuals are no longer effective unless combined with other activities as part of systemic processes. Avoiding the content of evaluation training modules being more theoretical than practical favour the dominance of long-term academic programmes.

Krishnan (2009:10) reminds us of tremendous differences between the disciplines with respect to their overall standing within universities. Among the benchmarks to assess the standing of the discipline is included the number of students and the amount of research money they attract and the overall resources allocated to them by universities in terms of teaching personnel, teaching hours, and equipment. Bigger departments with more staff and more expensive equipment tend to have greater influence within universities than smaller and less equipped departments. The M&E discipline within African universities is replete with a myriad of challenges but more so the ‘locus and focus’ problem. This has and continues to weaken its standing in universities. While it currently attracts the majority of students, the amount of research money allocated and the overall resources allocated to run this programme are disappointingly meagre. As a result, its teaching in most universities is faced with problems like lack of adequate space, inadequate staffing as it has to rely on staff from other disciplines, infrastructure, and brain-drain, lack of infrastructure, poor remuneration and human resources among others. Universities lack good supervisors, faculty lack facilitation to attend evaluation conferences to nurture their theoretical knowledge.

The following Table gives an illustrative example of the nature, name and location of postgraduate evaluation courses in selected African universities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Cape Town</td>
<td>● Master in Programme Evaluation</td>
<td>Institute of M&amp;E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● PhD in Programme Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Sciences</td>
<td>● Msc M&amp;E</td>
<td>School of Public Health and Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyatta University</td>
<td>● Master of Public Health (M&amp;E)</td>
<td>School of Public Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Nazarene University</td>
<td>● Master of Arts in M&amp;E</td>
<td>Institute of Open and Distance learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Kenya University</td>
<td>● Master of Arts in M&amp;E</td>
<td>School of social sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daystar University</td>
<td>● Master of Arts in M&amp;E</td>
<td>Department of development studies, school of human and social sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egerton University</td>
<td><strong>Master of Education in Measurement and Evaluation</strong></td>
<td>School of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic University of Eastern Africa</td>
<td><strong>Master of Education in Educational Research and Evaluation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Open University of Tanzania</td>
<td><strong>Master of Arts in M&amp;E</strong></td>
<td>Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavendish University Zambia</td>
<td><strong>Postgraduate–M&amp;E</strong></td>
<td>Education and Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mzumbe University Tanzania</td>
<td><strong>Master of Science in Health M&amp;E</strong></td>
<td>School of Public Administration and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzanian Institute of Project Management</td>
<td><strong>Postgraduate Diploma in M&amp;E</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Stellenbosch</td>
<td><strong>MPhil in M&amp;E</strong></td>
<td>Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of the Witwatersrand</td>
<td><strong>Postgraduate Diploma in Public and Development Management in the field of Public &amp; Development Sector M&amp;E</strong></td>
<td>School of Public and Development Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Johannesburg</td>
<td><strong>Master (MA) in Public Policy Evaluation</strong></td>
<td>Department of Public Management and Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Ghana</td>
<td><strong>Master of Public Health (M&amp;E)</strong></td>
<td>School of Public Health</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Compiled by the authors from a Google search)

Scrutiny of the courses shown in Table 1 suggest the locus and focus issues which raise serious methodological and operational challenges. These dilemmas raise doubts, fears and questions all of which combine to suggest that evaluation in some universities is at a crossroads. An analysis of the departments/schools/faculties where M&E courses are housed sheds light regarding the locus dilemma. In terms of locus (location) the experience reveals a ‘homeless’ discipline claimed by several departments in most universities. With this locus challenge, the capacity of M&E to influence the direction of debate in universities as envisioned by Krishnan becomes limited. While the number of students on monitoring programmes would result in higher revenues to institutions; the truth of the matter is that universities spend less of this portion on actual delivery of evaluation programmes.

M&E education in Africa faces the focus challenge. It is not in contention that universities play a crucial role in the supply to the market of graduates who have to steer M&E processes internally and externally. Such graduates must possess the right skills and competencies and ought to be educated in sophisticated methodologies for conducting sound evaluations in any sector. Universities must supply to the market what is demanded. The problems which have bewildered the location of the field in universities have an influence on the kind of focus the courses are oriented into. The field is new and scholars are yet to marshal the necessary theoretical infrastructure to produce the needed graduates using standalone methods. There
is thus a tendency to methodologically emphasise teaching of particular modules in graduate programmes of the field based on the department where the course is housed.

Table 2: Selected American universities teaching evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Name of course</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American University</td>
<td>Master in Public Policy</td>
<td>School of Public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antioch University</td>
<td>Master of Arts in Policy Studies-Systems Thinking for Policy Analysis and Programme Evaluation</td>
<td>Graduate programme in policy studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Gurion University of the Negev</td>
<td>Programme Evaluation and Measurement in Educational Systems, PhD IN Sociology and Politics of evaluation</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston College</td>
<td>Master in Educational Research, Measurement, and Evaluation, PhD in Educational Research, Measurement, and Evaluation</td>
<td>Lynch School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigham Young University</td>
<td>Master in Instructional Psychology and Technology w/ focus on Research and Evaluation, PhD in Instructional Psychology and Technology w/ focus on Research and Evaluation</td>
<td>David O McKay School of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigham Young University</td>
<td>Master in Educational Inquiry, Measurement, and Evaluation</td>
<td>College of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California State University, Los Angeles</td>
<td>Master in Research and Evaluation</td>
<td>Charter College of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claremont Graduate University</td>
<td>Master in Evaluation with a Co-concentration or MPH dual degree in Evaluation &amp; Applied Research Methods</td>
<td>School of Behavioral and Organizational Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duquesne University</td>
<td>Master in programme evaluation</td>
<td>School of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida State University</td>
<td>Master in Education policy and evaluation, PhD in Educational Leadership and Policy Studies</td>
<td>College of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Master in Quantitative Methods and Evaluation, PhD in Quantitative Methods and Evaluation</td>
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Source: (Compiled by the authors from the American Evaluation Association website)
Table 2 gives a summary of the location of evaluation programmes in different universities within the US which was obtained through a search on the website of the American Evaluation Association. The universities offer graduate programmes or certificate programmes either directly in evaluation or with available concentrations in evaluation. In their criteria of listing, the association demands that a programme should include a sequence of at least three courses focusing directly on evaluation supported by other coursework in appropriate methodologies. In most universities, programmes in evaluation are offered in the departments/schools of public administration and management, education and public health. While many disciplines claim the field of evaluation, an example of how selected disciplines help us in understanding evaluation is necessary. In the next paragraphs an illustrative description of this concern is given. We focus on sociology, economics, public health, public policy, political science, and public administration although several other disciplines are helpful in our understanding of evaluation.

A number of known evaluation experts throughout the world have been from the discipline of Organisation, and institutions help us in understanding how planning, managing and utilisation of evaluation findings are undertaken. Many sociologists aim to conduct research that may be applied directly to social policy and welfare, while others focus primarily on refining the theoretical understanding of social processes. In evaluation of social policies and interventions, the methodologies and knowledge base of evaluation is fundamental. Not only does it provide the subject matter at micro-level of individual agency but also the macro-level of systems and the social structure. Not only does it provide a number of approaches and models but it also provides the necessary tools of analysis in understanding how the social context in which such interventions are conducted provides an important benchmark for measuring the efficiency, relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of those interventions.

Governments in both developed and developing countries design numerous economic policies to regulate the economic business of countries. The discipline of economics with its various specialisations is helpful. When evaluating economic interventions, economics focuses on the behaviour and interactions of economic agents and how economies work. Even in the main stream evaluation of other areas, economists supply useful tools and techniques of analysis like the cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Using such models, they weigh the costs of interventions against the benefits to guide whether investing in some interventions is viable or not. The economic models which often take a quantitative approach are also helpful in measuring the impact of interventions.

Evaluation takes place in all sectors and within Africa, the health sector attracts heavy funding which calls for evaluations. This explains why most public health departments and schools in medical schools have either specialised master in health M&E or concentrations in evaluation within the traditional masters of public health. Public health which refers to the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through organised efforts and informed choices of society, organisations, public and private, communities and individuals adopts M&E approaches supported by the discipline of Public Health. Within the School of Public Health at Kenyatta University in Kenya for example, a master's in M&E is taught within public health and has related modules including (1) project planning, M&E (2) impact evaluation, (3) monitoring & evaluating maternal, child health and nutritional programmes, (4) M&E of malaria control and prevention programmes and (5) M&E of HIV/AIDS and TB Programmes.
In any society, governmental entities enact laws, make policies, and allocate resources. This is true at all levels. Public policy can be generally defined as a system of laws, regulatory measures, courses of action, and funding priorities concerning a given topic promulgated by a governmental entity or its representatives. Related to this subfield is the mother discipline of public administration. Public administration is the implementation of government policy and also an academic discipline that studies this implementation and prepares civil servants for working in the public service. Related to this is the ancestor discipline of political science which deals with systems of government and the analysis of political activity and political behavior.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS AND THE FUTURE DIRECTION**

The status in Africa suggests a positive trend as far as evaluation is concerned. Universities and other tertiary institutions continue to produce a number of graduates who find employment in the practice of evaluation whether in the public sector or the non-public sector. Across Africa, there now exists a community of evaluators and several projects to be evaluated. While the field has methodological challenges as well as utilisation challenges and has not yet developed its own theories, its multi-disciplinary approach has seen different disciplines injecting the needed theories. The field of M&E in Africa has academic programmes existing in universities, and research inquiry among both academics and practitioners is on the increase. The number of conferences and workshops devoted to discussing the body of knowledge is surely on an accelerating trend on the continent. The *African Evaluation Journal* is active and provides a window for shared knowledge on the continent. There is an impressive body of literature, a community of practitioners and even a profession with a group of “evaluators”. The field has moved from infancy to adulthood from all three perspectives. From a neglected field to a fully-fledged field with its established journal, all signs are positive. The number of postgraduate courses offered in various universities across the continent and the zeal with which students have embarked on attaining qualifications in this field solidify a resolve to conclude that the area is now in adulthood.

In general terms, the future of M&E in Africa lies in the ability of the continent and its actors to harness existing internal synergies, while simultaneous exploiting opportunities provided by the global arena. Mackay (2006:13) reminds us that the experience of African countries in evaluation is relevant not only to poor countries but also to other regions. Khan (1998:326) listed the key challenges facing ECB work in Africa including: (1) sensitisation of top political leadership to the benefits of evaluation; (2) identification of the most viable institutional framework of evaluation; (3) introduction of a cost-effective method of evaluation; (4) linking evaluation to governance reform and bringing NGOs and beneficiaries into the evaluation process; and (5) introduction of innovative feedback mechanisms and establishing linkages, both nationally and internationally, to ensure maximum access to and utilisation of evaluation information. These have to be overcome if the field is to post a bright future.

In Africa, it is undoubtedly clear that a mismatch between supply and demand of evaluation professionals is still wide. Different actors at all levels need to devise concrete
steps to reduce the gap. Not only should this endeavour involve senior practitioners but academia. Interpretation of M&E evidence is an important factor that needs to guide strategic and tactical decision making to uplift the field. M&E is a sometimes maligned and frequently misunderstood field or discipline that has grown up on the fringes of international development work. Yet the M&E systems support development of a country by generating relevant, accurate, and timely information that is used to improve programme design and decision-making and thus enhance impact (Elkins 2006:1). In Africa there is now evidence of emerging country-led demands for evaluation (Porter and Goldman 2013), consistent with the general emphasis of the Paris Declaration on the use of country-owned systems. To further scale up these efforts, specific interventions are necessary:

- Ability and commitment by universities to introduce new evaluation courses which address the skills, competence issues and attitudinal elements. While most universities are likely to duplicate existing programmes, time will come when a harmonisation of curriculum is envisaged.
- The education in evaluation lies in building synergy among African universities and sharing student and staff exchanges. Increased collaborative programmes should emerge and shape the direction of the discipline. To achieve this broad goal, an association of university educators needs to be established.
- Specialised centres, and departments for M&E need to be established and should be embraced by all universities. This is intended to nurture knowledge sharing and dissemination among a community of evaluators. Doctoral programmes in the field will need to be introduced and ought to take a course-work-dissertation modality.
- The equilibrium between demand and supply of evaluation professionals should be scaled down within the next ten years. This effort should concurrently address the questions of quality and building university capacities to deliver evaluation programmes.
- The blended modes of delivery which are in synch with ICT revolution should be encouraged.
- The number of members joining professional associations should be increased and more membership benefits should be emphasised. Regional professional associations are likely to emerge to address balance and cultural concerns. Addressing the gender disparities should also be supported.
- The need to establish evaluation journals within African universities should be supported as a long-term strategy for improving communication of evaluation findings.
- The number of graduate research and publications in the field will be on the increase. The struggle to make evaluation scientific and a discipline in its own right will continue in the years to come. The AfrEA was coined around the need to have indigenous solutions to evaluation challenges. Elkins (2006:2) is of a strong view that M&E at its best brings crucial empirical evidence to bear – directly, immediately, and within the context of the intervention – on assessments of ineffective or inefficient versus more effective or efficient programme design, implementation, performance, and achievement. At the same time, programme M&E is not merely different jargon for programme management, but a distinct undertaking: objective and representative empirical evidence generated through M&E systems is grist for interpretation by implementers in programme management systems.
NOTES

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Gender-based Public Procurement Practices in Kenya and South Africa

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ABSTRACT

This article reports on the gender-based public procurement practices in Kenya and South Africa and provides a framework for the post-2015 Millennium Development Agenda of public works programmes to accommodate Millennium Development Goal 3 that focuses on gender equality and women’s empowerment. Public procurement is a sector that allows governments to realise economic benefits through its financial-driven programmes. The concern is whether this sector accommodates men and women equitably in terms of resource allocation and economic wellbeing. The literature review indicates that women are not benefited on a large scale due to practical challenges that include lack of access to information regarding public procurement practices; understanding of tenders; ownership; and financial access, to state a few. At the onset of the Millennium Development Goals (now part of the post-2015 Global Development Agenda), the Millennium Development Goal 3 (Gender equality and women’s empowerment) serves as the rationale for this article. This article addresses the following dual research question: What is the status of gender inclusiveness in public procurement practices and how can the public procurement practices be utilised in promoting women empowerment? The article aims to determine the level of gender-based equality and responsiveness in public procurement policies in Kenya and South Africa.

INTRODUCTION

The post-2015 Millennium Development Framework of (MDF) provides an opportunity for the revision of global developmental goals and the extent to which gender equality can be
achieved. By all indicators, few countries in the world have achieved internationally set goals and targets in 2000, to be achieved by the year 2015. In the post-2015 MDF, the sustainable development goals will continue to aim at achieving gender equality, which remains crucial in the international community. Researchers continue to assert that gender inequality is still a global reality, through issues that affect women and children, such as, conflict and terrorism, refugee camps, HIV/AIDS, human trafficking, domestic violence, prostitution, rape, unwanted pregnancies and early marriages, large scale natural disasters and environmental problems (Tuyizere 2007). As a result, promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment and mainstreaming gender perspectives in development activities is crucial.

There are various systems of dealing with public procurement that differs from country to country and the tasks, responsibilities, authority and delegation of powers in public procurement systems are divergent and can be analysed in a country-specific scenario. In this article, the public procurement systems are related to the South African and Kenyan contexts.

Gender “is important for a public procurement policy because it can ensure equitable access and provide benefits from diversifying the supply chain. Increasing the opportunities for more economic agents, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to engage in the delivery of goods and services can result in improved outcomes for the alleviation of poverty and increasing gender equality, given that women-owned businesses are disproportionately located in this sub-sector of the economy” (Kirton 2012:9). There is a positive correlation between gender equality and a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. When women are excluded from the marketplace, the economy suffers. The same applies to using public procurement policy to stimulate entrepreneurial activity by women-owned businesses (International Trade Centre 2014:3).

In addition, “the area of public contracting, where public procurement is one instrument, is an increasingly important area for governments to realise equality objectives. Nevertheless, the application of gender equality objectives through public procurement remains underdeveloped and under-researched” (Ahlberg and Bruun 2010 in Callerstig 2014:53). It is therefore important to investigate the relationship between gender and public procurement practices imperative to achieve sustainable economic development in a country.

This article provides a conceptual clarification of the terms that are related to the units of observation of the topic in general and gender related terms in particular. It reports on gender mainstreaming practices in public procurement in Kenia and in South Africa. Based on these reports the article proposes a framework of suggestions to promote gender mainstreaming in public procurement in general, and for the post-2015 Millennium Development Agenda of public works programmes to accommodate Millennium Development Goal 3 that focuses on gender equality and women’s empowerment, in particular.

Through the review of literature, official documents, and related editorials, the article utilises a desktop conceptual and theoretical analysis by way of a descriptive and analytical exposition of the variables influencing the locus and focus of the units of observation offering policy implications and suggestions. According to Auriacombe (2012:65) a conceptual analysis needs to indicate which interpretations of concepts, theories, phenomena and variables the researcher believes to be most valid and it must be supported by evidence. It unpacks the key concepts, theories and phenomena used in the preparation of the research study in order to determine the relationships between the concepts and the variables that influences the phenomenon under study in order to draw conclusions (Auriacombe 2012:65).
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Gender is defined by various scholars with diverse perspectives. Inglehart and Norris (2003:8) define gender as “socially constructed roles and learned behaviour of women and men associated with the biological characteristics of females and males”. Grown, Rao and Gupta (2005:2) define gender as “a social construct; it defines and differentiates the roles, rights, responsibilities, and obligations of women and men”. Heywood (2007:201) defines gender as “a cultural distinction between females and males based on their different social roles and positions”. Okotie (2007:1421) supports this definition and defines gender as “a socially constructed phenomenon that is brought about as society ascribes different roles and duties, behaviour and manners to the two sexes”. Ako-Nai (2013:176) concurs that gender refers to socially constructed roles of women and men ascribed to them on the basis of their sex.

Gender equality, according to the United Nations (2002:2) refers to the “opportunities which are sought to narrow gender gaps and support greater equality between women and men”. Lober (2005:23) also supports this notion and states that gender equality entails, “equal valuing of the different roles assumed by men and women”. Other scholars added that it is “about equal visibility empowerment and the participation of both sexes in all spheres of public and private life, it aims to promote full participation of women and men in society” (Tiessen 2007:15); “the fairness of treatment for women and men, according to their respective needs” (Waithanji and Grace 2014:3); and “giving men and women equal access to economic, educational and political opportunities” (Okonkwo 2013:5580).

Gender inequalities result in high human costs to development. The factors that cause gender inequalities are difficult for individuals alone to change, hence a strong case for public action to promote gender equality (UN Report of the Economic and Social Council 1997 in Rubagiza 2015:85). In this context, engendering development outlines a three part strategy to promote gender equality:

- Reform institutions to provide equal rights and equal opportunities for women and men.
- Foster economic development to strengthen incentives for more equal resources and participation.
- Take active measures to redress persistent disparities in command of resources and political voice.

Establishing a level institutional playing field for women will promote gender equality. Legal, social, and economic rights provide an enabling environment in which women and men can participate productively in society, attain a basic quality of life, and take advantage of the new opportunities that development affords (UN Report of the Economic and Social Council 1997 in Rubagiza 2015:85).

Gender mainstreaming means identifying gaps in gender equality through the use of gender–disaggregated data, developing strategies to close those gaps; putting resources and expertise into implementing strategies for gender equality, monitoring, implementation, and holding individuals and institutions accountable for results (Karega and Bunwaree 2010:1). Mainstreaming gender can be regarded as a cognitive organisational and political process which requires shifts in organisational cultures and ways of thinking, as well as in the goals, structures and resource allocations of governments (Rai 2008:97).
Gender mainstreaming is a gender perspective, a process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action including legislation, policies and programmes in all areas and all levels. It is a strategy for integrating women’s and men’s concerns and experiences into the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic, educational and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated (Uganda Martyrs University 2010:125–126). The ultimate goal of gender mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality, namely to:

- Identify existing gaps between genders.
- Promote and carry out gender-oriented research in order to identify gender concerns.
- Establish gender-responsive monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for development.
- Make a conscious effort to address gender disparities.
- Develop policies that promote gender responsiveness.
- Transfer practical skills to those involved in mainstreaming gender.
- Promote a gender responsive approach to technical cooperation among the various actors in the development arena.
- Advocate gender equity at all levels (Uganda Martyrs University 2010:125–126).

The definition of the term public procurement is considered in a varied manner by public departments, agencies and public organisations depending upon how these institutions deal with external services and supplies. For the purposes of this article, public procurement “encompasses acquisition, contracting, buying, renting, leasing, and purchasing, to include functions such as requirements determination and all phases of contract administration (Thai 2001:42–43). This conceptual meaning is supported by (Krutz and Vines 2004:530) emphasising that public procurement is a “process of acquiring property or services, beginning with determination of a requirement and ending with contract completion”. Snider and Rendon (Undated: 330–331) add that public procurement can be considered as an achievement of many public policy objectives (e.g., supporting domestic suppliers or local economic development; remedies for historically disadvantaged groups)” that relies upon the expediency of procurement practices in a country-specific context.

Most “African countries have experienced (some still do) a crisis of political turmoil, intolerance and harsh dictatorship or have a military regime with highly centralised government processes… resulting in a marked degree of social disintegration and economic stress throughout the continent” (Vyas-Doorgapersad 2011:238). This scenario demands transformation and change through public service and financial reforms (and consequently public procurement), and has resulted in the emergence of New Public Management (NPM) approaches in public sector structures. One such approach is contracting out that is an alternative term for ‘outsourcing’ which means “contracting, subcontracting, or ‘externalizing’ non-core activities to free up cash, personnel, time and facilities for activities” (Business Directory.com 2010:1) where the state holds economic benefits (Vyas-Doorgapersad 2011:240). These NPM initiatives underpinned the discussions around the transformed role of government incorporating economic development issues, cost-reduction and cost-effective service delivery, mixed-market economy, and market-related products, and market-based innovative solutions in public sector delivery. Given this reality, gender mainstreaming is also an issue that gained prominence as a result of the implementation of NPM principles.
The incorporation of gender mainstreaming in NPM-led approaches, structures and operations has been stated in scholarly works conducted by Thomas and Davies (2002:389) emphasising that “the ‘new’ discourses promote new forms of masculinities, serving to reinforce the gendered substructures of the organization”. Hopton (1999:71) in addition stated that NPM represents “traditional masculinist behaviour such as competitiveness, risk taking, and the domination of territory and other individuals” (Sundin and Tillmar 2010:54). Therefore, still today, “the theoretical and pragmatic rationales for complete outsourcing, privatisation, or a combination of both have implications for women in the supply chain for public services. For instance, a shift in the role of the state as an employer of women in the service and caring occupations around the world deserves attention. The role and impact of new public-private partnerships–compared to other forms of privatisation- for the delivery of public services for women and by women, however, remain under researched” (Nyeck and Benjamin 2014:1).

THE PRACTICE OF GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN KENYA

Like in many other African countries, the case of post-colonial Kenya is not different. The colonial British Government at the behest of a Governor laid down government regulations including public procurement regulatory processes to legitimise colonial governance and exploit economic opportunities. It is important to note that procurement activities were limited, hence fewer regulations were in place. Available literature, albeit scarce, shows that the British government system under the responsibility of Crown Agents dominated the procurement process throughout the colonial period (Ochieng and Muehle Undated: 2–3; University of Nairobi (UoN) 2013:1; Juma 2010b:1; Kariuki 2009:2). In 1955, through a Treasury Circular, a Central Tender Board (CTB) was established to deal with all government tenders for local, overseas, and colony-wide procurements more or less in a centralised system since operations were minimal. CTB did not have a recognised structure until 1960 (Ochieng and Muehle Undated:1). In 1959, a Procurement and Supplies Unit was set up, under the Ministry of Public Works, which was renamed Supplies Branch in 1960 (UoN 2013:1), exclusively to handle common-user goods and services (Ochieng and Muehle Undated: 2–3). Even after Kenya gained independence in 1963 Crown Agents continued carrying out the procurement function until 1969 (Ochieng & Muehle Undated: 1; UoN 2013:1; Juma 2010b:1; Kariuki 2009:2), arguably due to a lack of local capacity (Juma 2010b:1) during the transition period. In the 1970s the procurement function was carried out through Treasury Circulars (Transparency International (TI) 2014:2; UoN 2013:1) and in 1974 the operations of the CTB were relocated to the Treasury from the Ministry of Public Works. Thereafter, all public procurement activities were handed over to ministries and departments.

In 1978 a Supplies Manual was developed to guide all aspects of procurement but a subsequent review of existing procurement systems in 1979 showed that:

- the public procurement system excluded local authorities, schools and government owned enterprises (UoN 2013:1);
- it was followed unevenly across ministries and departments; and
it lacked proper disciplinary mechanisms and most records were found misleading (Ochieng and Muehle Undated: 4).

This situation indicated rampant corruption and outright gross misuse of public resources and casted further doubts on the public procurement system with the general public (Ochieng and Muehle Undated: 4). Notably, from the foregoing it is clear that throughout the 1960s and 1970s there were no proper regulations guiding the public procurement system in Kenya and obviously this led to heightened pressure from the citizens and foreign institutions, to instill discipline in the financial sector, by instituting a proper legal and regulatory procurement mechanism.

A major milestone in aligning government acquisition of goods and services came after a 1999 Report initiated by the World Bank on the Kenya Procurement System which recommended the enactment of what came to be known as the Exchequer and Audit (Public Procurement) Regulations Act (EARA), 2001 (Juma 2010b:4). This Act among others merged all circulars regulating public procurement, abolished the CTB and established Ministerial Tender Committees, the Procurement Appeals Board and the Public Procurement Directorate (Ochieng and Muehle Undated: 6–7). These interventions subjected all government entities to public procurement regulations for the first time, including setting up a procurement unit within each governmental establishment (UoN 2013:1). The Exchequer and Audit (Public Procurement) Regulations Act (EARA), 2001 also authorised the Ministry of Finance to exempt procurement deals of a state security nature (Juma 2010b:5). Despite the public procurement reforms, it was discernible that there were glaring issues, ranging from unfair competition to exaggerated bid pricing, excessive corruption, fully paid up contracts with no deliveries, a slow procurement process and lack of legal procurement performance and enforcement mechanisms (UoN 2013:1; Ochieng and Muehle Undated: 6–7). Hence, more elaborate mechanisms were needed to instill further discipline when purchasing public goods and services.

To seal loopholes in the public procurement system, the new government of 2002 came into power on account of sound public financial management and governance and vowed to eradicate endemic corruption. The new government swiftly moved to draw up procurement regulations benchmarked against global best practices. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNICITRAL) model law on public procurement was used as a benchmark to draft radical reform measures that culminated into the Public Procurement and Disposal Act (PPDA) of 2005 that was enacted to set up clear guidelines for procurement and the disposal of unserviceable, obsolete or surplus stores and equipment. This Act intended to enhance efficiency, integrity, fairness, accountability, to promote local industries and also to offer reservations for disadvantaged groups including women, youth and persons with disabilities (Ochieng and Muehle Undated: 7; PPDA 2005:52). The PPDA, 2005 also established three entities to smooth procurement activities: the Public Procurement Oversight Authority (PPOA) to enforce compliance, implementation and monitoring of public procurement systems; the Public Procurement Oversight Advisory Board responsible for overseeing administrative and financial operations of PPOA; and the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board (previously known as The Public Procurement Complaints, Review Board, under the ERA, 2001). Other legal frameworks that developed over time included the Public Procurement and Disposal Regulations, 2006; the Public Procurement and Disposal Regulations (Public Private Partnerships), 2009; and
the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007. Under a devolved governing system, the Public Procurement and Disposal (County Governments) Regulations, 2013 operationalised the application of the PPDA, 2005 in the County Governments, in order to promote social industry and support socio economic developments but without taking cognisance of wide ranging gender disparities.

Several measures were also put in place to enhance gender equality, and the Constitution of Kenya, 2013 in Article 27 (8) summed up all, by stating that no more than two thirds of members of the same gender, shall be elected or appointed for public positions at national level, while Article 197 enshrines the above requirements at the County Government Level (Constitution of Kenya 2010:42). Article 197 of the Constitution moreover states that not more than two-thirds of any elected National Assembly, Senate, County Assembly and Executive Members respectively will be of the same gender. Further, Article 227 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2013 envisages public procurement of goods and services to be just, equitable, transparent, competitive, cost effective and that accords protection or advancement for groups or persons previously disadvantaged by unfair competition.

This notwithstanding, the Government enacted the Public Procurement and Disposal (Preference and Reservations) Regulations (PPDR), 2011 (Government of Kenya 2011:199) that, among others, regulated the inclusion of disadvantaged groups, enterprises owned by women, youth and persons with disabilities. The regulations of 2001 accorded preferential rights to the designated groups to procure goods, services and works within a specified threshold in the constituencies, counties, and local authorities where they reside or operate. The procurement items being motor vehicles, plants and equipment assembled in Kenya; furniture, textiles, foodstuff made in Kenya; and other goods manufactured, mined, extracted or grown in Kenya. The threshold for exclusive preferences ranged from Ksh 5m for road works, Ksh 200m for other works, and Ksh 50m in respect to goods and services (PPDR 2011:199–204).

To redress past injustices, and in tandem with the spirit of the Constitution, 2010, the new Government regime in 2013, amended regulation 31 of the PPDR, 2011 and gazetted the Public Procurement and Disposal (Preference and Reservations) Regulations (Amendment No. 2) Regulations (PPDR), 2013 by reserving 30% of government procurement of goods, services and works for enterprises owned by women, youth and people with disabilities (PPDR 2013: 2281). Unlike the PPDR of 2011, the PPDR of 2013 (PPDR 2013:2283) removed the threshold required to participate in public procurement for women, youth and persons with disabilities. To enforce the regulations, in October, 2013 the Government of Kenya, began, the Access to Government Procurement Opportunities (AGPO) programme, under the National Treasury Public Procurement Directorate, with a view to enable women and other marginalised groups to procure 30% of public goods and services in line with Article 2 of the PPDR of 2013 and Article 27 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, on equality and freedom from discrimination (www.agpo.go.ke, PPDR 2013:2281, Constitution of Kenya 2010). The sole purpose of the AGPO being to ensure that women and discriminated groups actively participate in public procurement. The benefits of registering for the AGPO includes among others: the ability to participate in 30% of government tenders, to qualify for Local Purchase/Service Orders financing from the Youth/Women Enterprise Development Fund, exclusion from bid bonds, and invoice discounting with financial institutions (www.agpo.go). The AGPO programme has access to government business worth Ksh 191 billion annually,
and by mid May 2015 over 6,500 businesses owned by female or disadvantaged groups had benefitted from government businesses worth Ksh9.3 billion (*Business Daily* 17 March 2015). Being at the inception and capacity building stage, the raft of measures undertaken will definitely yield positive outcomes in a couple of years.

THE PRACTICE OF GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Before democracy in South Africa (pre-1994), the country was regulated by a centralised system of procurement, resulting in the establishment of the State Tender Board (1968) at national sphere. The provinces had provincial tender boards and municipalities had their own tender boards. The procurement processes at national, provincial and municipal levels were managed by their own tender boards. It was, however, understood that “procurement through a central tender board in a large and varied state like South Africa would be time-consuming, and especially in urgent cases this would be problematic. Further, in light of the large range of supplies and services purchased by the government, decentralisation would reduce complexity at the centre, facilitating its smooth functioning. No doubt there were also other considerations, such as that decentralisation would ensure that procurement decisions would take account of specific circumstances and specialist knowledge, and that it would provide for quicker feedback regarding goods and services procured” (Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI) 2014:13). This intention brought two major procurement reforms between the years 1994–2000 (the first period of reforms entailed preliminary reforms) and thereafter from 2000–2010 (the second period of reforms focused on developmental reforms).

The *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, 1996 stipulates the foundations and operational aspects of a procurement system emphasising that “contracting by organs of state for goods or services must occur in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective” (RSA 1996). The Constitution therefore, protects any sort of discrimination in the procurement process. The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework of 2000 henceforth presented the national framework emphasising the preferences in awarding contracts. The process of awarding outsources contracts works on a points system (allocated to suppliers considering the price and preference) hence it assesses and evaluates bids accordingly. In terms of section 2(1) (d) of the *Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act* 5 of 2000, the “specific goals” for which preference points can be awarded may include: “(i) contracting with persons, or categories of persons, historically disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender or disability; (ii) implementing the programmes of the Reconstruction and Development Programme as published in *Government Gazette* No. 16085 dated 23 November 1994” (Republic of South Africa (RSA) 2000).

The awarding of preference points is tied to a supplier’s certified Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) status in terms of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEEA). The higher the BBBEE rating of a supplier, the higher the number of preference points awarded (Bolton 2014:4). The Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa: an initiative of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public Works, that also later came under discussion in April 1997. The reason for this Green Paper was to allow new
and upcoming tenderers to be part of the public sector procurement system. The “Ministries of Finance and Public Works embarked on the reform of the public sector procurement system to make the tendering system easily accessible to the SMMEs. The emphasis is on the development and stimulation of the SMME sector and using the procurement system as an instrument to achieve certain socioeconomic objectives without forfeiting the principles of good financial management” (http://www.gov.za). This initiative furthermore resulted in the implementation of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000.

The Department of Public Works (DPW) is responsible for implementing the above stated legislation related to public procurement, tender processes and outsourcing of projects. At the institutional structure level, the DPW, under its sub-programme: Corporate Services, set a Strategic Objective 6 that emphasises “mainstreaming of gender, disability and youth development in the core business of both DPW and its related industry (Construction and Property)...” (DPW Strategic Plan 2012–2016 2015: 26). However, the gender aspect of the DPW Strategic Plan 2012–2016 (2015:27) only incorporates “people with disabilities”. In terms of gender equality in employment equity, the DPW is progressive in its approach. The total number of employees (including employees with disabilities) at strategic, middle and lower management levels are 5 710, out of which 2 550 are female in comparison to 2 005 male (DPW Annual Report 2013/2014 2015:157). However, the gender disparity is visible in the appointments of top, senior, and middle management levels that are occupied by more men than females (top management: 5 male, 2 female; senior management: 87 male, 61 female; and middle management: 650 male and 371 female) (DPW Annual Report 2013/2014 2015: 157) and is a matter of serious concern and future debate.

In order to demarcate gender to masculine and feminine oriented responsibilities and resource allocation, the DPW has established an Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) to create employment opportunities” (DPW Strategic Plan 2012–2016 2015:37. The baseline 2010/2011 linked to Strategic Objective 4 of the DPW Strategic Plan 2012–2016 that states that “626 935 work opportunities created through EPWP; 59% of the wage incentive has been accessed; the overall participation targets were: 62% women, 51% youth and 0.45% people with disabilities” (DPW Strategic Plan 2012–2016 2015:37). In addition, the EPWP aims to target women and people with disabilities, however the “targeted proportions of each comprise of 60 percent women and 2 percent disabled” (Department of Labour 2002).

PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

The aim of Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 3 (Gender equality and women’s empowerment) are not absolutely realised worldwide, especially on the African continent, and it is considered as a stand-alone goal in the Post-2015 Millennium Development Agenda, that entails “increasing the relevance of pursuing options through procurement to deliver on development commitments” (González 2014:v). It is therefore suggested that public works programmes must accommodate the MDG Goal 3 in the following manner:

The gender mainstreaming of women in decision-making processes in the patriarchal societies (still in existence) in Kenya and South Africa, require education and training in public procurement processes and procedures provided to both men and women. This
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South African scenario</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender mainstreaming in public works programmes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Gender-based wage income benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Training/accreditation courses/capacity-building for women and men based on gender-based tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Infrastructure investment (social and physical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Crèche provisioning for gender-based labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Home-based/household/domiciliary care-worker</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Gender-based participation in policy design</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women empowerment through public procurement strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✔ Ensuring that 25% of all procurement contracts are conceded to women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Developing structures, systems, processes and mechanisms to identify women regarding the establishment of Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Creating a gender-based database for SMMEs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Entrepreneurship and business related workshops to acknowledge and empower women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Business related guidance to establish and run the SMMEs successfully</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Funding opportunities for women for establishing SMMEs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Enhancing capacity-building/skills development opportunities to manage personnel and management aspects of SMMEs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Creating opportunities in tender and procurement processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Enhancing representation in decision-making processes related to public works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Improving participation in procurement processes</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Kenyan scenario</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender mainstreaming in public works programmes</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Legislative requirement that no more than two thirds of the same gender shall be elected or appointed in public places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establishment of the National Gender and Inequality Commission with a view to reduce gender inequality and discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establishment of the Women Enterprise Fund to empower women through enterprise development</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women empowerment through public procurement strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✔ Reservation of 30% of public procurement for women and other disadvantaged groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Ease of getting finance for public procurement from the Women Enterprise Fund through issuance of Local Purchase Orders/Local Service Orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Capacity building in public procurement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
recommendation is substantiated by the findings of the research conducted by Jeroen Decuyper (undated) on “the introduction of the gender dimension in the public budgets, public procurement contracts and subsidies”, that emphasises that “it is possible to integrate the promotion of equality of women and men in the public procurement contracts, more specifically in the selection criteria (exclusion of discriminating companies), the contract award criteria (include gender as a sub-criterion when evaluating the quality of the offer) and the contract performance conditions (obligation to take the gender perspective into account when executing the commissioned tasks)” (Decuyper Undated: 2).

It is moreover recommended that capacity-building in expanded public works projects must be offered giving preference to women empowerment. This proposal corroborates with the research-based guide released by the International Trade Centre (ITC) (2014:vi) (the joint agency of the World Trade Organization and the United Nations) that explores aspects of “women empowerment through public procurement” and examines “some very basic, but often overlooked questions such as: “What is a women-owned business? How do we identify those businesses?” The guide also investigates several “barriers and challenges that prevent or discourage women entrepreneurs from entering the public procurement market and presents a range of best practices for overcoming them” (International Trade Centre (ITC) (2014:vi).

CONCLUSION

The authors suggest that governments must implement affirmative action mechanisms in public procurement practices to ensure that a non-discriminatory approach is followed in tender allocations. The policy objectives of the public works sector need to incorporate gender-based decision-making, participation, transparency, representation and recognition, or otherwise be considered as gender-neutral. The gender-based opportunities must also be offered in entrepreneurship capacity-building programmes empowering both men and women in the use of technology; bidding processes; tender procedures; establishment of SMMEs; business and finance management; etc. In addition, input, output and impact indicators need to be established to review and enhance the performance of gender-based public procurement practices. These indicators may assist in monitoring and measuring the socio-economic impact on the lives of both men and women in a longitudinal manner. The examples could include: reduced poverty levels for financial sustainability; improved educational/capacity-building initiatives for a reduced rate of unemployment and increased participation in public procurement decision-making processes for improved GDP of (any) country. Nonetheless, on-going research to measure the level of development of gender mainstreaming should be undertaken in a country-specific context.

NOTES

1 Prof Abel Kinoti is a Research Associate at the Centre for Public Management and Governance at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa.

2 The SADC Gender Protocol aims to ensure that women benefit equally economically and financially in the public procurement process.
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An evaluation of service effectiveness of selected refugee service providers in urban and surrounding areas of the Cape Town Metropolitan Area

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ABSTRACT

Thousands of refugees fleeing from surrounding war-torn and destitute African countries come to South Africa hoping to live in safety. Refugee service providers play a major role in providing services to help refugees to rebuild their lives and integrate into South African society.

The article investigated issues facing refugees in South Africa, particularly in central Cape Town. It aimed in general to determine how effective refugee service providers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), namely the Agency for Refugee Education, Skills Training and Advocacy (ARESTA), the Cape Town Refugee Centre (CTRC) and the Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town (SCCT) assist them in overcoming the hardships of being unprepared in a foreign country, and whether their clients are satisfied with their services.

The objectives of the article were to identify the kinds of programmes offered and how they are delivered; to explore refugees’ perceptions about services offered by refugee service providers in Cape Town; to identify the service providers’ strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT); and to develop and provide a framework for refugee service providers in Cape Town to improve their service delivery. The article also examined how sharing, or not sharing information affects the efficacy of services such as education, vocational skills and self-reliance projects.
INTRODUCTION

Thousands of refugees flee from surrounding war-torn and destitute African countries, coming to South Africa in the hope of living in safety. South Africa is a country with high levels of unemployment and poverty (Tregenna and Tsela 2008:3) and most refugees need assistance with basic necessities such as food, clothing and shelter. Refugees also need to find employment to sustain themselves and their families, and to achieve self-sufficiency. Several refugee service providers in Cape Town aim to assist and support this needy population to rebuild their lives and integrate into South African society, and to make this difficult transition easier. Delivering services to refugees in urban centres involves the interaction of multiple types of services and organisations.

Services provided by refugee service providers include:
- Information, orientation and referrals.
- Accommodation services.
- Interpreting and translating.
- Counselling.
- Lobbying and advocacy.
- English classes and training.

As many of the asylum-seekers and refugees come from non-English speaking countries, English language training is essential for them to be able to communicate and integrate into South African society. Different types of training provide refugees with opportunities to become self-reliant, start-up small businesses and secure other forms of employment, thereby becoming less dependent on relief, and rather contributing to the South African economy (ARESTA 2008:4).

A study by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE 2003:13) found that a large number of refugees were unaware of refugee service providers, the services they provide and criteria they utilise to provide assistance, because there was no systematic, coherent way of conveying information to refugees upon arrival. Furthermore, CASE (2003:13) found that applicants living in Johannesburg and Pretoria were significantly more likely to know where to go for assistance, whereas applicants in Cape Town were the least to know. The following questions provide a focus for this study:
• What kinds of services do the selected service providers offer to refugees, and to what extent do refugees receive these services?
• How do refugees perceive these services?
• What capacity do the selected service providers have to effectively deliver the required services to refugees?
• What measures could promote better services to refugees in Cape Town?

The article followed a mixed methods approach, implementing both qualitative and quantitative research methods to explore services provided by the three refugee service providers. Quantitative data was collected by administering a survey questionnaire to 120 refugees, all clients of the selected service providers, to obtain their perceptions about the services they receive. Semi-structured interviews with senior staff of two of the service providers provided insight into the services offered and challenges they face in assisting their clients.

CONCEPTUALISING THE REFUGEE PHENOMENON

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2010) reports that there were 43.3 million forcibly displaced people worldwide at the end of 2009, the highest number since the mid-1990s. Of these, 15.2 million were refugees. UNHCR (2010) estimates that more than half of the world’s refugees reside in urban areas and less than one third in camps. Some of the main reasons that compel people to flee their home countries are among others wars and conflicts, environmental factors and violence against women.

Iqbal and Zorn (2007:200–213) state that civil wars rank high in creating conditions that drive people out of their homes due to fear for their lives during combat, fear of capture by the opposing side or fear of political repression. Some groups fleeing their homes during violent conflict become internally displaced, while others become refugees by migrating to another state. Importantly, in addition to deciding to leave their home states, refugees also have to decide on a destination state. Conditions in the target state, including the presence and degree of civil conflict, affect refugees’ migration decisions. Hamilton (1999:5) agrees that one of the most obvious forms of violent conflict that may generate refugees is international war.

Adding to conflicts and wars, there are also environmental causes. Although environmental factors have produced fewer emigrants and refugees than conflicts, ecological pressures on population displacements cannot be underestimated. The African Union (2008:11) and UNHCR (2010:3) document massive displacement resulting from climate change and natural disasters, in addition to civil war: in the East and Horn of Africa, located in a fragile ecosystem, severe floods displaced more than 400 000 people in Somalia in 2006, and heavy rains caused flooding in several West African countries and a landslide in Uganda, affecting thousands of people.

Attention is also being drawn to serious problems involving rape, beatings, torture and mutilation that women and children around the world are subjected to, including female genital mutilation (FGM). The practice of FGM poses significant harm to women in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of the Middle East and Asia (Rice 1999). Zohry and Hassam-el-Din (1997) argue that FGM is considered as a kind of violence prevailing against females in developing countries. It is an old practice in some African countries, but its history is not clearly known.
Williams (2000:10) states that after being granted refugee status, refugees are entitled to the protection of the government in terms of international human rights law. However, many refugees do not receive material or practical assistance from either the government or UNHCR, which exposes them to extreme hardship and suffering. Finding food, accommodation and jobs is a daily struggle for many refugees.

**Main barriers facing refugees**

A study conducted in Britain by the Refugee Council of Brent, cited in Peabody Trust (1999:20, 21) identifies the main barriers refugees face in Britain, as highlighted by the refugees themselves, as:

- Language.
- Lack of work experience.
- Racial discrimination.
- Uncertainty of immigration status.
- Lack of information about the labour market and how to find jobs.
- Little or no work available for them.
- Skills not usable without re-training in professions.
- Lack of recognition of qualifications from abroad.

The study also confirmed that although people who spoke English had a much better chance of finding jobs, the unemployment rate of refugees was still 48% (Peabody Trust 1999:79). Jacobsen (2004:58) discussing urban refugees, the reasons they go to cities and the levels of aid to urban areas and camps; states that urban refugees find their way to towns and cities for various reasons. An assumption exists that most refugees originate from urban socio-economic backgrounds and choose to come to towns because they cannot farm or pursue livelihoods in rural areas and camps. Refugees also move to urban centres when food aid is cut off in camps. In countries that permit refugees to live in urban areas, such as South Africa and Egypt, little assistance is provided compared with that available in camps.

**Urban refugees**

Jacobsen (2004:61) notes that urban refugees face the same economic problems as the urban poor: scarce jobs, housing, no credit and banking services, crime and political marginalisation. However, refugees and asylum-seekers face additional challenges. Having borrowed money to make their journey or because they are living on the goodwill of locals, they often owe large debts to family members or others. The authorities restrict refugees’ right to work, grant little or no public assistance and require documentation. In addition, the local population and law enforcement agencies often react to refugees, as to urban migrants generally, with xenophobia, ranging from ignorance and resentment to harassment and violence. On the other hand, Jacobsen (2004:64) argues that urban refugees can easily be an economic asset, rather than a burden, to cities in the global South and suggests developing countries need to harness the economic power of the informal sector by creating or smoothing the passage of informal sector businesses into the formal sector. Many urban refugees are entrepreneurs whose economic contributions to the city can be
maximised by implementing their right to work and freedom of movement. State authorities that create obstacles to refugees’ livelihoods, through backlogs of status determination or police harassment, not only prevent refugees from pulling their economic weight, but create environments of resentment and rule-breaking (Jacobsen 2004:64).

Buscher (2003:3) recognises there has often been a ‘premise of advantage’ attached to urban refugees. An assumption prevails that as they are in cities; urban refugees have access to money, connections and opportunity and, hence, are in less need of assistance than camp-based refugees. As a result, urban refugees are often under-served and/or subject to inconsistent application of assistance. In fact, Buscher (2003:3) argues that urban refugees are more likely to be detained, face discrimination and racially motivated attacks, be subject to deportation and suffer serious human rights abuses such as sexual violence and arbitrary arrest.

SOUTH AFRICA: FROM THE REFUGEE-PRODUCING COUNTRY TO ONE RECEIVING REFUGEES

Since the advent of democracy in 1994, South Africa has shifted from being a refugee-producing country to one receiving refugees from across the African continent and beyond, because asylum-seekers perceive it as a viable and safe destination (Winterstein, cited by Lanzi Mazzocchini 2008:26).

The UNHCR (2008b:190) reports that in 2008 South Africa was hosting approximately 37 000 refugees, mostly from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Burundi and Angola, and some 137 000 asylum-seekers, the majority of which were from Zimbabwe, DRC, Somalia, Ethiopia and Burundi. It also reports (2008:190) that a significant number of asylum-seekers came from Asian countries such as India, Pakistan and China. A steep increase in the refugee population in 2006 was mainly attributable to Zimbabwean asylum-seekers, a trend that is likely to continue and may even increase given the continuing unstable political situation in Zimbabwe. The majority of refugees live in the main urban centres of Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth (UNHCR 2008b:190). De la Hunt and Gass, cited by Lanzi Mazzocchini (2008:26), reveal that the majority of asylum-seekers in South Africa are young males between the ages of 18 and 40.

Legal context of refugees in South Africa

The NCRA (2006:2) argues that by signing the United Nations and African Union Refugee Conventions and developing its own Refugees Act in 1998 (promulgated in 2000), the South African government has made important strides in protecting people who have been compelled to leave their countries of origin as a result of fear of persecution, violence or conflict. With this legislation, the following rights are guaranteed by law to refugees and asylum-seekers.

- Not to be returned to their country of origin or any other country, if doing so would place their life or security at risk.
- The right to work and study from the moment they lodge an asylum application.
- Access to health care, public relief, and assistance.
To have their asylum applications adjudicated in a manner that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, which includes the right to appeal a negative decision on asylum claim.

The right to freedom of movement and not to be arbitrarily arrested and detained.

The right to legal representation.

However, the NCRA report stresses that accessing these rights is far from easy (NCRA 2006:3).

Refugees’ needs in South Africa

Rather than warehousing refugees in isolated camps or detention facilities, South Africa encourages refugees to live in its cities where they can work and contribute to society. Yet despite South Africa’s relative wealth and development, urban refugees encounter many of the same problems in Johannesburg as in other African cities and cities of the global South (Jacobsen 2004:57).

According to Schreier (2006:47), the lack of material assistance programmes for refugees in South Africa and their inability to access most social welfare grants means that they rely on their own means to support themselves.

Serious impediments to refugees’ integration in Cape Town are highlighted by Kemar (2006:83) of the City of Cape Town:

- Poverty is pervasive, with 115 000 families living in informal settlements in 2006 (up from 23 000 families in 1993); the number of households below the poverty line increased to 38% in 2005 from 25% in 1996.
- Unemployment in the City of Cape Town grew from 13% in 1997 to 23% in 2004.
- The high crime rate causes fear and mistrust that leads to fragmentation and polarisation in the city.
- The apartheid legacy of social and special segregation is pervasive and acute inequality persists.

Kemar (2006:83) recognises that these factors necessitate deliberate and conscious approaches to foster social cohesion and unity. In addition to these impediments, there is a xenophobic attitude among some South Africans. According to McKnight (2008:18), the xenophobic attacks that began on 11 May 2008 in Johannesburg’s Alexandria Township left 62 people dead, and at the time constituted the worst violence in the country since the end of apartheid.

CASE (2003) investigated why applicants lacked knowledge of where to go for assistance and found there were no formal referral mechanisms in place to ensure refugees are able to obtain assistance upon arrival in South Africa. Referral often happens informally, by word of mouth. While some Refugee Reception Offices (RROs) provide information to new arrivals this does not happen in any standardised way. While RROs seem to be the most logical place for refugees to obtain advice or assistance, the actual conveyance of information at RROs depends on individuals and sometimes on whether refugees ask for this information directly. The CASE (2003) report showed some RROs were willing to provide this information, but others did not perceive it to be their responsibility to do so. Applicants who knew where to go for assistance sometimes complained about the poor quality of assistance they received or the fact that they received no assistance, despite asking for it.
CASE (2003) was unable to assess the quality of assistance provided by each organisation, but emphasised that applicants were not aware of the criteria used by different service providers to render assistance. Amongst its recommendations, CASE (2003) suggests that service providers conduct information campaigns, possibly in the form of public meetings, to inform refugees about the services they provide and criteria they use to extend assistance. Service providers within each of the cities of the study should strengthen their coordination of assistance to limit duplication of services and enable a larger number of refugees to be assisted. Working closely with religious organisations might allow them to reach a large number of refugees within a setting they feel safe and comfortable in (CASE 2003:20–28).

Given this background, an updated assessment of how services are perceived by refugees in Cape Town was required to improve service delivery in a coordinated manner. A number of refugee service providers operating in Cape Town attempt to assist refugees and asylum-seekers. Nevertheless, most refugees and asylum-seekers are literally unaware of where to go for assistance when in need; and many do not receive the assistance they require when they do approach refugee service providers operating in their area. In view of this deficiency, this study investigates the provision of services at three refugee service providers in Cape Town, and the effectiveness thereof.

**RESEARCH APPROACH, RESULTS AND FINDINGS**

The empirical material for this article followed a mixed methods approach by implementing both qualitative and quantitative research methods to explore services provided to refugees in Cape Town. Quantitative data was collected through the administration of a survey questionnaire to refugees, while qualitative data was collected by conducting semi-structured interviews with senior staff at two refugee service providers in Cape Town.

The survey and interviews were conducted in Cape Town at organisations where refugees go for assistance: ARESTA, located in Athlone; CTRC in Wynberg and SCCT in the City Bowl. Respondents included refugees who sought assistance at these organisations, those who did receive and those who did not receive the required services. The survey participants were selected by means of stratified random sampling methods. It is a two-step process that partitions the population into subpopulations, strata or groups, after which elements are selected from each stratum by a random procedure.

The questionnaire was distributed at the premises of the selected organisations which refugees visit daily to seek assistance. The selected service providers identified clients who had received assistance, and some who did not receive any assistance for various reasons. The target number of respondents chosen for the sample was 120 refugees and asylum-seekers; 40 respondents per organisations.

The two interviewees, senior management staff, were based at ARESTA and CTRC. The interviews were designed to investigate the organisations’ perceptions of their clients and what their capabilities to provide services were. It was planned initially to also interview the Director of Scalabrini Centre but time constraints did not allow this.

Data collected was analysed according to statistical principles as contained in the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to generate statistical information, including frequencies, and their significance. Results are presented in both tables and charts.
Demographic profile of respondents

The research focused on refugees who have settled in the Cape Town Metropolitan region and who are clients or prospective clients of three selected refugee service providers.

Table 1: Distribution of respondents across the selected refugee service providers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugee service providers</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Graph</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARESTA</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Graph" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTRC</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Graph" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCCT</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Graph" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Graph" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows that there was an even distribution in respondents’ place of survey. A total of 120 respondents were surveyed, 40 each at CTRC, ARESTA and SCCT. This is because the researcher distributed an equal number of questionnaires at each organisation.

Table 2: Gender of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents’ gender</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>54.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Table shows that 45.83% of respondents in the survey were male and 54.17% were female.

Figure 1: Age of respondents

![Age Distribution Chart]
Figure 1 displays the age categories of respondents indicating that the majority of respondents (39.17%) were in the age category 21 to 30 years, followed by those between 31 and 40 years (36.67%). The under-20 category (11.67%) placed third, while the last two age categories, 51 to 60 years and older than 60 years constituted 1.67% and 0.83%, respectively. It is clear that the majority of respondents seeking assistance are young adults.

Figure 2 provides the respondents’ countries of origin and shows that respondents came from 12 African countries. The largest group came from DRC (31.7% of respondents), followed by Zimbabwe (20.8%). These were followed by Burundi, Rwanda and Somalia.

Figure 3: Marital status of respondents
which together accounted for 31.6% (Burundi, 10%; Rwanda, 10.8%; Somalia, 10.8%). Other countries represented included Congo (3.33%), Angola (2.5%), Tanzania (2.5%), Cameroon (2.5%), Malawi (1.67%), Mozambique (1.67%) and Uganda (1.67%).

Figure 3 illustrates the marital status of the respondents and indicates that the sample was dominated by unmarried or single (49.17%) and married respondents (37.5%). The remaining 13.33 (8.33+5) were divorced or widowed.

The respondents’ occupational status as illustrated in Figure 4 shows a significant majority (75%) of respondents reported being unemployed, while 15% reported being employed and self-employed. Respondents reporting being students constituted 8.33%, while 1.67% did not disclose their occupation. A possible explanation is that people who visit refugee service providers are normally those refugees who are most

Figure 5: Respondents’ documentation
vulnerable; hence most of them are without employment, but some may have odd jobs, such as car guarding.

Figure 5 captures the relevant data regarding documentation respondents held and indicates that among the respondents 61.67% held a Section 22 permit issued in terms of the Refugees Act, 1998 which means they were classified as asylum-seekers; 22.5% had a Section 24 permit, meaning they were recognised as refugees in South Africa, while 12.5% possessed refugee ID books. Other respondents, including those whose applications had been rejected and those who had launched an appeal, had other types of documentation.

**Refugees’ evaluation of services received from service providers**

The sections below captures the results of the refugees’ perceptions about services offered by refugee service providers (see Abstract).

**Respondents’ experience of problems in acquiring documentation**

Although this study excluded services offered to refugees by government agencies, because of the requirement of refugees’ documentation to get them other services, respondents were asked if they had encountered any problems in their attempt to secure documentation. 40% of respondents experienced their attempt to acquire documentation at the DHA as being problematic, while almost 60% indicated they had not experienced any problem in acquiring documentation. The fact that 40% of respondents reported encountering problems at the DHA is alarming given that it is critically important for refugees to have documents to access services offered by refugee service providers, government services and private institutions such as banks, and when applying for jobs or enrolment at schools.

The main problem encountered by respondents was the documents issued to them by the DHA itself: 39% of respondents indicated that documents they had been issued were hardly recognised or accepted by third parties, thus preventing them getting assistance from other stakeholders such as schools, employers, businesses, traffic departments and most financial institutions. Almost 16% of respondents reported that the problems encountered related to rejection on grounds of language, while other major problems related to administrative inefficiency and slow service. Refugees’ seeking documentation reported the language barrier to be a major problem as they do not understand the language or the forms to be filled in.

**Assistance on respondents’ first arrival and how they came to know about the refugee service provider**

Only 32.5% of respondents received assistance when they first arrived in Cape Town, while 67.5% reported not having received any assistance on first arrival.

Respondents were asked how they came to know of the service providers on whose premises the survey questionnaire was administered. The question was intended to assess how prospective clients of the service providers became aware of these organisations, because the literature review revealed that there were no formal referral mechanisms in place to ensure refugees were able to obtain assistance upon arrival.

The majority (78.33%) of respondents learnt about the refugee service provider through referral by a friend. About 8% were referred to the service providers by the DHA, and
another 7.5% indicated they had been referred by other organisations. Some respondents became aware of these service providers through efforts made by refugee organisations at the DHA. A small percentage (0.8%) indicated they had been made aware of a particular organisation from information received at the border, although the source was unknown. About 6% indicated they had become aware of the refugee service providers through other means such as own search, Internet search and other searches.

**Level of assistance respondents had received from refugee service providers**

Figure 6 captures the level of assistance respondents had received from refugee service providers. A majority (75%) of respondents reported having received assistance whereas 6.67% reported not having received the requested assistance. During the period of the survey 18% of the respondents indicated that they were still waiting for the requested services. The following sub-section sheds light on the reasons why respondents would want to attend training provided by refugee service providers.

**Reasons for training**

85% of respondents wished to complete training to obtain a job or to enhance their prospects for a job. A further 6.25% underwent training to improve their ability to perform their current job and 4.17% wished to undergo training for their own personal satisfaction. Other respondents (4.17%) who wished to return voluntarily to their countries of origin in the near future, because of security concerns or dissatisfaction with living in South Africa, wanted to undergo training which would assist them on their return home. Others wished to resettle in a third country and wanted to complete a course which would assist them in a new country.

**Frequency of respondents’ need for assistance**

Respondents were asked how often they needed assistance from the refugee service providers; 55.26% of respondents needed assistance sometimes, while 38.59% were in
need of assistance regularly. Respondents who rarely needed assistance constituted 6.14%. The results show that refugees who visit the refugee service providers are either always or sometimes in need of assistance.

Respondents who indicated they only required assistance sometimes included those who sought guidance for training to acquire vocational skills (to find work or start their own businesses), while those needing regular assistance comprised vulnerable people such as refugees with disabilities, the elderly and unemployed parents with children.

Respondents who indicated that they did not receive assistance as requested were asked the reasons why they think they did not get it.

**Reasons expressed by respondents for non-assistance**

The majority (44.83%) reported they were told by the service providers approached that lack of funds and resources were the main reasons they were not assisted. This was followed by those who indicated that the services required were not available (13.78%), while lack of proper documentation was cited by 10.35% for being denied services. Another 10.35% reported being helped only once while they needed assistance more than once. The remaining respondents included those who reported they were not helped because that particular service required payment (10.34%) and one respondent (3.45%) who was denied assistance for not having a bank account. (Sometimes clients are required to have a bank account so that money can be deposited into their account).

As already discussed, it is not always easy for refugees to open a bank account as many banks are uncertain of the validity and reliability of the official documentation. In most cases, refugees were requested to provide proof of address, which was difficult due to the nature of their living arrangements or the work they undertake. Some respondents indicated that because of high rents, they shared crowded rooms, sometimes without the knowledge of the landlord, hence the difficulty in obtaining proof of residence. This was confirmed by Lanzi Mazzochini’s study (2008:103), conducted in Cape Town among refugee students, which showed that 85% shared a one- or two-room apartment. In the majority of the cases,
a minimum of three people shared one room and, in many cases, an average of between five and seven people shared a two-bedroomed apartment. Some male students indicated they slept in their room in shifts and had only one room at weekends as they were absent during the week working night shifts. Others who were also working night shifts stated that they stayed with friends at weekends (Lanzi Mazzochini, 2008:103).

Figure 7 illustrates respondents’ views on the service provided by refugee service providers and the majority (75.43%) of respondents rated the services positively (excellent and good), whereas 18.64% rated the services received as fair. Only 5.93% rated services as poor.

Correspondingly, 64.84% of respondents indicated that the way they were received when they approached refugee service providers was good. Collectively, all the positive responses indicate that the vast majority (92.3%) of respondents rated the way they were received positively. Conversely, only 2.2% of the respondents remained neutral in rating the way they were received, while 5.5% indicated that the reception was negative.

Relevance of service provided to respondents’ needs
With regard to the relevance of service provided to respondents’ needs, a slim majority (53.51%) of respondents were of the view that the services provided by refugee service providers were relevant to their needs, while 46.49% thought the services were irrelevant. This latter figure is also significantly high.

Services suggested by respondents
Participants proposed improvements to the provision of services, grouped into four categories: Assistance in documentation, enough help, additional services and jobs. Services that were said to be inadequate included rent for the elderly. Respondents explained that most of those receiving this kind of help cannot work because of advanced age and do not have anyone else to support them, but still only receive, at best, a third of their required rental money or school fees for primary and high school for their children or grandchildren. Regarding vocational skills training, some respondents said that the organisation provided full-time training for a period of about three months; but this was problematic because during this period people cannot work to feed themselves or their families. If trainees could not secure financial support for transport and rent during the training period, finishing the course would be difficult.

Another male refugee from the DRC, a 43 year-old carguard at a mall in Cape Town who had been in South Africa for four years, reported how he had been unable to attend English class during this time because he could not afford to miss even one day of work:

“If I miss one day it means I will struggle to pay the rent or to feed my family of five. My wife couldn’t attend English class either or any other training because two of our children are too small and we could not afford the childcare”.

In their case, if the refugee service provider could have assisted them with transport and childcare costs at least his wife would have attended English classes and a vocational skills training programme, which could possibly have led to a good job.

Furthermore, respondents identified financial help, courses and training based on what the clients want, food assistance for new arrivals, housing, income-generating activities, medical help, rent support, scholarships for college and higher institution, speedy translation
services and assistance with SAQA concerning academic qualifications obtained in refugees’ countries of origin as additional services.

The issue of translating degrees or certifications obtained in their countries of origin was very important for respondents. Refugees need SAQA certification mostly to apply to higher institutions to continue their studies or obtain documents when applying for employment. Respondents knew the service existed at CTRC, but they said it was ineffective. As one respondent wrote “you hand in your qualification and you have to wait between eight months and a year; the evaluated documents will come when you no longer need them”. During the interview with the Director of CTRC, she acknowledged that processing qualifications is a long process, but blamed it on SAQA. They had raised the issue with SAQA and hoped that from 2014 things would improve.

Other issues raised by respondents were those of housing or accommodation and that of banking. Several respondents said paying rent was very difficult for them. They were obliged to live in very crowded houses to be able to afford rent.

Regarding training, respondents indicated that they were given very little choice when it came to training. Respondents reported that, in most cases, they do a vocational skills training course not because they like it, but because it is the only one available or the only one refugee service providers can afford. This indicates that most clients approach refugee service providers looking for specific types of assistance. However, when they are told what they are looking for is unavailable they opt for what is available.

Barriers preventing refugees from using services
The majority (57.55%) of respondents identified lack of information as the greatest barrier to using services of refugee providers. About 22% indicated non-availability of transport to get to service providers, and 7.55% indicated they were requested to pay or contribute, but could not afford it. Almost 6% of respondents indicated they were not well received when they approached the refugee service provider and decided not to return. About 3% indicated that their employers did not allow time off, and 2% had no one to care for their children.

Additional comments and details from respondents
Respondents gave thoughtful insights into how services offered to them could be improved. Most agree that services provided to them are not adequate, and raised the issues of either lack of awareness of availability of services as well as frustrations about being told to come back many times without having received help, or having been obliged to take up available services which were not their primary request. Respondents called for more choices when it comes to services offered to them.

Other respondents ask the government of South Africa to be more involved and create special programmes for refugees.

The issue of communication kept arising. Respondents said that when they arrived as newcomers they didn’t know where to go or who to ask.

Beside challenges, some respondents argue that refugees also need to do their part and cannot expect that refugee service providers will do everything for them.

Interviews with two senior staff members
Interviews were conducted with two senior staff members from ARESTA and CTRC to validate the results gathered from the survey.
The two senior staff noted that refugee service providers provide the following services, among others: advocacy; basic education; skills training, self-reliance and income-generating activities, and job hunting skills; temporary accommodation for newly-arrived refugee women and children; psycho-social programmes and social welfare interventions.

Other services are provided by other organisations even though they were not analysed by this study. Those services include support for those with HIV/AIDS, gender equality and human rights workshops provided by Sonke Gender Justice, and legal advice provided by the UCT Law Clinic and Legal Resource Centre.

Priority in providing services is given to the most vulnerable. To be assessed, refugees need to provide proof that they are in possession of valid refugee documentation.

Asked why many people said that it takes long to get help, they replied that it was because of circumstances and non-availability of the services required and budget constraints and the scramble for funds among NGOs as big challenges hindering effective service delivery.

With regard to the issue raised by respondents of not being aware of refugee service providers or where to find them, the CTRC Director admitted there might be people in need who do not know about organisations helping refugees, but thought most refugees were aware. She explained why they do not advertise their services:

“We are struggling to satisfy those who came to us, we try to assist above 10 000 people per year. Imagine if we advertise; where are we going to get help for those who will come as a result of the advertisement?”

She insisted that they render quality services, but they cannot reach everybody and underlined that they will still select the most vulnerable for assistance.

The Director gave examples of the impact on people assisted, such as people having been assisted to do vocational skills who are now working and taking care of their families; children being assisted with school who are graduating; those assisted to start businesses which are now flourishing and becoming sustainable.

The Director acknowledged the dissatisfaction of some respondents as reasonable, but said most of it is related to the fact that people still mistake what services they are able to provide.

The majority (75%) of clients who approached the refugee service providers received assistance. However, some of them indicated that they could only choose among the limited available services on offer, which were not always the services the client needed at the time.

The reasons some refugees do not get services include lack of proper documentation; non-availability of certain services required by refugees and insufficiency of funding, which limits the number of people refugee service providers can serve, and level of material aid provided.

No formal communication channels exist to inform new refugees about refugee service providers and the services they provide. Refugee service providers refrain from advertising their programmes fearing an influx of clients whom they cannot accommodate and serve. While the reasoning behind this may be acceptable, it has the consequence of potential clients being ignorant of services provided.

The majority (64.84%) of respondents indicated that the manner in which they were received when they approached refugee service providers was good.
The referral system was being done poorly and was not structured. Training is very important for the self-reliance of refugees. However, lack of transport, childcare and other complementary assistance impedes their full success.

New technology has a place to improve services delivered: clients requested to be notified by telephone calls, SMS and even by e-mails.

Refugees coming from non-English speaking countries need to learn English first and afterwards undergo other training. Respondents presented a number of barriers to learning English. One was the difficulty of focusing on learning the language when there were a number of competing issues to which refugees must attend. Refugee women, in particular, found it difficult to learn English while they need to take care of small children at home and cannot afford childcare. Some communities, especially the Somalis, do not allow their women to go to school. Also, refugees who have a chance to learn tend to forget easily because they do not practice it.

The majority of respondents (53.51%) think that services provided are relevant to their needs. However, the percentage of respondents (46.49%) who think differently is significant.

Senior staff at two refugee service providers who were interviewed reported that there is collaboration between refugee service providers themselves and with the UNHCR. They meet monthly to share development of their work and try to resolve issues. ARESTA reported that it sometimes co-organises events or programmes with CTRC or SCCT, such as the Refugee Day celebration. SCCT has worked together with CTRC on a number of programmes such as caring for refugees who were affected by xenophobia. All three refugee service providers reported that they refer clients to one another. However, respondents complained that the referral system did not work effectively, for example referring someone without enquiring if the service for which he/she is being referred is available. The problem of funding affects all three refugee service providers.

**CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is recommended that the DHA revise its system to ensure refugees’ documentation is given timeously to all those who require them; resumes the information sessions that were taking place at its reception offices while refugees are waiting for services; and meets with a high-level panel from refugee service providers to discuss ways of ending the crisis in documentation.

It is recommended that service providers meet with SAQA authorities about reducing the delays in evaluating refugee qualifications.

Refugee service providers and the UNHCR must strengthen the orientation and guidance programmes they offer, because weak orientation programmes have a negative impact on the future of people who were not properly oriented in the first place.

Refugee service providers, in partnership with the government and the UNHCR, should find alternatives to bank loans to assist refugees who would like to start businesses.

It is recommended that instead of refraining from communicating and advertising their programmes, as suggested by the Director of CTRC, refugee service providers should improve communication among themselves, their clients and stakeholders.
Other communication efforts suggested by this study that could be embraced to inform refugees about programmes of interest include distributing flyers in schools, agencies, churches and malls; newspaper advertisements and advertisements at bus stops and train stations. All the communication tools should take into account the languages spoken by refugees.

Refugee service providers must seriously consider the situation of refugees who are willing to learn English, but cannot afford to miss work by instituting evening or weekend classes to accommodate them.

Vocational skills training being offered by refugee service providers appears necessary but not effective, because of lack of follow-up and the fact that training and services are, in most cases, offered at superficial levels only. For example, there is a need to rethink the wisdom of paying for a short (two-week long) course in plumbing for 10 clients who will end up not being hired and using the skills acquired because no one believes in the usefulness of a two-week plumbing course. It is recommended that refugee service providers look at the quality of services and the impact such services are making in individuals' lives. Refugee service providers should be flexible and ready to accommodate individual's needs.

Financial security is essential for sustainability. As the funding problem affects not only the refugee sector, but the whole NGO sector, it is recommended all service providers look at alternative ways to fund their activities and ensure they have effective mechanisms and techniques in place to enable them to carry on their activities and build sustainability. Fundraising should not be a task for only the Director or CEO of service providers. It is recommended that board members be utilised to assist, or professional fundraising consultants hired.

In addition to securing finances, service providers need to strengthen planning, governance, transparency and accountability.

Refugee service providers should devise ways to limit their reliance on donor funding; for example initiate social enterprises that generate income. Examples include sharing offices, sharing the cost of some staff, getting contracts from the government, using volunteers, targeting individual donors and starting commercial ventures such as fitness clubs, selling art and crafts made by refugees, running computer courses and Internet cafés, establishing catering and restaurant facilities that sell foods from countries refugees come from, engaging in housing projects, transport and other projects. However, refugee service providers need to be cautious in adopting these measures in order not to lose the focus of their main objectives.

The main constraint encountered in the conduct of the study was obtaining accurate data relating to refugees in South Africa and, in particular, in the Western Cape. Time and financial constraints limited the sample size to only 40 clients in each of only three refugee service providers and only two senior staff members.

The article has revealed areas that need further research in the field of refugees' welfare, and to identify more effective ways in which refugee service providers could improve their services. There is also a need for further studies to assess refugee service providers' interventions with a larger group, using a bigger sample. For example, a new study could include more refugee service providers and use different methods, including more qualitative methods (interviews and focus groups), to collect data from clients to obtain more insights from refugees.

One of the objectives of this article was to develop and provide a framework for refugee service providers in Cape Town to help improve their delivery of services. Although some
recommendations have been made, more research needs to be done to construct a proper framework. Finally, this research should be replicated with other refugee service providers nationally to reflect the broader situation of refugees living in South Africa.

NOTES

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Shifts in the Zimbabwean Land Reform Discourse from 1980 to the present

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ABSTRACT

The article captures the post-colonial developmental path of the Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe since 1980, when Zimbabwe got its independence from Britain. The shifts in the Zimbabwean Land Reform Programme since 1980, unveil four distinct phases that punctuate the Land Reform trajectory as well as exhibit their unique and distinct characteristics. The four phases of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe include: the willing buyer willing seller paradigm (1980–1990), the compulsory acquisition with fair compensation paradigm (1990–2000), the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) where there was compulsory acquisition with no compensation (2000–2002) and the partnerships and agricultural contracts between white commercial farmers and the indigenous black landholders (2014 to date).

The article highlights the key drivers to policy shifts, as well as the incremental pattern that punctuated the first and second paradigms, with the third paradigm assuming a radical policy leap in what was called the FTLRP. The fourth phase shows that the Government is making a U-turn on its stance about acquiring land without compensation. The Government is currently encouraging partnerships and contracts between black landholders and the previously evicted white commercial farmers. In this regard, the absence of a robust supporting legislative policy framework to substantiate these farming partnerships makes these contractual arrangements unpredictable.

As theoretical underpinning the article adopts American scientist, Thomas Kuhn’s scientific knowledge development paradigm (Kuhn 1962) where Kuhn narrated the transitions that normally take place in the scientific discipline and coined such fundamental changes or approaches underlying assumptions ‘paradigmatic shifts’.
INTRODUCTION

The concept of policy paradigm shift reflects a set of policy related assumptions, concepts, values and practices. In tracing the Zimbabwean land reform policy trajectory, four distinct phases or paradigms were identified. The first paradigm (The Lancaster House phase of 1980–1990) was characterised by the willing buyer willing seller policy. In this regard, the white land holders were given the autonomy to exercise their discretion with regards to ceding land to the Zimbabwean Government; hence they did it on self-ruling bases.

There was a gradual shift from the willing buyer willing seller policy, after it was seen that white commercial farmers were not willing to let go of the vast land tracts that they owned. Hence, the Government shifted to the compulsory land acquisition with fair compensation paradigm which exhibited dominance in the land policy domain between 1990 and 2000. The willing buyer willing seller approach, despite being a bit more effective than its predecessor with regards to the land tracts that were acquired was not sustainable and effective since the Government did not have adequate funds to compensate the white commercial land holders, as Britain the former colonial master did not live up to its promise of helping the Zimbabwean Government in compensating the white landholders.

Being displeased with the pace with which the land reform programme was being undertaken, the liberation war fighters (also known as war veterans or war vets) teamed up with many other aggrieved citizens and they resorted to violent land grabs and farm invasions. This marked a radical and boisterous third paradigm shift which was characterised by compulsory land acquisition with unfortunately no compensation whatsoever. This spontaneous and sporadic policy paradigm shift marked the beginning of what is known as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) and existed from 2000 to 2002. The FTLRP saw vast tracts of land being repossessed by the Zimbabweans. Instead, since 2014, an incremental approach, whereby the Government is now encouraging partnerships between the black land owners and the formerly evicted white commercial farmers are followed. However, the absence of a robust major legislative framework makes it difficult to decode some policy outlines and forms of this current dispensation.

POLICY PARADIGM SHIFTS

The concept of policy paradigm reflects a set of policy related assumptions, concepts, values and practices constituting a way viewing reality in a given polity or community. According to Auriacombe (in Schurink and Auriacombe 2010:435 & Auriacombe 2012:98) “due to the different ontological and epistemological beliefs of researchers belonging to different paradigms, the criteria for trustworthy, credible research can never meet everyone’s approval”.

This article selected the developmental phases of paradigms as introduced by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), as the most appropriate theoretical underpinning for policy paradigm shifts. Kuhn (1962:150) noted that a paradigm can be dominant (that is prevalent, governing, ingrained) but it is perpetually prone to the confrontation of competing and often opposing paradigms. Kuhn (1962:150) argues that a domineering paradigm in a particular period will eventually be deposed by a competing one. When that happens, the latter paradigm will resultantly assume primacy and dominance for a distinct time-period,
but over time it will also face a challenge from other contenders and the cycle of change will continue (Uwizeyimana and Maphunye 2014:90). In the real world of public policy, according to Chikozho (2008:70) “the point at which an embedded paradigm is dislodged by a contending rival marks ‘a policy paradigm shift’ and this kind of change is a disjunctive process associated with periodic discontinuities in policy” (see also Hall 1993:279). According to Masunungure and Chimankire (2007:11) it is at the point of replacement of one paradigm by another that a paradigmatic revolution takes place.

In their analysis of the development of public policy paradigms, Carson, Burns and Calvo (2009:3) argued that “over the past 20 years a constellation of concepts, principles and models have emerged which entail a promising new approach to capturing the interactions between ideas, organised actors and institutions in political, administrative and related social environment” (Carson et al. 2009:3). Consequently, these policy drivers serve as preconditions upon which a shift in the policy is predicated. Hall (1989:361) highlighted the preconditions for policy change by articulating that a “sufficient degree of political support is equally important” (Vogeler 2013:5). This political buy in, as Vogeler puts it “legitimises the new-fangled policy courses especially when they perfectly align with the overall goals of the ruling party, possible coalition partners and interest groups” (Vogeler 2013:5).

In order for policy shifts to take place it is important to ensure that the existing institutions have sufficient administrative capacity in order for them to be able to enforce policies related to the new paradigm (Vogeler 2013:5). In this regard, as Vogeler (2013:5) continues to argue, “administrative viability serves as a shell within which the acceptance of a new paradigm is housed. Emerging paradigms should be backed by a robust system of administration (administrative capacity) as well as by sound institutional settings which also provide room for the full and expeditious implementation of new policy measures” (Vogeler 2013:5). Another key ingredient for policy change is “economic viability, which has to be analysed against a specific national background, which is the current economic structure; the embedment in possible international regimes or economic constraints needs consideration as these may limit the possibilities for national policy-making” (Hall 1989:371 cited in Vogeler 2013:5).

Hall (1993:280) called these policy transformations “paradigmatic changes”. Paradigmatic changes can take the form of incremental and radical policy shifts. A radical policy change can be justified by a “new political actor or economic paradigm at any time” (Vogeler 2013:9). In defining a radical change, Vogeler (2013:2) is of the view that it entails a change (or a significant alteration) of the superior and long-term goals of policy-making. Notably, radical policy change entails the amendment of policy instruments, a change in policy goals and objectives as well as in certain circumstances the alteration of the policy ideological culture. This implies a modification of the underlying goals and ideas shaping policy-making. In addition radical change is a rather infrequent juncture and occurs more often than not as a rejoinder to domestic and outer shocks within the political system. Accordingly, Vogeler (2013:3) highlights that “shocks external to the political system have a strong influence on changing discourses”. A radical change in policy is a result of the rigorous and complete alteration of the procumbent and dominant core beliefs (Vogeler 2013:3).

On a contrary note incremental change as noted by Capano (2009:12) in Vogeler (2013:3) is a “regular feature of the policy-making process as it is closely associated with the concept of social learning which results in an adaptation of particular policy instruments
whilst the overall policy goals remain intact”. Surel (2000:495) asserts that the “stability of institutions and their intrinsic resistance to change is a decisive element in this context” (Vogeler 2013:3). Hayes (2013:95) defines incrementalism as “a theory of public policy-making, according to which policies result from a process of interaction and mutual adaptation among a multiplicity of actors advocating different values, representing different interests and possessing different information”. As such, Lindblom (1959:137) in Jones (2015:3) noted that “policy makers will build on past policies, focusing on incremental rather than wholesale changes”. Incrementalism as a policy-making strategy produces decisions marginally different from past practice (Lindblom 1959:137). Incrementalism thus reflects some marginal adjustments to the status-quo (Schinckus 2015:3).

McCarthy-Jones and Turner (2011:549) argue that policy change is mostly incremental but there could be occasions when policy is radically transformed over a relatively short period of time. In this regard it can thus be noted that “drastic changes in policies may lead to mistrust, lack of buy-in and ultimately failure of drastic change to be successfully implemented” (Hayes 2013:16). The following analysis of the development of land reform policy paradigm shifts in Zimbabwe between 1979 and 2015 shows that the land policy shifts have been generally incremental but also sometimes violent in nature.


The 1979 signing of the Lancaster House Agreement officially mandated the commencement of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe (Africa All Party Parliamentary Group 2009:19). The Lancaster House Agreement provided a legal framework for a more equitable distribution of land between the black majority who have been previously disenfranchised and the white minority who had exercised absolute control and total rulership over Southern Rhodesia [now Zimbabwe] from 1890 to 1980 (Hill and Katarere 2002:252). The land reform programme intended to alter the ethnic asymmetries of land ownership which as noted by Njaya and Mazuru (2010:166) saw approximately 97% of the black population occupying 25% of the country, while the Zimbabwean whites which made up 3% of the population owning about 75% of the most fertile land. According to Manjengwa, Hanlon and Smart (2013:23), at independence, “government’s stress was on promoting farming in the communal areas”, where the majority of the Zimbabweans live. Land reform was believed to be the vehicle that would foster socio-political and economic development in the country. Politically, the scheme was seen as a conduit through which peace and stability was going to be achieved in the country. Socially it sought to redress historical imbalances and inequalities in landholding with a long term thrust to eradicate poverty amongst the rural citizenry. Economically it was modelled “to augment agricultural productivity among the families that have been resettled” (Masiwa 2004:2).

The following periodical phases represent the distinct policy paradigms that were and are still existing in the Zimbabwe land reform trajectory. These phases include the Lancaster House (willing buyer willing seller) 1980–1990, compulsory acquisition with fair compensation (1990–2000), fast track land reform (2000–2002 and beyond) and the phase for partnerships between landholders and former white commercial farmers (2014 to date).

The willing buyer willing seller principle was the reigning paradigm from 1980 to 1992. The “three month long Lancaster House Conference” culminated in the crafting of the Supreme Law of the country which had a carefully worded section on the land issue (Nyawo 2014:36). According to the All Party Parliamentary Group Report (2009:13) Britain held out to protect white farmers and the Patriotic Front accepted British demands only after the United States (US) and British governments promised money to pay for land. The Lancaster House Agreement required the Zimbabwean Government to wait for a decade before starting to implement any land reform programme. It however permitted government to purchase unoccupied land for resettlement purposes. According to Richardson (2005:25) the draft Constitution agreed upon at Lancaster House sets out a “Declaration of Rights” which could not be changed for 10 years and these rights included the “Freedom from Deprivation of Property”. The other principles that were put forward at the Lancaster House Conference include:

- “acquisition of land only on a willing buyer willing seller basis;
- compensation to be remittable in a foreign currency; and
- under-utilised land could be acquired for public purposes but at the full market value” (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989:1).

The willing buyer willing seller principle entailed that there was no compulsory purchase and the Government would only buy land for resettlement that was offered voluntarily. This principle dictated that all land had to be offered to the Government first, and if the Government turned it down, a certificate of “no present interest” was issued allowing an alternative sale. According to Madhuku (2004:29) the Lancaster House Constitutional scheme severely limited the scope of any land reform based on compulsory acquisition. These are some constitutional impediments in the first phase of the land resettlement scheme; productive farms were exempted from acquisition for resettlement as they fell outside the bracket of under-utilised land, compensation was supposed to be paid promptly and the entrenched constitutional provisions could only be amended under the given circumstances that is, after the lapse of the first decade except with, as stipulated by Section 52(4) of the Lancaster House Constitution a 100% majority of members of Lower Chamber of the then bicameral Parliament (the House of Assembly) has unanimously supported that Constitutional amendment. Because of the Lancaster House Constitution, the Government was bound “to purchase surplus land for redistribution to the landless” and was strictly prohibited from land expropriation for the first ten years after independence.

According to Masiwa and Chigejo (2003:9) the “need to achieve national stability and progress in the country saw the resettlement programme being implemented in a planned and systematic manner”. Bratton (1990:45) asserts that in line with the National Land Policy, two land distribution schemes were availed in the initial phase. The first scheme entailed, “Model A (Normal Intensive Resettlement), whereby individual households would each be given five to six hectare plots, plus a share in a communal grazing area, and Model B (Communal Farming), which provided for farming of commercial farms on a cooperative and mechanised basis” (De Villiers 2003:10). The second scheme, as De Villiers (2003:10) continue to argue, entailed Model C (a core commercial estate with individual smallholdings), and Model D (which provided for pastoral grazing areas).
Some of the significant weaknesses of the land reform programme during the first phase included that land redistribution and “ownership were heavily skewed to the people with political connections with the ruling party (The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, ZANU-PF) rather than the farmers or communities (De Villiers 2003:10). The other problem was that “the Government did not have money to compensate the landowners” (The Mike Campbell Fundation 2008:2) and did not have the finances to support the newly resettled African farmers so that they can establish the farming infrastructure needed to make land fertile and productive. However, according to Kinsey (1982:101), the resettlement programme assumed that settlers under this programme would make use of the “admittedly inadequate infrastructure in adjacent communal areas” to make land productive.

Finally, despite the scheme being rational and well planned, the willing buyer willing seller clause rendered the progress sluggish and expensive. This means that, although “enough land was available for acquisition, the Government was not in a position to target certain areas and therefore had to be guided by land being offered to it and to purchase that land at market-based prices” (De Villiers 2003:45).

The compulsory acquisition with fair compensation phase (1990–2000)

According to De Villiers (2003:16) “the precincts imposed by the Lancaster House Constitution expired on 18 April 1990 and this marked a new constitutional dispensation”. As De Villiers (2003:16) puts it: “the expiry of the Lancaster House Constitution gave the post-independence government the first real opportunity to deal with the land issue and other constitutional matters in its own way”. This, according to Palmer (1990:163) “marked the emergence of a new policy paradigm shift”. Following the expiry of the Lancaster House Constitution “the Government legislated the introduction of its new land policy in two phases—first by amending the Constitution (Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 30 of 1990 and the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 4 of 1993). The second phase was characterised by the introduction of new legislation such as the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) 3 of 1992 which allowed Government to compulsory acquire land (De Villiers 2003:16).

De Villiers (2003:18) argues that, “these constitutional amendments allowed for land–both commercial and unutilised–to be compulsorily acquired for resettlement with ‘fair’ compensation being paid in a reasonable time”. Accordingly, Madhuku (2004:133) highlights that once a new constitutional framework had been put in place, it had to be followed by a new Act of Parliament implementing the principles set out in the Constitution. Consequently, “1992 saw the enactment of the LAA 3 being effected” and “this piece of legislation empowered the Government to buy land compulsorily for redistribution, and a fair compensation was to be paid for land acquired” (Chinamasa 2002:1).

The LAA 3 of 1992 (which replaced the 1985 Act 21) allowed government to compulsorily acquire land. According to Naldi (1993:13, as cited in De Villiers 2003:18) the LAA 3 of 1992 “empowered the president to acquire rural land compulsorily and set out the procedure in accordance with which that acquisition should take place”. A written notice (with a one-year duration) was delivered to the owner of the farm whose farm might have fallen within the acquisition category which meant that after receiving the notice landholders were no longer expected to make any permanent improvements thereon nor to dispose of the land (De
Villiers 2003:18). In addition, section 19 of the LAA 3 of 1992 stated that “Parliament was also empowered to specify through legislation certain principles upon which compensation could be calculated–thereby moving away from the market-value principle and the period within which the compensation had to be paid” (De Villiers 2003:17). In this regard, the LAA 3 of 1992 established a Compensation Committee which was mandated to determine a price tag for the acquired rural land. This was in sharp contrast to the Lancaster House Constitution which empowered the landholders to attach a price tag to the land.

The implementation of the LAA 3 of 1992 met serious challenges since its inception. There were some marked antagonisms between the land acquiring authority and the landowners which saw the landowners challenging the set prices in courts. Another major challenge was lack of funding. The absence of foreign support towards the implementation of the programme made the Government digress from the Lancaster House constitutional guarantees. Echoing similar sentiments, De Villiers (2003:79) argued that:

“The Lancaster House agreement did not contain a detailed and enforceable commitment from any of the foreign donors to actually contribute to land reform. In essence there were no guarantees of any kind, which in turn left the new government exposed to take political responsibility for the programme without necessarily having the means to abide by the constitutional guarantees” (De Villiers 2003:79).

Initially, according to De Villiers (2003:7) “the Government of Britain promised £75 million and the US promised US$500 million, but there was no written guarantees”. The analysis of the disbursement of such grants shows that, “By the year 2000 Zimbabwe had only received approximately £30 million, in contrast to Kenya where in its land restoration and resettlement process £500 million was provided” (De Villiers 2003:7).

Other prospective donors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank had certain conditions that they wanted to be met in order for them to support the scheme.

According to Masiiwa (2004:12), the IMF, World Bank and the EU declared that they would only assist in the programme if a sound policy document on the resettlement methodology was produced. These institutions, as Masiiwa continues to argue wanted the Government “to employ a market-oriented approach which would involve taxation of under-utilised land that would induce subdivision of farms, as such, this approach would in turn release more land to the market” (Masiiwa 2012:12). Some western donors, such as the United Kingdom (UK) and the US as well as international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank also wanted the reform programme to be integrated within the macro-economic framework of the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), which had specific targets aimed at fostering economic growth (Zimbabwe Independent 1998:7). Unfortunately, the Government ignored these requests and proceeded to implement the second phase of the scheme without taking heed of the donor community’s demands. This resulted in an increase in farm invasions and occupations as well as violence against white farmers.

According to Maposa (1995 in De Villiers 2003:19–20) “the vacuum that developed in the land policy field could have been prevented had the Government taken steps in the following areas”: 

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“Proper community-based land management, which should have included communities in decision-making processes.

- Improved education programmes and channels of communication.
- Equality in access to resources such as land and credit facilities.
- Clear tenure rights, which had as their aim security of tenure.
- The need for strong institutional capacity and [an] equally strong policy of political and economic empowerment to bring the population within the planning and decision-making framework of the resettlement programme” (Maposa in De Villiers 2003:19–20).

The former phase was followed by the next phase that was characterised by the compulsory acquisition of white owned land without compensation.

The compulsory acquisition without compensation phase (2000–2002)

The compulsory acquisition of white owned land without compensation was known as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). The FTLRP was carried out between 2000 and 2002, though the allocation of farms and resettlement of people on the land acquired during the FTLRP period continued well beyond the 2000 to 2002 period.

However, in order to legalise and implement the FTLRP, the Government had to amend the laws governing land reform and the Constitution in order to legalise the FTLRP process. According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2000:3), a draft Constitution which had proposals of clauses to compulsorily acquire land for redistribution without compensation was crafted and the Government organised a referendum on the new Constitution in February 2000 (HRW 2000:3). The new Constitution, had it been approved was going to empower the Government to acquire land compulsorily without compensation. However despite having an adequately large majority in Parliament, the proposed draft Constitution was defeated 55% to 45%. Despite the rejection of the draft Constitution by a ZANU-PF dominated Parliament, the Government proceeded to amend the Constitution such that it was empowered to acquire white commercial farms without any obligation to compensate the landholders for the soil. In terms of section (16A) (1) of the new Constitution Government pledged to pay for the improvements that were made on the farms, but this did not happen because most farms acquired during this period (2000–2002) that were generally acquired through violent land invasions.

The analysis of available literature suggests that the Zimbabwe Government has been motivated by the political climate that prevailed in this period (2000–2002) rather than its genuine willingness to fast track land reforms. For example, according to Shumba (2002:327), the year 2000 was the year in which parliamentary elections were held, and the year 2002 was the year for Presidential elections in Zimbabwe. Both elections happened during the period of heightened political competition as a result of the emergence of strong political opposition parties such as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Shumba 2002:327). Increased political competition “forced the ZANU-PF-led government to seriously consider rejuvenating the land resettlement programme, Government believed had slowed down over the years” (De Villiers 2003:20). These parliamentary (2000) and presidential elections (2002) also took place at the time when most Zimbabweans and war veterans in
particular had run out of patience. It was therefore not surprising that with the run-up to the 2000 election, the issue of land reform became a useful tool to mobilise public opinion and divert the attention from other serious socio-economic issues facing the country” (De Villiers 2003:20). De Villiers (2003:20) argue that, “Mugabe’s ZANU-PF ran the election on the basis of ‘Land is the economy, economy is land’ and won the election (with 63 of 120 parliamentary seats over 57 seats won by the MDC). Most independent observers argued that the 2000 parliamentary election and the 2002 presidential elections were the “most violence-ridden election in Zimbabwe’s history” (Shumba 2002:327).

Subsequent to the 2000 parliamentary elections victory, and just two years before the presidential elections: “the Government again amended the constitution and the LAA 15 of 2000 was introduced with the aim of speeding up land reform” (De Villiers 2003:20). De Villiers (2003:20) argues that “the most controversial part of the amendments concerned compensation for land taken”. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 5 of 2000 and the introduction of the LAA 15 of 2000 were undertaken in a bid to authorise land acquisition without paying compensation (Africa Focus Bulletin 2013). Madhuku (2004:138) asserts that these amendments constituted a fundamental departure from previous approaches (where for instance in the first two decades of independence (1980–2000) land reform had proceeded on the assumption that compensation was mandatory, the difference being only over the proper measurement of the compensation). In this regard, according to Tshuma (1997:39), the amendment went even further than what the Patriotic Front (PF) had proposed at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979 where the proposal was to pay compensation to the white farmers at the “discretion of the Government”.

In contrast to the LAA 3 of 1992, the amendments in the LAA 15 of 2000 provided that, “should Britain not establish a compensation fund, compensation would only be payable for improvements to the land and not the value of the land itself” (Section 29 of LAA 15 of 2000 cited in De Villiers 2003:21). Britain could not support the FTLRP since its implementation violated the Lancaster House principles. A few days later, according to Mitchell (2001:596) “angered and frustrated by the result of the referendum” and the refusal of Britain to provide funding for the land reforms in Zimbabwe, the pro-Mugabe War Veterans Association organised and mobilised other war vets and landless villagers to go on a rampage marching on white owned farmlands” (Nyawo 2014:36), initially with “drums, song and dance” (Mitchell 2001:596). The commercial farmers were alleged to have campaigned for a no vote against the draft constitution. The land invasions through which “white farm owners were forced off the land violently without any compensation” (Nyawo 2014:36) marked the beginning of a complex crisis in Zimbabwe (Musiiwa 2004:14).

According to the Human Rights Watch (2002:1) the “first wave of farm invasions saw a total of 110 000 sq. km of land being seized”. The land seized was then officially divided into “A1 smallholder production and A2 commercial farms schemes” (Scoones, Marongwe, Mavedzenge, Murimbarimba, Mahenehene, and Sukume 2011:1). According to Masiwa (2004:19) “out of the total number of 8 758 farms in the country 6 422 farms accounting for about 10.8m ha were gazetted for acquisition under the FTLRP, thus amounting to more than 73% of the farms owned by large scale white commercial farmers before the fast track scheme”. In July 2002, according to De Villiers (2003:21) “notices were given to 2 900 farmers out of the 4 500 to stop all farming activities by 8 August, where after they had to vacate their land without any compensation”. In fact, according to De Villiers (2003:21)
“the notice period for the landholders was shortened to seven days instead of the previous 90 days and fines for not complying with an eviction order were also raised”. Nevertheless, “by 2003, nearly 135 000 families had been given land and by 2010, the number was up to nearly 169 000” (Hanlon et al. 2013:72).

In terms of dividing the seized land into “A1 smallholder production and A2 commercial farms schemes” the Utete Committee Report (2003:5) shows that “2 652 farms with 4.2m ha had been allocated to 127 192 households under the A1 resettlement model as of 31 July 2003”. With a take-up rate by beneficiaries of 97%, the total of beneficiaries under the A1 scheme was 145 800 with 5.8m ha of land allocated to them. For A2, Utete Committee (2003) found that “1 672 former white farms with 2.2m ha had been allocated to 7 260 applicant beneficiaries with an average take-up rate of 66% nationally” (The Utete Committee Report 2003:5).

In a bid to bolster the Government’s position on rural land occupation, to legalise farms occupations that were taking place and to close all possible avenues that could be used by the white farmers who lost their farms through the FTLRP, the Government of Zimbabwe enacted a number of amendments to the laws governing land reforms. The amendments to the LAA 3 of 1992 were enacted in 2000 (under the Land Acquisition Amendment Act (LAAA) 15 of 2000) in a bid to accelerate the velocity at which the land was being acquired, by removing the so-called land acquisition “bottlenecks” as well as facilitating the “fast-track resettlement programme” (HRW 2002:3). This was followed by the amendment to the Rural Land Occupiers Act 13 of 2001, which protected people from being evicted from the white farms they have just invaded. Further series of amendments included the LAAA 14 of 2001 and LAAA 6 of 2002. Finally, in September 2005, a ZANU PF dominated Parliament passed a constitutional amendment that “nationalised farmland acquired through the fast-track process and deprived original owners of the right to challenge in court the Government’s decision to expropriate their land” (The Tobacco Institute of Southern Africa (TISA) 2011:2).

De Villiers (2003:64) argued that, “these amendments were aimed at legalising the ultra-vires expropriation of land without compensation in the hope that the land reform process could be faster, cheaper, less complicated and less legalistic”.

**Partnerships between white commercial farmers and the indigenous black landholders (2014 to date)**

It could be argued that there were no new significant policy shifts in the land reform trajectory between 2002 and 2014, since during this period Government focussed on the redistribution of the farms that have been compulsory acquired or violently confiscated through the FTLRP (2000–2002). However, since 2014, the Zimbabwean Government has abandoned the “chaotic and …wanton violence” which characterised the FTLRP, and has adopted an incremental approach whereby, instead of encouraging land grabbing, the government is now allowing the indigenous black landholders to venture into mutually beneficial partnerships and agricultural contracts with the once ejected white commercial farmers (Gutu 2015:1). Jena (2015:1) notes that the Minister of Lands and Rural Resettlement [Douglas Mombeshora] said farmers were now free to choose who they wanted to engage in joint ventures and contract farming. Thus, emphasis was made on the preparation and production of a contract that protects both parties to encourage fair play and to prevent
manipulation of one party by the other. Despite government efforts, there were some reports of indigenous people who complained of having been chased off by the resettled white farmers after pouring resources into the farms. These incidences highlight the need for improvements in the laws governing the new land reform approaches.

CONCLUSION

Since its introduction, “the Zimbabwean land reform course has gone through four major phases, each one having inimitable and distinct characteristics” (Rungasamy 2011:1). The period 1979 to 1990 was punctuated by the sole dominance of the willing buyer willing seller principle. The willing buyer willing seller principle was the reigning paradigm from 1979 to 1990. The second phase (1990 to 2000) was characterised by the movement from the willing buyer willing seller principle to compulsory land acquisition with fair compensation a move facilitated by “the enactment of the LAA No 3 of 1992” (Chinamasa 2002:1). Commercial white farmers were however, not forthcoming as well as uncooperative in selling back the land. Despite the compulsory acquisition of the land, the Government did not really acquire the intended hectares and in that regard, nothing really changed in terms of the realisation of the key objectives of this process.

In the third phase (2000 to 2014) there was a major change from compulsory acquisition with compensation to compulsory acquisition without compensation. The sluggish progression of the Land Reform Programme angered the indigenous Zimbabweans, who had long stretched their patience to no avail, and this saw the ex-combatants taking it upon themselves to radically invade and forcefully (violently) displace the white commercial farmers. The third phase was resultantly known as the Fast Track Land Reform because of its boisterous and violent nature which represented a radical paradigm shift that saw a far-reaching land reform being achieved in a relatively short period of time. The fourth phase is referred to as the era of partnerships between white commercial farmers and the indigenous black landholders (2014 to date) and is characterised by Government adoption of a softer stance which allows and encourages the indigenous black landholders to venture into mutually beneficial partnerships with the once ejected white commercial farmers.

It can thus be concluded that “the land reform has been part of the political campaign since 1980, it increased over the years in order for the governing party to sustain support and to distract attention from other burning social and economic issues” (De Villiers 2003:23). The land issue will remain an electoral issue until it is methodically and meticulously dealt with and resolved by both the ruling party and the opposition parties. The Government has now made a shift in its land policy by allowing black land owners to venture into contractual farming and partnerships with the white commercial farmers, a move that is meant to enhance the general productivity of the nation as well as reviving the agricultural sector that has been facing some production-related challenges since the clandestine land invasions of the Fast Track Land Reform. The missing link in these purported arrangements is the absence of political buy-in and support by the Government which by and large could manifest itself in the form of a robust legislative framework to substantiate and uphold these agricultural partnerships and contractual arrangements in the Zimbabwean agricultural sector.
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Rhetoric or Reality?  
The role of capacity development in poverty reduction in Ghana

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, the issue of poverty reduction in Ghana has become a central theme in major policy discourse. Despite the formulation and implementation of several policies to address poverty issues, poverty continues to persist and the living conditions of Ghanaians continue to deteriorate. Although capacity development is critical to poverty reduction, policy actors tend to overlook this important factor to address poverty in Ghana. Using a qualitative research approach, this study analysed the factors that militate against capacity development efforts towards poverty reduction, using Ghana as a case study. The article uses secondary data collected from government and conference reports, journal articles, newspapers, and books. The data was analysed using the content analysis method. It was found that poor leadership, lack of ownership of poverty reduction programmes, inadequate data, political corruption and inappropriate training militate against capacity development efforts. The study recommends pragmatic measures to address these capacity development weaknesses.

INTRODUCTION

The problem of reducing poverty has remained one of the pressing problems in contemporary development policy discourse. Perhaps the reason why poverty issues have become so critical in policy discourse stems from the fact that poverty has become pervasive in Ghana. This point has been emphasised by Domfeh and Bawole (2009) that “unless one pretends, poverty can be seen everywhere, although the form and nature of it vary from region to region and country to country.”

Several scholars have offered different definitions as to what constitutes poverty. Sachs (2005:20) suggests that, in defining poverty, “it is useful to distinguish between three degrees of poverty: extreme poverty, moderate poverty and relative poverty. Extreme poverty means
that households cannot meet basic needs for survival; moderate poverty refers to conditions of life in which basic needs are met, but just barely; relative poverty is generally construed as household income level below a given proportion of average national income.” Poverty is defined as a lack of material goods or services. People ‘need’ things such as food, clothing, fuel or shelter. George (1988) asserts that poverty consists of a core of basic necessities as well as a list of other necessities that change over time and place.

Townsend (1979:31) also defines poverty as “lack of resources required to participate in activities … and enjoyed the living standards that are customary in the societies to which they belong.” The World Bank (1990) sees poverty as the inability of people to attain a minimum standard of living. A critical look at these definitions reveals that poverty is related to the inability of people to meet their basic human needs. Most Ghanaians are incapable of providing for their basic needs which are pre-requisite for enjoying a decent standard of living. This provides ample justification to find a plausible developmental paradigm to remove the poor in Ghana from this economic quagmire.

Capacity development has been suggested as a pragmatic approach to address the problem of poverty in Ghana. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP:2008) refers to capacity development as the process through which individuals, organisations and societies, obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time. The World Bank Institute (WBI 2012) also sees capacity development as “entailing the purposeful use of knowledge and information to achieve capacity outcomes.” These definitions emphasise the importance of capacity development as an instrument to reduce poverty. The assumption is that poverty can be reduced considerably when people with the requisite knowledge, skills and information diligently apply these resources to provide goods and services to meet their needs and that of society in general. Inadequate capacity such as the lack of start-up capital, low motivation and improper planning have been cited as major constraints to the successful implementation of the first generation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs), where African countries generally lack the requisite armory of human resources and institutions to undertake poverty analysis, design and implement anti-poverty programmes and to monitor results (Ikhide and Obadan 2011).

Despite the importance of capacity development efforts to poverty reduction, it appears that most critical ingredients of capacity development for poverty reduction have not been given the desired attention. The purpose of the article therefore is to assess the effectiveness of capacity development efforts with regard to poverty reduction in Ghana. The article seeks to answer two questions: what are the major obstacles to capacity development efforts in Ghana and what strategies can be adopted to remove these obstacles in order to reduce poverty.

The article adopted a qualitative approach to social research. According to Babbie, (2004:281) “qualitative research enables researchers to observe social life in its natural habitat: to go where the action is and watch.” Creswell (2009:5) also defines qualitative research as ‘a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem.’ The qualitative research approach was therefore suitable for this study as it sought to explain and understand the capacity development challenges inherent in poverty reduction approaches in Ghana. The study systematically reviewed the existing literature on capacity development and poverty reduction and secondary data was
comprehensively analysed to establish patterns for evaluation. The source of secondary data included journal articles, newspapers, books, government and conference reports and other relevant documents. The data was analysed using a content analysis method and the findings were discussed and presented using the narrative approach.

BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

A glance at the relevant literature on poverty shows that there is no general consensus on the definition of poverty. Jensen (2009) has suggested that the word poverty is known to provoke strong emotions and engenders many questions. He defines poverty as a chronic and debilitating condition that results from multiple adverse synergistic factors and affects the mind, body and soul. Gradin and Canto (2012) further add that the literature on poverty has highlighted that poverty is a largely dynamic phenomenon. Other scholars also hold the view that defining poverty would depend, rather, on cumulative experience over time. Voices of the Poor, a series of studies for the World Bank, sees poverty in terms of the ‘web’ of deprivation (Narayan et al. 2000) – an expressive metaphor, which refers to a constellation of issues where people might suffer from shifting combinations of problems over time (Coffield and Sarsby 1980; Kolvin et al. 1990). Baratz and Grigsby refer to poverty as a severe lack of physical and mental well-being, closely associated with inadequate economic resources and consumption (Baratz and Grigsby 1971).

According to the European Commission (2004) people are said to be living in poverty if their income and resources are so inadequate as to preclude them from having a standard of living considered acceptable in the society in which they live. The World Bank (2000) cited in Sackey (2005) suggests that poverty is viewed as the result of exchanges among economic, political and social processes that lead in a disadvantaged way to produce deprivation and reductions in people’s standard of living. These definitions seem to encapsulate both the unidimensional and multidimensional approaches to defining poverty and leads Bellu and Liberati (2005) to the conclusion that any choice among the perspectives entails additional problems. Poverty is a complex phenomenon and does not mean the same thing to all people (Jensen 2009). Bellu and Liberati (2005) thus suggest that in conceptualising poverty it is important to look at it within a specific context, as there is not a general concept that we can safely assume to hold for all countries and in all situations.

The discussions of poverty reveal some trends worthy of notice. Poverty at any point in time can be linked to the inadequacy of resources, and such resources can be tangible or intangible. It is difficult to determine a single factor as the source of poverty. The World Development Report (2001) notes that poverty is a multi-faceted phenomenon which goes beyond the lack of access to basic income (World Bank 2000). The report further indicates that poverty transcends merely low income levels but has many phases which include lack of opportunity, low capabilities, security and empowerment issues. The apparent difficulty in attributing the causes of poverty to a single factor has implications for the policy design to poverty reduction. The reason is that poverty reduction policies must give attention to the multiple perspectives from which poverty is defined. Again, for poverty reduction policies to achieve their intended purposes, they must be consistent with what poverty means within the context for which the policy is designed.
The FAO (2008) argues that poverty is the principal cause of hunger and malnourishment; and conventional wisdom suggests that a hungry person is more likely to be an angry person and that if more people in society are hungry and angry; the world may become unsafe and insecure. This point was reiterated by Nicolas Sarkozy, former President of France in 2011 that ‘economies fare better when there are efficient social protection schemes, because they help improve worker productivity and promote balanced and sustainable growth’ (Daily Graphic 2013:13). Poverty reduction is a moral imperative which underpins the guiding principles governing the operations of the United Nations (UN 2010). Article 25 (1) of the UN Declaration of Human Rights provides that every individual has the right to a standard of living which entails health and acquisition of basic needs including food, housing, proper medical care, housing and shelter. The United Nations Declaration in 2000, commits states to reducing poverty through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and this is an indication that poverty reduction is at the forefront of the world body.

An analysis of poverty typically differentiates between absolute and relative poverty (1990). Relative poverty exists when the subjects under consideration are “poor” in relation to “others”-who remain, of course, to be more closely specified. Absolute poverty, on the other hand, refers exclusively to the situation of particular individuals without any comparison being made between them and others. Absolute poverty is considered to exist when the lives of those concerned are impaired by physical or socio-cultural deficiencies (Schauble 1994; Hemmer/Kotter 1990). If physical human subsistence (expressed in terms of nutrition, clothing and housing) is not guaranteed, this is termed primary absolute poverty. Clearly, this way of classifying poverty is linked to the concept of basic needs. People whose minimum or basic material or non-material needs are not satisfied are regarded as poor.

Addressing the problem of poverty requires an eclectic approach which combines political, economic and social considerations. The process of poverty reduction requires focusing on contextual issues which take into consideration the target groups and their socio-cultural characteristics. Poverty reduction is also viewed as a participatory process. The overall governance structure of an economy has wider ramifications on the poverty levels of the citizenry; this implies that governments of poor countries need to adopt good governance practices which demand judicious use of state resources and investment in human development as well as creation of opportunities for the citizens. Such an approach will require the participation of all actors including government, civil society, opinion leaders and target groups. Besides, poverty reduction strategies require the provision of the necessary enabling environment to encourage individuals to realise their talents.

**POVERTY IN GHANA**

Ghana is a poor and predominantly agricultural country, but has made economic progress in recent years. It ranks 135th on the United Nations Development Human Development Index, with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of USD 520 and the proportion of Ghanaians described as poor in 2005/06 was 28.5%, compared to 39.5% in 1998/99 while those classified as extremely poor reduced from 26.8% to 18.2% over the same period. However, 20 years of structural reforms led to Ghana attaining the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) status in 2004. The overall assessment is that economic progress is clearly
visible in the urbanised south and centre. However, development has been uneven, with particularly the rural northern districts lagging behind (UN Human Development Report 2007/2008).

The National Development Planning Commission (2008) suggests that Ghana is largely on track in achieving the MDG 1 of reducing by half the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty. However, trends in economic growth suggest a further decline in poverty between 2006 and 2008. Further although the 2008 Human Development Report (HDR) shows a decline in Ghana’s Human Development Index (HDI) rank and inequality remains high. Sowa (2002) adds that the decline is not evenly distributed geographically; the poverty reduction was concentrated around Accra and the forest (rural and urban) localities. The proportion of the poor in the savannah regions increased over the period; thus, poverty exists more in rural areas than in urban areas (Boateng, Ewusi, Kanbur and Mckay 1990, cited in Sowa 1992). Osei (2011) further adds that poverty in rural areas is twice that of the population living in rural areas was about 62%; the incident of poverty was about 39.5% compared to 10% for those living in the urban areas.

According to Sowa (2002:3), “data from various Living Standard Surveys, Demographic and Health Surveys, Core Welfare Indices Questionnaires (CWIQ) and other limited quantitative and qualitative surveys confirm the pervasiveness of poverty in Ghana.” In the view of Canagarajah and Portner (2003), even though some seven (7) regions in Ghana experienced a decrease in both poverty and extreme poverty according to two surveys: GLSS 3 and 4, poverty and extreme poverty in the Upper East, Northern and Central Regions increased. These regions are substantially poorer than the rest of Ghana. About 90% of the population in the Upper East Region is poor, in addition to 84% of the Upper West and 70% of the Northern Region, with the Central Region being the fourth poorest region.

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT/BUILDING

Having discussed the concept of poverty, it is germane here to discuss capacity development. Debates surrounding capacity development are believed to have emerged in the 1980s, following the publication of the Berg Report (World Bank 1981), when it was used as an all-encompassing term to address the need for developing nations to take responsibility for their own advancement (Clark 2000). Capacity development can be discussed within the context of public policy. This is important because public policy provides the “framework of ideas and values within which decisions are taken and action, or inaction, is pursued by governments in relation to some issue or problem” (Brooks 1989:14). Public policies thus reflect values (Bowen and Zwi 2005; Riches 2002; Sanders, Labonte, Baum, and Chopra 2004) and indicate the relative value that organisations and governments place on the various aspects of economic and social development. It could be inferred that when governments consider capacity building as a value, it must be seriously considered in an attempt to bring about the needed socio-economic development.

The concept of capacity building is widely used in a variety of fields, but there is no consensus on its theoretical underpinnings or its application (Chaskin 2001; Chaskin,
The literature on capacity building is replete with specialised forms of capacity, as well as their causes and effects, such as local tax capacity (Hy et al. 1993; Wong 2004), financial management capacity (Gargan 1987), fiscal capacity (Tannenwald 1999), management capacity (Donahue, Selden, and Ingraham 2000); and the capacity to guide management of state funds (Hou, Moynihan, and Ingraham 2003). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2008) reviews capacity development in terms of a process through which individuals, organisations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time. The UNDP prefers to use the term capacity development, which is more comprehensive, since this best reflects its approach. This approach is premised on the fact that there are some capacities that exist in every context and it uses the existing base of capacities as its starting point to support national developmental efforts. This process ensures transformation from the inside, based on nationally determined priorities, policies and desired results. It also encompasses areas where new capacities are introduced and hence, the building of new capacity is also supported.

Some scholars hold the view that the concept of capacity development has evolved from institution building to capacity building and then to capacity development (Hite and De Grauwe 2008) and thus “reflects a change process internal to organisations and people” (European Commission 2009:6). The OECD-DAC (2006:5) defines capacity development as the “process of strengthening the abilities or capacities of individuals, organisations and societies to make effective use of resources in order to achieve their own goals on a sustainable basis.” Implicitly, for a country to reduce poverty, it is expedient for that country to have the people with the capabilities, talents and skills, to organise and manage the affairs of the country.

Scholars are of the opinion that there are many challenges to the conceptualisation and measurement of capacity building (Bowen, Martin, Mancini, and Nelson 2000; Easterling, Gallager, Drisko and Johnson 1998; Labonte and Laverack 2001; Ritcher, Nathan, and Mehaffey 2000), but it is still seen as having potential to contribute to thinking about, and acting on, the challenges of rural and community development (Bowen et al. 2000; Hartley 2005; Hawe 2000). Within the realm of contextual factors, governments and NGOs are to ensure tailor-made strategies by taking the peculiar circumstances of the people implementing the initiative as well as those affected by the poverty reduction intervention into account. It is quite common to observe governments and NGOs using blueprint programmes for many communities and people without taking the peculiar characteristics of the targeted group into consideration. Such a wholesale approach to poverty reduction is less likely to achieve its intended objectives. A successful capacity development effort entails an understanding of the cultural, social, political and economical contextual factors of the country under consideration. It is therefore imperative to critically analyse and identify the felt needs of the target communities in designing any strategy towards poverty reduction.

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA 2008) for instance, found that country-led planning of capacity building is more effective than traditional approaches; yet, most capacity development programmes in developing countries do not often take the local context into consideration. Most countries appear to take a top-down assessment, design and implement models which in most cases are not tailor-made to the people or environment in question. Under such circumstances, resources are wasted and inappropriate
initiatives are embarked upon because complex contextual factors are not considered and thus negate the potential effectiveness of training and other learning-based interventions. The design of any intervention should be informed by in-depth understanding of the context and the identification of opportunities and constraints, and appropriately aligned to broader capacity development initiatives (Capacity Collective 2008; Berlin Statement 2008; Baser et al. 2008; Ramalingam et al. 2008).

Capacity development is much more than improving the abilities and skills of individuals (Hope 2008; OECD 2006). In most cases, it is simplistically regarded as just training, mentoring, or organisation restructuring (Hope 2006; Saldanha 2006). A critical analysis of the concept reveals three factors important to capacity development. First, capacity development is a process and not an event. Second, capacity development applies to humans as well as organisations. Third, capacity development is about how to manage scarce resources to satisfy societal needs. It therefore entails knowledge, skills, work processes, tools, systems, authority, patterns and management style (Hite and De Grauwe 2008:6). Loza identified some important areas of capacity building, namely; human resource development, research and advocacy, information access, use and dissemination of information, organisational development and financial sustainability. Farazmand (2004) points out that capacity building must aim at building and enhancing highly qualified, motivated and able individuals across all levels of society and organisations.

Some scholars also hold the view that capacity development entails the capacity to build the skills of government officials to address problems, evaluate policy alternatives and implement government programmes (Honadle 1981; Hall 2002). Many African governments have continued to embrace implementation of public sector reform programmes which demand increasing numbers of professional staff with new skills and approaches (Low et al. 2001; Mason, 2004) even though a lack of human resource capacity seems to be a persistent drawback of these initiatives in sub-Saharan African countries (Smoke 2003; Mason 2004). For example, it has been found that there is a lack of administrative capacity at the local levels, poor levels of coordination of different policy actors, irresponsible behaviour of public servants, and a general absence of accountability (Antwi et al. 2008). In their general summary of problems associated with decentralisation initiatives in the public sector, Khaleghan and Das Gupta (2007:1088) conclude that, in many countries: “. . . local officials have found themselves without the basic administrative capacity to take on their new roles, leading to failures in service delivery and the basic functions of government.”

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD 2009) provides a seven-point framework for capacity development which requires leadership transformation, citizen transformation, utilising African potentials, skills and resources for development, capacity of capacity builders, integrated approach and continuous improvement processes, knowledge-based and innovation-driven processes. This suggests that capacity development is an integrated process which requires a holistic approach involving commitment of political leadership, local factors of target groups, resources, and the ability to harmonise local resources to what is to be done.

Capacity development is a multi-faceted approach which requires teaching beneficiaries the necessary skills, knowledge, and aptitudes to undertake a particular venture. The concept is not only concerned with the provision and acquisition of knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) but also the provision of start-up resources and the environment necessary to put into
effect what has been acquired. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation emphasised in 2008 that empowering the vulnerable needs to go in tandem with giving them the opportunity for marketing their produce and enhancing capacity of groups involved by diversifying the activities involved. Following the adoption of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, Ghana embarked on various programmes to localise the achievement of the MDGs. In 2003, the Government came up with the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) which reflected a policy framework that was directed primarily towards the attainment of the anti-poverty objectives of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The Organisation for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD 2011) proposes a three-stage model to enhance the effectiveness of capacity development programmes. The model comprises a first stage referred to as assessment; a second phase called design and the last stage referred to as implementation. The extent to which these stages are carried out effectively would determine the success of the programme. The assessment process requires environmental scanning to get a picture of what capacity exists and what capacities need to be developed. The assessment phase is very critical because if the capacity constraint is not well-structured or diagnosed, it would lead to inappropriate designs and interventions. The assessment phase needs to involve all stakeholders and beneficiaries so that capacity building interventions would be relevant to the beneficiaries.

Though generally accepted as very critical to human and national development, capacity development efforts face several challenges in developing countries, such as inadequate technical skills, poor management, and corruption. A cursory observation of most capacity development programmes in developing countries reveals that capacity development programmes are bedevilled with a myriad of challenges, which ultimately affect the effectiveness and efficiency of these programmes.

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION: RHETORIC OR REALITY?

Even though, the respective governments of Ghana appear to commit themselves to capacity development with the aim to reducing poverty, their actions do not really demonstrate the expected commitment for such initiatives. Although some successes have been chalked, the general impression is that capacity development efforts have just been mere rhetoric and not reality.

The Fourth Republican Regime of Ghana has attempted to develop the capacity of poor people through the introduction of several pro-poor social intervention programmes. These capacity development programmes include the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) 2002–2005; Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) 2006–2009; Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 2008; National Youth Employment Programme (NYEP) 2006; Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency (GYEEDA) as well as the Savanna Accelerated Development Programme. Among other objectives, each programme was aimed at providing some level of empowerment, skill enhancement, and a source of living for the people.

While the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) focused on poverty reduction programmes and projects, the emphasis of the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy
(GPRS II) was on the implementation of growth policies and programmes which have the potential to support wealth creation and sustainable poverty reduction. GPRS II was therefore anchored in pursuing the following priorities: human resource development; continued macroeconomic stability; accelerated private sector-led growth; good governance and civic responsibility. The GPRS II emphasised agriculture and it was to support vulnerable groups such as women and other less privileged to ‘enhance the productivity of small scale farmers by securing their access to extension, storage, price stability, credit, markets and land. Women small holder producers of food crops will be given needed impetus to improve their livelihood and assisted to benefit from the potential positive effects of linkages between agriculture, industry and exports… strengthen farmer-based organisations, with full participation of women farmers, to enhance access to credit and other services’ (GPRS II:25).

The Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) identified the extreme poor, vulnerable and socially disadvantaged persons to be provided with stipends on a monthly basis. This direct provision of money was to enable these beneficiaries to support their basic needs. Some individuals who received these monthly stipends have been able to use the money to embark on some profit yielding ventures such as backyard farming including poultry keeping. Another capacity development programme has been the National Youth Employment Programme (NYEP). This programme had various modules targeted at youth training in various employable skills. Through the programme many pupil teachers whose living conditions were quite deplorable have now gone through some professional training to become trained teachers. Again, through the Community Nursing and Local Policing modules, most of the participants have become professional nurses and police officers respectively. The NYEP has now metamorphosed into the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency (GYEEEDA), and now Youth Enterprise Agency (YEA) which trains the youth, especially the less privileged into various trades and vocations. The programme teaches skills to participants and further provides them with start-up resources to start their own business enterprises. The GYEEEDA programme has some modules and beneficiaries have obtained skills in mobile phone repairs, fashion designing and tailoring, and driving. Through GYEEEDA, the government of Ghana launched the Youth-in-ICT Module to train a total of 30 000 youth across the country.

Despite numerous capacity interventions, a clear analysis reveals that Ghana has not been doing well in poverty reduction in terms of administrative regions. The picture seems appealing when one looks at Ghana’s performance in absolute terms as it gives an impressive picture. Table 1 shows the poverty trends of the country since 1991/1992.

Table 1: National Poverty Incidence since 1991/1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poverty line = 3 708 900 cedis</th>
<th>Poverty Incidence (%)</th>
<th>Poverty line = 2 884 700 cedis</th>
<th>Poverty Incidence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991/92</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/99</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (GS 2007)
The poverty lines (3,708,900 cedis and 2,884,700 cedis) were estimated using the cost of basic needs method in order to pay for a food basket providing 2900 kilocalories per adult equivalent, while also covering the cost of basic non-foods needs (GSS 2007). Specifically, the lower poverty line of 2,884,700 cedis represents the minimum amount of money needed to pay for only food needs whilst the upper poverty line of 3,708,900 cedis caters for both food and non-food needs (see Table 1). From Table 1, it can be seen that the poverty rate of the country has reduced drastically albeit high. It reduced from a rate of 51.7% in 1991/92 to 39.5% in 1998/99 and further to 28.5% in 2005/06. Similarly, extreme poverty rate measured by the lower poverty line also reduced significantly from 36.5% in 1991/2 to 26.8% in 1998/9 and further to 18.2% in 2005/06.

In terms of regional variation in poverty rates, over the years, the trend of poverty in the administrative regions has been diverse. Nonetheless, like the national poverty rate, all the administrative regions in 2005/06 experienced a significant reduction in poverty rates except Greater Accra and the Upper West regions (see Figure 1). The Greater Accra region in 2005/06 experienced an increase in poverty with the incidence rising from 5% to 12% whereas that of the Upper West region rose from 84% to 88%. Moreover, Figure 1 shows that the poorest regions in the country are the three Northern regions namely; the Northern, Upper West and Upper East regions whilst the Greater Accra region is the richest region. However, the Ashanti, Western, Central and Eastern regions are not performing badly in terms of maintaining a decent poverty record.

The measure of the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income or consumption in a given country is the Gini index. The index usually ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding with perfect equality. To explain differently, where a country’s income is close to 0, it means income in such a country is relatively more equally distributed and when it is close to 1, it means there is high degree of inequality. For instance, the national.
inequality index (Gini index) rose from 0.353 in 1991/92 to 0.378 in 1998/99 and further to 0.394 in 2005/06 (see Table 2).

In terms of administrative region, the Volta region has the highest level of inequality with a Gini index of 0.557 whilst the Eastern region has the lowest with a Gini index of 0.319. However, inequality in the three Northern regions (i.e., the Northern region, Upper West region and the Upper East region) and the Greater Accra region remained high in 2005/06 with an average Gini index of not less than 0.4065. Moreover, from Table 2, it can be seen that in 2005/06 the level of inequality rose in all the administrative regions with the exception of the Ashanti region whose Gini index fell from 0.380 to 0.377.

Table 2: Gini Index of Inequality by Administrative Regions, 1991–2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Region</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater-Accra Region</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volta Region</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Region</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashanti Region</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brong Ahafo Region</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Region</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>0.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper East Region</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper West Region</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Coulombe and Wodon 2007)

The above analysis has revealed that although several capacity interventions have been embarked on, inequalities exist in the various regions that call for a more vigorous approach to capacity initiatives. The Savanna Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) initiative, for example, was an intervention aimed at collaborating with the civil society organisations to reduce poverty in the northern regions, increase income levels, improve human capital and address desertification in some 62 districts of the Savannah Ecological Zone of Ghana. Unfortunately this initiative has been saddled with corruption amongst those with the responsibility to ensure its successful implementation. These interventions have their challenges which have to be looked into in the light of capacity development.

One major weakness in the capacity development efforts to reduce poverty is lack of commitment on the part of political leadership. Most often the urgent need to provide the required leadership is unavailable. Many political leaders are unwilling to properly and efficiently supervise work, probably for personal gains to be derived for poor supervision. This is consistent with the rational model, which states that policy makers aim at maximising their economic benefits and personal preferences. Some scholars have depicted presidents as institutionally rational actors seeking to develop policy proposals that satisfy their personal
preferences by using the “responsive competence” of their loyal inner circle of advisers rather than seeking the advice of agency actors (Moe 1985, 1989; Moe and Wilson 1994; Nathan 1983). Moe (1989) posits that agency bureaucrats have their own personal preferences tied to the mission of the agencies they serve and thus lack incentives to be adequately responsive to the president’s policy preferences. Poor supervision in the civil service as a problem to capacity development has been clearly explained by Quartey (2007) as: “one of the weakest chains in the management of the Ghanaian civil service is the lack of effective supervision. Many managers and supervisors are unable or unwilling to properly and efficiently distribute work, and to subsequently supervise efficiently and effectively. It is common knowledge that in most of the civil services, officers generally report for work two-three hours late and also leave office some hours early. Some even absent themselves from work for days, sometimes without anyone noticing their absence” (Quartey 2007:25).

It has been observed that much of Africa’s inability to implement anti-poverty programmes successfully stems from systemic weaknesses at the levels of the state, the region, and the continent, as well as the institutional and individual level. The inter-relationship amongst these levels of governance has created vicious cycles in which poverty, limited capacity, and bad governance are mutually supportive (NEPAD 2009). The resultant effect of this has been the further marginalisation of the continent. There is also a realisation that previous efforts and approaches to capacity building have not delivered the desired results and that capacity constraints still remain one of the major obstacles to development and specifically to the achievement of African Union Vision and NEPAD priorities. Overall, implementing capacities still remain a challenge. Several states including Ghana have committed to poverty reduction on paper and have approached the phenomenon from several perspectives. However, the various approaches have been bedevilled with serious challenges which tend to hinder the objectives of most of these programmes.

Insufficient economic development capacity is most prevalent in rural and small communities. Brown (1980) notes that rural areas are worse off than urban ones, and the more rural the area, the wider the capacity gap in terms of financial resources, expertise, and professionalism. Small to medium-sized cities often lack a critical mass of resources to allocate to sophisticated problem analysis or strategic planning activities (Gargan 1981). Leatherman and Deller (2001) add that even rural communities of size and substance struggle to meet local needs with limited human and financial resources. Small governments, especially those in rural areas lack the latent resources to effectively pursue economic development within their jurisdictions. Rural governments may lack the technical competence that is typical of more developed countries thus affecting their ability to implement capacity development programmes.

The problem of capacity development efforts in Ghana can be explained in terms of dependency theory. An economy is dependent to the extent that its position and relations to other economies in the international system and the articulation of its internal structure make it incapable of autocentric development. In the early days of Africa’s colonisation, there was little indigenous capital to mobilise for investment and development. This made it difficult for the Africans to accumulate much wealth. This situation led to dependence on foreign capital (Ake 1981). The dependence on foreign capital has not changed rather it has taken an alarming turn. An erudite Ghanaian scholar, Asante (2014) succinctly describes this dependency mentality in these words: “…Ghanaians have developed a dependency
mentality. They have come to believe that only non-Ghanaians can manage and solve their problems. Proud Ghanaians will dismiss this assertion. But actions expose beliefs. What do we do when we encounter a problem? We seek and request outside assistance. Even when we analyse the problem and design a solution, we look for outside resources for implementation. Our leaders in various fields and institutions feel satisfied when they announce that they have formulated a project and are looking for funds to implement it. Often they do not seek resources from the national budget. It appears that we do not really believe in planning, and even our national budget is not primarily designed to support projects to promote growth and well-being but to satisfy the beggar mentality of seeking donor budgetary support” (Daily Graphic, August 4 2014:7).

The challenges which affect capacity development and poverty reduction in Ghana generally stem from financial constraints, dishonest politicians, uncommitted bureaucrats who work in the bureaucracy for their parochial interest, bad governance, poor targeting, top-down approach, piecemeal approach and poor feedback. The weak capacity to implement public policies is aptly described by Ayee (2000) in these terms: “successful public policies and programmes are rare because it is unusual to have progressive and committed politicians and bureaucrats (saints) supported by appropriate policy analysts with available and reliable information (wizards), that manage hostile and apathetic groups (demons) and consequently insulate the policy environment from the vagaries of implementation (systems)” (Ayee 2000:14).

Another major challenge militating against capacity development efforts is late release of funds for such initiatives. In most cases, the release comes so late that it becomes difficult to implement the initiative to the letter. A report on Ghana GhanaWeb (July 25 2013) suggests that the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty has been in arrears for the past months and caused quite challenging moments for beneficiaries. The Annual Performance Report of the Civil Service (2011) states that: “A key challenge confronting all MDAs is the inadequate financial resources from national budget which is always translated in the form of late release or suspension of approved budgets by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. This in many instances, affected and continues to affect the effective implementation of programmed activities of the MDAs” (Annual Performance Report of the Civil Service 2011:26).

It is reported that there are financial challenges affecting capacity development programmes; for instance, the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) faces a serious challenge as a result of a delay in release of funds by the government which affects transfer of funds (Daily Graphic, 9th September 2013:130). An effective poverty reduction strategy requires a collaborative effort of governments, both central and local governments; Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs); local or contextual factors (local economic development approach) as well as the people or groups who will be affected by the poverty reduction intervention. Central government is involved in broad policy direction and the appropriation of resources for major poverty reduction programmes and therefore constitutes a key player in the poverty reduction process. Local governments are responsible for the social, political and economic administration of respective geographical jurisdictions and in most cases carry out and manage poverty reduction programmes on behalf of central government in their respective local government units.

Corruption has been seen as a serious impediment to capacity development efforts. The resources that are wasted as a result of administrative and management malpractices appear
to take more than half of the resources needed for the actual target groups. Corruption and poor management practices do not promote poverty reduction. Grindle (2002) has argued that tackling poverty requires the good governance approach which touches virtually all aspects of the public sector—from institutions that set the rules of the game for economic and political interaction, to organisations that manage administrative systems and deliver goods and services to citizens, to human resources that staff government bureaucracies, to the interface of officials and citizens in political and bureaucratic arenas. Todaro and Smith (2009) argue about the debilitating nature of corruption that: “The elimination of corruption is important for development for several reasons. First of all, honest government may promote growth and sustainably high incomes. In addition, the association of eliminating corruption with public empowerment suggests that it is a direct objective of development… The effects of corruption fall disproportionately on the poor and are a major restraint on their ability to escape from poverty. This is perhaps the most compelling reason for emphasising the elimination of corruption and improvement of governance in general as part of an antipoverty strategy from the earliest stages of development” (Todaro and Smith 2009:566).

Additionally, there have been several cases where capacity development programmes have been engulfed in financial malpractices and misappropriation of funds meant for the poor and vulnerable in society. For instance, following a report of alleged corruption by its officials, participants of the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency (GYEEDA) threatened to embark on a nationwide demonstration against their corrupt officials. A former Executive Director of the GYEEDA, Mr. Abuga Pele, in an interview on an Accra based radio station, Joy FM, said he had earlier called the attention of a former Minister of Youth and Sports, Mr Clement Kofi Humado, to suspected acts of corruption by some management personnel hoping that there would be some investigations but nothing had happened. A former Deputy National Coordinator of the programme, Alhaji Tapsoba, was last year (2012) asked to step aside following his alleged involvement in some corrupt deals. Workers and participants of the programme have a feeling that they had been taken for granted for far too long and would no longer tolerate any further delay in the release of their allowances because it was now clear to them that the reasons given for the delay were false (Daily Graphic 2013). Again, there have been reports of an alleged misapplication of some 15 million Ghana cedis for the Guinea Fowl Project under the SADA project.

Good quality data engenders numerous benefits, especially in helping to inform good policy decisions and in evaluating their impact. For example, a more accurate assessment of output and its components can improve the calculation of various tax ratios and propel countries to take a closer look at tax burdens and tax policy. This has stimulated increased demand for sub-Saharan African statistics from many sources. Unfortunately, the availability and quality of economic data in sub-Saharan Africa often does not measure up, as some commentators have recently emphasised (Devarajan et al. 2013; Devarajan 2012, Jerven 2013). Indeed, in terms of quality, the World Bank’s Statistical Capacity Indicator puts sub-Saharan Africa below the average for developing countries. African data exhibits deficiencies in accuracy, periodicity, and timeliness.

Training has often been both inappropriately used and poorly implemented as the response to capacity development needs. Taking a result-orientation can help to ensure that proposed training activities will meet identified needs, and that progress and the contribution to overall capacity development can be monitored and evaluated (UNDP 2006; DFID 2006;
Berlin Statement 2008). The Annual Performance Report of the Civil Service (2011) points out that lack of appropriate training has been one of the key problems in capacity development in the civil service of Ghana. “Decentralization of training to the MDAs has led to a situation where many civil servants have had no training in most of the critical courses, such as the Certificates in Public Administration and Diploma in Public Administration. This has affected the performance of the staff” (Annual Performance Report of the Civil Service 2011:27).

It is clear that effective monitoring and evaluation of capacity development initiatives is very critical to the overall success of such initiatives. Poor monitoring, evaluation and feedback mechanisms have been a major setback. The ineffective monitoring and evaluation is due to inadequate training of staff, poor motivation and lack of logistics. Interestingly if the capacity development initiative is donor–funded, monitoring and evaluation tends to be effective. This is because the donors are able to provide the needed supervision coupled with availability of well-motivated staff for evaluation, and availability of resources to facilitate efficient and effective monitoring and evaluation. It is prudent for the State and other institutions to be involved in monitoring capacity development programmes to ensure that implementers do what is required of them. For this reason, there must be no room for misappropriation of resources meant for capacity development. There is the need for proper targeting, beneficiaries must be given the required training and resources. Monitoring and evaluation also require the capacity of the process to occasionally monitor the progress and activities of participants or beneficiaries who have ever taken part in capacity development programmes.

Again, poor targeting tends to affect capacity building programmes. In this instance, capacity building programmes meant to enhance the livelihood of the poor and empower them are tailored to meet the needs of the poor. In Ghana, there have been reported cases where people who are not poor have found their names on the payroll to receive LEAP moneys. Greed and other misplaced priorities tend to perpetuate the disparity between the rich and poor in Ghana.

Moreover, most capacity development programmes for the poor take the top-down approach which often does not take inputs from the very poor whose poverty level is to be reduced. The policy formulation stage is an important phase which determines whether the implementation phase will be successful or otherwise. It is therefore essential to engage the target groups or beneficiaries in the formulation stage. In most cases, the policies do not tackle the very cause of the poverty and tends to be superficial. There might be some communities who may do well in farming but perhaps their main challenge may be marketing and storage. In this case, the best capacity development programme would be to facilitate a ready market for their farm products rather than giving them monthly stipends or other training. There have been other instances where under a module, people would be selected wholesale from several communities to be trained in bread-making without recognising the unique needs and marketing opportunities of each district. In some communities, people do not use bread so if participants in such communities are trained in bread-making, such capacity development is a waste of state resources and participants’ time.

Finally, a major challenge affecting capacity building and poverty reduction is the piecemeal approach that most of the programmes take. In some cases, people are given training on a particular activity or vocation but these people would not get the required resources for them to start their own businesses. For instance, some participants trained
and supported to go into agriculture without any support regarding how their produce would be marketed to sustain the particular intervention must be avoided. Many farmers who went into the cultivation of cassava under the Presidential Special Initiative (PSI) on cassava have been struggling to get a good price and ready markets for their products and the political leadership has failed to come to their aid. The argument being made here is that capacity development programmes should be seen as a process or continuum comprising different phases; it is never complete unless implementers are sure beneficiaries will have a sustainable level of living. It appears the actors of these programmes are only interested in committing financial resources to programmes but not in the outcomes of the programmes. Unfortunately, governments commit financial resources to build the capacity or equip people to undertake certain ventures without doing a follow-up on them to see how such ventures are being sustained.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion, the analysis and discussions of the findings reveal that most poverty reduction programmes in Ghana fail due to weak capacity building. Some of the factors that militate against capacity building include: corruption, poor targeting of beneficiaries, top-down mentality towards formulation and implementation of poverty reduction programmes and the piecemeal approach towards poverty reduction. In most cases, these problems that hinder the success of poverty reduction are integrated. Therefore, these problems must be tackled holistically. Efforts to support accountability systems within and across institutions are cardinal to capacity development. It is important to strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems such as public oversight and arbitration bodies and develop accountability mechanisms so as to promote stakeholders’ feedback and enforcement mechanisms, strengthening of regulatory and oversight capacity of public institutions.

In order to increase the success of capacity building programmes towards poverty reduction, the following recommendations are made. Political leadership must enhance institutional capacity to detect, prevent and punish corrupt officials. Capacity development efforts can only be successful if they are backed by the needed political will by the political elite. The process of formulation and implementation of poverty reduction must be interactive in nature so as to capture the actual needs of the people and for the people to own the programme. The needed funds for capacity development efforts must be released on time to ensure the successful implementation of such efforts. The situation whereby funds are released so late to support capacity development efforts lends credence to the notion that capacity development efforts are mere rhetoric. Again, there is the need for government to integrate programmes so that the chances of attaining the full outcomes of poverty reduction programmes can be achieved. Additionally, there is the need to appropriately monitor and evaluate capacity building programmes through the provision of requisite resources to facilitate effective monitoring and evaluation. Resourcing the Ghana Statistical Service is important here so as to be able to come up with reliable and credible data. Supervision must be seen at all levels as fundamental to success in capacity development efforts and policy implementers must devote time and other resources to ensure effective supervision. There is also the need to sensitise Ghanaians through the National Commission on Civic Education
that the Ghanaian is capable of handling his own affairs with the view to minimising the dependency syndrome which has now become a cancer in Ghanaian body politic.

NOTE

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A ten year gender comparison of police culture attitudes in the South African Police Service

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ABSTRACT

Numerous police establishments around the globe, including the South African Police Service (SAPS), have augmented the quantity of female police officials in their staffing complement with the resolution of counteracting various of traits of the police culture that accentuate the cynicism of and isolation from the public. The current study asks whether the introduction of more women police officials in the SAPS [by the organisation] assisted in counteracting the police culture traits mentioned supra. More specifically the study asked, “Are there signs demonstrating attitudes of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism amongst a random and representative sample of specifically categorised SAPS police officials?” If so, “Are these markers gender neutral as well as change in relation to Van Maanen’s (1975) and Manning’s (1989) stages of police culture socialisation: [1] choice- at the start of basic police training (January 2005); [2] admittance- at the end of ‘college’ training (June 2005); [3] encounter- at the end of ‘field’ training (December 2005), and [4] metamorphosis- nine years after concluding basic police training” “(June 2014). The study established that South African Police Service (SAPS) cadets that commenced their basic training at the six basic training institutes in South Africa (Pretoria, Chatsworth, Oudtshoorn, Graaff-Reinet, Phillippi and Bisho) in January 2005, entered the organisation with predispositions in furtherance of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism. The period of ‘college/academy training’ (January 2005 – June 2006) did not significantly counteract these tendencies, neither the subsequent ‘field training’ (July 2005 – December 2005). Nine years on, and these attitudes intensified to an overall average of 69.85%. The study further found that for the duration of the project (10 years), female trainees, and their ensuing conversion to fully-fledged police officials, had mostly stronger values exhibiting police culture solidarity, police culture isolation and police culture cynicism, compared to their male counterparts. These findings provide some credence for a ‘nurtured nature’ understanding to the acquirement, preservation
INTRODUCTION

This article accounts on an exploration of the police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism amongst a sample of SAPS officials in relation to Van Maanen’s (1975) and Manning’s (1989) stages of police culture socialisation: [1] choice- at the start of basic police training (January 2005); [2] admittance- at the end of ‘college’ training (June 2005); [3] encounter- at the end of ‘field’ training (December 2005), and [4] metamorphosis- nine years after concluding basic police training (June 2014). Specifically, the study reflects on possible differences in the presence of, and/or changes in, these attitudes between male and female police officials. The article investigates whether the introduction of more women police officials in the SAPS [by the organisation] assisted in counteracting the police culture traits. More specifically the study asked, “Are there signs demonstrating attitudes of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism amongst a random and representative sample of specifically categorised SAPS police officials?” If so, “Are these markers gender neutral as well as change in relation to Van Maanen’s (1975) and Manning’s (1989) stages of police culture socialisation as noted above.

BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

The motivation of public police agencies worldwide (Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, Nigeria, Botswana, Uganda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the United States) to change coincides with disillusionment with the military and paramilitary model of traditional policing (O’Neil, Marks & Singh 2007; Chan 1997; Manning 1997; Bayley & Shearing 1994). Where traditional policing emphasises arrests, speedy vehicles and haphazard perambulation, the new vision of policing is one of being accountable to the community and establishing a nexus of partnerships with the community in policing (Cockcroft 2013; O’Neil, Marks & Singh 2007). It recognises the ineffectiveness of traditional policing methods as well as the resourcefulness of the community in matters of crime deterrence and social control (Chan 1997:49). The ‘blueprint for the future’ of policing is not one of piecemeal tinkering with police practices or the police image, but a dramatic departure from traditional policing: “Police, in order to be competitive and to attract the resources necessary to fulfil their role of the future, must become outward-looking, increasingly sensitive to developments and trends in their environment, responsive and resilient to change, innovative and creative in their approach to problem solving and idea generation, and more open and accountable to the community and Government” (Bayley & Shearing 1994:143).
For this endeavour, the South African national Minister of Safety and Security, at the time, Dr Sidney Mufamadi, stated at the time of transforming South Africa from an autocratic state to a democracy: “The philosophy of community policing must inform and pervade the entire organisation. Changing the police culture is perhaps the most significant challenge facing the new government” (Department of Safety and Security 1994).

For such change to be actual and durable the creed of democratic policing must essentially be espoused by the stance of the police organisational culture, to comprise altering the rudimentary suppositions of each police official pertaining to the establishment and its setting. In advancing this makeover, the South African Police Service (SAPS) applied a national policy of guaranteeing gender parity in the composition of the Service to the conclusion of befitting representation of the greater population. Alpert, Dunham and Stroshine (2006) contend that an upsurge in variety in police establishments, to include women, might succeed to splinter, and even perhaps extinguish, the notion of a homogeneous police culture. Particularly, service of women in the police could weaken certain of the hyper masculine makings of police culture and as an alternative, spawn an empathetic and gentler manner of policing (Miller 2003). Aforesaid inclusion may well additionally counteract several of the traits of the police culture that accentuate the cynicism of and isolation from the public (Paoline, Myers & Worden 2000). Associatively, The National Center for Women and Policing in the United States of America (USA) and The Police Chief Magazine (2009) posit that women police officials often possess better communication skills than their male counterparts and are better able to facilitate the cooperation and trust required to implement community policing.

In juxtapose, Brogdan and Shearing (1993) submit that the policing approach is improbable to transform as a consequence of vicissitudes in staffing policy. Westmarland (2012), Sutton (1992), Heidensohn (1992), and Young (1991) have similarly contended that women recruited into male-subjugated police establishments familiarise either by welcoming the masculine police culture, and hence becoming ‘defeminised’ into police-women; or by bearing a more customary, service-led position, and therefore moulding ‘de-professionalised’ into police-women.

**POLICE CULTURE**

Police culture, within relative terms; derives from conspicuous qualities of two interdependent but paradoxical surroundings within which police officials perform their duties. More specifically, the police occupational setting and the police organisational setting (Paoline III 2003). The occupational setting relates to the police officials’ connection to the community of people residing in a particular country or region. The most referenced components of this setting are the manifest or latency for physical harm/risk, and the distinctive forcible ‘licence’ or mandate police officials enjoy over the population (Paoline III 2003). Police officials tend to be rigid in their belief that their work setting is in particular fraught with hazards (real or perceived), and expect such most of the time (Steyn & De Vries 2007). The component of physical harm/risk is so central to the police official’s world view that when challenged could prompt affective impediments to the operational environment. (Paoline III 2003). Physical harm/risk creates formidable solidarity amongst police officials whilst at the same time isolation from the public whom they view as the primary cause/source of physical harm/risk (Crank 2004). The police occupation is distinct in that police officials have the legislative right to use force if chosen to do so. This very licence and the accompanying need to demonstrate control underscores the acuity of physical harm/risk. However, irrespective of the circumstances; police officials are compelled to initiate, demonstrate and uphold, – control (Paoline III 2003).

The second setting that police officials operate in refers to the internal environment of the organisation, which consists of one’s connection with the establishment (i.e. overseers) (Paoline III 2003). The two most salient components of this setting that police officials are often faced with are the erratic and disciplinary overseeing, and the abstruseness of the police role (Paoline III 2003). The association between police officials and their managers have been depicted as ambiguous. It is expected of the police to impose laws, yet they are obliged to adhere to the prescripts of bureaucratic rubrics and conventions (Paoline III 2003). Technical infringements due to inappropriate use of the law can end in punitive proceedings and sanctions. Novice police officials soon realise that when they become noticed it is usually for mistakes, instead of being commended for behaving admirably (Steyn & De Vries 2007). Enthusiastic behaviour amongst police officials is not encouraged as it increases the likelihood of blunders and its accompanying detection and reprimand. As such, police officials are constricted and employed by an establishment that commands that all challenges on the ‘front line’ be controlled with competent inevitability, yet held accountable to extreme inquiry by faultfinders in the future (Paoline III 2003). This institutional ambiguity is the corresponding element to the apparent corporal risks within the police work setting. Supplementary to the often erratic and disciplinary overseeing, police officials also operate within an institutional setting that supports vague task affinity. In this regard, empirical inquiries have ascertained no less than three foremost roles that police officials are anticipated to perform: preservation of the peace, execution of the law and the provision of public assistance; yet police institutions have traditionally and more often than not, failed to formally recognise execution of the law. This is buttressed through police institutional tuition, formation of expert sections, emphasis on crime numbers and notably, assessment of performance and advancement (Meyer, Steyn & Gopal 2013).

In general, operational police manage circumstances that comprise all three roles, yet only criminal law execution is underpinned and endorsed. For police officials the vagueness derives from overseers who require juniors to perform all operational tasks the same. The
hazards and forcible licence in police officials’ occupational setting, as well as overseer critical observations and role vagueness from the organisational setting, frequently generate pressure and angst amongst police officials (Paoline III 2003). The manner in which police officials deal with such tensions maintain police culture.

The values of police culture are derived from the inherent dangers of the police vocation, and police officials often attempt to reduce these dangers to shield themselves in the process (Paoline III 2003). Adaptive strategies particularised by the police culture attempt to curtail the pressure and nervousness produced by the settings and direct opinions and actions. Thus, adaptive strategies assist police officials by providing a mechanism of ‘order and control’ to their vocational realm. Two extensively cited adaptive strategies arise from police officials’ occupational setting: Distrustfulness and sustaining superiority (Paoline III 2003); and the parallel, self-preservation and firm devotion to the anti-crime warrior semblance that results from police officials’ organisational setting (Paoline III 2003).

In the endeavour to minimise the hazards related to a treacherous occupational setting, police officials are thought to be distrustful. Skolnick (1994:46) notes: “… it is the nature of the [police officials’] situation that [her or his] conception of order emphasizes regularity and predictability. It is, therefore, a conception shaped by persistent [distrust]”.

Police officials aren’t just distrustful of citizens they equally engage greenhorns with suspicion. Old hands perceive novices as an added risk to coterie cohesion. “[Do not] trust a new [police official] until you have checked [her or him] out …” (Reuss-Ianni & Ianni, 1983:268). Thus, assenting depends on the demonstration of loyalty to colleagues.

Sustaining superiority is a utility of the hazards characteristic to police officials’ occupational setting, and is likewise connected to the proficiency of officials to demonstrate their authority (Paoline III 2003). Police officials often believe that they can curtail the possibility of harm in their everyday public encounters, by being primed for anything and everything from the population, in addition to appropriately exhibiting their licence to use force (Paoline III 2003).

Sustaining superiority relates broadly to individuals and circumstances. Interpreting individuals and circumstances also refer to the ability to ‘categorise’ clientele (such as “… dubious individuals, assholes and know-nothings…”), on the possible risk that they could offer (Paoline III 2003). Adding to the adaptive strategies imposed by the police culture as a product of population dealings in the occupational setting, the organisational setting in which officials are employed often creates pressure and angst that are thought to be dispelled by police culture. As Manning (1994:5) points out, “As an adaptive modality, the occupational culture mediates external pressures and demands internal expectations for performance and production”. A particular after effect of police overseers with the emphasis on regulatory infringements is the self-preservation mind-set. This adaptive strategy dissuades police officials from initiating behaviours that could possibly attract criticism. Herbert (1997:805) explains how the self-preservation mentality can have debilitating consequences on the application of policing: “The [self-preservation mentality] afflicts [police officials] who live primarily in fear of administrative censure and thus avoid all situations that involve risk that might later be second guessed”.

Another adaptive strategy is a firm devotion to the anti-crime warrior semblance or criminal law execution proclivity. Some police officials address ‘task vagueness’ by associating with the task superiors have valued traditionally (Paoline III 2003). Police culture is understood to accentuate law enforcement or genuine police graft above preservation of
the peace and the provision of public assistance. “As such, the inner-directed aggressive street cop is somewhat of the cultural ideal that officers are expected to follow” (Paoline III 2003).

True adherence to the law enforcement proclivity could clash with self-preservation dexterity, which may result in police officials utilising discriminatory tactics in relation to law enforcement, thus, concentrate on priority criminal offences.

Police culture adaptive strategies are cohortly passed on via predisposition and socialisation practices, and persist during the span of a police officials’ career.

According to the police world-view, no one else understands the real nature of police work. That is, no one outside the police organisation—academics, politicians, and lawyers in particular—can comprehend what they have to do. Further, police officials believe that the public is generally naive about police work and that the population is basically unsupportive and unreasonably demanding.

POLICE CULTURE THEMES OF SOLIDARITY, ISOLATION AND CYNICISM

Police culture can be considered as a confluence of themes of occupational activity. The word ‘confluence’ is a metaphor suggesting the pouring of streams and rivers into a conjoint body of water. At a confluence, the unique contributions of individual streams and rivers are no longer distinguishable; the flow is a blend of them all. Police culture can be expressed in the same way. Varied aspects of organisational activity unite into a collective united by commonly held values and shared ways of thinking. The term ‘theme’ can be defined as recurring tessellations of behaviour and values (Crank 2004). The concept of culture-theme embodies the fusion of cultural elements in methods that, as Manning (1989) discerns are locales of shared occupational activity. According to Crank (2004), themes have a propensity to blend together many cultural elements. First, they are behavioural – they transpire on the ordinary undertaking of police drudgery and derive their meaning from routine, ordinary police activity. Second, themes are a way of ruminating apropos that activity, the sentiments that are associated with the activity. Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1994) use the term ‘dynamic affirmation’ to illustrate the linkage of behaviour and sentiment. Put another way, police do not approach each aspect of their work as if they have never done it before – there are traditions and ways of thinking that are associated with their many activities. Nor are the themes rule-bound. They are predisposive, applying appropriate customs and taken-for-granted assumptions to provide, in Shearing and Ericson’s (1991) colourful phrasing, the sensibility for thinking about particular routine activities. Third, themes imply social and organisational structure.

Solidarity

One of the most powerful aesthetics (aesthetics resemble typifications of how meaning and common sense arise from everyday experience) of police culture is the sense of solidarity shared by its members (Willis 1990). According to (Crank 2004; Chan 2003; Skolnick & Fyfe 1993; Christopher 1991; Manning 1977), solidarity is the powerful bond between police officials that can be described as the glue that holds police culture together. Solidarity serves
to sustain police group identity, mark group boundaries and protect police officials from external oversight (Crank 2004; Chan 2003). Crank (2004) and Coser (1956) further state that police solidarity is a product of conflicts and antagonisms with diverse out-groups that perceivably challenge police authority on how they do their day-to-day work such as the public, courts, the media, politicians and top ranking police officials. Moreover, the sheer danger of police work (real or perceived), encourages strong loyalties in an ‘all for one and one for all’ sense of camaraderie, and a military sense of combat-readiness and general spiritedness. Powerful loyalties emerge in the commonly shared and perilous effort to control dangerous crimes.

Isolation

A considerable aggregate of police research throughout the preceding 45 years has chronicled the affinity of police to befall isolation. Isolated from prior pals, public, legal system, and even isolated from their spouses and families (Drummond 1976; Skolnick 1966). Police impose social isolation upon themselves as a means of protection against real and perceived dangers, loss of personal and professional autonomy, and social rejection (Skolnick 1966:18). Skolnick found: “In an attempt to be attentive to any possible violence, the officer becomes generally suspicious of everyone. Likewise, many officers begin to distance themselves from previous friends as they do not seem to understand and appreciate the rigors of being a cop”.

Likewise, administrative factors such as shift work, days-off during the week and court time tend to isolate the police official from persons other than police. Police also become isolated due to their authority. They are obliged to enforce numerous laws epitomising puritanical morality, such as proscribing drunkenness. Some police officials have been inebriated and become susceptible to the imputation of hypocrisy. Consequently police officials aptly socialise with other police or pass time alone, yet again fronting social isolation (Kingshott & Prinsloo 2004).

Cynicism

In 1967, Arthur Niederhoffer wrote about a pervasive cynicism he had observed during his career in the New York City Police Department. Niederhoffer defines police cynicism as wordly feelings of abhorrence, envy, impotent hostility and bitterness, which are displayed as a state of mind within the individual police official. Police cynicism is levelled at life, the world, people in general, and the police system itself. Cynicism is the derivation of various tribulations concomitant with the police (Niederhoffer 1967). Left unimpeded, an ominous cynicism and its accompanying loss of faith in police work contribute to alienation, job dissatisfaction and corruption. According to Crank (2004:324), cynicism arises promptly in a police official’s calling, and attains maximum potency in the fourth and fifth year, at which instant an official is most impervious to corruptive sways. Wilt and Bannon (1976) contend that gauges of police cynicism tap the argot of police culture, a language nuanced with vexation towards overseers, police toil and the establishment. Cynicism appears early on from language and attitude sculpting in college training, partly because of a desire among newcomers to emulate experienced officials in an effort to shed their status as novices (Wilt & Bannon 1976:40).
STUDY OBJECTIVES

Numerous police establishments around the globe, including the SAPS, have augmented the quantity of female police officials in their staffing complement with the resolution of counteracting various of the traits of the police culture that accentuate the cynicism of and isolation from the public. The current study is an attempt to establish progress in this regard by establishing whether there are signs demonstrating attitudes of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism amongst a sample of SAPS officials; whether these markers are gender neutral as well as change in relation to Van Maanen’s (1975) and Manning’s (1989) stages of police culture socialisation: [1] choice- at the start of basic police training (January 2005); [2] admittance- at the end of ‘college’ training (June 2005); [3] encounter- at the end of ‘field’ training (December 2005), and [4] metamorphosis- nine years after concluding basic police training (June 2014).

OPERATIONALISATION OF RELEVANT CONCEPTS

Culture, organisational culture, and police culture, are tricky concepts to define due to their scientifically abstract, intangible and non-essential nature. According to Hall and Neitz (1993), the study of culture emerged in ethnographies of primitive civilisations. In its origins, culture was conceived broadly, in that there are bounded, isolated and stable social entities called cultures, and these cultures provide the measure of a whole way of life of a people (Redfield 1939). At its heart, the study of culture is the study of what it means to be quintessentially human. More specifically, Schein (2004) defines culture as a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. Schraeder, Tears and Jordan (2005) bridge culture and organisational culture by noting that the latter tends to be unique to a particular organisation, composed of an objective and subjective dimension, and concerned with tradition and the nature of shared beliefs and expectations about organisational life. Crank (2004) provides a meaning of culture that furnishes a conduit to works on culture in the main, and from which depictions of police culture appear cogent. Crank (2004) terms culture as shared sense making. Sense-making with ideational, behavioural, material, social structural and emergent elements, such as (1) ideas, knowledge (correct, wrong, or unverifiable belief) and recipes for doing things, (2) behaviours, signs and rituals, (3) humanly fabricated tools including media, (4) social and organisational structures, and (5) the products of social action, including conflicts, that may emerge in concrete interpersonal and inter-social encounters and that may be drawn upon in the further construction of the first four elements of collective sense-making.

Roberg, Crank and Kuykendall (2000) conceptualise police occupational and organisational culture as the work-related principles and moral standards that are shared by most police officials within a particular sovereignty (Roberg, Crank, & Kuykendall 2000). Police subculture, represent the values introduced by the wider civility in which police officials exist (Roberg, Crank, & Kuykendall 2000).
That the police are inclined to function in analogous institutional environments and encounter consonant conundrums, that is, contend with the courts, law, suspects and the civic ubiquitously, could strengthen the argument for worldwide thematic compatibility. However, it could also be contended that such a deduction of equivalence is too facile and omits nuanced but significant variations in the way individual police officials and/or groups cogitate about their work. Depending on which components one considers, ideational elements (values, beliefs and ethics) can be akin and distinct simultaneously. Police cultural aspects are also complicated by the predilections of the observer. When researchers write about police culture, their values and predispositions are completely intertwined with the standpoints of the membership of whatever police group they are studying. In writing about police culture, academics authenticate it. The values of the observer are not separable from the object of the research, and are fully in place from the moment the researcher uses the word culture to describe a group of police officials. In a real sense, the researcher is always investigating his or her interaction with the people being studied. Hence, it is the view of the current authors that there is no such thing as a ‘universal-homogeneous objective police culture’ but rather cultures that evolve over time and are contingent on complex personal and situational factors that interrelate on numerous levels and dimensions.

The South African Police Service (SAPS) was instituted on 27 January 1995 in terms of section 214 of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993. The SAPS is the sovereign lone national police service and is tasked, under section 205 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), to thwart, resist and reconnoitre crime, conserve public harmony, safeguard the population of the Republic and their property; and uphold and implement the law.

For the purposes of the current study a SAPS police official is a personage that was conscripted by the officialdom, efficaciously realised basic training (college training [six months] and field training [6 months]) (January 2005 until December 2005), and subsequently appointed as such in terms of the South African Police Service Act (1995), and at the time of effecting the study (September 2013 – June 2014), posted within one of the nine provinces of the Republic of South Africa.

Male and female are operationalised as the gender choice signified by the participant on the 30-item self-report questionnaire measuring police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism.


Attitudes represent perceptive evaluations (favourable or unfavourable) of statements made on a 30-item questionnaire that measures police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism.

Stages of police culture socialisation – according to Van Maanen (1975) new police recruits go through various stages of socialisation before fully integrating the culture’s beliefs, attitudes and values beginning with a phase of anticipatory socialisation, choice, during which recruits prepare themselves for entering the organisation by adopting their interpretation of its values, attitudes, skills, and knowledge. Choice is followed by a period that Manning (1989) defines as admittance into the organisation, predominantly during
the early training phase (police academy/college). This is often a difficult phase if new recruits’ expectations of their job and the organisation are unrealistic. The newcomer’s experience during admittance is mediated by environmental, organisational, relevant-group, task, and individual factors. Admittance is then followed by a period of encounter, often a ‘field training’ experience, where the newcomer is introduced to the complexities of the ‘street’. It is during the field-training phase that the recruit is most susceptible to attitude change (Manning 1989). Finally, continued membership in the organisation results in a metamorphosis on the part of the newcomer.

**RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

The researcher employed a longitudinal-study within a quasi-experimental pre-test/post-test repeated measures research design:

- **Time 1 – Pre-test (choice stage):** at the beginning of SAPS recruit’s basic training (January 2005)
- **Time 2 – First post-test (introduction stage):** at the end of the SAPS recruit’s basic training (June 2005)
- **Time 3 – Second post-test (encounter stage):** at the end of field training at stations (December 2005)
- **Time 4 – Third post-test (metamorphosis stage):** 10 years after entering SAPS employment (June 2014).

**Survey**

A 30-item questionnaire suggested by a review of the literature (Crank 2004; Chan 2001; McNulty 1994; Skolnick 1994; Manning 1989; Reuss-Ianni & Ianni 1983; Shearing & Ericson 1991; Bayley & Bittner 1989; Van Maanen 1976; Niederhoffer 1967) and the engagement of a focus group comprised of senior SAPS managers and police science academics in South Africa was developed by the researchers, to measure attitudes evincing police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism amongst a sample of SAPS police officials:

**Solidarity theme items**

1. I think that a police official should be one of the highest paid vocations
2. I feel it is my duty to rid the country of its bad elements
3. Police officials are careful of how they behave in public
4. You don’t understand what it is to be a police official until you are a police official
5. Police officials have to look out for each other
6. Members of the public, media and politicians are quick to criticise the police but seldom recognise the good that SAPS members do
7. What does not kill a police official makes him or her stronger
8. Most members of the public don’t really know what is going on ‘out there’
9. A good police official takes nothing at face value
10. To be a police official is not just another job it is a ‘higher calling’
Isolation theme items
[11] I tend to socialise less with my friends outside of the police since I have become a police official
[12] I prefer socialising with my colleagues to socialising with non-members
[13] I don't really talk in-depth to people outside of the SAPS about my work
[14] Being a police official made me realise how uncooperative and non-supportive the courts are
[15] My husband/wife, boyfriend/girlfriend tends not to understand what being a police official is all about
[16] Shift work and special duties influence my socialising with friends outside the SAPS
[17] I feel like I belong with my work colleagues more every day, and less with people that I have to police
[18] As a police official, I am being watched critically by members of the community, even in my social life
[19] I can be more open with my work colleagues than with members of the public
[20] Generals do not really know what is happening at grassroots level

Cynicism theme items
[21] Most people lie when answering questions posed by police officials
[22] Most people do not hesitate to go out of their way to help someone in trouble
[23] Most people are untrustworthy and dishonest
[24] Most people would steal if they knew they would not get caught
[25] Most people respect the authority of police officials
[26] Most people lack the proper level of respect for police officials
[27] Police officials will never trust members of the community enough to work together effectively
[28] Most members of the community are open to the opinions and suggestions of police officials
[29] Members of the community will not trust police officials enough to work together effectively
[30] The community does not support the police and the police do not trust the public.

Response choices on the individual items were structured and close-ended with a five-point Likert-type option, ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. The level of measurement on scales of the 30-item self-report questionnaire was of an ordinal nature, meaning that the scales were mutually exclusive, mutually exhaustive and rank-ordered. Each scale was assigned a numerical value to identify differences in participants’ responses. Only items 22, 25, and 28 were assigned differently due to the direction of the statements. Although the item scales were of an ordinal nature the numerical data was analysed on an interval scale for the purpose of determining the category order of participants’ responses and to establish the exact quantities and distances between participants’ responses at and between Times 1, 2, 3 and 4.

A pilot study was also conducted (December 2004 among 100 SAPS functional police officials stationed within the city of Durban, Republic of South Africa) and the factor analysis (VARIMAX technique) identified nine factors of which four met the latent root criterion (also
known as the eigenvalue-one criterion or the Kaiser criterion) of eigenvalue greater than 1.0 (as indicated in Table 1). The rationale being that each observed variable contributes one unit of variance in the data set. Any factor that displays an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 accounts for a greater amount of variance than was contributed by one variable. Williams, Hollan, and Stevens (1983) noted that the latent root criterion has been shown to produce the correct number of factors when the number of variables included in the analysis is small (10 to 15) or moderate (20 to 30). The reliability coefficient (Cronbach alpha) of 0.77 for the 30-item police culture questionnaire is also within the 0.7 acceptable indicator level.

Table 1 Study measuring instrument Factor Loadings

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<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>3.4625324</td>
<td>2.1932821</td>
<td>1.7459078</td>
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</table>

The factor analysis discovered statistically significant loadings (with >0.70 communality) for items (measures/questions) 30, 24, 21, 29, 27 and 30, on Factor 1. More specifically, items 21, 23, and 24 can be grouped into respondents’ viewpoints apropos truthfulness and fidelity in the populace, whilst items 27, 29, and 30, gauge participants’ beliefs about the corollaries of these traits for police community interactions. The relational direction between the Factor 1 loadings signify that partakers who deemed the public as commonly deceitful and untrustworthy, correspondingly did not imagine that the police and the public can work well together, and visa-versa.

Questions that loaded with statistical significance on Factor 2, were items 29 and 30 (which was the case on Factor 1), as well as 25. The latter is a determinant of respondents’ creeds pertaining to veneration for the police by the civic, and the former (29 and 30) measure contributors’ attitudes vis-à-vis the upshots of these features for police public dealings. Participants that thought that people do not respect the police were also of the opinion that the police and the public do not trust each other, and visa-versa.

Factor 3 is constituted by high loadings (with >0.70 communality) from measures 12, 11, 2, 5, and 6. These items largely elucidate why respondents believe that police officials have to look out for each other. Participants who consider a collective purpose (rid the country of its bad elements) and view outsiders as hasty criticisers of the police, likewise believe that police officials have to look after each other, and as a result prefer to mingle more with police peers and less with folks alfresco of the police, and visa-versa.

Measures 23, 16, 28, 24, and 14, loaded statistically significantly on Factor 4. These items appear to measure the extent to which respondents socialise with others outside of the police and justifications thereof. Respondents that indicated that they were socialising less with those outside of the police since becoming trainee police officials were also of the opinion that this was due to uncooperative and non-supportive courts, shift work and special duties, and the belief that even though members of the public are open to the opinions and suggestions of police officials – they are not to be trusted and are generally dishonest, and visa-versa.

In general (factor analysis), several of the study measuring instrument questions did not load on any of the four factors (with eigenvalues >1.0), and some of the items loaded (statistically significant) on more than one factor. Thus indicating a composite of a more generalised multi-dimensional and categorical (behavioural and attitudinal) measure.
Table 2: Study sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>( \sigma )</th>
<th>( \varphi )</th>
<th>% of X</th>
<th>Attrition rate</th>
<th>Reason/s for not partaking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time 1</strong> (January 2005) Start of ‘college’ training Stage: Choice</td>
<td>4,350</td>
<td>1,453</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>33.40%</td>
<td>66.60% (chose not to participate)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time 2</strong> (June 2005) End of ‘college’ training Stage: Introduction</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>26.85%</td>
<td>19.62% (from Time 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time 3</strong> (December 2005) End of ‘field’ training Stage: Encounter</td>
<td>0,870</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>25.52% (from Time 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time 4</strong> (September 2013 – June 2014) 10 years’ experience Stage: Metamorphosis</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0,535</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>12.29%</td>
<td>Could not be reached or decided not to participate (230) Deceased (40) Discharged [either voluntary or dishonourably] (65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>0,076</td>
<td>050</td>
<td>026</td>
<td>65.79%</td>
<td>34.21%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>0,033</td>
<td>027</td>
<td>006</td>
<td>81.82%</td>
<td>18.18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>0,065</td>
<td>062</td>
<td>003</td>
<td>95.38%</td>
<td>04.62%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>0,104</td>
<td>062</td>
<td>041</td>
<td>60.19%</td>
<td>39.81%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>0,043</td>
<td>036</td>
<td>007</td>
<td>83.72%</td>
<td>16.28%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>0,040</td>
<td>036</td>
<td>004</td>
<td>90.00%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>0,068</td>
<td>056</td>
<td>012</td>
<td>82.35%</td>
<td>17.65%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>0,030</td>
<td>026</td>
<td>004</td>
<td>86.67%</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>0,077</td>
<td>054</td>
<td>023</td>
<td>70.13%</td>
<td>29.87%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 'P' signifies – Province; 'X' denotes – population parameters; 'n' signifies – actual participants; \( \sigma \) designates – male participants; \( \varphi \) signposts – female participants; 'N/A' indicates – not applicable.
A challenge for operationalising the constructs of police culture solidarity, police culture isolation and police culture cynicism, is therefore amorphous by nature, as the constructs are multi-dimensional. As a consequence it was originally decided (pre-test, first post-test and second post-test) to create a composite measure of each scale: (scale of solidarity [items 1–10]; scale of isolation [items 11–20]; scale of cynicism [items 21–30]) as the literature does not clearly indicate how each item relates. Obviously the longitudinal makes the argument that each individual item measures perceived solidarity, isolation and cynicism. The same procedure was followed for the third post-test (September 2013 – June 2014). The critical question regarding the measurement of the constructs is whether each item, based on the literature, is valid on its face-value as a measure of a dimension of the constructs of solidarity, isolation and cynicism.

The study contributors (Time 4, September 2013 – June 2014), as reflected in Table 2 constitute a representative (above 10%) sample of all novice SAPS cadets that commenced their basic police training in January 2005. The sizeable attrition rate amid Times 3 and 4 could perhaps be explicated by the certainty that at Time 4 the partakers were no longer student constables. One more consideration that might have swayed participation is the actuality that only 19 of the Time 3 participants were promoted (15 promoted from Constable to Sergeant and four from Sergeant to Warrant Officer), on performing the third post-test measurement. The sample closely resembles the national population estimates (Statistics South Africa, 2013) in terms of Black ethnicity (national population, 79.8% whilst study sample, 79.63%); as well as the SAPS gender demographic (according to the SAPS 2013/2014 Annual Report the organisation’s staffing consists of 34.48% women, which is still well below the national population percentage of 51%) (Statistics South Africa 2013).

Administration of the survey

As the general project engaged a recurrent measures design in two considerably dissimilar surroundings the administration of the survey alternated between the different gauges. The pre-test and first post-test were administered at the six (6) SAPS basic training institutes (hereon referred to as PBTI) (police college/academy) across the country, at the time. Each commanding officer was contacted and assistance requested and attained (all-encompassing, consent was achieved from the SAPS Head Office Strategic Research Component). Throughout these junctures the following procedures ensued:

- All trainees were amassed in a gallery and furnished with a desk, chair and a black ballpoint pen.
- Plebes were then enlightened vis-à-vis the survey and the voluntary nature of their involvement as well as the confidentiality of their ripostes and that the data would be used for research intentions only.
- Recruits who authorised the consent document were then supplied with and completed the questionnaire with no time limit (although participation was voluntary from the researchers’ perspective and that of college managers, the substantial participation rate at the pre-test stage does insinuate that the student constables might not have perceived it as such. It would be meaningful to consider that the pre-test survey was dispensed soon after arrival at the PBTI and the recruits were in a very early stage of adjustment to the paramilitary environment of the college).
 Upon completion of the survey the questionnaires were collected by the PBTI and preparations were made for courier services to dispense the finished questionnaires to the research project leader.

With regard to the second post-test another method was necessitated due to the dispersal of student constables to different police stations/units in numerous police areas located among the nine provinces of South Africa. During this phase the support of the various SAPS Area Field Training supervisors were required and thankfully acquired. The matching process that was respected at the basic training institutes relative to informed consent was applied in the police areas. Once a student constable volunteered to continue in the project he/she completed the questionnaire and returned it along with the signed informed consent form to his/her station. From the station level the completed surveys were disseminated to the Area offices and then dispatched to the principal researcher or retrieved at the Area office by him.

An altered approach was likewise followed for the third post-test (September 2013 – June 2014). The second post-test contributors were contacted by telephone and invited to voluntarily complete the study survey over the telephone.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

As discussed earlier, a decision needs to be made whether to analyse the data at the micro-level or to create composite measures of more generalised multi-dimensional constructs. The analysis begins with the macro-level questions: are there any indicators evincing the presence, gender neutrality, and change; in relation to traditional police culture themes of solidarity, isolation, and cynicism; amongst a representative sample of SAPS police officials that commenced their basic police training at the various SAPS BTI’s in January 2005? To be able to answer these questions one must ask oneself, how isolated or cynical, as a general proposition, must the police be; in order to assess whether one is willing to conclude that the police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism are sufficiently present? The decision is somewhat capricious but the traits must be present to an ample extent to substantiate a compelling assertion. During the first three assessments (that is, January 2005, June 2005 and December 2005) an inclusive mean score of less than 23 (54%) per individual participant on a particular police culture theme (for example, theme 1: Solidarity [items 1–10]), on a scale of 10 to a possible 50, was selected as criteria, with the lower score demonstrating the greater presence of a particular police culture theme (Meyer & Steyn 2009). At the last measurement (Time 4, June 2014), the scoring on the survey scales was changed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Times 1 – 3 scale scoring</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>I do not have an opinion</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>I do not have an opinion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time 4 scale scoring</td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>I do not have an opinion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Times 4 scale scoring</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>I do not have an opinion</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>I do not have an opinion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, a cut-off mean score of no less than 22 (55%), on a scale of zero to a possible 40, with the higher score demonstrating the greater presence.

Table 3 reflects the mean scores as well as mean score percentages of participants’ responses per theme per measurement time.

**Table 3: Mean score and mean score percentage comparison of SAPS police official responses to the 30-item questionnaire measuring police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism – over a 10 year period**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Solidarity mean score</th>
<th>Solidarity mean score %</th>
<th>Isolation mean score</th>
<th>Isolation mean score %</th>
<th>Cynicism mean score</th>
<th>Cynicism mean score %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time 1 (January 2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start of 'college' training</td>
<td>15.45</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>20.71</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>23.14</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage: Choice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.22</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>20.67</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
<td>22.06</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time 2 (June 2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of 'college' training</td>
<td>15.06</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
<td>20.39</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
<td>22.39</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage: Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.25</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>19.75</td>
<td>60.5%</td>
<td>21.72</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time 3 (December 2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of ‘field’ training</td>
<td>14.90</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
<td>20.35</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
<td>22.12</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage: Encounter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>20.24</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>21.59</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time 4 (September 2013 – June 2014)</td>
<td>30.14</td>
<td>75.3%</td>
<td>27.62</td>
<td>69.0%</td>
<td>25.06</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years’ experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage: Metamorphosis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.43</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
<td>26.50</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
<td>26.03</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** ‘♂’ designates – male participants; ‘♀’ signposts – female participants.

Overall, one can surmise from Tables 3 and 4 that the cohort of SAPS cadets that commenced their basic training at the six basic training institutes (Pretoria, Chatsworth, Oudtshoorn, Graaff-Reinet, Phillippi and Bhisho) in January 2005, entered the organisation with predispositions in furtherance of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism (Steyn 2006). These attitudes were then either maintained or strengthened during the period of ‘college/academy training’ (January 2005 – June 2006) as well as subsequent ‘field training’ (July 2005 – December 2005). Nine years on, these attitudes have intensified to an overall average of 69.85%. More explicitly, an upsurge of eight 8.45% on the solidarity items (1–10); 8.2% on the isolation statements, and 7.5% on the cynicism scales. Table 3 moreover reveals that for the duration of the project, female trainees and their ensuing conversion to fully-fledged police officials had stronger values exhibiting police culture solidarity, police culture isolation and police culture cynicism, compared to their male counterparts; with the
exception of Times 2 and 3 on the solidarity gauge as well as isolation at Time 4, by just more than 1.15%.

Table 4: ‘Darker shades of blue’: indicators evincing police occupational and organisational culture themes of solidarity, isolation, and cynicism within the South African Police Service over a 10-year period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police establishments recruit individuals from society with attitudes in support of the organisations' culture</th>
<th>Time 1 (January 2005)</th>
<th>Time 2 (June 2005)</th>
<th>Time 3 (December 2005)</th>
<th>Time 4 (September 2013 – June 2014)</th>
<th>Future research 11+ years’ experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Start of ‘college’ training Stage: Choice</td>
<td>Start of ‘college’ training Stage: Introduction</td>
<td>End of ‘field’ training Stage: Encounter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 provides the mean score and mean score percentage comparisons between male and female participants on each of the thirty items of the self-report questionnaire measuring police culture solidarity, isolation and cynicism, at Time 4 (September 2013 – June 2014).

The substance of Table 5 shows that the study participants’ retorts on the survey realised the predetermined cut-off mean score of 22 (55%), for both males and females on all the items, bar item (15), and here the mean is notwithstanding above the midpoint. However, there are differences of degree (4% > variance) and kind. In terms of the latter, male contributors bore moderate positions in validation of isolation item 15, whilst female police officials did not. Variances of degree can be noted on items 4, 10, 20 and 27. On most of these items male police partakers had stouter attitudes in support, except for item 4, where female police officials trumped their male colleagues.

On the micro-level, Table 6 indicates that men and women police officials in the SAPS, with 10 years experience, believe that their vocation, enacted in a dangerous and uncertain environment, is highly skilled and moral purposed, and can only be performed by unique individuals (appropriate for police work with characteristics such as toughness and suspiciousness, etc.) from broader society. Groups outside of the police (public, media and politicians) have very little regard and understanding of ‘coalface’ police work as reflected in

Note: ‘Time’ denotes a specific period of measurement. ‘Stage’ signifies a particular phase of police culture socialisation as ethnographically depicted by the seminal work of Van Maanen (1975) and Manning (1989). Individual applicants from South African society with their respective characteristics are represented by ● ● + ▲ ● ▲. Control of South African Police Service recruit admission is represented by + + +. The broader South African Police Service culture is symbolised by means of ■ ■. Strength and direction of indicators evincing the presence of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism are signified through ■ ■ ■ ■ ■.
Table 5: Summary of mean score and mean score percentage differences between male and female participants’ responses on each of the 30-items of the self-report questionnaire measuring police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism, at Time 4 (September 2013 – June 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Mean score</th>
<th>Mean score percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male (445)</td>
<td>Female (130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male (445)</td>
<td>Female (130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Measuring instrument subscale: Police culture theme of solidarity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 1</td>
<td>3.07 (1369)</td>
<td>3.24 (422)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 2</td>
<td>3.16 (1410)</td>
<td>3.36 (438)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 3</td>
<td>2.76 (1230)</td>
<td>2.97 (387)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 4</td>
<td>3.12 (1389)</td>
<td>3.46 (451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 5</td>
<td>3.20 (1424)</td>
<td>3.40 (442)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 6</td>
<td>3.02 (1346)</td>
<td>3.29 (428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 7</td>
<td>2.77 (1237)</td>
<td>3.02 (393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 8</td>
<td>2.93 (1306)</td>
<td>3.22 (419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 9</td>
<td>2.64 (1175)</td>
<td>2.80 (364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 10</td>
<td>3.43 (1529)</td>
<td>3.63 (472)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme total score</td>
<td>30.14 (13415)</td>
<td>32.43 (4216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Measuring instrument subscale: Police culture theme of isolation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 11</td>
<td>2.60 (1160)</td>
<td>2.60 (338)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 12</td>
<td>2.57 (1147)</td>
<td>3.23 (328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 13</td>
<td>3.32 (1478)</td>
<td>3.23 (420)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 14</td>
<td>2.66 (1186)</td>
<td>2.39 (311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 15</td>
<td>2.25 (1002)</td>
<td>1.85 (241)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 16</td>
<td>2.52 (1123)</td>
<td>2.47 (322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 17</td>
<td>2.66 (1185)</td>
<td>2.57 (335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 18</td>
<td>3.04 (1357)</td>
<td>3.14 (409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 19</td>
<td>2.85 (1269)</td>
<td>2.84 (370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 20</td>
<td>3.11 (1385)</td>
<td>2.86 (372)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme total score</td>
<td>27.62 (12292)</td>
<td>26.50 (3446)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Measuring instrument subscale: Police culture theme of cynicism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 21</td>
<td>2.70 (1204)</td>
<td>2.92 (380)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 22</td>
<td>2.72 (1211)</td>
<td>2.91 (379)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 23</td>
<td>2.64 (1176)</td>
<td>2.68 (349)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 24</td>
<td>3.03 (1351)</td>
<td>3.13 (408)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 25</td>
<td>2.29 (1020)</td>
<td>2.55 (332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 26</td>
<td>2.56 (1143)</td>
<td>2.63 (343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 27</td>
<td>2.26 (1008)</td>
<td>2.23 (291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 28</td>
<td>2.47 (1100)</td>
<td>2.67 (348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 29</td>
<td>2.15 (958)</td>
<td>2.11 (275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 30</td>
<td>2.20 (981)</td>
<td>2.14 (279)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme total score</td>
<td>25.06 (11152)</td>
<td>26.03 (3384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey total score</td>
<td>27.60 (36859)</td>
<td>28.32 (11046)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** ‘(445)’ denotes the number of male contributors; ‘(130)’ indicates the number of female participants.
### Table 6: Frequency summary comparison of male and female participants’ responses at Time 4 (June 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Did Not Complete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police culture theme of solidarity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 I think that a police official should be one of the highest paid vocations</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 I feel it is my duty to rid the country of its bad elements</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>02%</td>
<td>01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Police officials are careful of how they behave in public</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>02%</td>
<td>01%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 You don’t understand what it is to be a police official until you are a police official</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Police officials have to look out for each other</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Members of the public, media and politicians are quick to criticise the police but seldom recognise the good that SAPS members do</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 What does not kill a police official makes him or her stronger</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>06%</td>
<td>08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Most members of the public don’t really know what is going on ‘out there’</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 A good police official takes nothing at face value</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 To be a police official is not just another job it is a ‘higher calling’</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police culture theme of isolation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 I tend to socialise less with my friends outside of the police since I have become a police official</td>
<td>09%</td>
<td>09%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 I prefer socialising with my colleagues to socialising with non-members</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 I don’t really talk in-depth to people outside of the SAPS about my work</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Being a police official made me realise how uncooperative and non-supportive the courts are</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 My husband/wife, boyfriend/girlfriend tends not to understand what being a police official is all about</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>08%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Shift work and special duties influence my socialising with friends outside the SAPS</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>01%</td>
<td>00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 I feel like I belong with my work colleagues more every day, and less with people that I have to police</td>
<td>09%</td>
<td>09%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>01%</td>
<td>00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 As a police official, I am being watched critically by members of the community, even in my social life</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 I can be more open with my work colleagues than with members of the public</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>02%</td>
<td>03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Generals do not really know what is happening at grass roots level</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>03%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police culture theme of cynicism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Most people lie when answering questions posed by police officials</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Most people do not hesitate to go out of their way to help someone in trouble</td>
<td>02%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Most people are untrustworthy and dishonest</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>02%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>02%</td>
<td>00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Most people would steal if they knew they would not get caught</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>01%</td>
<td>02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Most people respect the authority of police officials</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>07%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Most people lack the proper level of respect for police officials</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>07%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Police officials will never trust members of the community enough to work together effectively</td>
<td>08%</td>
<td>02%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Most members of the community are open to the opinions and suggestions of police officials</td>
<td>05%</td>
<td>03%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Members of the community will not trust police oficals enough to work together effectively</td>
<td>07%</td>
<td>03%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>00%</td>
<td>00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 The community does not support the police and the police do not trust the public</td>
<td>09%</td>
<td>05%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>01%</td>
<td>00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
unsatisfactory monetary compensation, cockeyed criticism and ill-considered prescriptions. These police officials isolate themselves from outsiders (erstwhile friends, family members/important others, community, courts, and top ranking officials), and favour mingling with their fellows. They deem that most folks lie when replying to questions tendered by police officials, would thieve if they knew they would not get netted, are untrustworthy and dishonest, not perturbed by the help cries of others, dearth the decorous quantity of veneration for police officials, and are obtruded to the sentiments and promptings of police officials. Female trainees and their ensuing conversion to fully-fledged police officials had mostly stronger values exhibiting police culture solidarity, police culture isolation and police culture cynicism, compared to their male counterparts.

Non-probability qualitative studies (Prokos & Padavic, 2002) seem to suggest that in some instances women are treated as outsiders in the police organisation due to pervasive hegemonic masculine values (amongst others gendered language in both the internal and external operational environments, exaggeration of gender differences and exclusion from male bonding activities, together with resisting the authority of powerful women in the service). In comparison to their male counterparts, this gendered isolation may therefore present with a double-burden of isolation namely, isolation from broader society but also isolation in the internal organisational environment.

CONCLUSION

The article began with a number of aspects derived from the literature on police culture. Distinctly the research asked, “Has the introduction of more women police officials in the SAPS [by the organisation] assisted in counteracting police culture traits that traditionally accentuate the cynicism of and isolation from the public?” More specifically the study asked, “Are there signs demonstrating attitudes of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism amongst a sample of SAPS police officials?” If so, “Are these markers gender neutral as well as change in relation to Van Maanen’s (1975) and Manning’s (1989) stages of police culture socialisation: [1] choice-at the start of basic police training (January 2005); [2] admittance-at the end of ‘college’ training (June 2005); [3] encounter-at the end of ‘field’ training (December 2005), and [4] metamorphosis-nine (9) years after concluding basic police training?” (June 2014).

The study acknowledges that there are a myriad of other items that could have been employed to measure police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism but this should not be taken, in and of itself, as a limitation. All choices of measures are ultimately approximations of the true construct. The study does not assume a direct correlation between attitude and overt behaviour nor draw conclusions about the SAPS as a whole.

Based on the data analyses and results this report concludes that the representative sample of all SAPS police officials that commenced their basic training in January 2005 (Van Maanen’s [1975] and Manning’s [1989] choice-stage of police culture socialisation), irrespective of gender, arrived for basic training with predispositions in support of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism. These sentiments were either maintained or strengthened during academy training (Van Maanen’s [1975] and Manning’s [1989] admittance-stage of police culture socialisation) as well as field training (Van Maanen’s [1975] and Manning’s
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[1989] encounter-stage of police culture socialisation). A further nine years of operational police experience (Van Maanen’s [1975] and Manning’s [1989] metamorphosis-stage of police culture socialisation), moreover did not accomplish much to dissuade these viewpoints but rather fortified and reinforced. Thus the study argues that the introduction of more women police officials in the SAPS has not assisted much in counteracting police culture traits that traditionally accentuate the cynicism of and isolation from the public. On the contrary, as was indicated by Westmarland (2012), Brogdn and Shearing (1993), Heidensohn (1992), Sutton (1992), and Young (1991); women recruited into the police organisation (SAPS) become ‘defeminised’ into police-women. What is startling though is the stouter police culture solidarity, isolation and cynicism attitudes of female police officials from the outset as well as profounder amplification thereof, equated to their male colleagues. These findings provide some credence for a ‘nurtured nature’ understanding of the acquirement, preservation and firming of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism postures of police officials. The premise being police establishments recruit individuals (regardless of gender) with personality traits, values, and attitudes in support of the organisation’s culture and that these predispositions are cyclically fortified and reinforced by policing culture. The study contradicts contemporary ethnographers (Cockcroft 2013; O’Neill, Marks & Singh 2007; Sklansky 2005) who fashionably argue that conventional characterisations of police culture are antiquated, illogical and useless due to new developments in policing.

The study findings could appear reformist and condemnatory by virtue of envisioned contradiction, however the intention is explanatory. Police culture solidarity, isolation and cynicism are viewed as conscious/normal coping strategies (or coping police culture themes) utilised by police officials (male or female) to minimise physical and psychological harm. These coping police culture themes should be embraced rather than defied.

NOTES

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BIBLIOGRAPHY


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Strategies for evaluating training and development initiatives in a public sector setting

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Botswana

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University of Johannesburg
South Africa

ABSTRACT

The main aim of this article is to propose possible strategies to improve training and development initiatives in the public sector. To address this aim, two objectives were pursued. Firstly the article outlined critical variables that influence training and development. Secondly, the article provides guidelines for the evaluation of training and development to strengthen identified critical organisational success factors and, to contribute to improved performance management in the public sector. These critical organisational success factors include, the creation of a culture that enhances high performance; developing performance leadership; creating a learning organisation and the alignment of individual, team and organisational goals. In order to reinforce the above critical organisational success factors, a 10 phase strategy was proposed, to assist with the evaluation of training and development. The outlined 10 phase strategy for the evaluation of training and development initiatives may serve as a guideline for organisations that want to pro-actively manage training and development, along with aiding in constructively evaluating training and development initiatives.

INTRODUCTION

This article aims to contextualise the variables influencing the evaluation of training and development in the public sector. Training and development is discussed in this article as an essential element of a performance management system (PMS) and human resource development. Therefore, before strategies for evaluating training and development can
be provided, it is necessary to review important factors that link the PMS to training and development. The article thus firstly provides a review of critical success factors for improved training and development, including:

- An organisational culture that enhance high performance.
- Developing performance leadership.
- Creating a learning organisation.
- The alignment of individual, team and organisational goals (Tshukudu 2009:132).

Secondly, the article offers suggestions for evaluating training and development and proposes a 10 phase strategy to assist with the evaluation of training and development initiatives or programmes.

The research process for the purposes of this article entails a desktop conceptual analysis by way of literature review. To provide a theoretical underpinning for the analysis, the issues that are addressed are “…conceptualization, specification of variables… and the operationalization or implementation of those variables” (Auriacombe 2006:631). For Babbie and Mouton (2005 in Auriacombe 2006:632) conceptualisation refers to, “the process of specifying the vague and mental imagery of our concepts, sorting out the kinds of observations and measurements that will be appropriate for our research”. According to Auriacombe (2006:632), “at this level, one moves from the language of concepts to specifying different variables…a variable is a descriptive or analytical attribute that can take on different or varying values under different conditions…”.

**VARIABLES INFLUENCING TRAINING, DEVELOPMENT AND THE EVALUATION OF TRAINING PROGRAMMES**

All managers and supervisors should provide training and development for their subordinates. Training develops, cultivates and progresses people, it improves performance, and raises morale. Training and developing individuals ameliorates their health; enhances their outlook; enriches their performance and organisational ability; and raises the productivity levels of the organisation. All managers and supervisors should provide training and development for their subordinates. Ethics and behaviour also set the moral code, principles and standard of a trained workforce, which determine how productively they utilise their skills, competencies and knowledge. Training is ineffective, useless and futile if the motivation to apply it effectively is non-existent or lacklustre. A strong capacity to plan and manage skills training, the acquisition of knowledge, along with the development of motivation and correct attitudes, largely determines the level or degree of efficiency and effectiveness of individuals when performing their job tasks.

Chepkilot (2005:85) argue that the need for training has been necessitated by technological advances; organisational changes; and the realisation that organisational success is dependent on the workforce’s skills, competencies, and abilities. This has been accentuated by the progressive status and increase of human resources management with its emphasis on the importance of people and the skills they possess for enhancing organisational performance.

Somolekae (2010:42) identifies several elements which consequently may affect the evaluation of training, which include: insufficient budgetary allocation; insufficient time
being allotted; a lack of capacity and expertise; and a general, gratuitous and unsubstantiated acceptance of the status quo, a lack of confidence, faith and trust in training solutions. This may be attributed in part to the complexity of the task of evaluating training and development interventions. Evaluating training interventions, with regard to learning, transfer and organisational impact, involves numerous complicated and intricate variables. These variables are associated with the influence of the dynamic and continuous interactions of various dimensions, for instance the organisational culture; training goals; trainees; training situations; and instructional technologies.

Goldstein and Ford (2001:2) observe that training and development programmes promote business opportunities vis-a-vis the effort and money expended. In addition, Foxon and Lybrand (2005:77) assert that ample evidence confirms that evaluation continues to be a primary issue with which the training fraternity contends. Similarly, Marsden (2005:43) reveals that training managers have given evaluation a low priority within the instructional process. However, with the current economic environment and with the requirement of obligatory training, training managers have to reassess and undertake difficult economic decisions relating to the viability and value of the training programmes they offer. Numerous practitioners consider evaluation as a problem rather than a solution, and an end rather than a means. Marsden (2005:44) contends that when an evaluation of training is undertaken, it is often hasty and of limited scope. It can be oppressed or engulfed by quantitative measurement techniques, and may not be provided with an adequate budget and/or time.

Establishing a performance culture

Managing performance is an essential component in ensuring the appropriate and correct delivery of services by the public sector. Performance is measured in terms of value for money principles, viz. economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (Roos 2009:10). Hence, various organisational factors are critical for effective performance management. Performance management cannot be separated from the organisational culture, as this ethos influences and directs the behaviour of employees (Kreitner & Kinicki 1998:75). This denotes that particular consideration is required towards establishing a culture that is supportive of the attainment of excellence within an organisation. The overall leadership within an entity impacts the manner in which performance management will be utilised to accomplish the organisational objectives and fulfil its raison d’être. Viedge (2003:88) contends that learning may be the only factor that ensures continuous, sustainable future performance, subsequently allowing organisations a competitive edge. The PMS should, therefore, emphasise learning as an additional organisational goal. Finally, the alignment of individual goals with the strategic organisational objectives is imperative (Viedge 2003:76).

The aim of performance management is to ensure that organisational objectives are accomplished through the systematic supervision of employee performance. If the organisational culture does not support performance, a PMS will fail, no matter how meticulously and scientifically it is designed and implemented. Performance management cannot be detached from the organisational culture, as these principles and values of a PMS guide the behaviour of employees; facilitate increased commitment to the entity’s goals and objectives and serves as a framework for personnel when they have to make decisions and solve problems or issues (Kreitner & Kinicki 1998:75). Similarly, McNamara (2004:1) asserts
that the organisational ethos is the fundamental factor towards ensuring organisational excellence, along with the creation and management of a performance culture.

The culture of an organisation indicates to employees which behaviours are acceptable, along with those which will be punished or rewarded. This infers that establishing a philosophy supportive of the attainment of excellence within an organisation ensures enhanced performance and establishes a type of culture that is most conducive to elevated performance. Organisational culture is defined by Purcell (2005:65) as a system of shared values and beliefs of appropriate behaviour of the members of the organisation. McNamara (2004:1) defines organisational culture as the personality of the entity, contending that it consists of assumptions, values, norms and tangible signs or artefacts, which influence the behaviour of its personnel. Organisational culture is the innate structure of the establishment, constituting the entrenched collective values, principles, beliefs and assumptions of its human elements. Therefore, the management of performance will be more effective and enhanced in an organisation wherein performance and the contribution of individuals and teams are valued.

Kreitner and Kinicki (1998:75) identify three types of culture, viz. constructive; passive-defensive; and aggressive culture. A constructive culture comprises one in which employees are encouraged to interact with others and to work on tasks and projects in a manner that will satisfy their requirements for growth and development. In an organisation with a constructive culture, the organisation values members who set and accomplish their goals, as well as respects and values creativity, quality and individual growth (Kreitner & Kinicki, 1998:77). An aggressive-passive culture is one that is pushing organisational change through regardless of the consequences whilst a passive-defensive culture is premised on resistance, i.e. employees are resistant to change, reaching consensus is easy but action that ensures successful implementation is void. Under this type of culture, decision-making processes are murky and following them through is weak. On the other hand a passive-defensive culture is one that predominantly protects the status quo and leaders have every reason to remain unmoved and comfortable with minimal or no change at all (Martin & Fellenz 2010).

Dobson (2001:11) maintains that a good performance culture is created by establishing an environment where performance and accountability thrive. Within a good performance culture, individuals and teams are:

- Motivated to proactively fulfil their responsibilities.
- Stimulated to achieve superior outcomes.
- Inspired to communicate progress and conclusions.
- Willing to accept responsibility for results.

Robbins (1998:528) adds that the organisational culture influences employees' behaviour and a constructive culture reduces formalisation and creates a common understanding as to how staff efforts are recognised and rewarded. Robbins (1998:528) asserts that an individual who receives a job offer, is appraised as a superior performer, who consequently gets promoted and is strongly influenced by a positive reciprocal individual-organisation match fit. This signifies that the applicant's or employee's attitude and behaviour are compatible with the organisational culture. Culture enhances organisational commitment, increases the consistency of employee behaviour, and is valuable as it reduces ambiguity. It informs employees of the manner in which tasks are conducted and key performance areas
are achieved in terms of the importance of the priorities of the organisation. A vision is a representation of what the organisation wants to be in the future (Price 2004:589).

A mission is an explanation of why the entity exists or its raison d'ètre. Values are the principles, tenets and beliefs on which the business is founded, which determine personnel behaviour and business relationships (Price 2004:589). Purcell (2005:67) notes that successful organisations have strong values and strong guiding visions that communicate appropriate behaviour and conduct. The principles, ideals and standards are shared throughout the organisation and are reflected in the everyday actions of employees, individually and collectively. Organisational culture and values are fundamental and essential sources of a competitive advantage for the organisation. They provide a connexion between the manner in which people are managed and the overall performance of the organisation. The foregoing discussion illustrates that organisational culture influences performance management, as the organisational ethos and tenets motivate and determine individual and managerial behaviour, in adherence to a sound approach employed for the control and handling of performance. A constructive culture emphasises development and growth, which is the intention of an effective performance management process.

Developing performance leadership

This section presents a discussion of the importance of leadership for the effective management of performance within the organisation.

Effective and appropriate leadership contributes to the establishment of an improved and elevated performance culture (Dobson 2001:11). Leaders influence employees through their positions of authority, and employees are acute observers of the manner in which these superiors conduct themselves and frequently emulate them, in word and deed. Instituting a performance culture requires commitment and support for the process from the senior personnel, achieved through goal setting. Purcell (2005:68) emphasises that the behaviour of managers, who are responsible for performance management, contributes to the establishment of an enhanced performance culture within the organisation. Daft and Marcic (1998:420) contend that leadership plays a significant role in the development and implementation of performance management system within an organisation. These authors define leadership as the ability to influence people toward the achievement of goals.

A leader is also someone who sets a course, in an effort to influence people to follow that route. How leaders influence and set their direction depends on the organisational culture. Effective managers do not only give orders and discipline staff, but rather extract the best from their subordinates through encouragement, support and personal charisma (Price 2004:18). Considering the performance management process, the manager, as a leader, has various tasks to fulfil therein. Uphill and Riordan (2005:56) identify five major tasks that the leader is required to execute in the performance management process, which are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1 illustrates the critical role of leaders in performance management; with the aforementioned tasks defining the role the leader plays therein (Uphill and Riordan 2005:56). Firstly, the role of leadership is to require, evaluate and develop the competencies of team members to maximise their performance and to create a sustainable culture of continuous learning. Secondly, leadership is aimed at communicating results. This is achieved by the
reciprocal transference of information, ideas, understanding or feelings between individuals and groups. Leaders effectively relay information, concepts or ideas to others. Moreover, leaders utilise appropriate skills to establish performance expectations, which combine the requirements of the job and the needs of the individual, vis-a-vis opportunities, challenges and growth. Furthermore, leaders are responsible for monitoring performance against agreed expectations to obtain information to be used for recognising achievement; providing feedback; the development of strategies to resolve problems; and identifying coaching opportunities. The last element comprises leaders conducting formal discussions with teams and individuals, in conjunction with periodically reviewing employee performance, through monitoring and performance feedback.

The principal aim of performance management is to improve performance by coaching, supporting and developing employees. The requisite for coaching arises from formal and informal performance reviews. Every time a manager delegates a new task to someone, a coaching opportunity is created to assist the individual to learn any new skills or techniques requisite for its undertaking (Armstrong and Baron 1998:43). Coaching is based on performance expectations from the manager; therefore, managers and employees must be precise and clear in comprehending performance standards and objectives from the start. Supervisors should provide positive feedback when the employee performed well, in addition to indicating areas for improvement. People are more likely to advance and develop their performance and skills if they feel empowered by their leader (Armstrong and Baron 1998:43). When staff are convinced that managers care about their performance and individual development, they will buy into organisational leadership. This buy-in is important for the future development of the organisation and its competitive edge (Daft & Marcic 1998:12). During the performance review, recognition of achievements and development of plans to resolve the existing problems have to be addressed.

Leaders should assist individuals or teams in their development as they strive towards achieving agreed-upon outcomes. This involves offering guidance and direction and working

![Figure 1: Leadership roles in performance management](image-url)
with others to achieve objectives. Leaders should utilise communication skills to relate to subordinates (Uphill & Riordan 2005). The leadership approach and methods undertaken within an organisation determine how performance management will be utilised to achieve strategic goals. Both culture and leadership determine the rate at which the organisation learns, grows and develops. Leadership is an upper tier management function and is primarily concerned with motivating people to achieve objectives, together with establishing and maintaining a conducive and enabling environment facilitating or driving them to achieve certain goals (Ile, Eresia Eke & Allen-Ille 2012:75–76).

Creating a learning organisation

It is an aim of performance management to improve the performance of individuals, teams and departments. Learning is essential for future performance and should, therefore, be incorporated into the performance management process. To promote learning within the organisation, it is essential that a learning organisation culture is created. The emphasis in a learning organisation is on the entity becoming more intelligent and being able to deal with the constantly fluctuating environment, capturing the collective intelligence, experience and capacities within (Viedge 2003:82). In order to facilitate this, the individuals within the entity should continuously learn and reciprocally share information, knowledge and lessons learnt with their colleagues, subordinates and superiors. Performance is contingent on, and has a nexus with learning, thus making it indispensable for the achievement of effective functioning and consequently it is imperative that organisations create a learning environment via the PMS. Viedge (2003:83) and Windsor (2001:56) affirm that learning is the sole factor that continuously provides organisations with a competitive advantage. This denotes that it is a requisite that the PMS accentuates learning as an additional organisational objective. Essentially, current performance is a consequence of prior learning (Windsor 2001:56).

Price (2004:585) defines learning as the permanent change of behaviour as a result of past experience. Learning comprises a great deal more than merely acquiring knowledge. It encompasses the discarding or replacing of outmoded values and techniques in favour of new ones. It implies that the workforce within an organisation collectively alter their perspectives of the entity and its market. Farago and Skyrme (2004:54) categorise organisational learning as learning which continuously transforms the organisation. These experts continue, contending that although training does help to develop certain types of skills, learning involves the development of higher levels of knowledge, capabilities and aptitudes for the benefit of the organisation. Farago and Skyrme (2004:61) identify four levels of learning, which progressively indicate greater complexity and depth, and illustrate the type of learning required to sustain future competitiveness:

- **Level 1** - comprises the learning of facts, knowledge, processes and procedures. These apply to known situations where changes are minor.
- **Level 2** - involves learning new job skills that are transferable to other situations. This learning applies to new situations where existing responses need to be altered, and entails bringing in external expertise.
- **Level 3** - constitutes learning to adapt. This applies to more dynamic situations where a solution needs development and encompasses experimentation and deriving lessons from prior success and failure.
Level 4 concerns learning to learn, which refers to innovation and creativity; essentially, designing the future rather than merely adapting to it. This is where assumptions are challenged and knowledge reshaped.

Price (2004:43), Doherty and Horne (2002:122) and Farago and Skyrmer (1995:43) concur, maintaining that, for an organisation to be a learning organisation, it must have the following characteristics:

- The formulation of organisational policy and strategy is structured according to a learning process.
- Extensive and widespread participation and identification in the delineation, debating and formulating of policy and strategy.
- Management systems for accounting, budgeting and reporting are organised towards the assistance and facilitation of learning.
- Information systems are instructive, edifying and automated.
- Information on expectations and feedback is reciprocally exchanged by individuals and work units at all levels to assist learning.
- Employees with external links, for example sales representatives, convey information to other staff members.
- Encouragement, openness and the liberty to share information and acquire knowledge.
- An organisational culture and management style that encourages experimentation and learning.
- Everyone has access to the resources and facilities for self-development.

Aligning individual goals with strategic organisational goals

The importance of aligning individual, departmental and organisational goals is significant. For the organisation to remain competitive, the organisational culture, leadership and learning opportunities should be aimed at improving performance and achieving organisational objectives. Hodge, Anthony & Gales (2003:64) maintain that organisational strategies are a means to an end; once chartered, the manager is responsible for converting the strategic plans into organisational, departmental and individual objectives. The word ‘converting’ here implies that alignment is required. Hodge et al. (2003:64) assert that, in a perfectly rational world, the diverse goals of an organisation might be difficult to manage. The conversion of organisational goals into departmental and individual targets therefore requires careful consideration and planning. These authors (Hodge et al. 2003:64) maintain that the management of objectives involves the cascading and alignment of goals to the lowest level in the organisation, which denotes organisational, departmental, and then, individual levels. This streaming, affiliation, configuring and orientation of objectives constitutes an internal administrative activity, involving the succeeding elements:

- Planning resource provision and distribution.
- Identifying the key tasks to be carried out.
- Identifying the alterations and adaptations required in the resource mix of the organisation.
- Setting deadlines.
- Assigning staff to manage their performance.
• Specifying the role of the different departments.
• Stipulating the individuals’ roles within their departments (Buys 2000:22).

The preceding aspects notable relate to performance management, regarding the clarification of expectations; goal setting; and the facilitation of performance. Strategic goals need to be cascaded throughout all levels of the organisation. Aguilar (2003:91) states that organisational effectiveness is dependent on the alignment of individual, departmental and organisational strategic goals. The primary focus of performance management is to ensure that daily task execution is aligned with organisational strategy. Furthermore, Aguilar (2003:41) explains that performance management assists organisations in resolving certain questions, for instance:

- Is the organisation working on the correct issues, tasks and factors to achieve its goals?
- Is management’s manner of making decisions compatible with the strategic plan of the organisation?
- Which conflicting tasks should be emphasised, reviewed and addressed?
- How can the organisation leverage employee experience?

Performance management may be perceived as a stratagem or tactic to implement organisational strategic goals. The alignment of employee, departmental and organisational activities to the organisational strategy is crucial. An alignment is a condition wherein each employee at every level understands the strategy and their role in accomplishing it. The manager’s role is to ensure that the requisite alignment is created (Aguilar 2003:93). Managers must aid employees in comprehending the organisational strategy, in conjunction with how their jobs contribute thereto. They must create a situation wherein even the lowest ranking employee can articulate the tactical goals of the organisation and explain how their contribution fits into the overall strategic objective.

Armstrong (1999:442) affirms that an alignment of strategic goals is relative to achieving a collective and communal understanding of performance requirements throughout the entity, thus providing the entire workforce with the opportunity to make appropriate contributions toward the accomplishment of the organisational tactical objectives. The strategic plan of each business unit should be clearly expressed and communicated, in a manner that steers, drives and guides the organisation in the correct direction, in terms of the short- and long-operational key performance areas (Dobson 2001:9). Performance management assists organisations in aligning organisational units, operational processes and individuals with the predefined tactical goals and objectives, generated by a common strategy (Dobson 2001:11).

**EVALUATION OF TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES**

This section provides a strategy to evaluate training and development based on the above critical organisational success factors. Evaluation of training and development does not occur as a separate or detached undertaking, but is influenced by various critical organisational success factors. These include creating a culture; developing leadership; performance management; and the creation of a learning organisation. Several, diverse organisational factors are essential to the effective evaluation of training and development initiatives. Evaluation of training and development cannot be separated from the organisational culture,
as this culture directs the behaviour of the workforce. This implies that careful consideration must be given to establishing a culture that is supportive of training and development and the attainment of enhanced performance (Tshukudu 2009:144).

This section proposes a 10 phase strategy (see Figure 2) for the assessment and evaluation of training and development and outlines the proposed 10 phases for evaluating training and development.

**Phase 1: Identify training needs**

The initial strategy to evaluate training and development comprises the identification of training needs and priorities. The identification of training needs and priorities is a critical step in the

**Figure 2: Strategy for evaluating training and development initiatives**

![Strategic Framework for Evaluating Training and Development Initiatives](source)

Source: (Tshukudu 2009)
evaluation process, and provides the information necessary to design the entire training and development programme. Numerous programmes are predestined to fail, because the trainers place more emphasis on conducting the training programme than firstly, to identify training needs. Training needs should be identified, at both an individual and organisational level. If training and development are to remedy poor performance, there is a requisite that the organisation determines its training needs prior to initiating anything else in the training evaluation process. The first stage involves training managers ascertaining the correct and proper organisational requirements. Identification of organisational needs will assist the trainer in designing and developing a relevant, effective training and development initiative, which will greatly contribute to addressing organisational performance issues. The second step in identifying training needs is for the training manager to specify employee performance. Employees have to understand what their jobs entail, in consort with the link between training and their individual performance. The involvement of employees in the identifying of training needs is of paramount importance (Tshukudu 2009:78). Figure 2 illustrates 10 systematic phases in evaluating training and development.

The training department or unit, in conjunction with line managers, should address individual employees’ training needs through a formal performance appraisal of each employee; however the assessment information may be out-dated if it is generated from an appraisal or performance management review conducted on an annual basis. A bi-annual review should be undertaken by line managers and supervisors to appraise employee performance and it should consider essential feedback between the supervisor/manager and the employee’s performance process. This process will contribute to and facilitate the data realistically impacting on training and development, especially when it comes to aiding the trainer in identifying and ascertaining employee training needs. While conducting these evaluations, the trainer and line manager should be able to assess the actual skills, capacities and competencies of an individual, as well as to detect, distinguish and categorise issues that hinder effective performance. Training and development is intended to improve and advance individual employee performance, therefore, the training manager must establish precise, representative, unbiased and realistic personnel training requirements, while ensuring that employee performance management is critical and significant (Tshukudu 2009:88). The primary responsibilities, tasks and functions the trainers should adhere to are:

- Specifying the critical performance areas of personnel.
- Examining and comprehending both the short-term and strategic organisational goals, in consort with the entity’s raison d’être.
- Evaluating current trends, along with an awareness of changes due to the local and global environs and transformations therein, as to whether they are likely to affect the tactical organisational objectives.
- Identifying any deficiencies in the knowledge, competencies and skills of the trainees, measured against individual employee job requirements.
- Prioritising training requirements according to their connexion to, and alignment with, the strategic organisational goals (Tshukudu 2009:88).

Phase 2: Strategically plan for training

The second stage concerns strategic planning for training and development to facilitate an effective evaluation process. If strategic planning is not correctly conducted, there is
a probability that the instruction will be *ad hoc* and uncoordinated. This underscores the import, magnitude and significance of training and development, which should be accorded serious consideration and attention, to ensure and expedite the realisation of the entity's strategic organisational goals and objectives. For training, as a component of the strategic business plan, to engender the anticipated, requisite alterations and transformations in personnel behaviour and performance, necessitates that it be carefully designed, planned and considered from its inception. Planning for a training programme is a crucial, fundamental step in the education and learning process, which requires training managers and trainers to completely comprehend its consequences, and be cognisant of the function of training, and its connotations, in achieving strategic organisational goals (Tshukudu 2009:98).

The training manager and trainer must ensure that all training department members:

- Are aware of the strategic direction of the organisation.
- Understand the overall business strategic goals, along with those of their departments, when planning for training and development.
- Ensure that all stakeholders contribute and participate in the planning stage (Tshukudu 2009:98).

**Phase 3: Establish training objectives**

Subsequent to the completion of planning, the succeeding phase entails the trainer establishing the training and development objectives. These training and development objectives provide a framework and steer the relevance and direction of the education and learning process and are directly linked to individual trainee foci and aims, together with the overall strategic goals of the organisation. This connexion is important, from the perspective that training should be aimed at a particular achievement, which accentuates the need for the delineation and classification of training objectives. These should concisely, unambiguously and precisely demarcate, describe and define the intended achievements and outcomes of the process, envisioned by the organisation or the trainer.

It is necessary that these training objectives are measurable, assessable, observable or determinate, as they form the basis of training standards, as well as the evaluation of training and development. Trainers must make certain that the training objectives are specific in demarcating and distinguishing the terminal behaviours trainees should display on completion of the programme, as well as ensuring that each objective describes a specific behavioural action. The objective must indicate the standard of performance required, expressed in terms of numbers, degree and accuracy. Having indicated the required performance standard, it is imperative that the trainer confirms that the individual trainee is aware of these standards from the outset, in conjunction with how their individual capabilities may be developed to achieve them (Tshukudu 2009:100).

**Phase 4: Design of the training programme**

This step pertains to the design and development of the training programme, for which the extent and volume of learning which must be absorbed to produce new behaviours is considered and utilised. An effective training programme can fundamentally change an employee’s efficacy, efficiency and productivity at work. When designing a training
programme, all stakeholders must be considered and involved by the training managers and trainers which, through the consultation and interrogation of all associated entities, result in the realisation of a collaborative training design. This engagement and alliance with all individuals who have the greatest potential to be affected by the outcomes, increases the prospect and possibility that trainers will be able to achieve their intended results.

There is a need for the trainer to interrelate to all the parties in a reciprocal dialogue process, to establish and select the most apposite training methods for the proposed programme. Subsequent to this, training methods may then be categorised as on-the-job or off-the-job, as well as allowing the assessment and adoption of the type of techniques required. The selection of training techniques must be attributed detailed attention, in consort with the application of learning principles, which ensure effective evaluation. These techniques may be categorised into two brackets, viz. experientially oriented methods, which include role play, case studies, and group discussions; and didactic procedures, which involve lectures and presentations (Tshukudu 2009:100).

When designing a training programme a trainer needs to consider the following factors:

- Who the learner(s) is or are.
- What the purpose of the training is.
- Who the training is for.
- Who is undertaking the training.

In addition to the preceding questions, the trainer needs to be able to identify learner entry behaviour, which encompasses a wide variety of different issues, inclusive of previous experience, experience on the job, and experience in the organisation. Having considered the elements pertaining to the learner, the trainer determines the learning objectives. A behavioural approach is deemed as a suitable, beneficial learning method, allowing a trainer to focus on performance improvement, which brings the statement and delineation of an objective to the fore. This describes a desired outcome, action or skill, which the education will allow an employee to evince, achieve or improve, is something they can demonstrate and which can be observed and measured (Tshukudu 2009:101).

Phase 5: Scheduling the programme

Subsequent to identifying the training needs, establishing the training and development objectives and planning and designing the programme, the trainer is required to schedule the training programme. In scheduling the programme the trainer must consider the following questions:

- Are there possible seasonal fluctuations or peak production periods which would make it difficult for the trainees to be released to attend the programme?
- Is it better to run the course for a period of one week, over five continuous days or should it be run one day a week, over a period of five weeks?
- Should the programme be run during or outside working hours?

It is crucial that the trainer assesses employee time constraints and business environmental/economic factors. It is essential that training is not organised during peak production periods, when there are high demands for on potential trainees. Ideally, from the standpoint
of learning and attitude alteration, the programme should be conducted during non-peak production periods and over a number of consecutive days. The optimal process involves the potential trainees being released from their normal duties, which would allow them to devote their time and attention to the programme (Tshukudu 2009:102).

**Phase 6: Presenting the programme**

Presenting a training programme is the culmination of all the preceding activities of the training design process. In order to ensure an efficient presentation of the programme, the trainer must make provision for a wide variety of learning experiences and apply specific guidelines and principles. Comprehensive and rigorous planning is a prerequisite for good presentation. During the planning, the trainer must ensure that the content of the programme corresponds with the expected learning outcomes and that it fulfils the requirements of the target group. Once this planning and design has been accomplished the trainer is in a position to present the programme. The trainer needs to ensure that the correct learning climate is created at the commencement of the programme. The trainer may consider using pre- and post-tests to assist in the evaluation of trainees, as well as making certain that the trainees are aware of the anticipated, projected results. The communication of the envisaged outcomes may influence their attainment and must precisely inform the learners of what type of behaviour is required for successful realisation of the expected effects. Additional aspects a trainer must take into account include learners’ attitudes; previous experience and knowledge levels; and the expected outcomes in this regard. Unnecessary or superfluous details, issues or elements must be omitted, exclusively incorporating the learning material required for realising the desired outcomes (Tshukudu 2009:102).

**Phase 7: Transferring and implementing the programme**

A training programme cannot be considered complete and successful if the trainee does not transfer and implement the appropriate knowledge, skills and attitudes, as required outcomes of the training programme, into their work situation. There is a necessity for the trainer to facilitate the outcomes of the course through the training process. It is evident that it is pointless to delay planning of the implementation of the outcomes of the training until after the training programme has been conducted. Although this transfer and implementation of the specific training programme presents multiple challenges and issues, it is imperative that the trainer ensures that it occurs (Tshukudu 2009:112).

**Phase 8: Maintenance of training**

The immediate transfer and implementation of the appropriate knowledge, skills and attitudes into the work situation does not confirm or safeguard that the trainee will continue to utilise them in the long-term. This denotes that the trainer has a critical responsibility in the maintenance process of the training. The supervisor should continuously support the trainee through re-enforcement and reward, in conjunction with the elimination of any forces in the work environment which negate or combat the transfer and maintenance of training (Tshukudu 2009:113).
Phase 9: Evaluating training

The evaluation of training and development entails reviewing in what manner the training has been conducted, in order to determine whether apposite guidelines for the implementation of an effective training programme were utilised. The trainer must be able to answer the following questions to establish the extent to which these guidelines have been adhered to:

- Were needs diagnosed?
- Was there a knowledge or skill deficiency?
- Were the needs organisationally significant?
- Were the needs assigned to objectives?
- Were the organisational needs transferred and aligned to strategic organisational objectives?
- Were the prerequisite learning objectives derived from the overall training objectives?
- Were trainees assessed to determine the number of prerequisite learning objectives in which they were deficient?
- Was the evaluation system designed to measure the achievement of the objectives?
- Was the training programme designed to meet the specific learning, training and organisational objectives?

Phase 10: Evaluating change due to training and development

The trainer employs a summative evaluation to assess the final product, with greater emphasis on programme appraisal utilising the outcome criteria. The trainer must take into account the impact the training effected on the trainees attitudes, behaviour, skills and knowledge. The outcome appraisal focuses on the three-level evaluation, which considers the following facets:

- Firstly the trainer must define how satisfactory, suitable or enjoyable the trainees found the training programme.
- Secondly, as the trainers handle learning, they must determine what knowledge, attitudes and skills were learned or transferred in the training.
- The tertiary level of this approach concerns behaviour, which outlines the relationship of learning (the previous measurement levels) to the actual undertaking of the job.

It is imperative for the trainer to comprehend the difference between theoretically knowing principles and techniques, and actually employing them in a work situation.

The purpose of this article was to provide suggestions for improving and evaluating training and development. It can be concluded that evaluation is an important and integral element of successful training and development. Evaluation can be facilitated through the use of effective strategies; techniques; appropriate approaches; and through the implementation of a PMS. In addition, the fundamental processes of evaluation need to be fully understood in order to communicate the importance of evaluation to trainers and training managers. The evaluation of training and development assists managers to comprehend the transformation and changes engendered through training. The reason for evaluating training pertains to determining effectiveness at individual, team and organisational levels. Performance management is based on a participative decision-making process, wherein individual employees are able to explain their training needs, while allowing managers to incorporate individual needs into departmental training priorities; thus aligning individual development with departmental effectiveness and
efficiency. The overall principle of the evaluation of training and development initiatives is critical to the implementation and management of the learning organisation (Tshukudu 2009:224).

CONCLUSION

The success of performance management is directly reliant on its ability to guide employee behaviour towards the achievement of strategic goals. Organisational culture plays a critical role in the development and implementation of performance management, as it shapes employee behaviour according to the norms and values of the organisation. Leaders should influence subordinates to accept a performance culture and assist them in adopting the correct behaviour to achieve goals. Learning is essential for future performance, as it empowers employees with the ability to solve problems in a creative and innovative manner. Learning should therefore, be incorporated into the strategic organisational objectives. Training should take place in an environment where learning is encouraged, and at the same time, performance is effectively managed. The alignment of organisational strategic goals with those of departments, teams and individuals is essential for creating a high performing organisation.

A purpose of this article was also to provide suggestions for improving and evaluating training and development. It can be concluded that evaluation is an important and integral element of successful training and development. Evaluation can be facilitated through the use of effective strategies; techniques; appropriate approaches; and through the implementation of a PMS. In addition, the fundamental processes of evaluation need to be fully understood in order to communicate the importance of evaluation to trainers and training managers. The evaluation of training and development assists managers to comprehend the transformation and changes engendered through training. The reason for evaluating training pertains to determining effectiveness at individual, team and organisational levels. Performance management is based on a participative decision-making process, wherein individual employees are able to explain their training needs, while allowing managers to incorporate individual needs into departmental training priorities; thus aligning individual development with departmental effectiveness and efficiency. The overall principle of the evaluation of training and development initiatives is critical to the implementation and management of the learning organisation (Tshukudu 2009:224).

This article concluded with a classification and discussion of a 10 phase strategy for the assessment and evaluation of training and development, including: identifying training needs; strategically planning for training; establishing training objectives; designing the training programme, scheduling the training programme; presenting the programme; ensuring the transfer and implementation of the programme; maintaining the training; monitoring and evaluation of the training and development, learning from the training; and assessing the changes and improvement in performance attributable to the training and development course.

NOTE

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Gender dynamics in Public Policy Management in Uganda and South Africa

A comparative perspective of gender mainstreaming in policy making for the water sector

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, governments in Africa have been under increasing pressure to demonstrate their relevance as citizens demand delivery of better public services. To respond to the numerous calls for efficiency improvements in service delivery, governments design and implement a number of public policies that address service delivery problems. The question of how gender dynamics is used to shape public policy management is, though, less understood and has not been subject to enough scholarly attention among policy analysts. The challenges faced by different gender categories differ and ought to be considered in public policy formulation, implementation and review. While a significant amount of scholarly work has been directed at the broad subject of gender in Africa, there remains a dearth of research on gender dynamics specifically relating to public policy management. Also, studies that take a comparative angle on the subject are not a common feature on the continent. In this article, the authors interrogate through a comparative approach the gender dynamics in the public policy management of the water sector policies in South Africa and Uganda. It addresses certain policy and management implications, aiming at bringing to the fore issues of gender as specifically applied to the subject of public policy.
INTRODUCTION

This article provides a comparative perspective of the gender dynamics in the public policy management of the water sector policies in South Africa and Uganda. Firstly, the background, rationale and methodology are clarified. Secondly, the article explains the variables influencing public policymaking and gender to contextualise gender dynamics in public policy management. Some conceptual issues on the functioning of the public sector amidst several reform endeavors are highlighted.

The article then focuses on the main area of exploration and discusses gender mainstreaming in terms of the following comparisons: the water policy legal and institutional frameworks in Uganda and South Africa, gender mainstreaming in the Ugandan water sector and gender mainstreaming in the South African water sector. The comparative overview of both countries also explores the common challenges in the management of the water sector. The article attempts to provide a classification of gender mainstreaming in policymaking processes (Gm-PMP) based on the analysis in order to finally highlight the policy implications and to make suggestions to facilitate gender mainstreaming in both countries.

BACKGROUND, RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY

Good public administration is the desire of all humanity but the responses to what constitutes good public administration in Africa, remain controversial depending on the disciplinary perspective and lens one adopts (Villela 2001:7). While several experts and academics often have commented on public policies, the perspectives adopted in such commentaries differ based on the academic lens a commentator adopts. A gender expert for example would be interested primarily in how public policy management processes take into account matters of gender through the formulation, approval, implementation and review of public policies. Gender is unquestionably relevant to all policy dimensions, but it particularly presents striking importance in the water sector because of some unique challenges faced by women especially in rural communities in both South Africa and Uganda.

The choice of water sector management for this comparative perspective and the choice of the two countries of comparison need to be put in a proper context. Uganda and South Africa are two countries at different levels of economic and political development; but which strangely share historical democratisation credentials, hence offering an important tool of comparison. Uganda is ‘less developed’ as compared to South Africa which by all means is perceived as a developed economy and one of the continent’s ‘super’ economic powers. Uganda supported the African National Congress (ANC)’ struggle in South Africa against the Apartheid regime. Uganda remains one of the major economic hubs of South Africa as most thriving businesses in Uganda, be it in the telecommunications industry, utility sector (electricity), banking and wine industry among others, have a South African descent. Both countries are driven by the market ideology but South Africa has more of an interventionist approach to public service delivery and this includes the water sector. The strong regulatory presence of government in the South African water sector is stronger than in Uganda.

Uganda and South Africa have both undergone several public sector reforms aimed at making their public service delivery systems work better. The results of these reforms
have however been different in each of the countries with South Africa demonstrating some positive progress in service delivery at least in terms of public infrastructure and the utility sectors. Uganda though has often suffered what has been variously labelled the ‘implementation policy paralysis’ which largely entails failure to implement the well intentioned policies. Uganda and South Africa have both designed water sector policies intended to address the glaring disparities among citizens regarding this important resource. Both countries therefore recognise gender as a constitutional duty in the management of public affairs by all actors of the state and the water sector is not an exception.

Arguably, a “meaningful understanding of public sector reforms in Africa can only be achieved if one captures the role of the public sector in both the developing and developed countries and how the negative consequences of its expansion led to dissatisfaction about its size and role effectiveness in the 1980s” (Dzimbiri 2008:44). Both Uganda and South Africa have had the private sector take a leading role in service delivery, including the management of the water sector. While the “public sector represented by the executive and its bureaucracy at” different levels of government “together with various statutory and parastatal bodies constitutes the key apparatus for the execution of the functions of the state” (Mhone 2003: 8), the private sector has taken center stage in public service delivery under the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) nomenclature. The work in the water sector which used to be the domain of the public sector is now either shared between the public and private sector under some partnership or such services have been entirely privatised. This is so in both Uganda and South Africa.

The focus of this contribution is to measure gender-based mainstreaming in water policies in Uganda and South Africa (countries of the SADC region) by way of a desktop analysis of comparative literature, official documents, and related editorials, to conceptualise the area of comparison. A review of the countries’ gender policies has also been done to provide a theoretical underpinning for the analysis. “The measurement issues that are addressed are conceptualisation, specification of variables and indicators, and the operationalisation or implementation of those variables” (Auriacombe 2006:631). For Babbie and Mouton (2005 in Auriacombe 2006:632) conceptualisation refers to, “the process of specifying the vague and mental imagery of our concepts, sorting out the kinds of observations and measurements that will be appropriate for our research”. According to Auriacombe (2006:632), “at this level, one moves from the language of concepts to specifying different variables and indicators… a variable is a descriptive or analytical attribute that can take on different or varying values under different conditions… [and]… and indicator is a measure that gives a concrete, measurable but indirect value to and otherwise unmeasurable, intangible concept”. There are limitations to this article and more systematic empirical research needs to be done to test the classification of the indicators that were developed for gender mainstreaming in the public policy making process linked to the management of the water sector.

CONCEPTUALISING VARIABLES INFLUENCING PUBLIC POLICYMAKING AND GENDER

To contextualise gender dynamics in public policy management, some conceptual issues on the functioning of the public sector amidst several reform endeavors need to be resolved. At the heart of this conceptual dilemma is citizen engagement, the public policymaking or
management process itself, the NPM concept and gender. Hughes (2003:44) extensively describes the background and the fundamental features of the NPM approach. He reports how the “1980s and 1990s saw the emergence of a new managerial approach in the public sector in response to what many regarded as inadequacies of the traditional model of public administration”.

Citizen engagement which has different objectives is considered the interactive “processes of deliberation among citizens and between citizens and government officials with the purpose of contributing meaningfully to specific public policy decisions in a transparent and accountable way” (Phillips and Orsini 2002:3). Various gender groups need legitimate consideration during citizen-government engagement at all levels and in all sectors. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Report (2002:11) considers public participation (including gender) as “a sound investment strategy for better policy-making and a core element of good governance. This allows government to tap new sources of policy-relevant ideas, information and resources when making decisions and it contributes to building public trust in government, raising the quality of democracy and strengthening civic capacity”. Unlike the Aristotelian participatory democracy which eliminates participation by women and slaves in decision-making, participatory democracy heavily supports their involvement at both national and sub-national levels.

A study by Michels (2011:7) reveals how citizen involvement has positive effects on democracy. One of the critical beneficiaries of scaled public participation has been the women groups in both Uganda and South Africa. The inclusion of women in public policy formulation within any sector but more so in the water sector which is the focus of this assessment can increase issue knowledge of the water sector as it affects women. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) adopted a Declaration on Gender and Development in 1997 committing to gender mainstreaming all policies and programmes at regional level. One of the most significant sectors of the SADC Plan of Action was the water sector. Similar efforts have been well documented by other declarations at an African level.

“it is not possible to define public policy in any precise way” (Hughes 2003:114). This is partly because, the term means different things to different people (Nwagboso 2012:62). The widely adopted definition by Dye (2001:1) describes public policy as basically “whatever government chooses to do or not to do”. In his view, government’s decision goes through a complex interactive process influenced by diverse socio-political and other environmental factors. It is within these processes where arguments regarding gender dynamics should take center stage.

Policy management signifies the process of policy initiation, formulation, implementation, evaluation and review (Hague and Harrop 2010:371). Shafritz, Rusell and Borick (2011:46) regard the process of policymaking as involving agenda setting, policy decision or non-decision making, the implementation of a new programme or change in an old public programme and finally criticism from citizens and formal programme evaluations. Whatever approach to understanding policy management is adopted, it needs to be clear that the divisions of these different stages of the policy process are more analytical than chronological, meaning that in the real world, they often overlap. It is also the thesis statement of the article that gender issues have to be mainstreamed at each of the policy management stages.

At the height of the New Public Management (NPM) gospel during the 1980s, the state started rolling back in both Uganda and South Africa like other “developed and developing
countries and the emphasis shifted from the state and the public sector to the private sector” (Dzimbiri 2008:45). Significant reforms including Structural Adjustment Programmes, plus a wide range of political, economic and administrative reforms were undertaken and these largely aimed at minimising the direct role of government in service delivery in favour of the private sector. Economic reforms emphasised the need for liberalisation of the economy by minimising controls, denationalisation and privatisation while accompanying political reforms, including democratisation and decentralisation with improved public participation and accountability. The role of gender itself received more attention by all actors in government as a strategy for increasing the political space of marginalised groups to fit into the framework of ‘public participation’ advanced by good governance advocates. There were also management-oriented reforms under the slogan of adopting private sector led management techniques into the running of the government apparatus. The emergence of all these created a unique policy management environment with more focus on gender mainstreaming.

“NPM is a label used to describe a management culture that emphasised the centrality of the citizen or customer, as well as accountability for results” (Hood 1991 in Dzimbiri 2009:52). NPM brought the paradigm shift from traditional public administration to new public management, hence moving the state towards market-based public sector management. Powell and De Vries (2011:99) regard NPM as an approach to administration in government that utilises market principles to improve performance and effectiveness in the delivery of government services.

Gender mainstreaming involves “taking account of gender equity concerns in all policy, programme, administrative and financial activities, and in organizational procedures, thereby contributing to a profound organizational transformation” (Morna Undated:6). As Gudhlanga, Chirimuuta and Bhukuvhani (2012:4537) point out gender is the “fairness of treatment for women and men, according to their respective needs”. Similarly, Okonkwo (2013:5580) considers gender to refer “to giving men and women equal access to economic, educational and political opportunities”. Within the context of policymaking, men and women have to be given fair treatment from the initiation of any policy, through its approval, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and review.

GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE WATER SECTOR: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952); and the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) have opened opportunities for gender-based discussions at global level. These “conventions have established a strong paradigm that women are more than capable of handling specific delegated responsibilities”. In the context of this article “this responsibility is limited to the water sector, with the rationale that women are the main consumers and the foremost stakeholders of water and water resources” (Vyas-Doorgapersad 2013:6). Women require equal participation, representation and inclusion in the policymaking process for effective water resource management. Policy reflections also support the fact that a gender-inclusive outlook to water resource management is vital for accomplishing most post-development Goals (a way forward to achieve the Millennium Development Goals),
“including not only those related to health, but also to poverty and hunger eradication, education, women’s empowerment, environmental sustainability and global partnership for development” (Eid 2009:8).

“Water resource management is incomplete without a gender perspective” (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2012:4). The implementation of these conventions is studied in Ugandan and South African scenarios assessing the role of gender in the management of the water sector. To effectively incorporate gender in water sector policy management, a legal and institutional regime is fundamental. Below is a comparative illustration of these regimes in Uganda and South Africa.

Broadly, Table 1 suggests that both countries have an elaborate legal regime through which gender dynamics in water policy management can be anchored. Both countries’ gender policies are derived from the supreme laws of the countries and efforts have been made to adopt specific gender targeted legislation. The differences may lie in the implementation challenges but significant legal groundwork for inculcating a culture of gender in policy management processes in the water sector is demonstrably robust. Some of the outstanding features of the gender dynamics debate in the water sector are described below:

### Gender mainstreaming in the Ugandan water sector

The “Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, as the country’s overall legal framework, provides for gender balance and fair representation of marginalised groups; accords equal citizenship rights, freedom from discrimination and affirmative action in favour of women;
recognises the role of women in society and articulates specific rights for women including outlawing customs, traditions and practices that undermine the welfare, dignity and interests of women” (Gender Policy 2007). Article 21 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, states “all persons are equal before the law... a person shall not be discriminated against ...”. Article 321 of the Constitution of 1995 provides for affirmative action and states “the state shall take affirmative action in favour of groups marginalised on the basis of gender”.

The National Water Policy (NWP), 1999, which “provides the overall policy framework for the water sector, recognises the importance of gender and states that women’s involvement in design, construction, operation and maintenance of improved water supply and sanitation facilities should be supported through training” (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2012). One of its regulatory philosophy states: “Institutional reforms promoting an integrated approach, including changes in procedures, attitudes and behaviour and the full participation of women at all levels in sector institutions and in institution making” (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2012:9). The policy provides for participation of women by specifying that women and men should have an equal opportunity to participate fully in all aspects of public water management. The policy also emphasises that under the Community Based Maintenance System, a Water Users Committee (WUC) should have at least 50% women representatives (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2012).

The Uganda Gender Policy (UGP) (2007) “aims at establishing a clear framework for identification, implementation and coordination of interventions designed to achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment in Uganda. The policy requires sector ministries to translate the UGP into sector-specific strategies”. The Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) translated the National Gender Policy (1997) into the Water Sector Gender Strategy (WSGS), (2010–2015), and the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) has also “supported the MWE in policy development, development of sector guidelines and staff capacity building at the centre and in district local governments. In addition, the social sector reforms resulted in the appointment of District Gender Officers to support local governments in mainstreaming gender. This provides an opportunity for the District and Urban Water Offices to access this technical gender expertise during project and programme implementation” (refer to Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2012). The Strategic Sector Investment Plan (SIP) (2009) and various implementation guidelines advocate for gender in water and sanitation programmes and projects, in line with the National Water Policy (1999). Uganda has a comprehensive legal and water policy framework. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda of 1995 provided the supreme legal framework for the sector. In this Constitution, government recognises the important role of water in the development of Uganda. The country has the National Water Policy (1999) which recognises water as a social and economic good, the Water Act (1995) which describes the rational management and use of the waters of Uganda, the Environmental Act (1995) regulating sustainable environmental management as well as the other relevant regulations and policy frameworks.

In Uganda, “women and girls are the major water collectors, users and managers in homes. They are also the major promoters of household and community sanitation activities. They therefore bear the impact of inadequate, deficient or inappropriate water and sanitation services. Men however still dominate the arena of planning and decision making regarding water and sanitation development and women’s views are often under-represented, implying that women’s practical and strategic needs are not addressed (Water Sector Gender Strategy 2010–2015). The Water Sector Gender Strategy (WSGS 2003–2008) (hereby referred to as
WSGS I) served as the first strategic framework for implementing Uganda’s National Gender Strategy within the mandate of the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE)” (MWE 2015). The implementation challenges of the WSGS I, identified during the review process, resulted into the second Water and Sanitation Gender Strategy (2010–2015). However the challenges still prevalent include the following, among others:

- **The pre-policymaking phase**: Inclusiveness of gender perspective in water policies.
- **The policymaking phase**: Advancing capacity building of water sector stakeholders.
- **The post-policymaking phase**: Promoting opportunities for both men and women for participating in water resource management.

**Gender mainstreaeming in the South African water sector**

Since “South Africa’s transition to a liberal democracy, its government’s efforts to advance gender equality have been held up as a beacon of good practice across the world. However, the reality of women’s experience in South Africa, …, have been much more complex and casts doubt on the country’s celebrated gender achievements” (Gasela 2007 in Govender and Vyas-Doorgapersad 2013:108). This scenario is visible in the water sector in South Africa. In theory, at the national level, the Ministry of Water and Sanitation (MWS), previously known as Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) and the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) at the provincial level are responsible for water related legislation, institutional structures and processes.

The water sector is regulated by the White Paper on National Water Policy for South Africa, 1997, the Water Services Act 108 of 1997, the National Water Act 36 of 1998, the Free Basic Water Policy, 2000 and the White Paper on Basic Household Sanitation, 2001. The DWS has incorporated gender dimensions in the policy processes that are witnessed in the documents such as the Gender Policy, 1996, and the National Implementation Strategy and Action Plan 2006–2010 for Mainstreaming Gender into the Water Services Sector. The review of gender inclusiveness in these documents construes the following:

- **The pre-policymaking phase**: Gender-based “public participation in the National Water Act (NWA), South Africa has yet to implement a comprehensive and functional approach to public engagement at the level of Water Management Areas. Part of the problem is that actual requirements are not explicitly articulated anywhere. This has led to the situation where public participatory processes are poorly conceptualised, misdirected and often perceived as confusing by stakeholders” (Du Toit and Pollard 2008:1).

- **The policymaking phase**: Keeping gender on the agenda is a struggle for many officials and gender practitioners who find themselves managing events rather than a transformation process (DWAF Undated: 10).

- **The post-policymaking phase**: Gender is generally absent from the job descriptions and performance agreements of senior managers although there has been progress in including gender in the job descriptions of those responsible for gender (DWAF Undated: 12).

The comparative overview of both countries explores the common challenges in the management of the water sector. These challenges entail that: the water related legislation
requires public participation to discuss a diverse range (gender-based delegation of tasks, participation and involvement) of water related activities. The policy-making processes in the past did not (and still do not in most instances) “include the participation of previously disadvantaged groups in the management of the water resources” (Karodia and Weston Undated: 18).

In order to ascertain whether the legislative frameworks in South Africa and Uganda incorporate gender equity and inclusiveness, it needs to be determined whether there are any gender-based criteria in the utilisation of water. The response to this concern Rust (2007:136) argues that regarding, “the role of the gender officials …the specific traits and qualifications required in a gender focal point are not discussed; the very important aspect of strategic access for the gender focal point is not mentioned; and the responsibilities of the gender focal point are not detailed” (Rust 2007:136). Another concern raised is to determine whether there is a gender-disaggregated data-base available to identify the need for gender mainstreaming the water sector. In this regard Rust (2007:136) stated that in terms of a “Gender mainstreaming policy and approach…there is no interrogation of the gender mainstreaming approach per se, and no reference to the necessary recognition and respect for difference to facilitate gender equality” one cannot make these conclusions in the absence of proof of this (Rust 2007:136). It can therefore be deduced that there are policies, legislation and strategic frameworks in place stating gender in their content. Nonetheless, these documents lack the involvement, representation, and participation of gender at various policymaking stages (DWAF regulations in Vyas-Doorgapersad 2013). Lack of opportunities and capacity-building initiatives (Seetal 2005 and the Office on the Status of Women documents 2003 for more information) aggravate this situation hence gender mainstreaming is least visible in the water-related policies and programmes.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS**

The authors have examined the water sector policy in the two countries and based on the analysis, a classification of gender mainstreaming in policymaking processes (Gm-PMP) actions are proposed. This Gm-PMP suggests that gender must be considered at all levels of the policy process. This inclusion of gender must also transcend the levels of organisational hierarchy but should have its foundations in the departments/sections of the organisations.

Through the proposed, Gm-PMP, the classification proposes policy suggestions in terms of its implementation processes. It is also imperative to conduct a needs analysis to identify gender-based disaggregated data. Therefore, this classification may assist public policy makers to identify gender-based needs and responsibilities linked to management of the water sector. The organisational arrangements need to align performance management, monitoring and evaluation processes in an integrated manner linking individual, departmental and institutional goals to the performance agreements. These performance agreements need to incorporate gender mainstreaming and gender equality to achieve water based strategic objectives. Integrated performance management also needs to incorporate the relevant knowledge, skills and competence-related opportunities related to the management of the water sector equally to male and female officials. Impact surveys need to be conducted to obtain gender-based participation in water resource management.
### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Gender is an important socio-economic variable that needs a special place in the policy management process within African democracies. Public policymaking is a political process which balances interests of different interest groups in society. Women constitute one of the significant political groups in both Uganda and South Africa and have a voice worth considering in public policy management. The fact that women face different problems than men during the
formulation of policies and are affected differently by various policies during implementation due to historically known disparities among the two social groups (men and women), demands a renewed approach in the inclusion of gender in matters of public policymaking in all sectors. Gender issues have to receive a nod from policymakers from initiation of policies, through formulation, implementation, evaluation and finally the review. This will however need gender champions in policymaking and these can be both men and women.

In democratic or authoritarian regimes, policymaking is inevitable and it serves as a guide to the exercise of power by those that steer the affairs of the state (Nwagboso 2012:59–60). Policies affect different groups differently but most importantly they affect all citizens. During their formulation policies must be anchored in a clear framework of inclusiveness, therefore, gender variables demand sound considerations. Public policies ought to deviate from what has notably characterised the African continent where public policies have been formulated and implemented “with the help of international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank” (Imurana, Haruna and Kofi 2014:196); which often excluded local realities and dynamics. A water policy that disregards the role of women is destined to fail.

NOTES

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2 For more information about gender issues contained in the DWAF regulations in the South African context refer to Vyasa-Doorgapersad (2013).

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