EDITORIAL POLICY AND MANUSCRIPT SPECIFICATIONS

1. The *Journal of Public Administration* is a quarterly journal issued on behalf of the South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM).

2. The purpose of the Journal is to further the understanding of the theory and practice of Public Administration and Management by publishing articles of interest to practitioners and scholars in English.

3. The *Journal* publishes peer-reviewed articles, review articles, case studies, exemplar profiles, viewpoints and research results from practitioners of all grades and professions, academics and other specialists on the broad spectrum of administrative concerns regarding local, provincial, national, and international affairs.

4. All manuscripts are circulated anonymously to specialist referees for evaluation. Reports from referees may be made available to authors but the names of the referees will be withheld. On the basis of the referees’ reports, content and other deficiencies, the Editor reserves the right to make minor alterations or to reject any manuscript.

5. Copyright of articles published in the *Journal* vests in SAAPAM and may not be published or reproduced in any form without the prior consent of the Chief Editor.

6. Warning: infringement of copyright exposes offenders to criminal proceedings that could result in civil actions and/or a fine/imprisonment and a criminal record. Therefore, authors are advised to acknowledge the origin of any content in an article or other contribution obtained from another source.

7. Reprints of articles can be obtained from the Editor on the payment of a prescribed fee.

8. Opinions expressed in the *Journal* are, however, those of the individual authors, and are not necessarily subscribed to by the Editor, Editorial Committee or the Editorial Board.

9. Authors are required to pay a fee of R500-00 per page for any article or research results printed in the *Journal*. Payment is due on receiving confirmation from the Editor that a contribution is to be published in a particular issue of the Journal. Authors should consult their respective faculties or employer to establish the responsibility for the payment. An article will only be published once payment has been received. Payment should be made directly to the *Journal of Public Administration*, but proof of payment must also be submitted to the Editor to avoid any possible delay in the publication of a contribution.

10. Except in special cases where prior permission has been obtained, articles should not exceed 5000 words. Prospective contributors are specifically requested to ensure that the language and technical aspects of their contributions are of high standard. THREE identical copies of manuscript, typed in 1.5 line spacing, 12pt Times New Roman should be submitted. A disk should also be submitted. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an English abstract of up to 200 words. Since manuscripts are circulated anonymously for evaluation, the name and affiliation of the author(s) should appear on the separate page. If the manuscript is accepted, a computer disk with the text, preferably in MS Word or WordPerfect must be sent to the Editor, unless the Chief Editor grants special permission in exceptional instances.

11. All manuscripts must be accompanied by a covering letter in which the author(s) state(s) that the manuscript has not been submitted or will not be submitted or published or is not being published elsewhere in any form unless rejected by the Editor of the *Journal of Public Administration*. 
## MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION

Membership categories and annual subscription fees payable before/on 30 April:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Pro Rata Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEMBER</td>
<td>R350-00</td>
<td>R30-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUDENT MEMBER</td>
<td>R150-00</td>
<td>R15-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORPORATE MEMBER (5-9 MEMBERS)</td>
<td>R1 000-00</td>
<td>R85-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTITUTIONAL MEMBER (11+ MEMBERS)</td>
<td>R5 000-00</td>
<td>R425-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSOCIATE MEMBERS</td>
<td>R400-00</td>
<td>R35-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL MEMBER</td>
<td>US $100-00</td>
<td>US $10-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE MEMBER (5-9 MEMBERS)</td>
<td>US $550-00</td>
<td>US $50-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL MEMBER (11+ MEMBERS)</td>
<td>US $2 750-00</td>
<td>US $250-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONORARY MEMBER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please complete the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>SURNAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First names</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal Address</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellular</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fax</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-mail</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specific areas of interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Administration and Management Theory</th>
<th>Public Administration and Management History</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy Analysis and Management</td>
<td>Organisational Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Management</td>
<td>Project Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resource Management</td>
<td>Financial Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Management</td>
<td>International Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental Relations</td>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>Development Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Signature of Application**

Subscription deposited directly in **Standard Bank Cheque Account Number 0125800015, Hatfield Branch Code Number 01-15-45-15.** Completed application and proof of payment faxed to +27 12 382 9042 or mailed to **SAAPAM, PO Box 14257, Hatfield 0028, South Africa.** For additional information please contact Mr Vukosi Mathonsi at (012) 382 9769 or SAAPAM@tut.ac.za.

**Date**

**Membership Number (for official use only)**
CONTENTS

EDITORIAL 563
B.C. Basheka, B.C. Mubangizi, FM Lucky Mathebula & K. Phago

ACHIEVING GOOD GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA: IS LEADERSHIP THE MISSING LINK? 568
G. Mutahaba

ASSESSING PRACTICAL MECHANISMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS FOR RE-INVENTING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN UGANDA 591
S.B. Kyohairwe & G.K. Karyeija

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN UGANDA’S PUBLIC SECTOR 603
Y. Olum

INSTITUTIONS AND FOOD SECURITY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANISATIONS IN KENYA’S RURAL AREAS 622
S.K. Mutukaa & B.C. Mubangizi

REGULATORY AND OVERSIGHT SYSTEMS FOR REVITALISING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEMS IN AFRICA 637
B.A. Bana

WHAT CONSTRAINS A TRANSFORMED PUBLIC SERVICE IN UGANDA? 653
B.C. Basheka

GENDER MAINSTREAMING PRACTICES AND WOMEN’S CAREER ADVANCEMENT AT BANK OF UGANDA 672
S.K. Aliu, G.K. Karyeija & P.O. Naggita

HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA: REFLECTIONS ON ITS ROLE AND CHALLENGES IN THE GAS AND OIL SECTOR 692
F.J. Mateng’e
A robust early classification of political organisations was the influential grouping by Aristotle (384–322 BC) of the 158 Greek city states that had been in existence over the two preceding centuries. The diversity of the political arrangements offered Aristotle an ideal laboratory to consider which type of political system reflected what he saw as optimal government. Since then, the continuing debate on the role of government in society has taken many forms, extending, in particular, to the field of public administration. Within Africa, this debate has been rather intense, especially since the 1980s, as a result of the doctrines advanced by New Public Management (NPM) ideology which was based on market philosophies. The “African society”, so-called, can be classified into geographical regions, but within them, as Huntington (1991:8) cautions, no political regime fits neatly into an intellectually defined box, and any system of classification must accept the existence of ambiguous, borderline and mixed cases. Seen in this perspective, there can be no monopoly of knowledge that would give scholars in a given region final authority in assessment of issues in their particular milieu. While it is important, and indeed beneficial, that views from scholars in other regions are welcome in such an issue to provide a range of templates for comparative analysis, this issue relies on articles incubated in the East African region, but with contributors having significant exposure in other jurisdictions.

In this *Journal of Public Administration* special issue, scholars reflect on public administration and governance issues in the East African region. East Africa is a region endowed with natural good fortune, yet is burdened with misfortune almost in equal measure. The region’s bimodal rainfall patterns provide a variety of livelihood opportunities, as do its year-round sunny conditions. Unfortunately, the region is also prone to floods, droughts and a host of pests and diseases which, in combination, exacerbate conditions for endemic underdevelopment. These problems call into question the governance apparatus applied in the region. The East African region is among the poorest region in an environment of plenty and is notoriously prone to internal and external conflict. It is a region where governance is understood exclusively within the context of ethnicised politics, where patronage and bureaucracy pervade the public service, and where leaders make promises that are either unachievable due to a variety of challenges or are a long time coming, due to frustrating bureaucratic processes. In the aftermath of colonialism, the politics and governance infrastructure of the region have yet to achieve a sufficient measure of transformation to pull the majority of citizens out of glaring levels of poverty. No wonders of economics have transpired that would bring the region into the company of the well-developed.

There are nonetheless signs of hope as citizen awareness and democracy slowly take root within the society. This hope itself will depend on the type of leadership that prides itself on building true democratic institutions. Structures such as the
African Union, the East African Community and the Open Society Initiative for East Africa, combined with national policies and processes that endeavour to promote participation and citizen awareness, all promise to increase citizen participation in the governance and leadership processes of the region. But while the future is bright, scholars cannot, and should not, shy away from reflecting on and interrogating pertinent issues in public administration, for the central problems that beset the region inescapably point a finger at issues of governance, administration and leadership. Debate relating to these issues as they affect the East African region must seek to comprehend what has gone wrong and what can be remedied. We have thus been presented with a weighty task in venturing to assemble a set of scholarly articles that can begin to capture the breadth and depth of the governance and administrative systems, issues and processes in the region. But we feel that the effort has been worthwhile when we regard the team of committed scholars who have come together here to share their perspectives on issues affecting the region. If we ‘connect all dots’ between the articles presented in this special issue, broad themes of governance and leadership transformation emerge strongly as a common thread. As the 2010 World Public Sector Report has indeed noted

no progress can be made in promoting peace, development and protection of human rights unless appropriate governance and public administration institutions are established, leadership and human resources capacities are re-built, citizens are engaged in the process of reconstruction through decentralized participatory mechanisms and basic public services are delivered. (UN World Public Sector Report, 2010)

Leadership and governance are clearly pivotal to peace and development on the continent. Around the turn of the millennium, the concept of governance came to be a key subject of attention in the social sciences, although in truth it is an old notion now undergoing a revival in popularity (Hague & Harrop 2010:6). Invoked today in a variety of contexts, aspiration to good governance embodies citizens’ wish for their governments to be accountable and incorruptible, managing public funds for the common good. Hence the increased pressure on democracies to embrace public policies that reinforce the right of citizens to hold their governments accountable (Positive Peace Index, 2013:37). Political systems, accountability and sound management all have a bearing on quality of governance, but there is a familiar charge in academic circles that studies in comparative politics too often omit from consideration the element of history in this context, focusing too exclusively on the contemporary world. The article in this issue by Mutahaba seeks to readjust this focus by bringing a historical lens to bear on the concepts of governance and leadership in Tanzania.

Mutahaba’s immense experience and long intellectual journey across a wide spectrum of administrative systems fingers leadership as the weak link in the quest for good governance both in Tanzania and on the African continent more widely. Mutahaba carefully interrogates the way leadership has contributed to
improvements in the quality of governance and development in Tanzania since pre-independence days, indicating at the same time that there are also other examples elsewhere in the African region. He argues that the power and/or influence of those who are mandated to lead their countries at various levels is a key factor in responsible governance, and he stresses the need for countries to create and nurture institutions that make governorship a shared business, involving politicians in office and in the opposition, civil society leaders, civil servants, clerics and sheiks – not forgetting, most especially, leaders who may have retired but remain involved and interested.

In their article, Kyohairwe and Karyeija tackle the subject of governance from a local government perspective in the setting of Uganda. Their contention is that re-inventing local governments is an urgent necessity, given the signs they detect of possible stagnation at this level of governance. This analysis corresponds with Olum’s position in his article on the effectiveness and efficiency of Uganda’s public service as a vehicle for delivering goods and services demanded by the citizenry. He argues, rightly, that public officials, through their mandatory and discretionary powers, are expected to act in the public interest as they perform their roles and responsibilities. Yet the glaring lack of professional ethics and accountability exhibited by some public officials seriously undermines the contribution to good governance expected from the public service machinery. All public officers, and especially those in senior and strategic leadership positions, need to commit themselves to serving citizens’ needs by being more accountable and transparent in the way they manage public resources.

The next article, by Mutukaa and Mubangizi, tackles a subject that has universal relevance for the human race – food insecurity – which is a significant governance challenge in the East African region. With Kenya as their context, the authors demonstrate empirically how food insecurity continues to plague this country’s arid and semi-arid rural lands, which are notoriously vulnerable to market and climatic shocks. Performance of the agricultural sector, the authors suggest, has been declining, giving intermittent rise to acute food shortages that require workably sustainable food-security interventions. Mutukaa and Mubangizi conclude that properly leveraged community-based organisations are an important component of the institutional set-up for sustainable food security in developing countries such as Kenya. They advise that capacity building and provision of public services infrastructure are crucial for improving the performance of producers and enhancing their ability to access agricultural markets in the value-chain.

In Kenya, the food insecurity dilemma is linked to poor performance systems in that country’s agricultural sector. In the New Public Management (NPM) doctrines that emerged in the 1980s, the function of government is to maintain a strong oversight and regulatory role while actual service delivery was assigned to the private sector. It is in this context that Bana’s article educates us on the importance of the regulatory and oversight systems that are needed to address the performance
challenges. With regulation a constant issue of concern both in debate across and beyond the social sciences and in the day-to-day functioning of governments, especially in the contemporary era of privatisation, Bana considers it in relation to neo-liberal hegemony and political liberalism. From a public administration perspective, he argues that economic liberalism and political pluralism make it necessary to re-examine and reposition the functioning of public regulatory institutions. The regulatory institutions need to be set free to execute their worthy and important functions in a professionally acceptable manner. They should be perceived in the eyes of the public as assets created to safeguard public interests rather than liabilities that escalate corruption and its associated administrative and bureaucratic vices and pathologies.

Basheka’s article revisits the fundamental philosophies that shaped the discipline of Public Administration during its inception as a discipline of study – public service values, structures and institutions. Informed by the onslaught on the doctrines of public management theorists due to their inability to address the public service delivery challenges, the author highlights the constraints that hinder transformation of Uganda’s public service. This debate reveals the undeniable necessity for true dialogue on the centrality of government in public service delivery. A debate revisiting the crucial issues of how to render public service efficiently and effectively is made after carefully analysing the obstacles to functional public service machinery. Within this same context, there are significant gendered dimensions to this debate, taken up by Aliu, Karyeija and Oluka-Naggita who consider the extent to which internal recruitment practices, female-safety practices and practices relating to work-family balance influence women’s career development in a banking institution. Their study concludes that the problem of women’s career advancement is closely linked to procedural inequality in internal recruitment, coupled with inadequate gender-affirmative action in internal promotion processes, in addition to sexual harassment, bullying, inflexible forms of work and inadequate employee assistance programmes. Finally, Mateng’e closes this special issue with a discussion of human resource development in Tanzania. He attributes the country’s development challenges to ineffective management of the country’s abundant natural resources in service of the nation’s welfare, which may partly be due to the neglect of what in the 1960s was known as ‘administration development’.

Together, the articles in this issue of the Journal of Public Administration illuminate significant concerns in contemporary public administration. Addressing the numerous concerns requires the help of history in understanding what worked well before and what can be effectively applied to address the contemporary challenges. This prescription, however, will rely heavily on a clear analysis of the contexts in which the problems of public service delivery hinge. The discourse presented in this issue lays bare the numerous challenges but also points to copious opportunities for good governance in the public service of African countries,
advancing practical recommendations to improve performance and pointing out areas for further research.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


**Guest Editors:** Prof. Benon C Basheka (Uganda Technology and Management University-UTAMU)

Prof. Betty C Mubangizi (University of KwaZulu-Natal)

**Policy Editor:** Prof. FM Lucky Mathebula (Tshwane University of Technology & Uganda Technology and Management University)

**Deputy Editor:** Prof. K Phago (University of Limpopo)
ACHIEVING GOOD GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA: IS LEADERSHIP THE MISSING LINK?

G. Mutahaba
University of Dar es Salaam

ABSTRACT

The paper examines whether leadership, since pre-independence days, has contributed to improvements in the quality of governance and development in Tanzania. The paper interrogates the role of leadership in governance, development and social transformation both in Tanzania and in Africa more widely. The presented assessment suggests that the Tanzania polity (both state and society) during the colonial period and in much of the period since independence had a narrow conception of leadership in which leaders were understood merely as persons who hold positions that are linked to power. A different example of leadership was set, however, by Mwalimu Nyerere, a philosopher king figure, who had a vision for transforming the country using Ujamaa and charisma to sway the people and move with them. Even so, Tanzania is a large country, and Nyerere and the limited number of his converts were too few to reach all corners of Tanzanian society.

INTRODUCTION

The broad focus of this paper is on the role of leadership in governance, development and social transformation in Africa. The focus on leadership raises a number of important questions:

What is special about leadership in the governance and social transformation process? Does governance (and/or development) really need leaders to make it happen?

Even when a development role for leaders can be found, is it sufficiently clear what ‘leadership’ means?

Is there an inextricable link between power and leadership? In other words, does one need to have or to seek power to lead in governance and development situations?

Underlying these questions are the divergent positions taken by scholars on the role of leadership in social transformation/development and on the link between leadership and power. While some consider that, as a critical factor in development, leadership presents limitless theoretical possibilities, others argue that it is a mere
chance occurrence – an accidental collocation of personalities and circumstances\(^1\), whose behaviour cannot be logically explained or predicted with any degree of certainty. The author shares the view of analysts who say that leadership does make a difference to development. However, leadership makes a difference only insofar as it is holistically conceptualised and its significance across different historical epochs fully grasped. Specifically, leadership becomes a theoretically viable and empirically verifiable proposition only when it is seen broadly as an intra- and inter-generational institution, rather than narrowly conceived as an interaction between ephemeral structures and rotating personalities.

‘Leadership’ seen in this way is the behaviour of individuals who hold formal leadership positions in government, and of their counterparts in the corporate world, the academic community, primary civil society institutions, and diverse religious denominations. The term also extends to a rather unique category, namely leaders who are no longer in active service but continue to exert formal or informal influence on the governorship or development process. In effect, leaders are those who, in varying degrees, dictate the directions that others follow.

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

Leadership is essentially about power and/or influence in society. In normal day-to-day discourse, it means being in control of something: a situation, a social trend, or a group of people – including, in varying degrees, how the followers think, act and live, as well as the template they adopt in arriving at conclusions on right and wrong. A leader has a lot in common with the Aristotelian ruler insofar as they both see beyond the present. Commenting on the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, the philosopher Aristotle (1992:57) noted that “the element that can use its intelligence to look ahead is by nature ruler and by nature master, while that which has the bodily strength to do the actual work is by nature a slave, one of those who are ruled.”

Different conceptions of leadership exist, and a range of leadership categories can accordingly be identified:

**Rulers:** Slave drivers or individuals who lord it over others, who use ‘power’ to secure compliance from followers.

**Ringleaders:** Those challenging the establishment or leading an insurrection are sometimes referred to as leaders of opposition or derogatively as ‘ringleaders’.

**Formal and informal leaders:** This is leadership exercised transformationally – when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilise, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers ... in order to realise goals mutually held by both leaders and followers. (Burns, 1978:18 [emphasis added])

\(^1\) ‘Accidental collocation’ is the term used by Bertrand Russell in explaining the origin of the universe. Other philosophers and scientists, however, see order rather than arbitrariness in creation.
LEADERSHIP AS MANAGEMENT

Appointment to leadership positions in the development management and career public service branch of the state (e.g. Central Bank Governor, Inspector-General of Police, Accountant General, Ombudsman/Inspector-General of Government, Police Commissioner, Permanent Secretary, Director-General, Managing Director) tends to be even more formalised than in the case of political functionaries. Professional candidates are required to undergo rigorous selection tests, show they can function independently, and, once appointed, provide unbiased service in their designated positions. In addition to responding to vacancy announcements in local and international newspapers and submitting their credentials for evaluation, candidates for senior posts in the career service might be required to justify their candidatures before formally constituted interview panels. In some countries, incumbency of purely political posts and posts of confidence are tied to the life of the administration recruiting the candidates. In others, appointment to such offices is on fixed-term contract with the incumbents submitting themselves for re-evaluation on the expiration of their contracts.

INTELLECTUAL LEADERS, OPINION LEADERS, CIVIC LEADERS

At least in theory, the procedure for selecting, promoting, and replacing the leadership cadre in institutions of higher learning is as rigorous as it is for professional management, if not more so. Leading academics must, for instance, have established their reputations through publications in peer-reviewed journals. In some cases, academics outgrow their immediate ivory-tower environments and become ‘leaders of opinion’ or world celebrities in their own right. Examples include Cheikh Anta Diop (Senegal), Wole Soyinka, Chinua Achebe, Chike Obi (Nigeria), Ngugi WaThiong’o and Wangari M. Maathai (Kenya), and other internationally renowned scholars of African descent.

The peer or public recognition enjoyed by some individuals is a measure of their leadership standing in the community, even if the recognition cannot be easily parlayed into political power or formal authority. The same could be said for individuals who distinguish themselves in local community service, or who, like the environmentalists and anti-corruption crusaders in various parts of the continent, are associated with one or other worthy cause. These and others similarly placed could be termed leaders ‘by popular acclamation’ – leaders who do not hanker after fame, riches or high office, but are simply motivated by the will to serve. The ‘strong wo/men’ and ‘godfathers’ we shall consider shortly are in a unique leadership category: leaders with a significant governorship, if not developmental, role.

Clerics are among the civic leaders that have a crucial role to play in governorship and development. Thanks to the vigilance and courage of religious leaders, a number of countries that had been held captive to one-party rule or other forms of
Authoritarianism underwent peaceful transitions to democracy in the 1990s. Many of these leaders remain steadfast in their condemnation of despotism, corruption, and misrule. The leadership needed to challenge Hastings Banda’s claim to life presidency in Malawi and KANU’s one-party dominance in Kenya was provided not only by political activists but also by the religious establishment.

**REINVENTED, SEMI-RETIRED AND TOTALLY DISENGAGED LEADERS**

A subset of leadership not so far mentioned is the class of former heads of state and retired public officials. Depending on the mode of their disengagement and on the magnanimity of their successors, this class of leaders constitutes a rich reservoir of knowledge and experience that could be tapped to the benefit of governorship and development. While the environment prevailing in some countries might not encourage former leaders (derogatively referred to as the ‘old guard’) to play high-profile roles, it is generally believed that the memory and experience possessed by this class of leaders should not be lost to society.

**MEASURING LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS**

As noted in the preceding subsection, leadership is a highly complex and elusive subject. One way of dealing with the problem is to identify a number of indicators that can be used to identify good leadership. Key indicators in this understanding of the concept are the following:

- Foresight and prevision (including prophetic thrust, originality and clarity of vision; the act of crafting a vision that ‘speaks to’ some underlying problems and/or offers credible solutions to a major crisis)
- Charisma (the image or aura portrayed by the visionaries to immediate lieutenants, to their followers and to the masses, as well as the effectiveness of the communication strategies applied; ability to sell a vision to diverse constituencies, and apply to followers at an emotional level)
- Capacity to build and hold together widening and concentric circles of supporters and followers (teams of lieutenants; alliances of ethnic nationalities; united front of secondary associations; coalitions of otherwise antagonistic cultures and religious sects)
- Grassroots penetration and support (otherwise known as mass appeal as distinguished from admiration by the elite or by members of the leader’s own social circle)
- Depth of understanding of the environment and foreknowledge of the consequences of policy choices.

These indicators can, in turn, furnish a scorecard that will give a measure of leadership quality:
Indicators | Scores
--- | ---
Foresight and prevision | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Charisma |  
Team/coalition-building competency |  
Grassroots penetration and support |  
Environmental engagement capacity |  

**LEADERSHIP, GOVERNORSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND REALITY**

What then, effectually, is the role of leadership in development? If leaders are individuals with charisma and other unique attributes, does it mean that countries embarking on development must first pray and then wait for the ascendancy of these rare human species, these uncommonly endowed individuals? Conceptual frameworks seem thus far not to have shed much light on this question, but various perspectives on the relationship between leadership and development are nonetheless useful to list (Allen, 1995; Wilson, 1989; Burns, 1978; Blanchard & Hersey, 1982):

**THE SCEPTICS**

The sceptical view sees no correlation between leadership and social change. The doubt expressed by Wilson (1989) about the theoretical premises of leadership stems from the vagueness and imprecision of the concept. Leadership hinges on personalities, and, by implication, on accidents of history; as an accidental collocation of personalities, it does not lend itself readily to logical analysis and systematic study. As Wilson puts it, “It is not easy to build a useful social science theory out of ‘chance appearances’ (like leadership personalities”).

Allen (1995) is even more categorical in his rejection of ‘leadership theories’, particularly when such theories are not located within an ‘appropriate historical sequence’. Adedeji’s (1992) concern is not so much with the impossibility of leadership’s theoretical mission as with how to locate the role of leadership among other roles simultaneously performed within complex and constantly changing environments. He sees the risk of leadership becoming a ‘captive’ rather than a moulder of the environment.

Attempts to draw a correlation between leadership and the environment yield a range of conclusions about the nature of the relationship. While some regard leadership as an independent variable (or a catalyst), others see it, at best, as a prime mover, at worst, as a variable that is subject to, or dependent on, the vagaries of the environment. In what looks like a variation on Allen’s historical determinist
theme, some scholars have cited the free will exercised by human beings as a major barrier to a systematic study of leadership. In an environment in which leaders act as dictated by their inner convictions, and in which no single will predominates, it would take more than science to comprehend the ongoing power play, or to predict who would win in the end, let alone what his/her victory would mean for society and its people.

Even in a monistic (rather than pluralistic) society, it would take the interventions of shamans, water diviners, and medicine wo/men to determine whose will would prevail at any point in time, and what consequences a leader’s triumph would have on the course and outcome of development. That leadership is a coincidental and therefore unpredictable factor is not enough grounds to dismiss its theoretical potential. Indeed, refusing to explore leadership’s theoretical possibilities simply because of its coincidental nature evades a truly worthy scholastic challenge. Life itself is, on the surface, a combination of coincidences, but that has neither killed the curiosity nor dampened the enthusiasm of those researching its mysteries. The same could be said about the concept of leadership. While it is premature to speculate on causality, both history and the nebulous term ‘environment’ suggest a correlation of sorts between the prevailing leadership regime and change.

**TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL**

This model depicts the transformational leader as someone ‘endowed or ‘born’ with some rare, possibly super-human, attributes, such as a long-term vision that addresses the followers’ intrinsic needs. Such a leader inspires motivation, challenges existing assumptions, stimulates the intellect, applies the most effective means of communicating his or her ideas, builds consensus around noble (or reprehensible) ideals and takes measures to ensure the transmission of good (or bad) practices across generations (Burns, 1978). Above all, the transformational leader leaves behind values, institutions or messages for which he or she would be long remembered.

The transformational model thus projects leaders as persons capable of ‘transforming environments’ and influencing the course of history (Rotberg, 2002; 2004), or at the very least, guaranteeing political order in rapidly changing societies (Huntington, 1968). This is synonymous with what may be termed the ‘political-will hypothesis’: one which holds that the viability of the environment and of existing institutional arrangements depends on the protective cover provided by incumbent leaders. It rests on the assumption that qualitative governorship and meaningful development can be assured only if leaders committed to both causes remain in power.

The elevation of leadership to make-or-break status raises at least three fundamental questions. First, does change have to wait until persons with the ‘right’ leadership attributes are born and raised to positions of power? Second, does it
mean that change happens because the leaders want it to, or are there other factors at work? Third, is the ‘will’ of the charismatic leader always coterminous with the commonweal? To put it in a slightly different language, are we to understand transformational leadership as meaning that leaders are always fired by altruistic motives rather than self-interest? Is it a general rule that leaders ‘will’ (as in ‘choose’) what is not necessarily in their own best interest? We shall return to these and other questions later.

In any case, the assumptions underlying transformational leadership are at best questionable, and at worst, plainly false. First is the implied assumption that the signs of transformational leadership are easy to read and act upon. It is true that where the signs are easily (and properly) read, the persons with the desirable attributes (charismatic and visionary leadership) would be recognised and accepted by the followers. However, in real life – and in the prevailing circumstances that include miscellaneous information gaps, grinding poverty, widening inequality, high illiteracy rates, low rates of social mobilisation, ethnic bigotry and religious prejudices – the signs are most frequently misread, thus allowing others besides the genuinely charismatic and visionary personalities to assume leadership roles.

It is also possible that rather than ‘transform’, a leader only manages to deepen the changes already initiated by others. The changes that observers often confuse with ‘reforms’ are in most cases anything but. A reform is a unique type of change – one so drastic that it was never contemplated before. A reform is also different from ordinary changes in the sense that it has moral connotations and implies taking on powerful interests while protecting the weak and the oppressed. To qualify as reform, a change must both challenge the status quo and do so while substantially improving the status of a group previously excluded and disempowered. In this context, neo-liberal policy changes are simply that – changes in policy direction – rather than ‘reforms’. Insofar as these so-called reforms are instituted under external pressure, and to the extent that they roast the poor to feed the rich, it would take moral courage to embark on genuine reforms – changes designed to rework the existing socio-economic arrangements.

**TRANSACTIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL: STRONG WO/MEN AND GODFATHERS**

The ‘strong wo/men’ are those who have taken on leadership roles by default. They have a few things in common with the ‘transactional leaders’ once mentioned by Burns (1978). Like these, the ‘strong wo/men’ rely on a combination of positive and negative sanctions to keep their followers in line and to induce or command obedience. Leadership in countries under military and/or one-party rule falls under this heading. The transactional leaders’ agents in local communities – the ‘satellite strong wo/men’ – also capitalise on their ‘national connections’ and their control of information flow to consolidate their grip on local-level politics and power.
ENVIRONMENTAL ENGAGEMENT: A CAUTIOUS OPTIMISTIC MODEL

The emerging picture from the three perspectives listed above is that none on its own stands any chance of explaining, let alone predicting, the patterns of relationship between leadership and development. The transformational model makes a promise that in reality is well-nigh impossible to fulfil. The transactional (or, should we say, strong-man) alternative takes too pessimistic a view of leadership to account for the impressive development outcomes that a combination of foresight, altruism and other leadership virtues make possible at different times and places. A leadership founded on sectional or primordial loyalties may for some time engineer change at the periphery, but will be hard put to capture the centre and command the cross-cultural allegiance that is so essential to the success of social transformation efforts.

In any case, as long as leadership is viewed exclusively as a concept built around personal attributes, rather than, as implied in our earlier definition, one founded on constant interactions among a complex network of personalities, institutions and environments, it would be difficult if not impossible to construct a viable theory of leadership-driven change. This article suggests that the ‘leadership model’ that has the best chance of driving and achieving change is environmental (or dynamic) engagement. Here leadership is conceived as an evolutionary process in which negative and positive visions collide, leaving the conflict to be settled by the prevailing social forces. The key elements in a dynamic interactive combination of this nature for transforming social systems are:

- A visionary leader(s) who recognises the need to mobilise social groups and has charisma and credibility to build intergroup consensus around a few fundamental and abiding values
- Leadership resources that are randomly distributed among the various social groups (such as the political class, the religious establishment, the legislative and the judicial branches of government, the career civil service, academia, civic and community-based organisations, trade unions and professional associations, the private sector, the class of retired but constantly influential leaders, the intelligentsia, howsoever defined)
- Clarity of the vision and its success in capturing the underlying concerns of the followers
- The motives of the group in power and the end(s) to which the power is directed – the ultimate governorship and development outcome being dependent on these
- Orderly inter-generational leadership change: critical not only in the institutionalisation of good governorship ethos and practices, but also in socio-economic transformation, since the needs and concerns of the various social groups continually evolve.
Therefore, rather than regarding visionary leadership as an occasional or chance occurrence, the dynamic engagement model holds that individuals with the required attributes are to be found in one of the social groups existing at any point in time. Indeed, the failure to harness and integrate leadership talents from different sources accounts for the lack of progress on various fronts.

**ASSESSING TANZANIA’S RECORD IN APPROACHING LEADERSHIP ISSUES**

An analysis of Tanzania’s leadership question using the foregoing theoretical and conceptual constructs would require more extended research and a deeper review of existing literature than this author presently has time to undertake. Nor is he familiar with studies on Tanzania that may have been undertaken using the aforesaid constructs. For the purposes of this discussion, however, some notes on the leadership situation in Tanzania are now presented.

**Leadership types/categories**

In Tanzania the definition of who is a ‘leader’ is a function of who is being asked that question. At the official level, the determination of who is a leader went through an evolution over the colonial period, post-independence period and current period. Before Tanzania attained independence, leaders (Viongozi) tended to be people holding management and professional positions, who were invariably appointed by the colonial regime, or traditional rulers who had been co-opted into colonial administration under the indirect rule system and could exercise authority over citizens (effectively their subjects). Recruitment into the leadership had defined procedures and there was no ambiguity. Whoever fell outside that category was a ‘follower’.

When the country became independent, an additional window for recruitment into leadership was opened; now one could become a leader through the elective route. This new category of leaders owed their positions to the ruled and a category of ‘followers’ thus emerged. Some of the political leadership came to occupy executive and policy positions, in which the rulership functions they undertook (as government ministers) caused them to lose their previous closeness to the followers. As the state expanded its developmental role through nationalisation of parastatals and development of new state enterprises, the numbers also grew of management officials (administrative leaders) who had little connection with the governed. So, at the official level, the country witnessed a situation where being a ‘leader’ was synonymous with occupying a political/administrative position in government. This situation came to be institutionalised with the establishment in the early seventies of the leadership code.

At the unofficial level during the colonial period in Tanzania ordinary citizens were clear about who ‘leaders’ were and the roles they were supposed to play in society. The ‘leaders’ were those who exercised power over them and enforced government orders and directives at different levels of governance using
transactional models of leadership: colonial officers, chiefs, headmen, agricultural extension officers, magistrates. The independence struggle brought to the fore people who had no legal powers and were not using transactional approaches to gain acceptance. They soon succeeded in mobilising the populace to oppose and disobey administrative orders and were accepted as an alternative leadership deriving their legitimacy from a sharing of values with the citizens seeking to be free.

Very soon after the attainment of independence, however, as the revolutionaries took over the reins of government, the citizens quickly came to realise that behind the rhetoric of transformation their erstwhile revolutionary compatriots were not very different from the colonial masters and their servants (chiefs, traditional rulers, etc.). The new leaders barricaded themselves in the offices they had taken over, and pursued policies akin to those of the departed colonialists. They had thus become transactional leaders, strongmen, no longer the visionary and charismatic leaders that had fought for independence. The citizens, meanwhile, watched sceptically, recognising that these new leaders were the transactional type, eager for the acclaim as WaheshiwaViongozi that the citizens willingly and loudly accorded them.

**Mwalimu Julius Nyerere: Visionary and charismatic leader**

Mwalimu Nyerere, learning from the experience of African countries that had attained independence before Tanganyika, quickly came to realise that unless deliberate action was taken to chart a vision to guide the country’s development path, the new governors would in due course simply reoccupy the seats left by the colonialists. So rather than sit and enjoy the fruits of independence as a transactional Prime Minister and Mheshimiwa, he resigned from the cabinet and became a parliamentary backbencher. His intention was to spend the year thinking and working with his party’s grassroots members on a vision and strategy for tackling the potential obstacles to development.

Following a year spent outside of Government, Nyerere was then elected president of the country and instituted a number of measures that set him apart from the transactional leaders who had run the government in the first year of independence. He embarked on building a Tanzanian nation, taking hard policy decisions to drive that agenda, such as emphasis on Swahili as the national language, nationalisation of religion-denominated schools as a strategy to address potential religious strife, and measures to achieve regional balance in the allocation of social services. The hallmark measure was adoption of the Arusha Declaration that committed the country to a socialist development path, implemented through measures such as nationalising the commanding heights of the economy and encouraging citizens to relocate to settlements where services could be delivered more efficiently and effectively.

The formulation and articulation of the Arusha Declaration, and especially
its UjamaaVijijini component, required visionary and charismatic leadership – preeminent attributes of Nyerere. And actual implementation of this vision in a complex country as large as Tanzania – with mammoth sectoral challenges relating to infrastructure, skills development and a host of other issues – intensified the need for more dynamic leadership than in the transactional approach that had been inherited at independence and continued in the early years of independence. Indeed, with the major social engineering project of villagisation, the appropriate leadership model would have been the dynamic engagement model.

**Leadership since the emergence of political pluralism**

The emergence of political pluralism opened opportunities for changes in the conception of leadership in Tanzania by bringing other players into the leadership equation. These included intellectuals, political party leaders, civic leaders, clerics and opinion leaders. While some of these leader categories (priests, sheikhs and sorcerers) had always hovered around in rural communities, their authority was limited to things regarded as supernatural. When it came to governance and development the ‘leaders’ were the holders of official offices (elected and appointed) and invariably included those holding office in the dominant Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party.

This category of leaders is now increasingly acknowledged at both national level (the leader of the opposition in parliament has some statutory rights and voice) and in the case of leaders of the opposition in the local authority councils. Space is also being created for civil society representatives in meetings on budget reviews and in policy development forums. There is increasingly an opening up to perceptions among the citizenry that a ‘leader’ need not have power and authority of office or pursue authoritative power. What he/she needs is to be networked to followers. Indeed, the fact that people can now become leaders through elective routes, and exit for some time and return again, demonstrates that leaders and followers could exchange roles and thereby contribute to sustainable transformation.

The opening up and acceptance of a broader definition of leadership, and the consequent inclusion of leadership types other than those holding elective or appointed office should be pursued more vigorously in Tanzania by seeking new ways towards building an inclusive leadership. This would in turn enhance the contribution of leadership to governorship and development.

By way of conclusion the article next considers an aspect of leadership that may contribute to that goal, namely, re-engagement of disengaged leaders in governorship and development.

Towards the productive engagement of disengaged leaders in governance and development

We have noted that Tanzania has been moving towards a culture which acknowledges the need for a dynamically engaged kind of leadership that can galvanise society in pursuit of better governance and accelerated development.
A further possibility we should therefore explore is how to tap the rich reservoir of retired leaders: former presidents; vice presidents; prime ministers; ministers; councillors with vision and policy experience; permanent secretaries, directors and other senior civil servants; professors and other academics, etc. Our first example of the extent to which disengaged leaders have been engaged in governance and development in Tanzania is that of Mwalimu Nyerere himself.

**Mwalimu Nyerere: Engaged or disengaged?**

Of all the presidents who have retired from the presidency since independence, Julius Nyerere towers above them all in terms of the influence he continued to exert both domestically and internationally after he retired from the presidency and party chairmanship. Following his retirement from the presidency, Nyerere left Dar es Salaam, the capital, for his birth place, Butiama, one thousand miles away, where even telephone connections were difficult and the distance to the nearest tarred road was thirty kilometres. The symbolic value of that action was to show that he was creating space for the new president to govern without Nyerere’s shadow looming over him. However, as in leaving the presidency on completion of his last five-year term, he still had two years to go before his term of office as chairman of the ruling party was due to end. While there was a small minority who urged him to resign from that position, most people urged him to stay on and finish his term, thereby contributing to the tradition of constitutional transfer of power.

There was another reason why his continuation as the ruling party’s chairman proved critical and stabilising. His successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, had been President of Zanzibar and Tanzania’s Vice-President only for one year. Before that, he was Tanzania’s Ambassador to Egypt for over eight years. He therefore did not have immediate first-hand knowledge of the Tanzanian political scene. He had become Zanzibar President following political turmoil in Zanzibar, and the climate was not yet very stable. Nyerere’s remaining in the wings was therefore to prop up his successor rather than to second-guess him or otherwise constrain his freedom.

During the first two years of his retirement, Nyerere concentrated on settling down in Butiama village. He became a small-scale farmer, cultivating maize and millet and influencing development at the local village level. He was elected a member of the village council/development committee and it is alleged he clashed with his village mates on a number of occasions over development priorities. He won some battles and lost others. He continued to chair the National Party meetings routinely, which brought him to Dar es Salaam, but during much of that period there were no contentious issues. The only potentially contentious issue related to Tanzania/donor relations and IMF conditionalities, which he had fought as president. Information available is that in spite of his philosophical distaste for the IMF, he never used his muscle, as party chairman, to block moves by his successor to negotiate with the donor community. During that initial period when he resided in Butiama, many national and international leaders, including the President, often
went to his village on pilgrimage or to seek his counsel.

A senior clergyman interviewed for this study had the following to say about Mwalimu Nyerere’s contribution to governorship and development during and after retirement:

Nyerere was a true son of Tanzania, Africa and the world over. He was one of the precious gifts that God gave to mankind in the 20th Century. He was a man genuinely touched by whatever atrocities that befall fellow human beings ... He was a humble man and a man who practised what he was preaching. He loved peace and wanted peace to prevail on earth ... Until his death in 1999 he was engaged in efforts towards restoring peace in the neighbouring ethnic conflict-torn Burundi. ( )

A similar assessment is offered by Werrema, who describes Nyerere in the following terms:

Nyerere died as one of the most respected figures on the continent, and the world as a whole. His perfect combination of philosophy, intellect and integrity made him seem, at least to some people, like a saint. He loved his country very much. So much so that he sacrificed his own life totally for the country ... Nyerere was popularly known and highly respected for his struggle against slavery, racial discrimination and humiliation. Besides, Nyerere was also respected for his pure traditional African lifestyle. (Werrema, 2006:25-6)

The two views on Nyerere reproduced here are not exceptional. Many people who were asked to give a verdict on Julius Nyerere affirmed these sentiments. A content analysis of Nyerere-related stories published by the Tanzania Daily News between 1990 and 1995 indicates that governorship and development featured more than 200 times in the statements attributed to the former President. A few examples are listed here:

- ‘Preserve Water Sources’, Nyerere tells peasants throughout the country (9 June 1990, p. 1)
- Nyerere warns Tanzanians to avoid electing people into high office on tribal or religious grounds (5 October 1995, p.1)
- Nyerere calls for government of national unity (9 June 1995, p. 1)
- Nyerere against Opposition demand for holding a constitutional conference (9 June 1995, p. 2)
- Opposition parties too young to rule – Nyerere (4 October 1995, p. 1)

These citations show the founding father’s active involvement in the country’s governance and development following his retirement. It is appears, too, that he was particularly involved, and had a major influence, in the turn of events that
led to the selection of the presidential candidate of the ruling party in the 1995 elections. Tanzania’s *Guardian* newspaper carried a number of front-page stories on Nyerere and the nomination process:

- Elect non-corrupt President – Nyerere (9 June 1995, p. 1)
- Nyerere virtually chaired meetings of the Party’s Central and Executive Committee during screening of presidential aspirants in Dodoma (28 June 1995, p. 1)
- “Nyerere washes linen ...” – CCM founding father Mwalimu Nyerere who vowed to remain politically biased yesterday turned neutral and strongly warned government against harassing political party leaders particularly at party meetings (1 September 1995)
- Mwalimu: “You must accept results.” As Zanzibar held its breath and waited for the result of the presidential election, Mwalimu Nyerere last night appealed to the two leading parties to accept the results (26 October 1995)

It is clear from the news reports that Mwalimu Nyerere actively sought to ensure that the 1995 first multiparty election was peaceful, free and fair. He also emphasised the need to elect competent leaders who would be able to uphold the country’s cherished history of peace and national unity. He was against electing leaders on the basis of ethnicity, religion or any other divisive element that would compromise national unity. On 1 May 1995, at the May Day celebrations in Mbeya, Tanzania, he insisted furthermore that election of leaders was a very serious matter, and that voters needed to be very careful so that only competent and non-divisive leaders were elected. He also used the occasion to highlight the ruling party’s ills as a way of ‘rescuing’ it from potential defeat in the 1995 multiparty election. He was particularly concerned about the party fielding weak and incompetent candidates and about corruption (Maliyamkono, 1995:31). In the same year, the late Mwalimu also published a book *Leadership and the destiny of Tanzania* (Nyerere, 1995), which was a critique of the then top leadership and the need to address contemporary leadership challenges.

Based on the foregoing assessment, it is reasonable to suggest that during his retirement Nyerere was actively engaged in politics, and that he once in a while interfered with the running of government. It is also evident that although Nyerere sought to ensure that his country did not fall apart after his retirement, he was occasionally overwhelmed by his party inclination. Being the founding father of CCM, he was unable to disguise his love for, and commitment to, the party. This compromised his position as a neutral umpire and as the father of the nation. That is also why some opposition parties voiced their uneasiness (as noted above) with his apparent bias towards the CCM during the 1995 election.

At the international level, the retired Mwalimu Nyerere also had a major influence in roles such as Chairman of the South-South Cooperation and as an advocate for Africa at global forums. His views on the restructuring of the UN, the reordering of the international economic order and the need to rein in the Bretton
Woods institutions are very well known. He was a staunch believer in African self-reliance and in the dignity of the black race. Having worked tirelessly with others in seeing to the liberation of the former Rhodesia, and in ending apartheid in South Africa, Nyerere was a major arbitrator in civil conflict in various parts of the continent. Nyerere died a hero. His death caught the attention not only of his country but also of the world at large.

**Mzee Mwinyi, Benjamin Mkapa and Rashid Kawawa**

Content analyses of newspapers generally indicate that the second Prime Minister, Rashid Kawawa, and the Second President of Tanzania, Ali H. Mwinyi, also remained engaged in governorship and development after retirement. The main difference between Nyerere and these two is that their engagement has largely been in domestic issues and that in his case there was no perception that his engagements were crowding the space of the incumbent. A survey of *Uhuru* local newspapers in the years 1985, 1986 and 1987 shows the remarkable engagement of Rashid Kawawa in domestic matters. Similarly, a survey of the Tanzania *Daily News* and *Guardian* newspapers, covering the years 1990 and 1995-2000, shows that retired President Mwinyi was also active in governance matters, mainly in domestic politics.

Former President Benjamin Mkapa has served on international panels, and has played highly effective roles in settling regional conflicts. Lately, he has been actively engaged in the ruling party electoral campaigns, causing raised eyebrows as to whether such engagements are appropriate for a former head of state.

**Other retired Tanzanian leaders**

The table below indicates patterns of continued engagement of retired Tanzanian parliamentarians and ministers since independence.

**Patterns in the engagement of Tanzanian retired MPs and ministers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of engagement</th>
<th>Year of retirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully retired</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceased</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Speaker’s Office, Parliament of Tanzania, supplemented by interview responses from MPs, Dodoma, Tanzania, June 2007.
These figures show that a good proportion of first-generation retired leaders (those who served in the immediate post-independence period) died early in their retirement. Another significant proportion went into farming (20) while a sizeable group reinvented themselves within the political arena (18). Later, as the country moved towards pluralism and multiparty competition from 1990 onwards, an increasing number of political and civic leaders began re-inventing themselves as they retired from one type (political) of leadership. They stood for other political offices, went into business, but (with a few exceptions) avoided going into farming.

The reform period has witnessed an upsurge in the engagement of retired leaders in governorship and development. This is partly due to the fact that the reform era has created more avenues for retired leaders to engage in politics, economics and other socio-cultural activities. The single-party monolithic politics and state-centred governance strategy of the earlier years had tended to limit these avenues of opportunity.

Responses from interviews with both ruling party and opposition party MPs generally showed acknowledgement of the need for retired leaders (in this case, MPs and Ministers) to continue engaging in the country’s governorship and development even after formal disengagement from current positions. However, many MPs were of the view that the initiative for continuous engagement must come from two sources – from the retired MP/Minister himself or herself, and from the state. On the latter point, the MPs stressed the need for an institutional framework for tracking the progress of retired public officers and availing the nation of their knowledge and experience. In particular, the Bunge (Parliament Office) needed to establish a databank of retired MPs so that those among them who were capable could, regardless of their party affiliation, be called upon to serve the country in other capacities.

The MP for Karatu (CHADEMA), the Hon. Dr W. Slaa, emphasised, however, that parliamentarians needed to acquit themselves creditably while in office, commenting that the issue of post-retirement engagement in the country’s governance and development is primarily to be based on deliverables by the MP/Minister when still in formal politics. People will just look for you if you made a difference during your political career. One should not expect to be called for engagement if he/she was inactive. The CCM’s Mbozi East MP, the Hon. Zambi, reiterated the need for retired MPs/Ministers to be proactive and enterprising after retirement arguing that end of tenure in formal politics does not mean that the MPs/Ministers are no longer useful for the country.

It is gratifying to note that in his response to the concerns expressed by MPs, the Director of the Bunge confirmed plans to establish a databank for retired MPs. The next table indicates current placements of retired leaders from 2005 to 2008.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of current engagement</th>
<th>Number of retired MPs and Ministers</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2005 to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully retired</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceased</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>ditto</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Speaker’s Office, Parliament of Tanzania, supplemented by interview responses from MPs: Dodoma, Tanzania, June 2007

*Additional perspectives on retired leaders’ activities were gleaned from surveys of newspaper coverage, along with aspects reflected in the (limited) literature.

The table shows that the business sector is the sector that has attracted the largest number of retired MPs and Ministers. This is partly because of the sector’s buoyancy following the liberalisation of the mid-1980s. The post-socialist period in Tanzania has seen increased engagement of Tanzanians in the private sector, including private economic ventures.

For similar reasons, a significant number of retired MPs and Ministers are also moving into civil society roles, with the introduction of multiparty and political pluralism having expanded opportunities for involvement in civil society activities. Among the roles that could be played in civil society bodies are those of advocacy and lobbying for the disadvantaged, provision of welfare services, and policy activism. There is likewise an increasing tendency by retired MPs and Ministers to return to politics.

Strikingly, none have chosen to move to academia, even among those who were academics before becoming politicians. This reflects a general feeling that academic work in Tanzania is less lucrative than politics these days, with salaries, incentives and terminal benefits for MPs and Ministers being higher than those accruing to academics.

The overall indication is that these exiting leaders are not opting for retirement; they remain engaged in various productive activities within the governance and development arena (or vie for further elective or appointive office) as an income-generating endeavour. There is a need to address this problem so that society taps their experience and hindsight without encumbrance and embarrassment. For that to happen, however, institutional arrangements must be devised that would make their engagement more honourable and productive. So what then (assuming that retirement benefits are satisfactory) are the institutional
mechanisms that could create an environment conducive to productive input from retired leaders?

Some lessons from Nigeria could be useful in developing such a framework. As a way to engage its senior retired leaders, Nigeria has set up a number of mechanisms – one having constitutional standing, while others are backed by Acts of Parliament. Acknowledging the need for continuity in governorship and development, Article 153 (1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides for the establishment of a Council of State, and the Third Schedule, Part I of the Constitution lists the membership of the Council as follows:

- the (currently serving) President, who shall be the Chairman;
- the Vice-President, who shall be the Deputy Chairman;
- all former Presidents of the Federation and all former Heads of the Government of the Federation;
- all former Chief Justices of Nigeria;
- the President of the Senate;
- the Speaker of the House of Representatives;
- all the Governors of the states of the Federation; and
- the Attorney-General of the Federation.

The Council’s responsibilities as follows:

1. Advise the President in the exercise of his powers with respect to:
   - national population census and compilation, publication and keeping of records and other information concerning the same;
   - prerogative of mercy;
   - award of national honours;
   - the Independent National Electoral Commission (including the appointment of members of that Commission);
   - the National Judicial Council (including the appointment of the members, other than ex-officio members of that Council); and
   - the National Population Commission (including the appointment of members of that Commission).

2. Advise the President whenever requested to do so on the maintenance of public order within the Federation or any part thereof and on such other matters as the President may direct.

Another example of efforts to keep erstwhile leaders fully engaged (and institutionalise their continuing engagement) is the establishment by Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration of a Presidential Council on Foreign Affairs. As its name implies, the Council is expected to advise the President on foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the strategic choices open to Nigeria in the contemporary world. The Council is made up of all surviving former foreign ministers as members. In addition, a few former ambassadors are to serve on the Council on a rotational basis. The Council’s work is backstopped by a secretariat supplied by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (which also covers the Council’s incidental expenses). Other than the appointment of other retired public officials to serve on an ad hoc basis as chairpersons or members of public institutions and boards, no attempt has been made to establish for the home service a body similar to the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs.

Without necessarily copying the model, Tanzania could develop such types of institutional arrangement for various sectors to tap the experience of erstwhile retired leaders. Given the broader definition of leadership, arrangements could tap retired leaders from industry, civil society and religious organisations.

**CONCLUSION**

The paper examined whether leadership has contributed to improvements in the quality of governance and development in Tanzania since pre-independence days. The results of the assessment seems to suggest that the Tanzanian polity (state and society), during both the colonial period and much of the period since independence, conceived leadership in narrow terms, taking leaders to be persons holding positions that are linked to power. Mwalimu Nyerere, however, a ‘philosopher king’ for his time, had a vision for transforming the country using *Ujamaa* and a charisma that could sway the people and move with them. But Tanzania was a large country and Nyerere and his converts were too few on their own to reach all its corners.

The majority of his lieutenants, moreover, were steeped in the transactional conception of what it meant to lead, in both governance and in steering development, which kept them distant from the main body of society. Since Nyerere could not be everywhere, his message failed to reach all of the populace, and when it did it was often distorted. Cynicism set in and the transformation of Tanzania along the lines of *Ujamaa* failed to materialise, although some of the underlying philosophical foundations such as empathy and national cohesion are fortunately still alive.

The country does not as yet have another philosopher king to read the citizens’ mood and bring forth a new vision for it. This task has now to be done on a consensus basis. Fortunately the new political dispensation ushered in a culture of leading by consensus and in a climate of political pluralism, where leaders are not necessarily those holding power. The country should hold fast to that route and create institutions that make governorship a shared business involving politicians in office and in opposition, civil society leaders, civil servants, clerics and sheikhs, and, in particular, leaders who may have retired but are still not tired.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


ASSESSING PRACTICAL MECHANISMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS FOR RE-INVENTING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN UGANDA

S.B. Kyohairwe
& G.K. Karyeija
School of Management Science
Uganda Management Institute

ABSTRACT

Century-long theories on local governance demonstrate big achievements that range from efforts of improving efficiency and effectiveness in the local level service delivery to enormous participation and democratisation. Arguments of post-war reformers in the 1950s and relating to localists’ hypotheses of the 1980s have indicated tremendous achievements in as far as attaining substantial local autonomy, pluralism and social-service provision are concerned.

The New Public Management approach, with a business customer service model, and the New Governance models, have had observable impacts on the local governments. Both local and central governments have been characterised by attempts to slow down government’s growth in terms of overt public spending and staffing; shift towards privatisation, quasi-privatisation and away from core government institutions; renewed emphasis on ‘subsidiarity’ in service provision development of automation; and adopting a more international agenda on decision styles and intergovernmental cooperation. Participatory approaches in governance and democratisation through massive local pluralist elections and approaches towards local economic development are claims behind the current nature of developing countries’ local politics. All these notwithstanding, observable trends indicate a possible stagnation of local governance in all spheres of local governance in Uganda. This paper therefore explores probable explanations for this phenomenon and suggests feasible solutions for re-shaping local service delivery approaches.

INTRODUCTION

Re-invention of local self-governance gained momentum in the late 20th century with most developing countries going through waves of public service reforms. During the 1980s, and increasingly in the 1990s, governments tried to overcome the flaws of centralisation by transferring decision-making powers not only to local
levels of central government organs or semi-autonomous public agencies but also to elected officials of local jurisdictions and civil society organisations. In the early 2000s, the main focus was on securing service delivery to the poor and on citizen-based conceptions of local governance. In the course of these transitions, certain persistent elements have become apparent. One has been a shift from centralisation and concentration to disengagement of the state, accompanied by economic liberalisation and decentralisation. More recently, however, local governance has become increasingly preoccupied with good governance practices embodied in increased participation through representative institutions, political equality, participative governance, and guarantee of collective and individual rights. Continued improvement of performance calls, in turn, for a further range of approaches such as partnerships that draw in diverse societal actors.

Uganda has a relatively long history of local governance dating back to the colonial period in the first half of the 20th century. Following this phase, two statutes in the initial post-independence period, (the 1964 Urban Authorities Act and the 1967 Local Administrations Act), recentralised most service delivery functions to the minister responsible for local government, with individual local authorities maintaining only a few residual duties. The political regime of the 1970s further incapacitated the existing local governments. A general analytical view of the period 1960 to 1980 makes apparent pervasive institutional and systemic decay, socio-economic stagnation and infrastructural deterioration that offered little opportunity for structural government rejuvenation. A global trend in the 1980s of restructuring governance and public services, coupled with a new national government regime in 1986 headed by the National Resistance Movement (MoLG, 2006), brought changes in both national and local structures of governance that laid the ground for subsequent transformations over the past two decades. At the level of local governance, changes in Uganda have been enabled by institutional and legal frameworks that include the Local Governments (Resistance Council) Statute of 1993, the 1995 Constitution and the Local Governments Act of 1997. These paved the way for full operationalisation of the decentralisation policy. Uganda’s attempts to re-invent local governance fall in with corresponding moves across Africa characterised by a cocktail of New Public Management (NPM) and New Public Service (NPS) approaches to governance cascading from national to local level.

LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM AND ITS THEORETICAL CONCEPTIONS

Understanding re-inventions of local governance calls for a detailed reflection on the fundamentals of local governance per se. A starting point would be the orthodox theoretical propositions in its favour dating back to the 19th century

2 1971 to 1979 was the political era of Idi Amin, the notorious totalitarian president of Uganda.
advocacy of thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, arguing that local governments aid political participation, ensure efficiency and service delivery and counter excessive centralisation of government (Stoker, 2005). Their focus was largely on increased participation, contending that decentralised units not only increase accountability and responsiveness but also promote and utilise the knowledge and interests of the people in the locality and in due course build their governance and political capacities.

The second strand of theorists is represented by the post-war reformers of the period between the 1950s and 1970s, such as Mackenzie (1961) and Sharpe (1970), whose chief concern was with the implications for local governance of the expanded and extended welfare state. King and Stoker (1996) have shown that local governments are necessary to allow individuals to voice their needs and learn the art of practical politics. Sharpe suggests that local governments create a moderate consumer pressure group that promotes unorganised interests such as those of young people, women, and other marginalised social categories. Serving as agents of response to rising demand for public services, local governments offer better controlled and planned service delivery and provide a counterweight to the discretional power of professionals who run the public services in their own interests rather than in the interests of society (King & Stoker, 1996:7-8).

A third strand, represented by theorists such as Jones and Stewart (1985), values the local government system for its considerable scope in relation to local autonomy and decision making. Their concerns chiefly relate to advancement of local autonomy in service delivery, thereby reaping advantage from pluralism of participants and pluralism of ideas.

Jones and Stewart (1985) also make the point that local government and local people are essential for ensuring that resources are better matched with the diversity of the local needs, arguing that closeness of local governments to citizens increases the visibility of government and opens it to public pressure for responsiveness and accountability, concentration of power being a danger to a free society.

Although a range of developments have taken place since the orthodox debates began, and notwithstanding failures and questionable relevancy of some of the original conceptions, they continue, in one way or another, to guide local governance world over. Attempts to re-invent local government still echo the assumptions of orthodox theory.

**EXPLORING THE NPM AND NPS CONCEPTS AND DEVELOPMENTS**

New Public Management is a term that has attracted wide scholarly attention and analysis. It has been described by Christensen and Lægreid (2005) as “a global reform movement inspired by particular economic theories and normative values, and characterised by increased market orientation, devolution, managerialism and
the use of contracts” and by Minogue (1998:17) as “the form of modern public administration that seeks to bring equilibrium between making government efficient and keeping it accountable”. Tom Hernes (2005) emphasises its dual focus on service to the public and accountability to society at large, seeing it like Minogue (1998), as a set of ideas and methods that aim to combine accountability and efficiency in public administration, but pointing out in addition that it may “imply the creation of market mechanisms for the delivery of services, such as contracting out”.

Christopher Hood (1991) describes NPM as a loose shorthand term for a set of related ideas about how to organise public services, which challenges established or traditional ideas and embodies seven principal doctrines: (i) hands-on professional management in the public sector, whereby managers are allowed to manage so that there is clear accountability, since accountability requires clear assignment of responsibility for action; (ii) emphasis on explicit standards and measures of performance, whereby goals must be defined and performance targets set and assessed based on these measurements; (iii) output controls that focus on results rather than procedures; (iv) disaggregation of units in the public sector through breaking up large entities into corporate agencies to gain the efficiency advantages of franchise arrangements; (v) greater competition in the public sector through term contracts and public tendering; (vi) introduction of private sector styles of management practice through the application of private sector management tools to the public sector; (vii) emphasis on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use.

Even in the absence of an agreed definition, many developed and developing countries have used these guiding principles. Following suit in this paper, we will consider NPM as public administration reforms focused on the infusion of market-oriented principles to improve performance and service delivery with minimum cost.

Emerging subsequently in reaction to the New Public Management, and gaining increasing currency is the development that has come to be known as New Public Service, in which the focus is on the mission of government and how to determine collective public interest. Denhardt and Denhardt (2011) argue that there are other considerations that should come before cost and efficiency, and that citizen participation should be a major factor in decisions. They see the role of the administrator as very complex: synthesising the needs of citizens, interest groups and elected representatives. They outline seven core principles of NPS: (i) serve, rather than steer; (ii) seek the public interest; (iii) think strategically, act democratically; (iv) serve citizens, not customers; (v) recognise that accountability is not simple; (vi) value people, not just productivity; (vii) value citizenship and public service above entrepreneurship. They present NPS as a set of ideas about the role of public administration in the governance system that places public service, democratic governance and civic engagement at the forefront, arguing
that in the present era of governance, good governance requires a perspective on public service that is open to the full range of policy choices, management strategies, ethical responsibilities, and civic commitments needed for effective and responsible public administration. They see NPS as highlighting the complexities of democratic governance and civic engagement, where democracy involves a diverse collection of people, beliefs, traditions, processes and structures that come into play when public decisions are made. This calls for a public administrator who fosters citizenship while at the same time defining, protecting, promoting and managing public values. In the NPS perspective, government is a vehicle for ensuring that competing and diverse interests in the public domain are nurtured to promote a national ethos or shared values. NPS focuses on democratic and social criteria whereby the public interest has priority and public values are upheld. In the dispensation proposed by Denhardt and Denhardt, the public administrator must attend to law, community values, political norms, professional standards and citizen interests.

Motivations for NPM and NPS, envisioned on economic growth and development in Africa as reported in the 1981 World Bank document, *Accelerated development in Sub-Saharan Africa* (also known as the Berg Report), noted that African economies were witnessing retrogression rather than accelerated growth. The report identified four problem areas that were obstacles to economic growth: (i) poor macro-economic management marked by persistent fiscal deficits, negative interest rates, price inflation and controlled exchange rates; (ii) an over-extended public sector in which ubiquitous parastatals (such as marketing boards, nationalised import substitution industries) were seen to be inefficient entities that squandered resources, and distorted prices insofar in their mandate to control and regulate certain markets that governments regarded as strategic; (iii) management of the trade regime, which was regarded as militating against free trade through high rates of protection and exchange rates that overvalued local currencies; (iv) too much spending on public service as a guarantor of employment, and on social services and other consumption-related expenditures, which were seen as unsuitable in the long run in relation to the global environment.

Emanating from these perspectives were the Service Improvement Wave of the 1980s, the Capacity Building Wave of the 1990s and the Structural Reform Wave from 2000 onwards. The improvements were felt globally, especially in developing nations, which led to structural reforms in most developing countries from the beginning of the 1980s propelled by the World Bank and the IMF. The structural reforms sought to make governments learn to adopt affordable cost reductions and containment measures, focus on the redefinition of the role of the state as limited to some functions and leaving the others to sub-national governments, the private sector, and the voluntary sector. The main issues were the need for the state to provide a conducive environment through private sector development, decentralisation, and the privatisation, commercialisation or liquidation of non-functioning public
enterprises. The second generation of reforms focused on capacity building for improved service delivery, accompanied by efficiency measures to enhance public management performance. Underlying principles included improvement of functional and personnel management systems with an emphasis on increased autonomy for managers (with corresponding responsibility), pay reform (linked to performance), and continued skill development and upgrading. The third generation of reforms was partly a response to inadequacies in the first and second waves of reforms focused on service delivery improvement. These new reforms sought to establish transparency and accountability, along with sector-wide approaches in service delivery – the emphasis being on enforcement of accountability through increased transparency, openness, and citizen participation. Efforts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and transparency in the delivery of public services came to include privatisation, decentralisation, commercialisation, contracting out and (most recently) trendy agencification and public/private partnership approaches to service delivery.

**NPM PERSPECTIVES ON UGANDA’S LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM**

The Ugandan local governance system and its dynamics have received scholarly attention in a number of studies. In what he categorises as Phase Three (1970s to 80s) of the decentralisation which took place in African countries under structural adjustment policies and practices, Dele Olowu (2001) argues that the economic crisis of the 1970s, triggered by the (Bretton Woods-instituted) IMF and the World Bank, resulted in the adoption of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) which promoted decentralisation of local governments as a possible mechanism for cutting back central government expenditures. Through devolution of functions and responsibilities of the central government to local units, it was hoped that efficiency and effectiveness would be gained. In reality, decentralised structures were seen as extensions of central government into the field. In a drive to advance service delivery, the SAPs promoted a decentralisation of responsibilities for services not only to state-created structures, such as local governments/administrations, but also to private entities and non-governmental organisations. In many instances, local governments remained nonetheless dependent on the centre for budgets, personnel and ideas.

In Uganda, for instance, one reason for embracing a local government system in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the orthodox notion of offering opportunities to develop the local public and private sector economies, premised on an idea that separating service provision from service production could increase autonomy and efficiency in service provision. Pressured by financial crises, the state opted to broaden funding of these decentralised services to include not just the traditional tax sources or government transfers but also user fees for basic services such as health and education, and also funding from the private sector and from non-
Financial decentralisation in Uganda was preceded by political and administrative decentralisation that, along with other approaches, attempted to restructure both the political units and the public services and their related administrative structures. Among the factors that propelled these macro-and micro-level reform initiatives were (i) constitutional reform to democratise the national political system (a Constituent Assembly was elected in March 1994); (ii) decentralisation intended to boost democratic participation in local authorities and promote empowerment through self-determination (Decentralisation Statute, 1999, Constitution of 1995; the Local Governments Act of 1997); (iii) liberalisation and privatisation designed to reduce state control over the economy with macro-economic stabilisation, adjustment framework and market-led competition (PERDS Statute, 1993); (iv) the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) initiated in the late 1980s, which sought to redefine the role of government, rationalise and streamline government structures, eliminate redundant staff, and restructure management systems and incentive structures for improved public service delivery.

These numerous listed reforms were implemented in Uganda at the central level within government ministries but also, more especially, in the locally decentralised units. As we have already noted, local governance was long established in Uganda, but with feeble structures. These reforms sought to renew and strengthen the shaky existing local governance frameworks of post-colonial and post-independence Uganda. The new mechanisms gradually brought about a substantial reduction in the functions and size of all governments (particularly in the late 1990s), with notably improved capacity of local governments to perform the more limited range of economic management activities, coupled with a reduction of local government expenditures.

**DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISATION AND COMPLEXITY OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES**

The principal impact of NPM on Uganda’s local governance was political decentralisation. The push for democratisation in the 1990s inspired a further wave of decentralisation reforms. Kiyaga-Nsubuga and Olum (2009) cite issues of citizen participation, equity, electoral representation and accountability that together constituted a driving force for democratic decentralisation in Uganda.

This democratisation force inspired a structurally complex system in Uganda that embraces urban and rural dichotomies in a spectrum of local councils (LCs) ranked hierarchically from LC1 to LC5. Uganda local governance taxonomy includes rural and urban local governments as well as administrative units. Local governments are further classified into higher and lower government structures. The higher local governments are the District Councils and the City Council, with city division councils, municipal councils, town councils and sub-county councils.
being lower LG councils. Within the urban area, local governments fall into three categories: the city LG council (equivalent to a rural district LG council), municipal councils and town councils. Subordinate to the City Council are city divisions LG councils, equivalent to the municipal LG councils. Within municipal councils are municipal divisions that are equivalent to town councils. Town council local governments are equivalent to a sub-county LG council of a rural area. Each of these listed units legally qualifies as a body corporate.\(^3\)

With regard to the rural areas, the existing local governance system and legal framework provides for district LG councils as the highest organ, below which are the sub-county LG councils. Within these designated local government councils there are a number of administrative units. Rural area local governments comprise county, parish and village administrative units, while in the urban area local governments there are parishes/wards and villages. The Local Government Act also provides for a town board administrative unit positioned between the ward and village in urban councils (Kyohairwe, 2009; Local Governments Act Cap 243).

**LOCAL UNIT SIZE AND DETERMINATION OF SERVICE DELIVERY**

Government in Uganda has also seen a rapid expansion of sub-national administrative units. Since the initial embrace of decentralisation and the ideals of NPM, districts as functional administrative units have risen in number from 34 in 1990 to 112 in 2014. Although the creation of new districts is provided for in the Constitution, and is supported by citizen demand, the rate at which districts are being created is, we would argue, becoming unsustainable. The parliament of Uganda estimates that it requires Ushs.1.145bn (in personal emoluments alone) for a new district to be operational. There is a general feeling in the local government policy subsystem that the Ministry of Local Government should, at a minimum, phase out and control the creation of new districts, and the Ministry has in fact now adopted a phase-out strategy for the creation of new districts (Mwesige, 2012).

A further complexity underlying the formation of these districts is the way they are carved out of ethnic community backgrounds. In a population of 35 million, more than 65 ethnic communities make up Uganda’s 112 districts. This diversity has been largely responsible for persisting social divides in relation to management and service delivery (Karyeija, 2010)

**UGANDAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN RUINS?**

In the years since NPM reforms took root in the 1980s, transformation of the public sector has undoubtedly (in the words of Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 34), involved “less government (or less rowing) but more governance (or more

---

3 LGA sec 6 stipulates that as bodies corporate, these local governments, among other mandates, have perpetual succession, a common seal, and may sue or be sued in their corporate name.
steering), but it is increasingly clear that the transformation and improvement of local governments still has far to go. Our conclusion stems from the challenges presented by structural fragmentation and new managerialism that tend to reduce the likelihood of benefit from the NPM and NPS reforms.

Of late, the mechanism for re-inventing local governance seems to lead to excessive decentralisation in the creation of financially unfeasible local units that have reacquired the massive unproductive civil service that existed before the 1980s. Indeed, the arguments now re-echo those advanced three decades ago by Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1983), who noted then that the degree to which decentralisation is carried out is critical. Analysis of the Ugandan local governance trend since the early 1990s to date indicates a transition from orthodox local governance principles of community empowerment and NPM to much broader structural redesigning. The original goals of participation, citizen education, efficiency and effectiveness, linked with enhancement of local interests and capacity, have waned considerably. Similarly, the NPM doctrines of hands-on professional management that focuses on accountability remain questionable in the face of financial misappropriation and poor procurement management and accounting reports – as constantly reflected in the Auditor General’s reports, parliamentary debates and the media (Basheka, Oluka & Karyeija, 2013).

While there has been improvement in the standards and measures of performance – enhanced by performance management reforms in the public service such as goal-setting and performance-contracting – evidence is negligible of this NPM doctrine having an effect in local government. Massive inefficiencies continue in local government service delivery, where value-for-money audits have yet to convince activity financiers (the central government and donors). The focus on results rather than procedures, as required in NPM, is yet to be realised, with most civil servants still engrossed in their traditional administrative culture of rule-following.

We could, on the other hand, argue that there has indeed been focus on the fourth NPM doctrine concerning disaggregation of units in the public sector by breaking up large entities into corporate agencies to gain efficiency advantages. This doctrine might be strongly appealing to policy makers who have displayed unflagging interest in re-dividing the existing local governments (to the point of 112 districts by May 2014). The doctrine concerning a shift to greater competition in the public sector by term contracts and public tendering has also been widely embraced, with frequent inadequacies in the processes that have continuously raised accountability concerns.

Like other doctrines borrowed from NPM with admirable but minimal achievements, so too has been the attempt to follow private-sector styles of management practice by applying private-sector management tools to the public sector. It must, however, be noted that significant differences between the contexts
and the nature of goods and services offered in the public and private sectors cast doubt on the universal applicability of private-sector management tools. Claims of greater discipline and parsimony in resource use that Hood (1991) advances remain unrealistic in Ugandan local governments, not only due to failures on the part of the local governments themselves but also in the face of a pervading national culture of financial indiscipline.

**WHAT OF THE NEW PUBLIC SERVICE?**

New Public Service approaches in Ugandan local government largely subscribe to the orthodox doctrines of local governance. Community participation has been – and is still – strongly emphasised at local level with both top-down and bottom-up approaches. The local government planning process is one area where bottom-up community participation has been maintained consistently over the years. Top-down community approaches have been widely utilised in project implementation where the project frameworks are designed at the national or sub-national level and then brought down to the community for purposes of legitimating ownership, enhancing accountability and realising the public interest of service delivery. Community associations and groups are agents for full community participation. Observable and documented evidence also shows many areas of partnerships among private and public agencies at both local and national levels.

NPS has not, however, progressed without observable obstacles, including professional and political infiltration of existing associations and groups, derailing them from their core aims and operations. The un-representativeness in terms of disadvantaged groups such as women and the disabled, as well as literacy levels (and differences) of community group members, continue to pose a great challenge to full membership participation. We must also recognise, on one side of the continuum, the scourge of corruption, and on the other, the limited value attached to recognising people as citizens and to public service. These same factors affect both NPM and NPS objectives for working towards public and community interest in the locality. Traces of non-democratic tendencies are one more factor in the minimal relevance of NPS in Ugandan local governments.

Finally, while centralisation and decentralisation are not mutually exclusive or dichotomous arrangements for governance, as evidenced in various ongoing instances of mutual and harmonious central-local relations, the extent to which the local units have gained and maintained their autonomy does matter in local governance. A situation of total financial dependence of local governments on the centre (as is currently the case in Uganda) incapacitates political and administrative decisions at the local level. The central government transfers, which constitute a large proportion of local conditional and unconditional expenditure, demonstrate that NPM reform benefits are increasingly less relevant. This state of affairs calls for a renewed vision to refocus Uganda local governance.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Ugandan local governance system has been reinvented and re-engineered several times, but the impact remains rather difficult to measure. On the one hand, there has been a tendency to over-decentralise, and on the other, institutional capacity at the lower local governance units remains fragile. This creates a continual dilemma for under-funded administrative units seeking to maintain service delivery, where they are overstaffed with political leaders and administrators yet understaffed in critical services such as health. We find it hard to resist the conclusion that local governance in Uganda is in ruins, with little reward to be derived from an NPM/NPS cocktail.

Following the tenets of NPM and NPS, we argue nonetheless that the degree of decentralisation must be given close attention to broaden the possibility of achieving its political objectives; at issue is government responsiveness to the needs and demands of particular interest groups within society and appropriateness of the means by which policies and programmes are designed and carried out. Equally critical is the potential for decentralisation to foster self-determination and self-reliance among subordinate units of administration or non-government organisations, whether in promoting development or in meeting priority needs within society. We also urge that both central and local governments need to work in tandem, with substantial financial, political and administrative autonomy, for cost-effective and managerially efficient achievement of development goals. A starting point would be to change the sharing formula so that the revenue gets spent at the local levels rather than only at the centre.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


ABSTRACT

The effective and efficient performance of Uganda’s public service is critical in delivering goods and services demanded by the citizenry. Public officials, through their mandatory and discretionary powers, are expected to act in the public interest as they perform their roles and responsibilities. However, the glaring lack of professional ethics and accountability by some public officials prevents the public service machinery from contributing to good governance. All public officers, and especially those in senior and strategic leadership positions, should dedicate themselves to fulfilling the citizens’ needs by being more accountable and transparent in the way they manage public resources. This, along with other critical measures, is essential if good governance is to be embedded in Uganda’s public sector.

INTRODUCTION

In Uganda, lack of professional ethics and accountability are two critical factors that obstruct efficient and effective performance by the public service. Professional ethics signifies values underpinning the impartiality, objectivity, integrity, efficiency, effectiveness and discipline of public officials when they act in the public interest and exercise discretionary powers (Rasheed, 1993). These problems are aggravated by the severe crisis of legitimacy and governance (Hondeghem, 1998). Hence, many leaders, such as members of parliament, cabinet ministers, and public servants, fail to fully represent their constituencies, misuse their powers, and fall short of serving the public interest (Aucoin & Jarvis, 2008; Prah, 1993 553).

In Uganda, these shortcomings are treated as normal behaviour by some politicians and technocrats. Citing statistics that clearly indicate how Ugandans have become corrupt over the years, Bafokuzaara (2008:4) notes the 2004 National Service Delivery Survey (NSDS) evidence of corruption in most institutions, with service-users paying for services that they should enjoy freely. She also cites bribery in various institutions: Central Police Station (33%), Local Administration Police (26%), High Court (16%), Magistrate Courts (16%), and in the health sector 30%
where patients have been asked to pay for the services despite the abolition of cost-sharing. In addition, she cites the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Report (2007), which notes that all informants acknowledged that corruption is now institutionalised.

This is not an environment conducive to good governance, for which a key requisite is public accountability (Global Call for Action Against Poverty 2008a and 2008b). For this reason, “there is now a global resurgence of interest on how to prevent all forms of unethical practices including corruption and fraud in the public and private sectors” (Rasheed & Olowu, 1993:1). Holding governments accountable is a technical process of policy monitoring based on reliable statistics and a political process of empowering the public and civil society to participate effectively in the democratic process. Under international law, governments are obliged to enforce human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, by delivering economies that are both equitable and work for the poor through quality public services, and by ensuring decent work for all.

This article argues that some public officials working for the Government of Uganda (GoU), especially at the senior level, have failed to fulfil their commitment to the citizens by accounting to them and being transparent in the way they use public resources. The delivery of services and the entrenchment of good governance have thus been greatly hampered.

ACCOUNTABILITY, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, GOOD GOVERNANCE

Accountability is a protean concept (Mashaw, 2007:1) denoting a social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other (Bovens et al., 2005:5). Accountability ensures that actions and decisions taken by public officials are subject to oversight to guarantee that government initiatives meet their stated objectives and respond to the community’s needs, thereby contributing to better governance and poverty reduction. Accountability involves two distinct stages: answerability and enforcement. Constitutionally, accountability is a bundle of rules and principles regarding checks-and-balances on public power that may be institutionalised in various ways (Curtin, 2005).

In the accountability process, the relationship, or the account-giving, is between the accountor and the accountee. Any accountability system should prioritise four fundamental issues (Aucoin & Jarvis, 2005): (i) priority given to the transparency of data, files and records; (ii) independent audit of financial statements, management systems and transactions; (iii) independent review of decisions and behaviour for compliance with the law and policy; (iv) public questioning of ministers and public officials about their policies and executive-administrative actions.

Taxonomically, accountability is classifiable according to the type that is
exercised and/or the person, group or institution the public official answers to. The main forms of accountability, in reference to their alternates, are: horizontal versus vertical accountability (embracing social and diagonal accountabilities) and political versus legal accountability. Other forms include financial accountability, moral accountability and professional accountability. These typologies express themselves variously within a country but with minimal consequence in relation to public accountability. Of these latter forms, financial accountability is the most disrespected.

However, increasing accountability in an organisation may also have adverse effects. O’Neill (2002) notes that beyond some critical threshold, further increases in accountability may actually decrease legitimacy and trust. The thrust of his argument is that every glitch in a policy process and every disappointing policy outcome may become a source of public outrage and political bickering. Similarly, Brin (1998:140) argues that too strong an emphasis on criticising and sanctioning may lead to disdain for government and paranoia. In other words, transparency and accountability are beneficial up to a certain point. This is why Power (1999) stresses that increased transparency may lead to a call for even more transparency, setting in motion a vicious cycle of control and distrust.

Nevertheless, public accountability is crucial because it is about the legality and institutionalised practices of account-giving (Bovens et al., 2005:5). It means the obligation of authorities to explain publicly and fairly, before and after the fact, how they are carrying out responsibilities that affect the public in important ways (Citizens’ Circle for Accountability, 2008:2). The requirement is that those who hold public trust should account for the use of that trust to citizens or their representatives. Hence, public accountability signifies the superiority of the public will over private interests and tries to ensure that the former is supreme in every activity and conduct of a public official (Olowu, 1993:221).

Furthermore, the initiatives of public accountability ensure that public money is spent most economically and efficiently to avoid wastage or theft. The main aim of public accountability is that the public should benefit from public finance (Khan & Chowdhury, undated:1). Significantly, public accountability condemns and strives to combat corruption because it is one of the worst enemies of development – diverting resources, weakening public institutions, eroding the legitimacy and credibility of state action and ultimately destroying citizens’ trust in government. Misuse of public office for private gain bodes ill for accountability and good governance.

The fact is that whereas the provision of goods and services can be privatised, governance cannot. This is why ‘holding to account’ means obtaining from authorities the explanation that the public need at the time they need it, validating the reporting for its fairness and completeness, and doing something sensible and fair with explanations to attain good faith. Public accountability also means
promotion of democratic control, compliance, and continuous improvement in the use of public authority and resources (Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000:45-46). In democratic governance, public accountability requires that those who exercise public authority are subjected to scrutiny by a superior public official or public body. Accountability imposes obligations: those who exercise authority must render accounts to superiors, and superiors must extract accounts and pass judgment on them. Should this judgment be negative, then superiors should take corrective measures or apply appropriate sanctions, as they deem necessary.

**LINKING PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY TO GOOD GOVERNANCE**

Full and fair public accounting is an imperative if public institutions and society are to function properly. Governing authorities ought to know their obligation to give public account. Today, transformation of governance is towards a more participatory and democratic model so that the public can ask for accountability where none is forthcoming (Kim, 2003:1). The “displacement or diffusion of national, state-based ‘politics’ is one of the crucial contemporary ‘shifts in governance’” (Bovens et al., 2005:2). This transformation is a result of the traditional bureaucratic state being reshaped by non-state actors including civil society because accountability is now viewed as one of the cornerstones of good governance.

Although the essence of good governance, or even simply governance, remains ill-defined (Landell-Mills & Serageldin, 1991), the bottom-line is that shareholders (citizens are the stakeholders with regard to public resources) want assurance that their money is being well managed and that finite resources are being expended in the people’s best interest (National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy, 2007:1). Governance thus means “the exercise of political, administration and managerial authority and order, which is legitimate, accountable, transparent, efficient and equitable in allocating and using resources to promote human welfare and positive change of society” (Bafokuzaara, 2008:1).

The link between public accountability and governance is that the former cannot transpire in the absence of the latter where citizens themselves participate fully (ECOSOC President, 2008:2). In such a governance system, citizens dispose of effective and legitimate means for questioning the ways in which development is promoted. Public accountability therefore goes beyond citizen engagement, participatory governance and constant and interactive process of making the governors answerable to the governed for their actions, extending to the very essence of rule-of-law and good governance (ECOSOC President, 2008:2).

Ultimately, good governance is about good government and the inclusion of civil society and the private sector in the management of public affairs. It is also about enabling citizens to gain freedom, have their views heard, choose their representatives and associate freely with others. Citizens therefore become rights-
holders, and as such they claim their rights through the use of responsible, effective and efficient institutions. Lack of good governance produces disparity, injustice, deprivation and lawlessness in society and for the poor.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY TO GOVERNANCE

Public accountability has direct and indirect significance for governance in several ways. Public accountability is critical to governance because of the need for fair and full accounting from authorities. Despite its simplicity, public accountability has not been grasped as a regulator of fairness by citizens and their elected representatives. Evaluating the ongoing effectiveness of public officials and public bodies ensures their full performance, providing value-for-money in the provision of public services, instilling confidence in the government and being responsive to their community. However, for full accounting to occur, citizens should not confuse the meanings of public accountability and responsibility. Public accountability is the obligation to explain intentions, performance standards, results of action taken, and how the available resources have been applied. Responsibility is the obligation to act. While the two go hand-in-hand, citizens tend to ignore the significance of responsibility in enforcing governance.

Consequently, public accountability is an obligation that cannot be refused in a democracy. It is actually central to representative democracy. From a democratic perspective, therefore, the accountability arrangements do not offer enough incentives to the accountor to commit himself/herself to the agendas of the democratically elected accountees. Constitutionally, an accountability arrangement should create the checks and balances needed for a balance of power.

Unfortunately, there are three grounds on which citizens have yet to set basic performance and public accounting standards for authorities and their elected representatives for public validation of what they say: (i) lack of the knowledge required to do so because many are uneducated; (ii) failure of public officials to sensitise them to do so; (iii) blind trust in authorities on the part of the citizens, effectively condoning a syndrome that has allowed unethical conduct to persist. It is arguable that unethical practices and the lack of accountability of public servants are partly, and importantly, due to insufficient awareness on the part of the public and public servants of the overall socio-economic costs of malpractices.

Yet anti-corruption agencies and citizen protests, outrage and distrust of the intentions and performance of authorities in Uganda, as in other countries (Prah, 1993:49), clearly indicate that they have not succeeded in winning the battle for fairness. The demand by the public for greater accountability becomes even more urgent as corruption remains entrenched. The effectiveness of the design and practice of accountability within governance and public administration invariably and significantly affects the behaviour and performance of public officials and
public authorities. Usually, the design and practice of accountability ignoresthe ‘voices’ of the public and of civil society, resulting in a public service that ischecked by public officials themselves – many of whom have a carefree attitude
towards issues of public accountability and governance.

Both elected representatives (politicians and councillors) and non-electedrepresentatives (bureaucrats) should exercise public accounting according toa standard of explanation that citizens have the right to see met. However, therelationship between public accountability and governance is complex and mul-tilayered. Virtually everyone to whom an account is due is also accountable tosomeone else at a higher level. The ultimate authority is the electorate: citizens have theconstitutional right to pass judgment on those they have elected to parliament andindirectly on their government. The effectiveness of public accountability andgovernance in Uganda has been questioned by a number of individuals andbodies, such as the Auditor General and civil society. This deficiency is the basis foran analysis of the degree of public accountability in Uganda’s public service andits significance to governance.

LEGAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY MECHANISMS FORENFORCING PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

The GoU has set in place a number of legal, institutional and policy measures toenforce public accountability in pursuit of good governance (Bafokuzaa, 2008:6-16). The legal mechanisms to be discussed here include the 1995 Constitution, theLeadership Code Act (2002), the Inspectorate of Government Act (2002), thePrevention of Corruption Act (2009), also referred to as the Anti-Corruption Act,
*Qui tam* legislation, the Whistleblowers Protection Act, the Local GovernmentsAct (1997), the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (2003), thePublic Finance and Accountability Act (2003), the National Audit Act (2008), andthe Access to Information Act (2005).

Clearly, Uganda has the necessary constitutional framework for fightingcorruption. The 1995 Constitution (as amended) entrenches the constitutionalparameters through which all other laws derive their authority and function tofight corruption. Specifically, Article 17 (ii) provides that “All persons placed inpositions of leadership and responsibility shall, in their work, be answerable tothe people; all lawful measures shall be taken to expose, combat and eradicatecorruption and abuse or misuse of power by those handling political and publicoffice.” In addition, the Leadership Code Act (2002) lays down the minimumstandards of behaviour and conduct for leaders. The Act emphasises transparencyand accountability in the way leaders exercise their public obligations. An anticorruption court and leadership tribunals have been established constitutionallyas a means of implementing the Act. The Access to Information Act (2005) is anaccompanying measure to ensure that the Act and other statutes enforce publicaccountability. With this constitutional framework in place, the anticipation was
that leaders would behave within the framework of the Act. Unfortunately, a pervasive regime of insufficient reporting of performance by ministries has given rise to serious accountability problems (Olum, 2008:45-51; Opio-Lukone, 2008). In reports prepared by these agencies, the focus is frequently on self-reporting, thus establishing only one-half of the accountability process. As for the Act, leaders continue to embezzle public funds and misuse public resources with impunity as if the Act does not exist. While some officers have been arrested, for example the Principal Accountant in the Office of the Prime Minister, others go scot-free.

This impunity is one of the main reasons why the Inspectorate of Government Act (2002) was passed by parliament. It is meant to ensure that all categories of leaders behave accountably. The powers of the Inspector General of Government (IGG) include investigation and prosecution of those involved in corruption or abuse of office and authority. Special courts have been created specifically to handle corruption cases. As will be discussed later, however, the fight against corruption by the IGG’s office has been extremely difficult because of the complexity of the corruption scourge.

Consequently, the GoU had to review the Prevention of Corruption Act (1970) to cause it to bite. A new Act, which came into force, known as the Anti-Corruption Act (2009), incorporates Uganda’s international obligations under the African Union Convention on Corruption and the UN Convention Against Corruption. It is a penal law providing for corruption offences such as bribery, transacting business with agents in a corrupt way, and procuring the withdrawal of tenders. It also expands the scope of the definition of corruption and provides for stiff sanctions against the corrupt through measures such as confiscation, freezing and seizure of proceeds obtained corruptly. Further, the Act defines the role of CSOs in reporting cases of corruption-related activities. Confiscation, freezing and seizure of proceeds obtained corruptly have thus far never been put into effect in Uganda.

To strengthen the review process, the GoU has initiated *qui tam* legislation designed to allow a private citizen to sue on behalf of government and to receive a share of any financial penalties imposed, inclusive of government protection. It is a reward system for whistleblowers. The 2010 Whistleblowers Protection Act sets out the procedures through which individuals in public and private sectors can disclose information that relates to irregular, illegal or corrupt practices. It also provides for the protection against victimisation of persons who make disclosures regarding the conduct of other persons. This Act also enables civil society to effectively participate in gathering evidence against those who are corrupt and improving the prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases. It is interesting to note that while Black Monday demonstrations by some civil society activists have sought to sensitize citizens to taking action against the corrupt, they have instead become the victims of police harassment and arrest. This contradiction is a serious constraint to whistleblowing.
At the local level, the Local Governments Act (1997) seeks to strengthen transparency and accountability in local governments. The 2006 Local Governments (amendment) Act (No. 2) and the supporting Local Government Regulations No. 39 of 2006 were streamlined to bring them into line with the 2003 Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (PPDPA) – which itself gave birth to the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA). The PPDPA empowers the PPDA to intervene to minimise corrupt practices in public procurement. The Authority is also empowered to monitor how the Procurement and Disposal Entities (PDEs) comply with the provisions of the Act, the regulations, and any guidelines issued by the PPDA. In addition, the Act empowers the public to report acts of non-compliance with the existing law. And like other statutes, this Act has continuously been flouted by numerous individuals in the public and private sectors. Many have escaped arrest because of connections to highly placed politicians. Hence, the legislative measures have done little to end corruption in some local governments.

Another government measure to curb malfeasance by officials of all categories has been the Public Finance and Accountability Act (2003), which is amended whenever need arises to meet changing demands for transparency and accountability. The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) is mandated to handle a number of accountability-related functions such as guiding and monitoring the financial affairs of local governments, and to impose sanctions on them if they fail to comply with the law. Giving further thrust to public accountability is the National Audit Act (2008), intended to enhance the autonomy of the Auditor General’s Office. The Auditor General is empowered to approve the withdrawal of funds from the Consolidated Fund through auditing and reporting on the public accounts of Uganda. In spite of this Act, financial indiscipline continues unabated. Worst of all, the Auditor-General’s reports to parliament are either not acted upon, or acted upon belatedly.

Lastly, there is the 2005 Access to Information Act, intended to provide the necessary tools for enforcing efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, accountability, constitutionality and empowerment. Empowerment is within reach when the citizens can cause public officers to conduct themselves according to high standards by demanding relevant information relating to matters of public interest. However, not all citizens are aware of this Act or know how to use it.

Uganda has established institutional frameworks to enforce these legal provisions. These are the IGG, the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (DEI), the Inter-Agency Forum (IAF), the Judiciary, the Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID), the Directorate of Public Prosecution (DPP), the Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) and District Public Accounts Committee (DPAC), and the Accountability Sector. Given their significance, each of these institutional frameworks will be discussed in turn.
Under article 223 of the 1995 Constitution, the IGG is mandated to fight corruption. Ten regional offices have been established to bring the institution closer to the people. Also, under article 233 of the 1995 Constitution, the IGG has set up a Leadership Code Directorate to implement the Leadership Code Act with the aim of requesting, receiving and processing declarations of incomes, assets and liabilities from specified public officers. The IGG is authorised to take action on the non-compliance by public officers in accordance with the established procedures within the Leadership Code Act. Because the IGG’s office has been decentralised, more complaints have been received from citizens. However, inadequate resources and poor co-ordination have constrained the full implementation of its mandate.

To address the co-ordination problem, the DEI was created to coordinate the efforts of government agencies in fighting corruption with the objective of rebuilding ethics and integrity in public offices and the private sector. It is mandated to set policies and standards that enhance accountability, ethics and integrity. It also spearheads the development of the national strategy to fight corruption in order to rebuild ethics and integrity in the society. Effective coordination suffers from resource constraints in all the ministries. To support the DEI’s efforts, the IAF was established.

The IAF is comprised of government agencies charged with promoting accountability and transparency in public offices to fight corruption. It is meant to combine planning and implementation of a national Anti-Corruption Strategy in furtherance of a common agenda. As a forum, it is expected to improve communication between various anti-corruption agencies, build synergies, rationalise activities, share experiences and information, and pool resources in pursuit of a common goal. Like the DEI, it faces serious resource challenges thus delaying all forms of justice (economic, social, political, etc.) suffered by citizens.

The responsibility of the Judiciary is to ensure that the administration of justice is executed and is seen to be executed. Further, it is supposed to strengthen the administration of justice to make it more independent and self-accounting. However, some of the institutions are weak and the judiciary and the legal sector experience serious challenges such as a backlog of judicial cases, poor prison conditions, high detention rates, excessive use of force by the police, lack of a legal assistance system, corruption, limited internal control mechanisms, and limited understanding by citizens of their rights due to high levels of illiteracy. Hence, fraud continues unabated.

This intensity is the reason why the CID has established a fraud unit to manage fraud cases. It has also developed its staff capacity. Enforcement of the Prevention of Corruption Act is the responsibility of the DPP and the IGG, and the former has special investigative powers to examine a suspect’s bank account, power to order inspection of documents possessed by a suspect or his or her relations, and power to obtain forensic information such as sworn statements or certified
copies of documents. Alam (2002/2003:1) notes that constraints commonly faced by governments in attending to such measures are limited capacities and resources; Uganda is no exception to these constraints. Lastly, the PAC and the DPAC are mandated to monitor the utilisation of public resources in implementing government plans. Cases of corruption detected through their efforts can lead to prosecution of the officers involved. The Accountability Sector, meanwhile, seeks to establish a sectoral approach in fighting corruption and in building systems of accountability. The Sector brings together institutions that perform complementary roles in the delivery of services and the execution of other government programmes. It coordinates the following members: the MFPED, the DEI, the Inspectorate of Government, the Office of the Auditor General, the Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority, the MoLG’s Inspectorate, and representatives of the development partners.

Apart from the laws and institutional framework, the GoU has formulated several policies to provide guidance to various institutions in relation to issues which include decentralisation, a national strategy and plan of action to fight corruption, national values, and coalition building. Each of these policies is discussed in turn.

The decentralisation policy was formulated to transfer power, authority, responsibilities, resources and functions from the centre to local governments and to bring services nearer to the people. It was also meant to enable the public to monitor public officials and prevent them from misusing public offices and resources (Local Governments Act, 1997). Much as decentralisation has brought government nearer to the people, corruption has continued unabated.

The National Strategy and Plan of Action to Fight Corruption, drawn up in 2000-2003, is a multi-agency approach intended to co-ordinate national efforts in the fight against corruption and to establish a system to enforce transparency and integrity in the public service. It has both reactive and proactive elements. Reactively, it deals with detection, investigation, prosecution and adjudication of cases; proactively, it deals with public mobilisation and education in ethics and integrity and creating a conducive environment for citizens to hold public officers to account for their actions or inactions. Because this policy has not yielded much, yet another policy had to be formulated.

The National Values Policy identifies common values that define the direction on ethical standards of behaviour in a democratic polity. It is also intended to bring about behavioural change in society where issues of integrity and public accountability are uppermost in the minds of the citizens. However, high attrition in elective offices at local and national levels tends to produce relatively inexperienced MPs and other political leaders. In addition, representative systems and party leadership structures have given political leaders enormous dominance, producing situations in which such leaders are unwilling, or perhaps unable, to hold public officials to account. In a survey in Uganda commissioned by the then
Minister of Ethics and Integrity, Dr Nsaba Buturo, and conducted in December 2007 by the Steadman Group, parliament was found to be the fourth most corrupt institution in the country, reflecting the general lack of effective leadership and weak functioning of the legislature (*Sunday Vision*, 2008:1-2).

Lastly, the policy on Coalition Building deals with the establishment of collaborative frameworks linking the IAF, civil society and the private sector in a sharing of information and experience as they fight corruption and promote integrity in public life. The relationship between the partners is based on mutual trust and commitment to fight corruption by raising public awareness on the need to insist that public officers be accountable. Aligned with this policy are the policies on liberalisation and, in particular, privatisation – where the focus is on reducing state involvement in the economic sector and thereby eliminating corrupt practices. However, civil society organisations are so weak that they cannot undertake rigorous political analysis to identify the tools and processes that would be needed to hold the GoU to account. Similarly, the citizens are too powerless to hold their governments (central and local) to account due to ignorance and poverty.

In spite of these policies and programmes, the major problem is that accountability arrangements do not respond adequately to the practices of multilevel governance. Bovens *et al.* (2005:4-5) note that ‘multilevel governance’ challenges hierarchical assumptions about relations between clearly delineated ‘levels’ of government – national and local. Multilevel governance is characterised by three main features: (i) decision-making centres at multiple levels of government, that (ii) are not clearly hierarchically ordered (even though there may be formal relations between them), and (iii) whose decision-making processes are mutually intertwined. All these and related issues must be addressed if public accountability and good governance are to be entrenched.

**REFORMING PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY TO ACHIEVE GOOD GOVERNANCE**

Improving public accountability and governance requires a reformed oversight of the public sector and its agencies and of the governance infrastructure in the country. In seeking to identify reform strategies, it has to be recognised that accountability and governance are complex issues that will require multi-dimensional and integrated solutions.

At the outset, auditors of public companies must exercise maximum accountability to enhance the confidence, reliability and integrity of the financial reporting process. By implication, the mandated bodies (Auditor General, IGG, etc.) must act independently and transparently in their oversight function to achieve results from various complaints. The findings of annual inspections should be posted on a website for public scrutiny. Self-reporting should be complemented by independent performance reviews in evaluating departmental programmes and
their management. Such reviews should not be confused with performance audits, which have a different focus and function. Hence, there is a need to develop and implement proactive national anti-corruption strategies (Republic of Uganda, 2000) consistent with international conventions on anti-corruption (Ofosu-Amaah et al., 1999:38-81). Professional experts should adhere to such strategies by rejecting any form of political interference.

Another way in which professional experts can perform their roles is to form a public accountability board or a parliamentary agency – a system of private sector (but not ‘self-’) regulation that would not be under the control of the accounting profession (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2002:1). This structure should supplement existing oversight and enforcement efforts by expanding the opportunities to detect and remedy lapses or deficiencies in competence, thereby complementing the existing authority’s enforcement efforts. While parliamentary committees could receive performance reviews, they should not undertake them because MPs on either side of the House are partisan. They may even be reduced to the status of rubber-stamp MPs if the executive is too powerful to be subdued. These reviews should therefore be undertaken by professional experts who are ‘peers’ of the professional public servants managing departments and their programmes. Furthermore, there is a need to reconfigure existing accountability forms and develop new forms and practices to act as checks upon the evolving politics of multilevel governance. Related to this measure is the need to encourage public service occupational associations to institutionalise professional values and to deploy them as instruments in transmitting expectations of the public to their members. Further, they should be seen as channels through which the morale, feelings and attitudes of public servants can be communicated and maintained.

While the enactment by the GoU of the Access to Information Act (2005) entitles the public to demand information on any matter of interest to them, public officials should proactively make it easy for the public to access information. Policies for the provision of such information, as methods of soft accountability, should contribute to the legitimacy of any institution (Voermans, 2007:148-159). To attain full legitimation, the GoU, working closely with other stakeholders in support of this Act, should enforce and support freedom of expression, including freedom of the press and freedom of association. The media should be seen as central to investigating and exposing all factors that interfere with proper accountability and governance in the country. Of late, the liberalised media, especially the press and FM radio stations, have become a vanguard for probity and accountable public performance in the country, despite the harassment they sometimes encounter from some overzealous state operatives.

Equally crucial, the GoU should ensure quality and universal public services for all (health, education, water and utilities) and stop privatisation where it causes deprivation and poverty. A citizenry that is poor and deprived of services cannot easily fight graft. If anything they can be compromised and end up joining groups
that are ready to use activism, as has been the case of the banned civic group formerly known as For God and My Country (4GC).

Furthermore, the public sector should promote ethical behaviour by public officials through the Code of Ethics – which needs to be made more current, applicable and effective and should be online. Ethics ought to provide the basis for accountability. Ethically, the concept and practice of accountability is expected to make public officials responsible for their actions or inactions. Unfortunately, in the majority of African governments, widespread ethical violations and weak accountability undermine the effectiveness and image of government still further (Rasheed & Olowu, 1993:3). Whistleblowing mechanisms should be made available, through websites for example, both internally to staff and externally to outside stakeholders. Theoretically, an accountability arrangement should be able to stimulate administrative bodies and officials to achieve a higher awareness of the environment, increase self-reflection, and induce ability to change so that public officials do not remain permanently in a bureaucratic routine of public administration. Experts such as scholar-statesmen, specialists, consultants, government experts and entrepreneurs, should be in a position to construct such an arrangement. They must, however, be corruption-free.

With the authority and legitimacy of policy experts being founded upon their knowledge and professional credentials, there are strong traditions of professional accountability; experts are called to account by other experts and professional norms and standards are important in guiding their actions and decisions. In Uganda, emphasis on professional accountability can weaken hierarchical and political accountability in regard to expert input in policy making because experts do not feel a strong obligation to account for their actions other than to their peers. Yet increasing the transparency and expert input in policy making is a key solution in controlling technocracy and enhancing democratic accountability. Ultimately, each person is accountable for his or her own deeds or misdeeds. To strengthen internal self-restraint on the part of public officials, there is a need to educate and motivate them to seek and defend the public interest rather than selfish interests either of their own or of other special interest groups. Professional and ethical standards can be enhanced when enabling conditions of service are promoted.

Fostering public service professionalism is an important safeguard in seeking to entrench ethical and accountable behaviour. It remains a fundamental requirement of public service professionalism that recruitment should be based on ability and advancement within the service on merit. These are central elements in institutional capacity building (Olum, 2013:19) and they call for a sound educational system that is relevant and responsive to the developmental and professional needs especially germane to a public service career and its changing demands and requirements. More outcome-focused performance indicators for public officials make it possible to spell out service requirements in advance through means such as results-oriented management (ROM). A further reason why standards of accountability for
public and private providers of services need to be enforced is to clarify how the convergence of public and private sectors impacts on accountability (Cameron, 2004:59-63).

Furthermore, where responsibility for programmes is collaborative, clear governance frameworks should be established by, for instance, ensuring more participative and collaborative leadership. Duty to serve the public requires a psychology or culture or ethos of service in national political and public life. Uganda’s political leaders bear a heavy responsibility in promoting governance in all spheres of life. All the more reason, then, for them to transmit such a psychology of service through their own example and action. Capacity to create, manage, and optimise the required resources is a key challenge facing leadership and management in Uganda today; visionary leadership and managerial excellence will be a key answer to the socio-economic crisis of Uganda’s underdevelopment.

Once these bottlenecks are dealt with, a more constructive and informed policy dialogue will be possible to enhance the legitimacy of the government’s policy choices in fostering national stability, strengthening the formal processes of audit, and helping to remove governance-related barriers that constrain all accountability measures in the country. One means for this could be to strengthen the multiparty system so that political debates focus on developmental issues. Also, Ugandans need to be sensitised on public accountability and governance issues so that they will take the issues seriously, approach them systematically, and ensure that sanctions, condemnation and punishments on public officials are imposed on offenders to deter malpractices. Social reward, honour and recognition should be bestowed on ethical practices in government offices.

The ultimate safeguard of high standards of public ethics and accountability has to be the capacity of average citizens both to hold public officials to account for their actions or inactions and to ensure that public institutions fulfil their functions and responsibilities. It also means actively involving civil society – including the poor, women, children and socially excluded groups, including people with disabilities and indigenous peoples – in policy formulation and implementation of international and national development priorities, policies and plans (such as budgetary and employment processes) (Uganda Debt Network 2002:16-22). Although civil society groups in the country are increasingly vocal in opposing structures of state domination and increasingly foster integrity, accountability and transparency of governance, they are still weak and disunited and lack adequate resources. They are also intimidated by state operatives whenever they campaign against corruption.

Entrenching public accountability also requires creation or strengthening of internal and external institutions: (i) the legislature (which scrutinises public accounts and oversight responsibilities over the executive) and legislature-based institutions; (ii) the judiciary (courts which adjudicate among institutions, organised
groups and individuals) and quasi-judicial institutions (commissions of enquiry, tribunals, ombudsperson, and the public service commission); (iii) the executive (which exercises the powers of governance through ministerial agencies) and executive-based institutions; (iv) extra-legal bodies (media, pressure and interest groups, and political parties – formidable institutions that demand accountable performance from the public service – and not forgetting elections and referenda); (v) internal institutions (civil service rules and regulations, training, disciplinary/appraisal procedures and inspection – supporting their accountability by making them more autonomous, less bureaucratised, better-resourced in funds, tools and skilled personnel, and with enhanced public visibility and respect). Accountability requires a range of institutions to give it force over a sustained period of time. Unfortunately, they continue to be ineffective because they focus more on dispute accountability – which deals with issues that particular institutions are meant to handle – rather than on the intrinsic accountability of the institutions themselves.

More seriously, entrenching public accountability cannot yield positive results when the capacities of the public and private sectors are relatively unknown. There is urgent need for research into the country’s public and private sectors since a major factor in the country’s management crisis is because little is known about them – an information deficit that explains why reforms turn out to be counter-productive (Rasheed & Olowu, 1993:6).

Equally significant is the need to plough resources into the country’s programmes, although this would require improvement of the economy to a level where there would be resources for all sectors – governmental and non-governmental; resources sufficient, for example, to pay public officials well. Endogenous factors inhibiting development that must be attended to include poor planning, bloated bureaucracies, bad public expenditure policies, runaway inflation, lack of viably adapted institutional structures for accumulation based on indigenous cultural usages, lack of probity and unethical behaviour by public servants, and patron-client networks which breed sectarian practices (Prah, 1993:52). Exogenous factors include declining terms of trade, economically paralysing debt burdens, socially and economically disenabling structural adjustment programmes and globalisation.

Although public accountability is a technical issue, it is also a democratic question. In this regard, the electoral system under the current multiparty system should be reformed so that leaders are elected credibly in order to stabilise the polity. Equally important is the fact that citizens should be sensitised on governance generally. Given that the political institutions are still young and fragile, the ruling party is dominant in both the political and public spaces, especially now that there is weak separation between the ruling NRM party and the state. This fusion explains why the parliament has yet to play a more critical role in quality of political debates or holding the executive to account on behalf of the citizens. The recent opening towards multiparty politics creates a need for clear scrutiny of electoral procedures and management so that electoral results produce wide public support with efficient
management by a non-biased Electoral Commission. Also, the parliament should be reformed to strengthen the position of MPs generally with their parliamentary leaders and thereby reduce party indiscipline, which is undermining the capacity of parliament to hold the executive to account.

In modern democracies a basic principle is that the public service derives its authority from the citizenry and its responsibilities and duties from the public interest. As such, the public service must answer to the general public through the representatives of the citizenry. Hence, greater democratisation of the polity is contingent upon government having greater capacity and willingness to make hard policy choices in prioritising resources across and within sectors, in translating resources into better service delivery, and in managing the political fallout from those choices (DFID, undated). When this becomes possible, weak or broken links between authority, responsibility and accountability can be restored.

Ultimately, public accountability and good governance must be located squarely within the domain of politics because public accountability and governance are political acts. Here, ‘politics’ is defined in the Eastonian sense as the processes of deliberation and decision making regarding the binding allocation of values for a community (Easton, 1965). Thus, there is a need for political will to tackle the problem of lack of accountability and bad governance head-on. Political will at all levels enhances institutional capacity to make accountability more effectual. In the end, government is said to be accountable when duty-bearers do the following (Alam, 2002/2003:2): respect and are willing to practise their defined responsibilities; take action in a way that ensures equitable treatment of all citizens and create spaces for others to take action; permit and enable stakeholders to participate in government decision making; establish measures to account for horizontal and lateral relationships; relate performance and outcomes of action and inaction; and institute mechanisms of sanction by which citizens can criticise government and seek justice, including the application of voting rights to change their government.

**CONCLUSION**

This article has argued that the practice of public accountability is central to good governance in Uganda. Hence, there is a need for better articulation and practice of the essential elements of accountability and good governance. Because there is confusion over what public accountability and good governance mean, the starting point must be to clarify them by locating their analysis in their proper conceptual framework. Although some legal reforms and institutional actions have been taken by the GoU to improve public accountability and good governance, the increasing number of accountability mechanisms has made the regime even more complex. Since government is best when it accounts to the people, and power, according to Acton’s dictum, corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely, the GoU is consequently most effective and responsive to the citizen’s interest when
it accounts directly or indirectly, formally or informally, to the citizens or their accredited representatives.

Today, with immense pressures locally, nationally, regionally and globally to address defective public accountability systems in the developing countries, the controls (including accountability elements such as audits and reviews) that apply to departments and to government agencies operating at arm’s length from ministers need to be strengthened further. Further reforms such as giving assurance to parliament and the public on the use of public authority and resources by the government or promoting ‘continuous improvement’, would also enhance public accountability and probity of governance. Another critical factor is the political capacity of parliament to hold the government and the public service to account – an issue that will be determined largely by the extent to which the parliament is dominated by the executive. The current executive arm clearly overpowers the parliament to the extent that the latter is frequently impotent to contain the excesses of the former, thus disrupting the notion of parliamentary democracy in which the checks-and-balances should be ingrained.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Olowu, D. 1993. Organizational and institutional mechanisms for enhancing


INSTITUTIONS AND FOOD SECURITY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANISATIONS IN KENYA’S RURAL AREAS

S.K. Mutukaa & B.C. Mubangizi
School of Management, IT & Governance
University of KwaZulu-Natal

ABSTRACT

Food insecurity continues to plague Kenya’s rural arid and semi-arid lands, which are vulnerable to market and climatic shocks. The majority of Kenya’s population lives in rural areas and depends on agriculture for survival. However, the performance of the agricultural sector has been declining, leading to intermittent acute food shortages necessitating workable sustainable food security interventions. Drawing on open systems theory and on the capability approach to food security, this paper reports on a study that sought to investigate the contribution of community-based organisations (CBOs) and how such institutions can be leveraged by the public sector to achieve sustainable food security in Kenya’s rural areas. A sample of 202 respondents was drawn from 40 CBOs in Kenya’s Kakuku sub-location, Thika District. The data was collected through household interviews using a structured questionnaire and was analysed using descriptive statistics. The study established that although 70% of CBOs were undertaking food-security related activities, poor marketing channels and storage facilities were identified as a major hindrance to expanding sustainable food security in the area. The study recommended that capacity building and provision of public services infrastructure was of paramount importance in improving the producer’s performance, and in increasing their competitiveness and ability to access agricultural markets in their value-chain. The study further noted that CBOs were an instrument of social transformation and an effective channel for community participation and empowerment. Properly leveraged, CBOs are an important component of the institutional set-up for sustainable food security in developing countries such as Kenya.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), more than 850 million people live in conditions of hunger or undernourishment worldwide, most of them in the developing world. In sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture is the most important economic activity supporting over 67 per cent of the population, and 60 per cent of this segment depends on rain-based rural
economies, generating a range of 30-40 per cent of the country’s GDP (World Bank, 1997). In Kenya, poverty and food insecurity are the main challenges facing the majority of Kenya’s population (Nyoro & Jayne, 1999). This is because the majority of the population depends on agriculture-related activities for their livelihoods and the performance of the agricultural sector has been declining.

The main feature of Kenya’s agriculture is the predominance of small-scale farmers who account for 75 per cent of total agricultural production and 70 per cent of marketed agricultural output (Kinyua, 2004). The communities in arid and semi-arid lands of the country are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity because of recurring natural disasters such as drought, livestock diseases, animal and crop pests, and limited access to appropriate technologies, information, credit and financial services. The Government of Kenya declared food security a crisis in January 2009, indicating that 10 million Kenyans would need urgent assistance in rural and urban areas. The aim of this action was to put measures in place to implement the Concept Note on the Kenya Special Program for Food Security (KSPFS), which was developed in the year 2002. This Concept Note outlined the Kenya Rural Development Strategy for alleviating poverty by encouraging farmers and particularly the CBOs in Kenya to improve their agricultural productivity and other income generating activities.

Since Kenya’s economy is largely agro-based, economic growth has also dwindled due to the poor performance of the agriculture sector. The sector has performed poorly in the last two decades registering its lowest growth rate (Republic of Kenya, 2009). Kenya’s average poverty level currently exceeds the 50 per cent mark. The number of the absolute poor increased from 10 million in 1994 to 13.4 million in 1997, and by the year 2000, the overall poverty situation in Kenya was 56 per cent of the total population. Nanok (2005) observes that increased investment in capacity building is critical for speeding up improvements in food security. This may involve training and extension services in rural areas to improve farmers’ ability to implement more advanced technologies and to find more profitable off-farm employment in order to boost household income. In addition, more stakeholders in the form of partnerships and networks need to be brought into the mainstream functions of the public sector. For, as Nanok (2005) has observed, developing better food security programmes will require that governments and development partners undertake an integrated and multi-sectoral effort in the rural areas of developing countries.

Achieving and maintaining food security is a central development goal in all countries. Indeed, ensuring food security should be a basic tenet of all democratic states. As noted by Mubangizi (2013), the state, through its actions, can contribute to food security by promoting and implementing policies and strategies that incrementally promote food security in society. Conversely, through state inaction, the state can contribute to food insecurity through inappropriate policies and strategies. Although food insecurity is an outcome of a multiplicity of factors and
cannot be seen in isolation from wider livelihood considerations, governance processes play a significant role in promoting food security. Governance, however, is a relationship between the government and those who are governed. In food-secure systems, it is crucial that this relationship be one that promotes and nurtures an environment that is supportive of food-secure systems. In an attempt to understand what modalities such a relationship should take, we draw on the open systems theory. The theory provides a general analytical framework (perspective) for viewing the public sector as an institution that is interdependent on its environment for structure and function, thus showing the effect of outside stakeholders on the public sector. Fundamentally, an interactive model of understanding organisation (such as in the public sector) shows the continual stages of input, throughput and output, which demonstrate the concept of either openness or closedness.

Thus, for example, ensuring food security as a desirable outcome for the state, open system theory would suggest that the state, through its public sector set-up, be open to other role players who would, in partnership with the state, provide input for better delivery and functioning of food security processes. According to Katz and Kahn (1978), such energic inputs or external influences include familiar resources, such as employees, raw materials and capital. However, they could also include intangible external influences, such as status, recognition, satisfaction or other personal rewards (Katz & Kahn, 1978). To explore this multiplicity of inputs and processes it is useful to outline pertinent conceptual issues with regard to food security.

THE CONCEPT OF FOOD SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY

The concept of food security has continued to evolve since the formation of the FAO, with the purpose of organising and strengthening international efforts in food-related matters. According to the FAO (1996) at the World Food Summit, “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. This refers to food security at household, local, regional, national and global levels. Food security therefore refers to the availability of food and one’s access to it. A household is considered food secure when its occupants do not live in hunger or fear of starvation.

Sustainability refers to the conditions that allow practices, activities and systems to endure in the long term, that is, to be sustainable. Environmental concerns have grown exponentially in recent decades, giving birth to the idea of sustainability, in which economics, society and ecology are considered together. The concept of sustainable development was first used in the World Conservation Strategy released by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) in 1980, being the culmination of many people’s thinking. According to the Brundtland Report of 1987, sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Brundtland, 1987).
For Pezzey (1989), sustainable economic growth depends on the level, quality and management of renewable and non-renewable natural resources and on the state of the environment, for the production of goods depends on flows of capital services provided by natural systems. Therefore, investments in the maintenance of natural capital services in the form of soil productivity and water availability are important pathways for achieving sustained growth in the agricultural sector. The current state of global food security raises serious concerns, as the number of hungry has surpassed 1 billion people and emerging trends are further threatening global food supply (FAO, 2003) despite a substantial global increase in per capita food production for the past several decades. Fan (2010) suggests that globally the forces challenging food security include population growth and demographic changes, high and volatile food prices, land and water constraints, and climate change. In sub-Saharan Africa, these global stress factors put pressure on already fragile food security and agro-ecosystems. Region-specific stress factors, which worsen the situation for the food insecure and vulnerable groups, include weather-related shocks, poor infrastructure, undeveloped markets, as well as weak governance and institutions. A comprehensive policy and investment agenda for achieving sustainable food security is needed to: (i) improve smallholder productivity and market access; (ii) keep trade open; (iii) promote productive social safety nets; (iv) integrate climate change into strategies at all levels; (v) harmonise food security and sustainability policy. The complexity of the food production and distribution system requires a multiplicity of actors from variously positioned institutions and organisations for, as the following discussion will show, these play a significant role in food security.

SUSTAINABLE FOOD SECURITY – THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

According to Miller (2011), contemporary sociologists refer to institutions as complex social forms that reproduce themselves, such as governments, the family, human languages, universities, hospitals, business corporations and legal systems. While Turner (1997:6) refers to institutions as “a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organising relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment”, Giddens (1984:24) simply states that “institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life.” Giddens (1984:31) goes on to list as institutional, orders, modes of discourse, political institutions, economic institutions and legal institutions. A common thread running through these definitions is that institutions shape rules, values and principles, while organisations serve as conduits for action and that these institutions shape and reshape actors and activities of the environment within which they operate. Food security is thus dependent on the institutional establishment of state and
culture, while organisations of civil society and of the private and public sectors determine how well policy and cultural intentions translate into food security.

In societal relations and livelihood processes, these rules and values shaped by institutions together with the actions and principles of organisation, not only determine the growth path (in a social, economic, political, technological and cultural sense) of society, but also the distribution of benefits, access to resources and the decision-making power of who governs who in society, and who in society determines who gets what. In other words, representative, robust and effective institutions play a significant role in advancing the development trajectory of a society and enhancing the quality of life. In this regard, North (1990:2) argues that an enabling institutional environment plays a central role in economic development by reducing transaction costs and risk, and thus promoting trade and specialisation – the prerequisites for growth. With regard to food security, a study conducted by the Broadening Access and Strengthening Input Market Systems (BASIS) in 2000 established that in order for food security to contribute to both production and nutritional well-being, institutions must think and act in an integrated manner. The research established the need for collaboration and forming partnerships (BASIS, 2001). Such partnerships should be based at the micro level with support and guidance from the macro level. In this regard, community-based organisations are most ideally placed to play a critical role in food security – a discussion of this follows.

SUSTAINABLE FOOD SECURITY AND COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANISATIONS

Sustainable food security is the condition under which the food system provides adequate food while promoting social justice and ecosystems integrity. Sustainable food security exists when all people have stable physical and economic access to healthy and culturally-appropriate food; the food system respects and promotes equity and social justice, strengthens social integrity and contributes to biophysical sustainability. It promotes biodiversity and ecosystems integrity, ensures consumers have a food environment with favourable conditions for choosing foods, and allows people to make choices and have attitudes that are beneficial to the promotion of sustainable food security (Lima, 2008).

Community-based organisations are civil society non-profit organisations that operate within a single local community. They are essentially a sub-set of the wider group of non-profits. They are often run on a voluntary basis and are self-funding and may vary in terms of size and organisational structure. The recent evolution of community organisations, especially in developing countries, has strengthened the view that these ‘bottom-up’ organisations are more effective at addressing local needs than larger charitable organisations. Efforts to reduce chronic food insecurity have focused mainly on improving food availability. These efforts have included: (i) development of improved agricultural technologies through conventional and
transgenic plant and animal breeding and better farm equipment; (ii) improved post-harvest handling, processing and marketing technologies; (iii) expansion of the quantity and quality of farmland available, including expansion of irrigation; and (iv) access to agricultural inputs such as fertilisers and improved seeds.

Mulwa (2002) establishes that community-based organisations are the most effective conduits for social transformation and are effective conduits for community participation and empowerment, which can be utilised by government to initiate food security development programmes in rural areas.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study aimed at investigating the role of community-based organisations (CBOs) and how their activities can be leveraged and integrated into the state’s objective of achieving sustainable food security in Kenya’s rural areas, with particular regard to the Kakuku sub-location, Thika district.

The objectives of the study were as follows:
- To investigate the contribution of CBOs in achieving sustainable food security in Kakuku sub-location, Thika district.
- To establish the challenges faced by CBOs in achieving sustainable food security in Kakuku sub-location, Thika district.
- To examine the strategies for integrating CBOs into sustainable food security programmes in a rural area of Kenya.

THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study used a survey design. The rationale for the selected design lies in the nature of this study, which lends itself to the use of a survey design. The research questions about the contribution of community-based organisations (CBOs), the challenges faced by CBOs, and appropriate strategies that can be used for integrating CBOs into sustainable food security programmes in a rural area of Kenya, require adequate discussion and explanation regarding the key issues. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (1999), a survey research design is probably the best method available for social scientists who are interested in collecting original data for the purpose of describing a population that is too large to observe directly. Hence, such conditions make a survey design the most appropriate methodology for this research.

POPULATION AND SAMPLE

In this study, the population comprised 40 community-based organisations with a target population of 672 community members drawn from 8 villages of Kakuku sub-location in Thika district. These villages are: Mianyani, Mwania, Kyaume, Giathanini, Kanduri, Naitira, Kakuku and Maningu. A 30% sample of the entire population was considered adequate for the study.
Table 1: Target population from eight villages of Kakuku sub-location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>No. of CBOs</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mianyani</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyaume</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giathanini</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanduri</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naitira</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakuku</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maningu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>672</strong></td>
<td><strong>202</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data from the study in Table 1 show that a sample of 202 respondents was used. This included respondents working in different CBOs in Kakuku sub-location of Thika district in Kenya. A list of all local CBOs was obtained from the district agricultural office and supplemented by the World Vision Kenya Rural Development Programmes office at Makuyu in Thika district. The study adopted simple random sampling techniques to select respondents from a particular CBO and purposive sampling to obtain key informants in the study. The primary data was collected using interviews with structured questionnaires, focus group discussions, direct observations, and trader and market visits. The secondary data was collected from documented materials from other researchers and government documents, among others. The qualitative analysis was done using content analysis guided by research objectives. The quantitative analysis was carried out using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) computer program with descriptive statistics.

**FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS**

The contribution of CBOs to achieving sustainable food security

The first research objective was to investigate the contribution of CBOs in achieving sustainable food security. The research focused on examining the activities that were carried out by 40 CBOs to determine their engagement in activities related to food security. During the study the following data was obtained.

Table 2: Activities by community-based organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBOs activities</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tree planting &amp; spring protection</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Organic farming | 26.00 | 12.9
Housing & brick making | 8.00 | 4.0
Buying, storing & selling maize | 40.00 | 19.8
Poultry production | 11.00 | 5.5
Bee keeping | 9.00 | 4.5
Building water tanks | 13.00 | 6.5
Horticultural farming | 3.00 | 1.5
Merry Go Round – saving clubs | 12.00 | 6.0
Goat rearing | 17.00 | 8.4
Hospital & burial activities | 29.00 | 14.4
Buying home furniture | 13.00 | 6.1
Total | 202.00 | 100.0

The results from Table 2 indicate that the majority of the CBOs were carrying out food security-related activities. This was demonstrated by those buying, storing and selling maize (19.8%), organic farming (12.9%), tree planting and spring protection (10.4%), goat rearing (8.4%), building water tanks (6.5%), poultry production (5.5%), bee keeping (4.4%) and horticultural farming (1.5%). This is an indication that the local communities have the potential to use available resources to develop and improve their rural livelihoods as over 70% of CBOs were directly involved in food security-related activities.

The above results suggest that a community-based approach to the problems of food insecurity is a necessity. It is a welcome approach in that it identifies the main challenges of food systems at local level and attempts workable and practical responses. Furthermore, there is an acceptance and recognition by communities that CBOs offer a foundation for initiating sustainable food security in rural areas. Clearly, this community-based approach is likely to contribute to sustainable food security in that it engages the whole community in productive activities that could be integrated into public development programmes aimed at promoting food security in the country. Given their proximity to the community, successful CBOs can promote sustainable food security by nurturing the adoption of new behaviours and attitudes that progressively lead to self-sufficiency in food production. The community approach represents an opportunity for the grassroots organisations to become empowered and to have their voices heard by government. Individuals need to embrace the principles of sustainable food security in their attitudes, and promote their traditional food production and processing activities while cautiously embracing modern agri-food models promoted by state programmes.
The challenges faced by CBOs in achieving sustainable food security

While several CBOs are involved in food-production activities, it is worth noting that they often do so under seemingly insurmountable challenges. Thus, the second research objective was to investigate the challenges faced by CBOs in achieving sustainable food security. The study focused on the existing challenges at local level that affect rural communities in expanding sustainable food security and that pose challenges to improved action by local communities.

Table 3: The challenges facing CBOs in Kakuku sub-location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges facing CBOs</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor storage facilities</td>
<td>38.00</td>
<td>18.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport problems</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>5.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crop failures due to droughts</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>11.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor marketing channels</td>
<td>57.00</td>
<td>28.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of tools &amp; equipment</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crops and livestock diseases</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>8.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of funds</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage of pasture &amp; firewood</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of technical knowledge</td>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>16.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>202.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings from Table 3 show that many of the current challenges to expanding local food security facing CBOs are linked with poor local marketing channels (28.2%) for agricultural products, where farmers are exploited by the middlemen, poor store facilities (18.8%), lack of technical knowledge (16.3%) and crop failures (11.4%) due to low and unreliable rainfall. Other challenges identified were crop and livestock diseases (8.9%), transport problems (5.9%), lack of tools and equipment (5.0%), lack of funds due to unemployment (3.5%) and shortage of pasture for livestock and firewood (2.0%), a situation which was increasing deforestation and environmental degradation.

It is worth noting that the factors regarded as least challenging are in the nature of private goods, and include funds and availability of tools. Conversely, those regarded as most challenging are factors generally regarded as public goods which are best produced by the public sector, notably, appropriate marketing channels, storage facilities and technical knowledge.

Nicholson (2004:59) describes a private good as “an item that yields positive benefits to people” and one that is excludable, i.e., its owners can exercise private
property rights, preventing those who have not paid for it from using the good or consuming its benefits. McAdams and Hallgren (1995) refer to a private good, as a scarce economic resource – one that and by its very nature can cause competition among would-be owners such that only those who can afford it will have access to it.

Public goods, on the other hand, are those whose provision cannot be confined to only those who have actually paid for them. In this sense, those unable to pay for certain services can enjoy the benefits of consumption at no financial cost to themselves. Thus, while private goods are owned by individuals or private companies, public goods are owned and provided by the government. The study confirms that CBOs are able to mobilise resources for the provision of private goods, but are hamstrung by their inability to provide such public goods as storage facilities, marketing channels or technical know-how.

That ‘poor marketing channels’ were singled out as the biggest impediment is particularly disturbing for it suggests that despite increases in global trade and food production, the actors in the agricultural markets are battling marketing systems in which middlemen and business cartels are buying, distorting farm-gate prices and forcing farmers to sell their produce at throwaway prices in Kakuku market, while these middlemen are receiving supernormal profits.

The strategy for integrating CBOs into sustainable food security programmes in rural areas

The third research objective was to examine the strategies for integrating CBOs into programmes aimed at achieving sustainable food security. Interviews with different respondents on what should be done to improve the food security situation within the context of the community organisations revealed the following.

**Table 4: Strategy for integrating CBOs into sustainable food security programmes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges facing CBOs</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBOs to form partnerships with state actors</td>
<td>28.00</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs to expand their networking</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>6.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation of cooperative societies</td>
<td>63.00</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs to lobby the government</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquiring maize mills</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation of auctions</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link CBOs with marketing organisations</td>
<td>42.00</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From Table 4 it is noted that the main strategy for integrating a CBO into sustainable food security programmes in rural areas is the formation of cooperative societies (31.2%) to market and sell food locally. Such cooperative societies have high bargaining power and are even able to acquire loans from micro-financial institutions, linking CBOs with marketing organisations (20.8%) such as the Cereals Board of Kenya, Kenya Grain Council, millers and food manufacturing companies, and enable CBOs to form strong partnerships with state actors (13.9%), particularly local government.

Other strategies include acquiring maize mills (8.4%) for grinding maize flour which can be bought more easily by customers; starting value addition by the processing and labeling (7.4%) of local products and marketing them; CBOs to expand their networking (6.9%) to create more opportunities for small-scale farming to become economically viable; CBOs to lobby the government (4.9%) to open institutional markets to family agriculture, including institutions such as public schools, prisons and hospitals, which would provide the same benefits on a larger scale; utilisation of business development services (4.0%) provided by development practitioners to gain technical skills, and marketing and the development of business plans; and, finally, the formation of auctions (2.5%) owned and managed by the farming community that can provide sustainable food options to consumers and a market for local producers.

It is important to note that the top three strategies relate to the formation of partnerships, specifically, partnerships with market organisations, partnerships in the form of cooperatives and partnerships with the government generally and local government in particular. From the findings, key informants from the community were supportive of the fact that access to adequate food through assistance, aid or charity should not be considered to be food security. Instead, people should be sufficiently empowered to be food secure without having to depend on food assistance. It was also suggested that the food system needs to be embedded in a culture that relates eating habits with sustainability.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Despite numerous and complex challenges to sustainable food security in local communities, coordinated action between the government, businesses and civil society groups could overcome many barriers. Therefore, civil society organisations can play a role networking, organising, assisting the community, raising awareness and lobbying other actors. Ikombo and Mnene (1995) carried out research on food security in the central division of Marsabit district and found that capacity building
in CBOs was the key to creating community awareness of appropriate measures that could address the food insecurity situation. The government, in turn, could create an appropriate policy environment for sustainable food security promotion, reducing barriers to local food marketing and providing more opportunities for local food producers to be economically viable by opening institutional markets. As already indicated, 70% of activities undertaken by local populations and CBOs is food security-related, and this provides an opportunity that can be used by different actors and development partners (CBOs, non-governmental organisations, the government and businesses related to food) to promote sustainable food security in the form of policy changes, community initiatives and networking among different stakeholders. The understanding of food security and a greater awareness of its challenges can be used to influence the attitudes and behaviours of different social actors, leading to action plans in the country that can contribute to a tangible transformation of the current food situation.

Most of the locally produced agricultural products are sold at Kakuku shopping centre at a throwaway price. This is because there are no organised marketing channels to sell beyond the local outlets. Therefore, limited marketing of agricultural products in Kakuku sub-location is a major problem and in fact a hindrance to the expansion of food security programmes in the area. As has been shown, 70% of CBOs are undertaking activities related to food security and only 25% were found to be involved in activities unrelated to food security. Therefore, CBOs should be used as channels for social transformation and effective conduits for community participation and empowerment. Hence, they should be used as effective vehicles for initiating development programmes in the area. This research has shown that this can be done effectively through forming partnerships with the state and the private sector.

Open systems theory describes organisations in partnerships as social systems to transform resources from the environment into products or services for the environment – in this case food security. Institutional theory explains why organisations ought to develop specific structures and processes, depending on the institutional environment, that provide them with acceptance and credibility. As Kreuter and Lezin (1998) have shown, interests in partnership involve mutual benefits that range from additional resources, increased credibility, and a better understanding of and responsiveness to community needs, among others. For sustainable food security therefore, the recognition and support of community-based structures by the state can only lead to a win-win situation for all parties.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The study recommends the adoption of a community-based approach to sustainable food security and a policy environment that facilitates local food marketing. Local governments could provide incentives to industries willing to work in partnership with the farming community, for instance, to process, preserve or add
value to local foods. This would not only absorb the local produce and increase its availability in local markets, but also create jobs and provide farmers with a higher income. The local government institution should be willing to exchange experiences, learn from other communities, and possibly adopt programmes that are successful by becoming partners and facilitators of CBOs in food security initiatives.

Community participation in food-activity development initiatives leads to ownership by the community, and CBOs can be suitable instruments and entry points for empowerment of local communities. This is because they are more organised, can be reached easily by development agents and can mobilise resources in a synergetic manner to achieve food security goals. They act as testing grounds for new innovation and networking for local action. Finally, CBOs can initiate bottom-up strategies, provided that the upper levels of governance are willing to learn from local experiences.

Notes:

• The support received from World Vision Kenya while carrying out this research is appreciated and hereby acknowledged.
• An original version of this paper was read at the 2014 IASIA Annual Conference in Port Elizabeth, South Africa.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Kreuter, M & Lezin, N. 1998. Are consortia/collaborative efforts effective in enhancing health status and health systems? A paper prepared for health resources and services administration.


REGULATORY AND OVERSIGHT SYSTEMS FOR REVITALISING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEMS IN AFRICA

B.A. Bana
University of Dar es Salaam-Tanzania

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the regulatory and oversight systems necessary for revitalising public administration systems in Africa but with special reference to Tanzania. Regulation is a concept used in different contexts. As Jordana and Levi-Faur, (2004:1) for example opine, regulation can be described as an art and craft of governance, as an institutional reality, as a field of study and as a public discourse, and is more salient and celebrated nowadays than ever before. However, the challenges are as great as the achievements. As a popular subject of study in several disciplines across and beyond the social sciences, various meanings are attached to the concept, a fact that equally leads to reflecting the existence of different theoretical perspectives and disciplinary concerns on the subject. The paper discusses the major theories for understanding regulation before attention is given to various regulatory instruments. The paper then turns to a description of the roles of regulatory institutions as an attempt to discuss the current state before suggesting away forward for policy and managerial improvements.

INTRODUCTION

Regulation is a popular subject of study in several disciplines across and beyond the social sciences as well as day-to-day functioning of governments, especially in the contemporary era of privatisation, neo-liberal hegemony and political liberalism. Economic liberalism and political pluralism have triggered the need for re-examining and repositioning the functioning of public regulatory institutions. Issues of regulation have long been matters of both public policy discussion and academic research, particularly in developed economies, and tend to attract significant attention, especially in times of economic and social crises. Most intriguing is the expansion of regulatory bodies and oversight institutions in the public administration milieu. Regulation has existed for as long as governments have interfered in private actions.
There is also an emerging consensus among scholars and practitioners pointing to a positive correlation between the mode of regulation/regulatory practices in public administration systems and ‘good governance’. However, forms of governance are in transition on an international scale. Neither the juxtaposition of the market and state regulation nor those of the public versus private actors in governing society match well with the multiple faces of modern governance. The classical regulatory state, which has emerged as an alternative to the welfare state (both, however, with intent to complement or correct market mechanisms) is gradually changing its distinctive face of top-down authoritative control of market and society and is joining with other steering mechanisms. The process of regulating is being decentralised, allowing access to and spreading responsibilities across economic and societal actors. The regulations themselves are taking on various forms ranging from substantive rules to incentives and procedural requirements; chains of control are blurring and mechanisms of control softening with emphasis shifting towards more responsiveness and self-responsibility.

Anecdotal evidence reveals the existence of the camp of public administration practitioners, scholars and politicians who are attributing the current global economic crisis to the dysfunctional character, failure and ineffectiveness of the regulatory and oversight institutions or rather the regulatory regimes in most countries. This camp questions the efficacy and competence of the regulatory and oversight institutions that governments create to help pre-empt or avert incipient or perceived crisis situations. We do not have sound reasons to refute the allegations against the public regulatory and oversight institutions. There might be other principal reasons regarding the root causes of the crisis but it seems plausible to suggest that regulatory failure is one of the factors that may correctly explain the current global economic downturn. The literature also documents several studies that reveal a positive link between socio-economic crises and the performance levels of the regulatory regimes in public administration.

This article examines the regulatory and oversight role of public administration institutions in Africa. The article has two major sections. The first section focuses on the conceptual and theoretical issues regarding regulation, including the meaning attached to the concept of regulation and regulatory governance as used in the mainstream literature and in the context of this work. The manner and extent to which public administration institutions in Africa are positioned and prepared to serve as early warning systems for government in the advent of an incipient or real crisis are examined. The second section delineates the role and efficacy of regulatory institutions in public administration. The capabilities of regulatory regimes\(^4\) that are used in public administration are critically assessed in order to unravel problem areas and suggest possible ways of strengthening them in order to make a difference in the functioning of regulatory institutions in Africa.

\(^4\) The concept regulatory regime is used to denote the institutional setup, legal framework and policies governing the regulatory function in public administration.
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF REGULATION

Regulation is a popular subject of study in several disciplines across and beyond the social sciences. Various meanings are attached to the concept regulation, reflecting the existence of different theoretical perspectives and disciplinary concerns on the subject. Three meanings are delineated by Baldwin, Scott and Hood (1998). The first meaning points out that regulation refers to the promulgation of an authoritative set of rules, accompanied by some mechanisms, typically public agency, for monitoring and promoting compliance (Baldwin, Scott & Hood, 1998). A second meaning of regulation refers to ‘all the efforts of state agencies to steer the economy’. This meaning is somewhat broader than the first since it includes, in addition to rule-making, measures such as taxation, subsidies, redistribution and public ownership.

The third meaning of regulation is broader still, and encompasses all mechanisms of social control, including unintentional and non-state processes. Baldwin et al. (1998), as well as Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004) conceptualise regulation broadly by including all the mechanisms that are not the products of state activity, nor part of any institutional arrangement, such as the development of social norms and the effects of markets in modifying behaviour. Thus a notion of intentionality about the development of norms is dropped, and anything producing effects on behaviour is capable of being considered as regulatory. Furthermore, a wide range of activities that may involve legal and quasi-legal norms, but without mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement, might come within the definition.

The three meanings, to some extent, reflect the changes identified in the economic and social contexts of regulation. Thus, from the foregoing it seems plausible to conclude that regulation does not only denote the general instruments of government for the control of the economy and society. It is more than that. Moreover, regulation and intervention should not be used interchangeably. In this context we are compelled to support Kirkpatrick and Parker’s (2004) definition of the concept ‘regulation’, which views regulation broadly as the totality of government measures that are intended to affect individual or group behaviour and market outcomes.

Economists, unlike lawyers and political scientists, used to employ the word regulation in its broad sense. The global spread of the wave of regulatory reforms and especially the establishment of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) in various sectors of the economy (especially in the utilities) have led to some convergences in the meaning of regulation. As such, we are convinced that regulation should be viewed as specific sets of commands; and as deliberate state influence that involves a set of promulgated rules applied by a body created for this purpose. It also covers all actions of the state or government designed to restrict or influence activities of various social and economic groups in society. Regulation both restricts and
We learn from real-life experience that theory without practice is ‘empty’ and practice without theory is ‘blind’. We need theory to understand the nature and character of regulation and regulatory institutions. In most cases, and for most people, regulation is associated with the disciplines of economics, law and, to some extent, political science and public administration. The way in which economists have approached regulation has had a profound impact on regulatory scholarship and policy. The economic theory of regulation as conventionally understood was developed during the 1960s and 1970s and did much to explain how the regulation of that period came into being and why it failed. The theory is less adept at explaining the phenomenon of regulation which occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, and as a consequence, its influence is much in decline. Many economists have a narrow vision of regulation. They focus almost exclusively on what can be referred to as economic regulation, which is applied to markets in respect of which there is inadequate competition (Ogus, 2004). These economists tend to ignore ‘social regulation’, the justification for which arises from other forms of market failure.

The age of governance has seen the expansion of regulation as a distinctive mode of social coordination both at national and supranational levels. The establishment in almost all countries and many sectors of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) demonstrates the expansion of regulation. These are one of the main distinctive features of the regulatory state that has been rising in African countries since the 1990s. Regulation has existed a very long time, but regulation for defensible reasons of economic or social policy is more recent.

MAJOR THEORIES OF REGULATION

Available literature and anecdotal evidence show that theories of regulation may be grouped into public interest, regulatory capture, and median-voter classes (McLean, 2004:45). The public interest theory states that regulation is the solution to certain sorts of market failure, especially market failure due to natural monopoly. A normative version states that given such failure, regulation ought to occur. A positive version\(^5\) would state that given such market failure, regulation does occur. However, what Wilson (1980:370) calls ‘policy entrepreneurs’ may create a public interest if they persuade enough people to believe that it is in the public interest to do what they advocate.

Regulatory capture, endorsed by a wide ideological range of scholars, from the Marxists to the public choice theorists, is both positive and normative. In a strong positive version, it predicts that regulation comes into existence to serve the interest of the regulated (Laffont & Martmort, 1999). A weaker positive version would hold that, once regulation has come into existence (for whatever, perhaps

\(^{5}\) No scholar known to me is brave or foolhardy enough to espouse this version.
exogenous, reason), it is captured by the interest being regulated. A normative implication is that self-regulation is a bad thing.

The medium-voter theory states that, assuming that politics in the relevant arena has only one issue dimension, the outcome under any defensible voting system will be the favourite issue position of the median voter in that dimension. In ordinary application to any economic policy arena such as trade policy or optimal regulation, it implies that policy in each dimension sits stably at the median point of the interests concerned. Regulators may be captured, in any given policy area, by the regulated industry.

**REGULATING ECONOMIC ACTIVITY**

The economic theory of regulation was revitalised by the neoclassical revolution. In the last three decades, political scientists have also identified a distinct ‘politics of regulation’ (Wilson, 1980). Other scholars have gone the extra mile to claim that European democracies have become ‘regulatory states’ in which government has retreated as direct controller of the means of production, but advanced as an indirect regulator of them. The same phenomenon also appears in developing countries, including the African countries, especially in the current era of ‘managerialism’ under the auspices of New Public Management (NPM) rubric. Other analysts, including Majone (1994), defend such a phenomenon as the replacement of ‘government’ by ‘governance. The NPM paradigm emphasises the shift from government to governance. As broadly defined, governance is the “system of values, policies and institutions by which a society organizes collective decision-making and action related to political, economic and socio-cultural and environmental affairs through the interaction of the state, civil society and the private sector (Robertson, 2003).

Using the conventional tools of micro-economic analysis, in relation to any area of government intervention, economic analysis serves twin purposes. First, it helps to identify the failure of the market that justifies regulatory interventions. Second, it enables to select the method of intervention which predictably will collect that failure at least cost. In relation to the first function, the incidence of market failure will normally arise from the externalities (market transactions generate significant external effects that are not reflected in the pricing of the transaction) and information deficits (the information available to some of those engaging in the market transactions is seriously imperfect). These two forms of market failure will justify what is often and conveniently referred to as ‘social’ regulation whose typical examples include health and safety regulations, and environmental and consumer protection.

**REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS**

There are two main forms of regulatory instruments. These are the economic and social regulations. According to Ogus (2001:10) economic regulation “applies
to markets which are insufficiently competitive”. This means that there is a need to come up with certain measures to make or enhance the competitiveness of the market such as the formulation of a law on competition and the passage of legal measures on controlling the price and quality of products and services.

Social regulation deals more with the promotion of public welfare, health and safety. This further implies that rules are applied to the operations of business firms to control their activities for loss abatement. The activities related to this are (i) prior approval, where the firms are required to first secure a license or permit to operate from an authorising agency; (ii) mandatory standards, where the companies have to meet certain standards, both performance and specification, set by the agency tasked to formulate the standards; (iii) information disclosure, where the establishments are required to disclose to the public information regarding harms and risks that may arise from the operational activities and the product; (iv) economic instruments where the government can offer incentives to the firms in the form of a tax or charge (Ogus, 2001). This could also be seen as a policy instrument where the government adopts a policy of a tax holiday for business firms for a certain tax payment period to encourage more investments in the area.

Nevertheless, the more important aspect of social regulation in governance is the control of certain operational activities of the firm for the health and safety of the general public. Thus, the enabling role of government puts a premium on the social aspect of regulation primarily because of the need to protect the interest of the public and to promote more economic activities in the community for the people’s general welfare and wellbeing. However, social regulation may also be viewed as an instrument for the consolidation of the economic and political power of the leaders or politicians (Ogus & Zhan, 2003). By imposing certain regulatory measures on the entry or operations of economic or business firms, the leaders or politicians may be able to block the entry of certain businesses that run counter to their economic or political interests.

This situation is especially true in a third world economy where the distinctions between economic and political elites are blurred. The same goes for public officials who are tasked with implementing the regulatory measures for the entry of business firms. Given certain discretionary powers, they are provided with the opportunity to commit graft and corruption. This may explain their interest in maintaining the system of entry controls. The concept of ‘social regulation’ then implies the promotion of public welfare and interests as well as the advancement of private interests.

**REGULATION AS PUBLIC POLICY INSTRUMENT**

The use of regulation as a public policy instrument in public administration, and for improving economic and social development has had a long but chequered history, as part of the broader shift from the positive or interventionist
state towards the regulatory state in Africa. This is even more so in the era of new public management and ensuing administrative reforms that have essentially called for a ‘minimalist’ government. This entails the redefinition of government functions, including the need for governments to go back to their basics, which include maintenance of law and order; regulation; policy management; economic infrastructure development and guaranteeing the enforcement of contracts.

Regulatory institutions are not new in the public administration arena in Africa. On attaining independence, most countries inherited a small number of regulatory institutions that were created by colonial governments. These include the public/civil service commissions, central banks, licensing authorities, school inspection agencies and professional regulatory authorities. Studies carried out by Minogue and Carino (2006) reveal that most developing countries, and African countries in particular, started with a single regulator for multiple sectors; given the original focus on economic regulation and relatively simple technologies of the regulated industries.

However, the urge for deregulation, adoption of market economy principles and liberalisation of the economy has necessitated the expansion of regulatory agencies in most African countries. Several regulatory agencies have been created to perform the regulatory function in public administration. Today there are several regulatory agencies in the public service. It seems the areas that have been given top priority include the transportation industry, utility networks such as water, electricity and gas and fuel supplies; the communication (including telecommunication) sector; education and training, the financial sector; trade and industries; the media, and health and safety.

**EXPANSION OF REGULATORY AGENCIES**

The roles of the state and regulation have been changing overtime in Africa. The earlier view of positive interventionist government was replaced by the orthodoxy of minimal state, which in turn gave way to the notion of regulatory state (Zhang, Yin-Fang & Thomas, 2009). The decision to increase the number of regulatory authorities in public administration in the current era has been triggered by privatisation policy and the adoption of the market economy principles in most African countries.

Moreover, the redefinition of the role of the state and government from the interventionist function to the regulatory role, by and large, called for the establishment of strong oversight institutions to enable government to carry out its regulatory role. However, the push and efforts towards creating a minimal state and privatising state enterprises did not match in significant ways with the need to create strong and vibrant regulatory institutions.
REGULATORY POLICY AND THE DONOR FACTOR

Compelling and anecdotal evidence exists showing the intervention of donors in regulatory reform efforts in most African countries. Following the implementation of privatisation policy in African countries, aid donors such as the European Union (EU) have promoted a model of regulatory ‘best practice’ based on Western and North American examples of regulatory agencies independent of government control. However, there is a reality gap between donors’ ideas of the so-called ‘best practice’ and the real legal, administrative, economic and political processes which exist in African countries, and indeed other developing countries. In this regard, we are compelled to support the views expressed by Ogus (2005). He correctly argues that:

Western models of regulation have a growing influence in developing countries. Promoted by the World Bank and IMF, they are assumed to lead to economic growth. But many problems arise when attempts are made to put these imported models into practice – strategies designed for a Western context often do not work well when transplanted to different economic, social and political cultures. Although this is well recognised, the most common response is to simply carry on ‘as well as possible’ in the circumstances.

It seems plausible to point to the fact that Western models of regulation have a growing influence in developing countries. Despite the emphasis that donors and multi-lateral agencies have put on privatisation and market liberalisation, scant attention has been placed on creating the capacity of regulatory agencies in Africa. Reforms in regulatory governance have not gained sufficient grounds in African countries.

ROLES OF REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS: ASSESSING CURRENT STATE

Public administration institutions, including regulatory agencies, are expected to play a crucial role in protecting the interests of the public. The citizenry, including customers, must be protected from unscrupulous enterprises offering unsafe products and services. Regulatory agencies are supposed to ensure that standards are being met through inspection, which may be random or targeted, sometimes in response to complaints from customers. State regulation needs to be effective if it is to benefit African countries by removing market failures, imperfections and, consequently, promoting sustainable development.

There is compelling evidence revealing systemic and endemic problems in regulatory institutions in Africa. Empirical evidence shows that the necessary legal framework and institutional arrangement that provide the essential foundation for effective regulation is lacking in many African countries. In some cases it has been established that regulatory agencies do not seem to serve the purpose they
were created to serve, that is “regulatory regimes seem to be serving other than regulatory purposes” (Ogus, 2004). In the following sections we examine the nature and character of regulatory regimes and regulatory institutions in Africa.

**Licensing**

Discussion on the licensing systems in the light of available evidence in Africa demonstrates that:

Such systems at best are over-elaborate and dysfunctional, and, at worst, are kept in place to support rent-seeking activities by political and bureaucratic elites. The reduction and streamlining of such processes would, it is argued, remove constraints damaging to enterprises and economic growth in developing countries (including African countries). (Ogus, 2004)

It is important for politicians to maintain control over who enters the market through licensing, implying that the government has a great deal of control over the economy as a whole. However, the capacity of regulatory institutions in most African countries to use licensing as a regulatory tool for alleviating the damaging effect of the market imperfections is acutely weak. Licenses are not solely money-raising devices but are also intended for consumer protection. The capacity of regulatory institutions in African countries to continuously monitor the licensed firms is somewhat weak.

**Central banks and related institutions**

Regulatory agencies are expected to demonstrate a high degree of efficiency and effectiveness in executing the functions they were created to perform. The credibility and efficacy of some of the most central regulatory institutions, such as central banks, in some African countries is doubted. There is evidence showing that, in the public eye, central banks in some African countries are unable to regulate other financial institutions effectively. Moreover, it is argued that political interference and lack of transparency and accountability are some of the vices that characterise the operations of key regulatory agencies such as central banks.

**Public utilities: Water, electricity, gas, etc.**

In this area, studies conducted by Kirkpatrick and Parker (2007) in developing and African countries have revealed that the utilities sector faces two particular problems, which they refer to as ‘hold-up’ and ‘information asymmetry’.

**Hold-up phenomenon**

When the investment is first negotiated, the firm and the state must both agree on a price -- for example, the fee the government will pay to the contractor for carrying out a service. This price must be acceptable to both if the private investment is to go ahead. However, once the investment is undertaken and becomes ‘sunk’, there is considerable scope for ‘opportunism’ or ‘gaming’ from both sides. The state regulator, for example, could attempt to reduce the contract fee. In principle, the
firm will still choose to go ahead provided that its labour and material costs are covered. Therefore, the regulator could attempt to negotiate the price down to this bare minimum. Equally, the firm might recognise that it is providing an essential facility, such as water. If the government has no alternative supplier, or cannot obtain one quickly, the firm might attempt to renegotiate the price of the contract upwards, above the original fee.

The result is a dual ‘hold-up’ problem. The firm can be held-up by a government that takes advantage of the firm’s vulnerability in having invested heavily in a network. Equally, the government can be held-up by a firm that realises the government cannot afford the social and economic costs of closing an essential facility.

**Information asymmetries phenomenon**

To regulate effectively and efficiently the regulator needs to have considerable and accurate information about the supplies (material and labour) and demands from consumers and the public in its entirety. This knowledge is especially necessary to set prices and restrain excess profits. However, in practice the firms and the regulators can be expected to have very different levels of information. In general, the firms have this information and the regulators must tease it out. Even with an efficient incentive system to reveal information, or alternatively draconian legal penalties for failure to co-operate, it is highly unlikely that the regulator will receive all of the information required to regulate optimally (Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2007). Available evidence shows that regulation of public utilities whose ownership and operations are in the hands of private firms has not been an easy task in the realm of public administration in most African countries.

**Social services: Education and health**

Development statistics reveal significant expansion of social services in most African countries in the last decade. Both the public and private institutions that are involved in the provision of education and health have expanded rapidly. In some African countries the responsible citizenry, conscious public and service consumers have raised their concerns about the declining quality of education and health services. Regulatory agencies are supposed to ensure that set standards are being met through regular inspections, which may be random or targeted. This is not always the case. Evidence exists in most African countries to show that providers of education and health services are not regulated effectively due to a number of reasons. The most pronounced reasons include inadequate financial resources and insufficient expert regulators as well as failure of the service consumers to exert continuous pressure in demand for quality education and optimal level of health care.

A very recent study on regulatory reform in developing and transition economies shows that governments in many developing countries, including African countries, have not increased resources for regulatory reforms. Moreover, it was revealed that
most African countries, except Ghana, do not have dedicated permanent central bodies for coordinating and overseeing or supervising the roles of regulatory agencies (public and private) for the purpose of enhancing regulatory quality in the national administration. In Ghana the Ministry for Public Sector Reform is vested with the responsibility for enhancing and monitoring the regulatory quality at national level.

At the institutional level, it is essential that the substantive appraisal of new regulations is reviewed by a public body that is independent of the regulator proposing the regulations and ideally located at the centre of government (OECD, 2002). We are not aware of other governments in African countries with a distinctive central body for encouraging and monitoring regulatory quality. In the light of the preceding, we are compelled to pose one fundamental question on regulation: Who regulates the regulator? At the central government level there should be an organ vested with responsibilities to oversee the conduct of both public and private regulators.

Public Service Commissions

The most celebrated regulatory agency in mainstream public administration regarding human resource management is the Public Service Commission. The commission is supposed to ensure that the key practice areas in human resource management in the public service are carried out in a manner that is transparent and competitive based on merit principles. However, empirical evidence shows that the commissions are acutely under-funded and, consequently, they do not have financial and human resources to carry out their regulatory function in a manner that is efficient and effective. Under-resourced regulatory institutions are unlikely to carry out their mandate efficiently and effectively.

STRENGTHENING REGULATORY AGENCIES IN AFRICA: THE WAY FORWARD

In the light of the preceding discussion, it seems plausible to point to the fact that African countries need to devise processes and create institutions to ensure that the quality of regulation is enhanced over time. This is important to ensure that the quality of public service delivery is improved.

Institutional and legal frameworks

There is a need to put into place the essential institutional underpinnings and legal frameworks for creating vibrant and effective regulatory institutions in African countries. The institutional and legal frameworks should take into account the economic and socio-political contexts of African countries.

---

6 This is also referred to as Civil Service Commission.

7 Especially employee ‘resourcing’ or staffing in the public/civil service, i.e. recruitment, selection and disciplinary functions.
The creation of effective regulatory institutions should largely be informed by a model designed by Majone (1999:11) whose components include:

- the extent to which decisions are delegated to an independent agent rather than taken by the political principal
- the nature of the structure of governance itself, particularly in determining the agent’s degree of independence from the political process
- the rules that specify the procedural framework, e.g. reason-giving requirements, consultative processes
- the scope for political principals to overrule agency decisions
- the relative autonomy of financial resources
- the extent of ex-post monitoring, e.g. legislative oversight, judicial review, citizen’s complaints procedure.

It is important, however, to take into account the fact that ‘independence from political control does not mean independence from public accountability’ (Minogue & Carino, 2006). Undue political interference in the functioning of regulatory institutions, however, is likely to do more harm than good. Moreover, creating regulatory institutions is one thing and their efficacy and capacity to facilitate effective regulatory enforcement is another. In this regard, we are compelled to learn from the works of Kirkpatrick (2006) on building effective regulatory systems, processes and tools. Building an effective regulatory management system for a viable public administration in Africa requires the following ingredients (Kirkpatrick, 2006):

- Adopting regulatory reform policy at the highest political level
- Establishing explicit standards for regulatory quality and principles for regulator decision making within government
- Introducing effective training schemes in regulation theory and practice
- Introducing effective data collection processes
- Introducing systems to monitor regulatory implementation
- Ensuring that Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is built into the earliest possible stage in the design of new regulations
- Assessing alternative regulatory options, including not regulating
- Reviewing and updating existing regulations
- Applying the cost-benefit principle through both qualitative and quantitative analyses.

These guidelines are useful in facilitating and speeding up the creation and institutionalisation of effective regulatory regimes in government. However, the need for flexibility in using the guidelines is required. Furthermore, effective use of the guidelines must reflect the country’s specific circumstances, including available institutional capacity.

**Adopting Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) tool**

Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is a systematic and key policy tool used
to examine and measure the likely benefits, costs and effects of new or existing regulatory measures. It is a useful instrument which generates relevant information for decision makers. RIA is not a substitute for policy decision making, but it contributes to regulatory design by providing information and justification for government action. It is important to determine the responsibilities that will be allocated to different government agencies for enforcement and compliance, thus:

To ensure the effectiveness of a regulatory activity, it is vital to know how a proposed regulation will be correctly enforced and to understand the capacity of affected parties to comply with it. At the final stage of the policy process, after regulation is operable, an RIA process should include an evaluation of whether regulations are operating in the manner that was expected. (OECD, 2008:14)

We should recognise the fact that there is no single ‘correct’ model for Regulatory Impact Assessment. Available evidence reveals that the RIA tool has not been widely adopted in developing economies, including African countries (Zhang & Thomas, 2009). Governments should assess the incentives and institutions through which the regulation will take effect, and should design responsive implementation strategies that make the best use of them. Emphasis must be placed on both ex ante assessment of regulation proposals and ex post evaluation of the existing regulatory measures.

Conducting RIA requires technical competencies that go beyond the training of officials. Training and capacity building is thus of utmost importance for the success of RIA implementation. As guardians of the public interest, regulators should, in principle, have both technical capacity and relative autonomy.

**Coordinating and networking regulatory agencies**

Institutions that governments create to carry out the regulatory function have ideas to share and transferable practical experiences to exchange. Regulators must be coordinated and networked at the central government level. Separate regulators are required in particular sectors or industries; however, they need to be coordinated. As such, governments in Africa may wish to consider the need for the establishment of a dedicated permanent body for coordinating regulation at a national level as well as monitoring regulatory quality in the national administration.

At the institutional level, it is essential that the substantive appraisal of new regulations is reviewed by a public body that is independent of the regulator proposing the regulations and ideally located at the centre of government.

**Public consultation**

This is important for improving regulatory transparency in the process of regulatory decision making. Consultation must be used systematically and it should be mandated by law. Regulatory institutions in Ghana and Tanzania have developed the practice of consultation with stakeholders and the public in the processes of reviewing existing regulations or initiating new regulatory measures.
This is good practice worth emulating. However, there should be clear guidelines to facilitate effective and systematic consultation. The public in its entirety must be given sufficient and accurate information to help them engage meaningfully in the discussion fora on regulatory proposals.

**Regulatory capacity enhancement**

The capacity of regulatory institutions in Africa is relatively weak. There are constraints in regulatory capacity. Most African countries are short of resources and expertise required to implement effective regulatory reforms. Governments in African countries should invest adequately in enhancing the human and technical capacity of regulatory institutions. Regulators must (again, in principle) be abreast of the technological sophistication of the regulated industry, and have working knowledge of its needs. This would allow them to assess the capacity of firms to deliver the required services, to evaluate their petitions for rate increases and to balance these against the demands of consumers and clients. Their lawyers and accountants must match the industry’s own staff so that neither the state nor the public are misled by the arguments and figures produced by the regulated firms.

**CONCLUSION**

Regulation is now considered to be an integral instrument in re-invigorating public administration in African countries. The need for effective regulatory frameworks and institutions to sustain the process of public sector reforms for economic growth and development has now been widely recognised. Foreign and domestic investors alike are discouraged from investing in countries where the regulatory framework falls well short in efficiency and effectiveness. Governments of African countries must make deliberate efforts to strengthen the regulatory institutions in order to enhance their performance.

The regulatory institutions must be shielded not only from endemic corruption and bureaucratic pathologies but also from undesirable political interference. The regulatory institutions need to be set free to enable them to execute their noble functions in a professionally acceptable manner. In the eyes of the public, the institutions should be perceived as assets created to safeguard the public interest rather than liabilities for enhancing corruption and related administrative vices and bureaucratic pathologies.

Higher learning institutions are beacons of knowledge creation and advancement in society. Unfortunately, most higher learning institutions, including universities, in Africa do not have academic programmes that are specifically aimed at creating and disseminating knowledge on regulation and regulatory institutions. Effective regulation requires deliberate effort to continuously develop, install and institutionalise regulatory tools and processes in public administration systems. Public administration in Africa requires robust regulatory frameworks and oversight agencies that are essentially derivatives of adequate investments in research and knowledge dissemination.
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


WHAT CONSTRAINS A TRANSFORMED PUBLIC SERVICE IN UGANDA?

B.C. Basheka
School of Business and Management
Uganda Technology and Management University

ABSTRACT

The reassertion of government’s role in the last decade has led to a revival of scholarly and practitioner interest in public services, more so in developing countries (Batley, McCourt & McLoughlin, 2011). The most contentious debate, however, remains first, how best to offer the public services efficiently and effectively and second, what usually stands in the way of most governments to have functional public service systems. Governments deliver services only through efficient and effective public service systems, which ought to be driven by core public service values as opposed to ‘managerial values’. Public servants are the backbone and heartbeat of the public service (Mle, 2012:29). In 2011, the government of Uganda adopted, through the Ministry of Public Service, a tripartite panacea for public service ailments that include strategies to improve the public service infrastructure (structures, processes, systems and practices), and the public servant and the client at the tail end of service delivery. However, the implementation of all designed strategies has suffered the usual ‘systemic implementation paralysis’. As a consequence, the public service is still perceived as slow and unresponsive to the needs of service users, particularly citizens and the investors. The public servants who have citizen trust are accused of corruption and inefficiency. There are incidences of poor client/customer care, and outright mistreatment. The structures of public service do not function as expected and citizen apathy has increased as those entrusted are not held to account. Such a crisis makes it imperative for public administration scholars to engage in debates on the nature of the problems and suggest possible prescriptions. This article is intended to examine the constraints to the transformation of Uganda’s public service. It makes proposals on how the government can create a well-functioning public service.

INTRODUCTION

Public expectations worldwide regarding the role of the state in providing public goods and services are on the increase and will possibly remain so. Governments are challenged to find new and more efficient ways to deliver public goods and services. Government’s role in public service delivery in the last decade has led
to a revival of scholarly and practitioner interest in public services in developing countries (Batley, McCourt & Mcloughlin, 2011). With the apparent failure of public management prescriptions, governments are now challenged to play a rather dominant role in service delivery. The public management theoretical prescriptions offered public service solutions from the late 1980s but the cumulative effect has not posted desired results. The prescriptions have been accused of not being ‘fit for purpose’ and as (Osborne, Radnor & Nasi, 2013:1) recently forcefully argue, public management has possibly never been a solution to public service problems due to two fatal flaws: it focuses on intra-organisational processes at a time when the reality of public services delivery is inter-organisational, and it draws on management theory derived from the experience of the manufacturing sector, which ignores the reality of public services as ‘services’. With this onslaught on public service management, the intellectual discourse has now tended to shift to public service management.

A literature synthesis of the classical paradigms of public administration (the politics-administration dichotomy and the principles periods in particular) point to a consensus that earlier scholars of public administration conceived their ideas based on fundamental public service values. In his public service revival call, Coats (2006, preface) demonstrates that contrary to the experience of the last thirty years, there is a need for a deep-rooted political consensus about how public services should be managed. His call was that establishing a well-founded agreement that recognises the importance of the public realm and accepts the need for flexibility and diversity in provision of services, as well as placing democracy at the centre of a new model of public management, was a critical challenge for adoption. This would still leave ample room for political disagreement about the size of the state and, at the margin, room for discussion about the role of markets. Citizens urgently need better services from their governments but are not getting them due to serious impairments in the public service delivery systems. African governments increasingly operate in an environment of unprecedented changes driven by technological transformations, as facilitated by the internet. Within this environment, governments have found themselves challenged on what their appropriate size and role in service delivery should be. The role of the private sector and other non-state actors has complicated the debate on what exactly the role of government should be.

The advocates of private sector dominance in service delivery come from the public choice school of reasoning. They advocate for a minimalist state and support increasing the role of the market. They have lined up a number of alternative modes of public service delivery such as outsourcing, contracting out, public-private partnerships, as well as third party governance as the alternatives to the centrality of the state. Their prescription is contained in the 3 Ms – markets, managers and measurement. Through such prescriptions, governments have undertaken numerous reforms to involve the private sector and other non-state
actors in service delivery. Work that was initially done by the government has been handed over to the private sector under various service model arrangements. The entrepreneurial spirit has entered the systems of government where private sector styles of management have been introduced.

The state is the most important catalyst of development (Amuwo, 2008:1). Citizens interact with their government through public servants. Public servants are the backbone and heartbeat of the public service, but if this heartbeat is unethical and unprofessional, there will be no blood circulation and the public service will ‘die’ (Mle, 2012:29). Literature from pre-colonial times to the present remains largely elusive on solid examples of societies that have been transformed to see reduced poverty and substantial growth without the central role of governments of the time. Literature is scanty on successful stories of societies that have developed solely in the hands of the private sector, given the undisputed difference between the public and private motives. It would not be out of context, therefore, to posit that societies will only see development with a strong state.

Legitimate governments are run on institutionally strong, efficient, effective systems, anchored on publicly determined, predictable and increasingly rational rules of behaviour. In such a system, the public service becomes a central pillar of the government as it regulates, administers, executes, mediates, invests and delivers the construction, operations, maintenance and servicing of service delivery infrastructure, and ensures that the public service machinery is oriented to diligently serve the citizens.

A debate on the constraints to the transformation of the public service in Uganda aims at generating an intellectual platform on which solutions to the impediments can be hinged. Prescriptions to the ailment of the public service must, as a matter of logic, consider the ecological dynamics in a particular country. The skills and values required in the public service are defined by a country’s development priorities and challenges as well as the specific institutional conditions that exist or may need to be created. This, however, presupposes a number of things, particularly about the democratic developmental state and what it is (Fakir, 2007:1). First, public servants are not simply employees of the state, but have a constitutional role to play. Second, while ultimately such employees must be responsive to the government of the day, they must use their professional knowledge, skills and competencies to ensure a better life for all by offering their best services in the most known efficient way while being economic and effective in the use of taxpayer’s money. Thirdly, the public servants must be fully accountable for their decisions.

The African Public Service Ministers’ meeting on the occasion of the Third Pan-African Conference of Public Service Ministers, held in Windhoek, Namibia, on 5-6 February 2001, reaffirmed the political commitment made by African Public Service Ministers at the Second Pan-African Conference held at Rabat from 13-15 December 1998, to enhance professionalism and ethics in the public service in
Africa, in close collaboration with their colleagues from the other ministries. In their resolution, it was documented that the recommendation of the Rabat Declaration on the elaboration of a Charter for the Public Service in Africa, which affirmed the professional values of the public service in Africa, redefined its objectives and missions and specified the fundamental conditions required for strengthening its role, competence, ethical values and image, including a code of conduct for African public service employees, which was to be a central pillar.

In 2011, the Government of Uganda, through the Ministry of Public Service, formulated a policy paper on the transformation of Uganda’s public service. This initiative was a product of the analysis of the impact of previous reforms on public service in the public sector in Uganda, and lessons learnt from international experience. The policy paper presents proposals for the transformation of the public service under three main pillars, namely, the public service infrastructure, the public servant and the client and was to be implemented over a period of ten years beginning with quick wins to be implemented within the short term (one to three years). It stated in its strategic outlook that to transform the public service infrastructure, Government would: (i) strengthen supervision, coordination, monitoring and evaluation and inspection functions; (ii) improve staff recruitment and selection methods; (iii) review, simplify and automate Government processes; (iv) establish a connected Government; (v) implement a stringent performance management system; (vi) review fiscal transfers of local governments with a view to stepping up the size of the local government budgets to match their core service delivery mandates; (vii) allow flexibility in management; and (viii) review and restructure the local government administrative set-up to become centres for service delivery and local economic development and not purely as a political and administrative tool.

To transform the public servants, Government will: (i) enhance the capacity of public officers through regular skills development, attitude shaping and performance improvement training; (ii) improve public officers’ motivation through salary enhancement and improving work environment to deliver quality services; (iii) establish a Salaries Commission with mandate to determine, review and harmonise salaries of all public servants and political leaders paid from the Consolidated Fund; (iv) conduct periodic National Service Programmes for public officers to develop a sense of commitment to the wellbeing of their country and the people and re-orient them into the value system and culture of the Uganda Public Service; (v) strengthen the rewards and sanctions system in the public service; and (vi) enhance leadership capacity in the public service.

To empower citizens to demand services and accountability, Government will: (i) review the curriculum for primary and secondary schools to include civic education, including knowledge about human rights, obligations of citizens so that citizens know their rights, and national values from a tender age; (ii) disseminate service delivery standards and client charters; (iii) establish call-in centres to provide
an effective feedback mechanism from the population to enhance transparency and accountability and hence service delivery; and (iv) gazette specific days for all citizens to participate in national service such as: cleaning, road and water source maintenance; and building a sense of commitment to the wellbeing of the society.

In this article, the author explores the major constraints that have and will possibly remain a hindrance to service transformation unless specific interventions are put in place. Since the launch of the public service transformation policy paper in 2011, there remains a serious deficit on its implementation as most of the initiatives had specific time periods that have never seen the light of day. There is indeed poor coordination of government and the public servant has not changed as much as had been anticipated by the transformation policy. The public service systems, procedures and rules are not working and there is growing collusion across government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) to defeat the same systems established to deliver the services. Public servants recruited to guarantee and strengthen the public service systems are the same servants who work tirelessly to undermine the systems. Politics has entered the public service and its detrimental effects on the meritocracy are glaringly seen in Uganda’s public service.

The following sections are discussed in the article. Section two gives the problem at the heart of the article. In section three, a theoretical framework that provides a template for analysing the public service transformation debate is developed, and then the major constraints that impede the process of transformation in section four are discussed. Finally, the article makes concluding remarks and offers policy suggestions on what needs to be done to address the challenges of public service transformation.

THE PROBLEM

Fakir (2007:1) is authoritative on the centrality of the public service in the functioning of a democratic developmental state. He posits that the public service essentially focuses not only on the delivery of services, but is also crucial for economic and social development through providing the essential services and basic infrastructure necessary to help spur economic development and improve the lives of communities, especially poor communities. The public service not only focuses on the hard issues but has to be keenly aware of outcomes – the soft issues. In doing so, it has to deliver services in ways that are efficient, effective and maintain the dignity of citizens. However, the performance of the public services, from education and policing to health and recycling, is a matter of concern in many countries. Issues of public service efficiency, cost and effectiveness have moved to the forefront of political debate.

The central problem addressed by this article is why the public service in Uganda has not been transformed to a level at which it would discharge its duties to the satisfaction of stakeholders. It tackles the bottlenecks that are likely to impede
the initiatives aimed at legitimately creating well-functioning public administration machinery. The management of service delivery institutions as critical links with citizens is lacking. Yet, virtually all citizen experiences of the public service are through service delivery institutions such as hospitals, schools and home affairs offices. These service points are often run down, have shortages of staff, equipment and vehicles are in a poor state, and there is virtually a silent struggle to provide basic services. They remain poorly managed with rates of absenteeism even for those in senior position reaching unacceptable levels by all human standards.

Uganda used to be widely acclaimed as an African success on account of achievements in macro-economic reforms, poverty reduction and political stability, following years of civil war, economic decline and worsening poverty. The country’s public service was regarded as among the best after independence in 1962. Progress has been made on governance reforms, ranging from an ambitious programme of civil service restructuring, the creation of a series of semi-autonomous public agencies, reforms in public expenditure management, decentralisation, and innovations in service delivery, to legal and institutional measures to combat corruption. These achievements were, in the early years of the 1990s, attributed to the personal commitment of President Yoweri Museveni and a dedicated core of technocrats in the Ministry of Finance, and the Movement system of no-party politics (Robinson, 2006).

A number of public service reform initiatives have been implemented over the last two decades aimed at improving the capacity and performance of the Public Service, as the implementing arm of Government. To date, however, the Public Service is still criticised for being slow, corrupt, inaccessible and rigid, and therefore unresponsive to the needs of the people. The National Development Plan (NDP) listed weak public sector management and administration as the number one constraint to attaining the economic growth envisaged in the country. This public sector was and still remains characterised by weak policy, and legal and regulatory frameworks, and weak institutional structures and systems. Corruption has become endemic and manifests itself in many different ways across the governance institutions.

It is thus clear from the foregoing discussion that, in Uganda, while there is an adequate legal and institutional framework, the capacity of the public sector to deliver services has remained questionable. Corruption, maladministration and general inefficiencies remain a big threat to achieving the national objectives. This, coupled with a weak and underfunded civil society, raises questions on the progress of the public service transformation agenda. To understand the deep-seated causes of this malaise, however, it is useful to situate the discussion in a theoretical framework and it is to this that the discussion now turns.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Modern governments have found themselves entangled in different modes of service delivery amid an increased demand for better services due to the changing paradigm shifts in the discipline of public administration. Central to the debate of modern governments is the question of what exactly should be the role of the government in service delivery. One clear stance is that public servants must be able to discharge their vital mission of safeguarding the fundamental values of the public service. In order to preserve their legitimacy, public servants must adapt to and respond in a sustainable, quality-conscious and efficient manner to the needs of users by placing them at the centre of their concerns, while ensuring transparency and respect for human rights and democracy. These expectations are to be met in a changing complex environment with multiple players, stakeholders and demands based on the developments in public administration study, and more so the prescriptions offered by the market-oriented New Public Management (NPM) philosophy. The complexity theory and NPM paradigm are the theoretical strands upon which this article is based.

According to Cilliers (1998), a complex system is a system of inter-relationships between nodes, with the nodes deriving their significance not as atomistic units but as products of the particular inter-relationships embodied at each node. This is how complexity theory has been associated with democracy. As far as accepting the need for regular monitoring of important outcomes so that problems can be identified are concerned, complexity theory and the new public management have common cause. But the new public management has tended to see the results fed back within a coercive and hierarchical audit culture. In contrast, feedback in complex systems goes directly to the elements running relevant parts of the system and problems are explored openly rather than in an atmosphere of blame and sanction.

Complexity theory and the new public management have a common focus on monitoring and feedback in steering the behaviour of organisational systems. However, they are profoundly different. New public management theory focuses on results (Strathern, 2000). It emphasises the measurement of performance against objectives, with defined responsibilities for achieving these objectives and the use of data – especially cost and output information – to evaluate performance and decide whether to apply sanctions or rewards. Complex systems are defined by relationships and networks rather than by their constituent elements. A complex system interacts with its environment both in terms of feed-backs and feed-forwards, so its boundaries connect the system with its environment rather than separate it (Blackman, 2000). The roadblocks that will remain on the way of public service transformation are internal and external. Some are located within the broader societal values in which the country operates and others are shaped by global forces. Political leaders and technocrats in government have their share of the blame in a complex system.
CONSTRAINTS TO PUBLIC SERVICE TRANSFORMATION

In a public service context, transformation covers a deliberate and well-coordinated process of radical change intended to re-orient the public service machinery and systems in a new direction to make them more efficient and effective to facilitate fulfilment of the government mandate to citizens and ‘other customers’. Unlike public service ‘turnaround’ (which implies incremental progress) public service transformation suggests a basic change of the entire machinery of the public service. Public service transformation should cover the public service infrastructure, which includes the processes, procedures, policies, rules and regulations, as well as the practices in public service at all levels. It will also need high-level deliberate interventions to re-orient the character and attitudes of all the public servants to do a good job in the context of the re-oriented public service infrastructure. At all times, such public servants, at whatever level, must do their work within the prescribed rules and regulations. The transformation efforts should equally be extended to emancipating the citizens in whatever capacity possible to enable them to demand accountability from those delegated to manage the state apparatus.

A number of obstacles lie in the path of effective public service transformation in Uganda. The public service infrastructure, processes and technology have not been effectively aligned to the realities and expectations of citizens. Resistance to change to new ways of government service delivery mandates remains a common problem at various levels. There are significant institutional weaknesses: poor human resource management and inadequate skills among public servants; lack of planning and development; and widespread gaps in the quality and relevance of training and institutions of service delivery. There is also reportedly increasingly poor linkages and partnerships between government departments and other non-state actors and a declining trend in public service culture. Less focus is now attached to public service norms, values, attitudes and the orientation of public officials to true public service. Political intrusion into the activities of the public service is increasingly becoming a hindrance to effective public service transformation. Coupled with a citizenry too weak to demand accountability from those managing government delivery systems, politics has become so pronounced that even public service recruitments are highly politicised, a development that has negative effective on the merit doctrines.

Uganda’s public service is not unique in having such problems. Fakir (2007), for example, while writing from a South African context, reports that the public service has to deal with complex and interrelated challenges that include (i) internal staffing and capacity, including supervision and management; (ii) streamlining processes for effective, efficient and equitable delivery; (iii) interacting and coordinating with other institutions, including state institutions; (iv) interfacing with a variegated, complex and demanding citizenry; and (v) responding to the
complex contemporary challenges that have been shaped by apartheid policies. In this article, the constraints to public service transformation are analysed under three sets of parameters, namely, the public service infrastructure, the public servants, and the citizens. However, because the public servants are central for the effectiveness of the public service infrastructure and citizen empowerment, the article prioritises the debate by first analysing a set of variables that impede the public servants from doing a good job.

**Public servant-related constraints**

In any country, to find maladministration and corruption in the public sector serves to fault the capacity of public servants to discharge their mandates. It is true that any country expects its public service to manifest professionalism and ethics. Uganda is not an exception. This will increase citizens’ trust in public servants. However, in Uganda, most citizens do not regard public servants as honest any more, due to the dishonest behaviours that characterise their activities at all levels. Gildenhuys (1991:41) rightly opines that poor, dishonest management of public affairs and corruption (immoral acts) are among the most serious manifestations of unethical conduct. On this same subject, the findings of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Public Economics and Public Administration (2000:3) report that scandals involving public officials had captured world attention, with the public not distinguishing between elected and appointed officials in government.

Public servants hold offices in trust. Codes of conduct intended to ensure that they cleave to that trust have been designed in almost all countries. Kernaghan and Dwivedi, (1983:157-158) elaborately demonstrate how, since the dawn of civilisation, an expected code of conduct for public officials different from and in many respects superior to the code in the private sector has been in usage. Public service codes provide minimum standards of behaviour for public servants, and all practising professionals are expected to follow the agreed pattern of conduct in respect of how they go about their public service roles. These practices are as old as antiquity (Gilman, 2005:1). Failure to implement the public service codes of conduct is the primary constraint to effective public service transformation. The public service of Uganda has an elaborate framework that provides the codes of conduct for public officers. Only such codes of conduct are used when unwanted public officials who fail to toe the common line, are in focus. The poor enforcement of the codes of conduct has created a problematic cadre of public officials whose behaviour deviates from what is expected, and they always act with impunity. Unless there is universal implementation of the public service code of conduct at all levels, the transformation of public service will remain on paper. For centuries, the military has remained one of the most efficient institutions because of strict observance of the codes that regulate military conduct.

Any accountability system in any country, organisation or business is based on certain assumptions about human behaviour. It is assumed that officials
in a specific government ministry, working in different departments, cannot collude. Even if this happens, it is assumed that officials in different government departments cannot collude on one transaction. That is why internal auditors in any ministry are appointed and transferred by the Accountant General, who sits in the Ministry of Finance. Yet all these assumptions have been false, resulting in the total collapse of the entire public financial management system. Collusion among public servants with motives intended to defraud government and defeat the established systems is a major constraint that is currently standing in the way of public service transformation. Uganda has recently witnessed high level scandals that were perpetuated through a well-calculated scheme of senior public servants. The two most prominent scandals involving billions of shillings were exposed in Uganda simultaneously as 2012 came to an end; one in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), and the other in the Ministry of Public Service. These two are in addition to several other scandals in other critical service delivery institutions such as the Ministry of Education and Sports, Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and Ministry of Works and Transport.

According to the Auditor General’s report, which exposed the scandal in the Office of the Prime Minister, a systems administrator for the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) at the Bank of Uganda gave the then principal accountant in the Office of the Prime Minister the powers of permanent secretary (an accounting office) to sign and approve expenditures in the ministry on specific dormant accounts. It was unearthed by the Auditor General that the Accountant General eventually transferred money from a donor account, bypassing the Consolidated Fund, to the said dormant account in the OPM directly controlled by the principal accountant who had been given approval rights; which in a functioning system should have been detected given the levels of approvals involved. Government has elaborate internal controls that should have stopped such theft of public monies, but collusive behaviour ensured all these systems did not work. Public finance rules further provide that for such monies to be paid out, they would have to be approved by an Internal Audit Officer in the Ministry of Finance, appointed and supervised by the Accountant General. Secondly, before the Central Bank can honour a cheque, it has to ensure that the signature on it is the same as the specimen signature in their records. Before paying money out of government accounts, the officials in the Bank of Uganda (BOU) are required to call the accounting officer of the concerned ministry and confirm telephonically that he signed the said cheques. After spending the money, the Auditor General’s Office is supposed to establish whether all these procedures were followed. Unfortunately, in the unearthed scandals, all such procedures were not followed because of collusion.

Uganda, like other African public services, has financially indebted public servants who are often vulnerable to unethical behaviour. Reports indicating the
persistent indebtedness of members of parliament (MPs) have been very regular. This is a major constraint to their legislative duties as they cannot demand accountability from thieving and well-connected bureaucrats. A suspicious deal by the country’s parliamentary commission to buy off the loans of the MPs through a Chinese firm was recently blocked by the president of the country, who through his own manipulative calculations, wanted them to remain indebted. The indebtedness malaise that has hit the legislature has found its way to most public servants across all levels and sectors. The majority of public servants have been entangled in a debt trap which has serious implications for their efficiency levels. Not only does it portray a negative unethical image of the public service in general, but it derails effective and efficient service delivery. The outright impact is that the affected public servants will have to engage in irregular activities and do many other jobs to earn a living, and this happens at the expense of their legitimate office work.

The indirect consequence of indebtedness is that a heavy strain and fatigue is exerted on the public servant, which in itself leads to low productivity. The overall impact is the poor performance of public service organisations. When public servants have to perform the duties they are employed for in their respective departments, they put in half the time due to stress. Relatedly, public servants who have debts are forced to do private work using public resources such as time, the telephone, stationery and vehicles. Others deliberately create inefficiencies in public service systems and processes so as to allow space for corrupt tendencies. In other cases, employees resign from their jobs to get access to their pensions, pay their debts and end up being jobless, a situation that holds more dangerous long-term impacts, not only to the individual and his or her family, but to the economy. Hard-earned skills and experience are lost. Social behaviour for the individual changes, family life suffers and people turn to substance abuse as a means of managing (Mle, 2012).

In Uganda, efficient public service transformation is at times hampered by attitudinal impairments of public servants. They have a poor attitude reflected in poor time management and the blatant misuse of public resources, absenteeism and doing less than expected in a full working day without much concern. Public servants are supposed to be citizen-centred, where consulting the recipients of services, treating them with courtesy and providing them with information on service delivery-related matters is of paramount significance. Unfortunately, most public servants in Uganda regard customers’ questions and complaints as disruptive of their work. Yet, true public service demands openness on the part of the servants who run the public institutions so that the public may know more about the way government institutions operate, as well as to emphasise a need to identify quickly and accurately when services are falling below the promised or expected quality (Mle, 2012).

Public servants in Uganda have poor communication skills, which affects the quality of services they offer. Moreover, government needs to respond to societal
shifts by learning to navigate multiple channels, not only to communicate but also to give feedback on key achievements as well as constraints that impede satisfactory service delivery where it has occurred. In his classic work *The functions of the executive*, Chester Barnard pronounced, “The first executive function is to develop and maintain a system of communication” (1938:226). For Barnard, communication was not just an executive function but the primary function. In another classic write up Simon, Smithburg and Thompson (1950) acknowledge the crucial nature of communication to government performance. They counsel that, “Blockages in the communication system constitute one of the most serious problems in public administration” (1950:229). However, Uganda’s public service remains with the perennial challenge of effective communication. Formulated communication strategies lag behind implementation schedules.

Finally, most public servants in Uganda have been accused of various forms of corruption. This malaise remains pervasive in Uganda’s public service. Some of Uganda’s bureaucrats have often been accused of lining their own pockets at the expense of the citizens. Indeed, Larmour (1990:64) persuasively argues that people are self-interested and opportunistic maximisers. Public equipment, office supplies and other stock may be used for the improvement and maintenance of a public official’s private property. Public servants are sometimes used as workers in political campaigns while on government time – an illegal advantage of incumbency. This is straightforward stealing. Opportunities for public servants to be involved in unethical conduct arise from the power they exercise in both the development and administration of public policy. Mle (2012:22) adds that corruption taints the image of the public service, and it is therefore a source of concern to most citizens. It deprives the citizens of services due to them.

**Public service infrastructure-related constraints**

The second set of variables in the way of Uganda’s public service transformation undoubtedly relates to the public service infrastructure. The public service infrastructure includes the public service structures, processes, rules and regulations as well as the practices which, if well nurtured, should facilitate the operation of the public service. The public service infrastructure means the interconnected structural elements that provide the framework supporting public service at all levels. Both hard public service infrastructure such as roads, bridges, water supply, sewers, electrical grids, telecommunications and soft infrastructure such as ethics infrastructure are necessary. The soft infrastructure further relates to all the institutions required to maintain the economic, health, cultural and social standards of a country. The financial system, the education system, and the health care system are other examples of soft infrastructure.

The basic function of the public sector, which comprises a number of institutions for the making and implementation of decisions with regard to interests of various kinds, is to provide needed goods and services to citizens (Haque, 2001:65).
Within the context of market-led ideologies, the public sector is expected to create a conducive environment. It is expected to provide a strong regulatory role; a task that can be possible with institutions that are well coordinated. Strong monitoring and evaluation mechanisms will be a key necessity for governments to be able to play a regulatory role. Unfortunately, Uganda’s public sector structures suffer significant ailments. There is poor coordination of government programmes and this has been further compromised by duplicated mandates across sectors with the cumulative effect that it sometimes is hard to know which institution should be held accountable. The duplicated structures and mandates across sectors have resource utilisation implications as scarce resources are distributed across the various structures. Monitoring and evaluation systems are significantly too weak to create the desired benefits. As a result, the private sector; through the alternative modes of service delivery introduced, continue to exploit the citizens.

The constraints to public service transformation above have created negative implications for public service structures. Inefficiencies, unnecessary rigidity and red-tape continue to characterise most government institutions. Indeed, in a country where there is lack of a supportive social infrastructure for the transformation of the public service, the public service rules and regulations are quite often used by public servants for private gain. The system of government and law enforcement, including the political, legislative, law enforcement, justice and penal systems, as well as specialised facilities and systems for collecting, storing and disseminating data, laws and regulation, are not supported. They are too inefficient to facilitate the purpose for which they were established. The public service, which also needs to build a strong economic infrastructure for the government, has not done so to the satisfaction of stakeholders. Uganda’s education system has been hit by complaints about the quality of education. There is too much absenteeism and low pay for teachers, which have combined with other factors to undermine the purpose of true education. Universities are underfunded and there is not much research output.

The public service in any country is expected to serve the interest of the public without much discrimination against its employees. However, the problem of discrimination has affected the public service institutions. The neutrality of the public service institutions as a whole remains questionnable in respect to demands by the ruling government. Public service recruitments are increasingly becoming biased and merit-based doctrines are being replaced by informalties. Within public service institutions, there is a paralysis with regard to implementation of well articulated policies. This has been partially blamed on poor funding, but the ‘public service culture’, where public interest has been increasingly replaced by private interest, becomes suspect. Performance contracts only target the invisible officers at local government level. There is increased political influence and ‘NRMisation’ of Uganda’s development processes.
Public service systems in Uganda are highly entrenched and embedded in a bureaucratic culture managed by public servants, the majority of whom have behavioural impairments, such that any effort made to transform the public service is not an easy job. The public servants have a critical role in ensuring the effectiveness of government. The inefficiencies generated by the sheer incompetence of public servants, when combined with the dysfunctional public service infrastructure and a weak citizenry, can have wide-ranging ramifications on the capacity of government to function.

Fox and Meyer (1995:98) define politics as the process of decision making; determining who receives what, when, where and how; a conflict resolution process which determines the apportionment of resources; the process by which power is applied in order to determine whether and how government is to be exercised in any given area; and/or the apportionment of values. Public service processes have become too politicised and, as some have argued, the country suffers from a ‘presidentialisation syndrome’. The president has become such an institution himself that every major policy shift requires his personal intervention. As a result, the policy strategies may not have been thoroughly assessed and it could discourage innovativeness in policy making. There are duplicate offices that have been established under State House and the numbers of issues that are addressed by His Excellency the President are too many, yet there are already established institutions for such activities. There is a belief that too much power and resources are being concentrated in State House as opposed to building institutions of democracy and governance.

**Citizen-related constraints to transformation**

For ordinary citizens, problems of poor public services by government should embolden them to hold errant public servants to account. A high level of involvement and participation by ordinary people is conducive to sustainable development. It has become common currency in development circles that we cannot rely exclusively on technical, capacity-based explanations in order to understand bottlenecks and inefficiencies in public services. Citizens have not held their leaders to account. There is growing citizen apathy and this has increased the impunity of public servants and politicians. Thus, transformation of the public service is not given priority.

**CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

The idea of public service transformation is not new. From the 1940s when the idea of a welfare state emerged, governments have been concerned with how to deliver public services efficiently. One of the primary challenges has been how to balance the market and the role of the state. Reforms upon reforms have come but the desired results of an efficient public service have not been achieved. In Uganda’s case, most previous public service reforms targeted only the public
servants and have ignored the politicians, yet government work is shared between their two constituencies. Politics has continued to play a fundamental role in either facilitating or undermining the public service transformation processes. Questions have also been pointed at the institutions and implementation strategies adopted. Reform efforts have ignored the non-state actors whose buy-in and support is fundamental to the implementation agenda of any public service transformation efforts. The gaps in implementation are so glaring that something has to be done. It is critical to have a good team of public servants to do what is expected of the public service.

To address the problems militating against transformation of the public service in Uganda a total reconstruction of the country’s moral infrastructure is needed. This has to be based on Ugandan values and must take into account the diversities within the country. The transformation should be based on commonly agreed values that reflect the cultural diversity of the country and are aimed at rallying a common support for the transformation. Much effort should be directed at harnessing the opportunities presented by a diverse society. The reconstruction of the moral infrastructure requires consensus building. With appropriate commitment by the top bureaucrats and politicians to the transformation agenda, the chances of success become clearer. For the public service transformation agenda to succeed, it should be beyond party affiliations and, as a matter of necessity, should involve a wide array of stakeholders – government, the Civil Society Organisations, the media, the private sector, church and traditional institutions, academia and development partners. Adequate financing for the transformation agenda will be critical. However, such finances must be put to efficient and effective use. The citizens must be vigilant and hold the elected and unelected leaders accountable.

The following policy proposals need to be undertaken by government under the direct championship of the Ministry of Public Service to address the challenges that stand in the way of public service transformation:

Public servants need to be educated on their philosophical roles and inherent public service values. Most public servants appear to have been more driven by the public management approaches at the expense of public administration philosophies in a democracy. A public service built on public management values will certainly never be like one built on public administration values. There is therefore a need for a renewed public service culture. The elected leaders themselves seem not to understand the foundation of government. To reverse this trend, the implementation of national service courses becomes a matter of necessity, not choice. Practices of public administration have ignored the theoretical foundations of public administration, which undoubtedly provide useful answers to pressing public service problems. People who manage government affairs must appreciate how governments have historically evolved in relation to the concepts of a state and citizens. Recruitment in public service needs to be reoriented to those with training in public administration, as opposed to the apparent emphasis on business-
oriented graduates who confuse the long-standing notions of public service values.

There is a need for attention to policy preparation and evaluation. If the government wants to have impact, it is critical that decisions are taken based on well thought-out visions that have seen major stakeholders participate and feel a degree of ownership of the policies. The culture of minimalist consultation during policy development needs to be replaced with the true meaning of consultation. While participatory representation may be a challenge due to the complexities of its implementation, the representative representation itself has to take the heterogeneous nature of the country into account. Once there is ownership of the policy of public service transformation, for example, its implementation will be smooth, as everybody will value its vision. It is up to these stakeholders to build the platforms for successful implementation and monitoring of the outcomes and the impact of the government’s role. Strong re-orientation to evaluation of public policy interventions is a critical pillar.

A more regulatory role of the government in a complex society is urgently required and will be a catalyst for an effective public service transformation agenda. While most government activities in Uganda are driven by the business approach, government’s strong arm remains paramount in such a service delivery mechanism. Government has to exert its influence through a robust monitoring role if its regulatory function is to succeed. An effective government must have an elaborate instrument to safeguard the well-being of its citizens. Uganda’s rather complex society needs an intelligent government that supports opportunities for further growth towards a harmonious organisation and an effective and safe society. Regulatory issues should have a positive impact on these ambitions.

New delivery through partnerships of its various forms needs to be explored but with a caveat that government retains the role of conducting due diligence and performs its regulatory and monitoring role efficiently and effectively. Government; it has been argued by public choice theorists, can no longer have the ambition to accumulate all needed knowledge and budgets. To safeguard the positive impact, governments have to elaborate new collaboration models with different stakeholders and private partners. Controlled trust and respect instead of distrust should be the main driver in the relation between government, citizens and companies.

Attention to the doctrines of good government and governance, guided by the century-old principles of separation of powers and checks and balances in the context of democratic doctrines is, an important likely strategy that will support public service transformation. Democratic principles of public financial management will need to be at the centre of government-citizen interaction. Reliability, transparency and accountability should be key words for a government with interests in ensuring societal transformation. Identification of clear objectives, development of transparent processes, adapting checks and balances, with strong monitoring, accountability and communication should be at the heart of all public
service delivery institutions and political and other non-elected leaders will need to be champions. The use of civil society organisations and other non-state actors in instilling a stewardship culture and demanding accountability on behalf of the people will most probability post impressive outcomes. This, however, has a caveat that government recognises the positive roles of such non-state actors and that they are availed of a conducive policy regime to perform their activities.

Building the public sector landscape of the future, with foresighted public servants, is a suggested area for policy intervention. To increase government relevance in society, perform its roles in an efficient way and cope with the complexity of public service delivery, public administrations need to embrace new concepts of an open organisation: new collaboration models between administrations of similar level, between administrations of different governance levels and/or between public and private organisations will have an impact on the organisations’ design of the overall public sector. The specific application and relevance of such interventions will remain a critical area of policy intervention.

The culture of designing efficient processes and managing complexities needs urgent policy attention. All administrations will need to have a continued desire for innovation in the public service processes, while they optimise the processes – adapting to the specific strategy, legal changes, innovation, new services and delivery models. An efficient government should look for standardised solutions in domains such as finance, human resources, public procurement, all adapted to the specific public sector environment.

The power of an efficient coordination and monitoring framework is critical. Government urgently needs to re-evaluate the mandates of its various departments and agencies with a view to consolidating existing mandates into related areas. This will build synergy among related functions and will see significant saving of resources, which will be put to good use. The relationship between the central government and local government should be a major area of emphasis in debating, coordinating and monitoring.

Performance measurement for senior managers will need much more robust attention than it has attracted in the past. Even public servants in responsible, supervisory positions must be given clear benchmarks of performance, and remedial action needs to be taken where adherence to agreed benchmarks is not upheld.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Batley, R., McCourt, W. & McLoughlin, C. 2011. The politics and governance of
public services in developing countries. Paper presented at the annual conference
of the International Research Society for Public Management in Dublin in April
2011.


GENDER MAINSTREAMING PRACTICES AND WOMEN’S CAREER ADVANCEMENT AT BANK OF UGANDA

S.K. Aliu
IS Auditor - Bank of Uganda

G.K. Karyeija
& P.O. Naggita
School of Management Science
Uganda Management Institute

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the study was to establish the extent to which gender mainstreaming practices influenced women’s career advancement in the Bank of Uganda (BOU). Specifically, the study strived to establish the extent to which internal recruitment practices, women safety practices and work-family balance practices influenced women’s career development in the BOU. The study used a cross sectional design adopting both quantitative and qualitative approaches on a sample of 93 respondents. Data was collected using a questionnaire and interview guide. The study established that internal recruitment gender practice predicted 45.7%, women’s safety practice predicted 46.6% while work-family balance predicted 36.3% of the variance in women’s career advancement. The study concludes that the problem of women’s career advancement in the BOU prevails and is highly associated with procedural inequality in internal recruitment and lack of an adequate gender affirmative action in the internal promotion process, sexual harassment, bullying, inflexible forms of work and inadequate employee assistance programmes. The study recommends that to foster women’s career advancement and contribute to the achievement of MDG III, the management of the BOU should strongly commit itself to affirmative action through gender mainstreaming. The internal recruitment process should be adopted (with affirmative action) in the identification of talents for development (succession planning) to take up future managerial positions. The BOU management should strengthen the sexual harassment policies and concretise the bullying practice through sensitisation/awareness building and the implementation of adverse disciplinary action in proved cases, continuously exploit and adopt flexible work forms, and explore the provision of adequate employee assistance programmes such as day care centres and facilities, as well as sabbatical leave.
INTRODUCTION

The study focused on the gender mainstreaming and women’s career advancement at the Bank of Uganda (BOU). Gender mainstreaming was the independent variable while women’s career advancement was the dependent variable. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 3 required national governments to develop or strengthen government machineries to promote women’s equality; integrate gender perspectives in legislations and public practice; and generate and disseminate gender disaggregated data by 2015 (Walby, 2009). What instigated this study was that:

With three years left to the MDG targets, recognized institutions, which are supposed to be exemplary in gender mainstreaming, are still embroiled in workplace gender disparities questioning the level of institutionalization of gendered workplace policies for promotion of women equality (OECD Employment Outlook, 2012).

Before the 18th and 19th centuries, women were condemned to perform agricultural and other related physical labour in mines until the passing of the Mine and Collieries Act in the United Kingdom in 1842 when women were allowed to work for a wage and eventually a salary. At the turn of the 19th century, many women entered into paid labour as it provided some insurance against the possibility that their husbands might become too ill or injured to support the family (Joan, 1993). However, inequality in gender enrolment and wages existed, yet pregnant women worked up until the day they gave birth – the reason being that many women could not afford unpaid leave as provided for in the 1891 laws related to maternity leave (Joan, 1993).

Claudia (2006) refers to the period 1890 to 1930 as the quiet revolution and notes that the increase of women in the labour force of western countries gained momentum, yet the women in the workforce were typically young and unmarried. They had little or no learning on the job and typically held clerical and teaching positions. However, the period 1930 to 1950 marked a transition era when the discriminatory institution of marriage bars, which forced women out of the work force after marriage, were eliminated, allowing more participation of single and married women in the work force. Lynn (1991) notes that during the period 1975 to 1985, the United Nations, in an attempt to reduce global discrimination against women, initiated a series of conferences, declarations, covenants and conventions, most of which were to provide generally acceptable models of legal equality of the sexes aimed at not only helping to identify and remove some of the obstacles women face but raise the status of women at national, regional and international levels in response to women career marginalisation. Similarly, Walters and Mason (1994) report that as of 31 October 1989, women hold about 24% of top decision-making positions in only four countries, despite laws and practices that establish equal pay and employment rights.
In Africa, it is only recently that attention has been paid to problems faced by women in the workplace and management positions. Most African governments, including Uganda, adopted the various UN gender-related treaties such as a national women’s empowerment practice, the signing of a number of UN conventions on women, the Commission on Gender Equality, and the Women’s Charter for Effective Equality (1993). The UN Treaties were complemented by the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995), but the fact remains that women employees fill the lowest ranks of organisations, find it difficult to rise to senior and executive management levels, and are not benefiting from government practices and legislation to advance in their careers (Kyohairwe, 2010). Musimenta (2013) contends that even education does not seem to make a difference. In her doctoral study, she finds that in Uganda, on the one hand, traditions and religion still play a major role in constraining women from advancing to high positions. On the other hand, she argues that “women perceive themselves as different from who men think they are; some women have potential assets and strengths that they are aware of; they have dreams and visions of the future; they have been (in subtle ways) putting up resistances against subordination and oppression; and some have tried to challenge gender power relations by challenging and reordering their status quo. Feminist and masculinity studies should engage with the questions of having women gaining education, good jobs; fending for their families as main breadwinners or co-breadwinners while taking the back seat.”

Mathur-Helm (2005) notes that present-day organisations in both developed and developing countries are now trying hard to meet global needs by transforming their human resource practices to gain respect and promote the rights of all its citizens irrespective of race, gender, class, age, and disability although they are still constrained in achieving the goal of equal opportunity in career advancement for women.

This study was intended to assess the influence of organisational gender practices and women career advancement in Uganda. By studying a national parastatal in Uganda, a country with relatively good success in advancing women practices and a country where women are already prevalent but struggling to break the “glass ceiling” (Musimenta, 2013), this study intends to build on existing research to better understand the persistent practice barriers restraining women’s equitable representation in senior management positions, which in turn constrains the achievement of the MDG III requiring national governments to develop or strengthen government machineries to promote women’s equality; integrate gender perspectives in legislations and public policy; and generate and disseminate gender disaggregated data by 2015.

The study was underpinned by two theories, the human capital theory of Becker (1964) and the gender socialisation theory of Acker (1990), which are briefly reviewed in this subsection but are detailed in Chapter two. The human capital theory (Becker, 1964) asserts that individuals who invest the most in human
capital attributes such as education, training and experience are expected to show higher chances of career advancement, and an individual’s career progression and success are contingent on the quantity and quality of human assets the individual brings to the labour market and that the skills and experiences that individuals bring to their work are related to their promotions. Some scholars have noted a gender difference and posit that lack of experience and job tenure is the major reason why women are not yet well-represented among senior management (Davies-Netzley, 1998; Ragins et al., 1998). The human capital theory and its supporters underpin this study by identifying how women career advancements have been influenced by the possession of the desired skills and the enabling gender-sensitive practices required for career advancement at the BOU.

The gender socialisation theory of Acker (1990) asserts that women and men are socialised to behave in gender appropriate ways from an early age. Therefore, women seek out jobs that best allow them to perform their gender roles. In support of the gender socialisation theory, Eagly et al. (2000) note that the differential social roles inhabited by women and men will contribute to the division of labour. Women’s worlds are thought to include a particular type of labour, namely, care for others and maintenance of relationships, whereas men’s worlds are characterised by individual thought, independent achievement and success based on competition and hierarchy (Maier, 1997). These expectations produce gendered stereotypes which are, in turn, used to support the traditional sex roles (Heilman, 2001; Lyness & Heilman, 2006; Schein, 2001). The gender socialisation theory underpins this study in examining the gender discrimination in internal recruitment and the work-family influences on women career advancement in the BOU.

Career advancement is typically defined as an ongoing series of stages characterised by unique concerns, themes and tasks (Greenhaus et al., 2000). A common underlying assumption behind these stage models of career development is that there is a series of predictable tasks that happen at more or less predictable times during the course of a career (O’Neil & Bilimoria, 2005). This study conceptualises career advancement to include job-related training and development and the resultant promotions to top managerial positions.

Most scholars agree that gender safety at the workplace tends to focus on sexual violence against women and bullying (Berdahl, 2007; Chappell & Di Martino, 2006; Sipe et al., 2009). Sexual harassment is defined as “unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or other conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at work (Sipe et al., 2009). In support, Chappell and Di Martino (2006) note that sex-based violence at work is a very complex issue, rooted in gendered power relations in the society, the economy, the labour market, the employment relationship and organisational culture. Bullying is any verbal, physical or psychological aggression engaged in by an employer against employees or by an employee or a group of employees against another employee. It can take the form of intimidation,
isolation, victimisation, exclusion, shouting, abusive behaviour, constant criticism or nagging, verbal threats, physical threats, humiliation, excessive controlling behaviour, unreasonable behaviour or task assignment or posters, banners, e-mails and emblems that cause offence to women (Berdahl, 2007).

Workplace actions to combat gender-based violence may include regulations and disciplinary measures; practice interventions against violence; disseminating information about positive examples of innovative legislation, guidance and practice; workplace designs that may reduce risks; collective agreements; awareness raising and training for managers, workers and government officials dealing with or exposed to violence at work; designing and putting in place procedures to improve the reporting of violent incidents in conditions of safety and confidentiality (McCann, 2005; Sipe et al., 2009). This study conceptualises women’s safety to include protection from sexual harassment and bullying.

Work-life balance is a broad and complex phenomenon, lacking a universal definition. Greenhaus et al. (2003) define work-family balance as the extent to which an individual is equally engaged in and equally satisfied with his or her work role and family role. Work-life balance consists of three components: time balance refers to equal time being given to both work and family roles; involvement balance refers to equal levels of psychological involvement in both work and family roles; and finally, satisfaction balance refers to equal levels of satisfaction in both work and family roles.

The work-family balance encompasses a range of interventions to rectify Work Interference with Family (WIF) and Family Interference with Work (FIW). FIW conflict occurs when family-related responsibilities interfere with work-related roles, and WIF conflict occurs when work-related responsibilities interfere with family-related roles (Thompson et al., 2004; Noor, 2004). Each type of work-family conflict is associated with unique work-and-family-related antecedents and outcomes. Kinnunen and Mauno (1998) note that the best antecedents of FIW conflict are family-domain variables, while work-domain variables are mainly the best antecedents of WIF conflict (Fu & Schaffer, 2001).

Employee Assistance Programmes (EAPs) are common work-family balance interventions and typical examples of EAPs included providing assistance in the areas of personal issues, relationship issues, eldercare, childcare, parenting issues, harassment, substance abuse, job stress, financial or legal and family violence. Employers can offer a range of different programmes such as flexible working arrangements in the form of part-time, casual and telecommuting work, compulsory leave, strict maximum hours and by fostering an environment that encourages employees not to continue working after hours (Spinks & Moore, 2002).

Other work-family balance practices may include flexible hour arrangements such as job-sharing, flexitime and part-time working; flexible leave arrangements such as career breaks, sabbaticals and parental leave; and availability of
information on possibilities and emergency childcare (Thornthwaite, 2004). This study conceptualises work-life balance to include provision of work flexibility and employee assistance programmes.

The purpose of the study is to establish the extent to which gender mainstreaming practices influence women career advancement at the Bank of Uganda (BOU), specifically

- to establish the extent to which the internal recruitment practices influence women career development in the BOU
- to establish the extent to which the women safety practices influence women career development in the BOU
- to establish the extent to which the work-family balance practices influence women career development in the BOU.

**METHODOLOGY**

The study used a cross sectional design adopting both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The cross sectional study design was used because data on gender mainstreaming practices and women career advancement was collected from a sample of the population at that time. The design was equally used because the study findings could be generalised in work force gender mainstreaming for enhanced women career advancement in the study organisation and other government parastatals as supported by Amin (2005). The quantitative approach was used to quantify incidences and current conditions, and to investigate the relationship between gender practices and women career advancement using information gained from the questionnaire. The qualitative approach was used to give an explanation on the study variables under investigation using interviews (Amin, 2005). All this enabled obtaining data that could be used to find solutions for the research objectives, questions and hypotheses on gender mainstreaming practices and women career advancement.

The study population comprised 866 managerial and non-managerial staff (male and female) of the BOU headquarters. However, the study considered a target population of 178 staff at the top, middle and lower management level (BoU Human Resource Establishment December, 2012), who are responsible for identification and management of the employee promotions process in the bank and therefore deemed to have managerial and practical experiences on the promotional practices and women career advancement in the Central Bank. The study selected 118 respondents based on Krejcie and Morgan’s (1970) table for sample size determination which indicates that 118 is the appropriate sample for a population of 178.

The study relied on primary data collected using a standardised questionnaire, interview guide and document review. Both qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques were used. For qualitative data, thematic and content analysis...
were employed, while for quantitative data, Pearson’s correlation analysis was used. The correlation coefficient ranges from −1 to 1. A value of 1 implies that a linear equation describes the relationship between X and Y perfectly, with all data points lying on a line for which Y increases as X increases. A value of −1 implies that all data points lie on a line for which Y decreases as X increases. A value of 0 implies that there is no linear correlation between the variables.

**FINDINGS**

The extent to which internal recruitment practice influenced women career development in the BOU

The first objective of the study was to establish the extent to which internal recruitment practice influenced women career development in the BOU. Internal recruitment gender practice was one of the dimensions of gender practices and had two indicators of procedural equity and affirmative action. To test the relationship between the internal recruitment practice and women career advancement, Pearson’s correlation analysis was conducted at the 2-tailed level. The findings are presented below.

Table 1: Correlation results between internal recruitment practice and women career advancement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal recruitment practice</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women career advancement</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.680**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Primary data.

Table 1 shows Pearson’s correlation coefficient $r = 0.680^{**}$ and $p = 0.000$ between internal recruitment practice and women career advancement, suggesting that there was high positive significant relationship between the internal recruitment practice and women career advancement. The practice implication was that strengthening of and adherence to the internal recruitment practice by observing procedural equality and gender affirmation action by the management of the Central Bank will foster women career advancement in the institution.

To establish the extent to which internal recruitment practice influenced women career advancement, a regression analysis was conducted using the
ANOVA techniques of adjusted $R^2$ values, standardised beta values, t-values and the significance measured at 0.05 levels. The results are tabulated in Table 2.

**Table 2: Regression results between internal recruitment practice and women career advancement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$R$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>Adjusted $R^2$</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>F-constant</th>
<th>Sig</th>
<th>Std error of the estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.680a</td>
<td>.463</td>
<td>.457</td>
<td>8.849</td>
<td>78.312</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>.697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Predictors: (constant), internal recruitment practice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P<0.05

Source: Primary data.

The regression model in Table 2 shows adjusted $R^2$ value of 0.457 between internal recruitment practices, suggesting that internal recruitment practice alone predicted 45.7% of the variance in women career advancement. This also could be interpreted as that strict adherence to procedural fairness in the internal recruitment practice coupled with affirmative action will contribute to about 5 in every 10 women progressing upwards in the Central Bank. The adjusted $R^2 = 0.457$, $t = 8.849$, $F= 78.312$ and significance 0.000 suggests that the internal recruitment practice was a significant predictor of the variance in the women career advance.

Asked to describe the extent to which the internal recruitment practice influenced women career development in the BOU, interviewee A put it thus:

“We are all different; there are women who will do all it takes to attain their set goals meaning that if it means putting the family on the side as they pursue their career/academic goals, they will go for it. Then there are the women that will slow down at work in order to balance out the responsibilities at home. Others give up, resign and move on with their lives outside of the Bank. I would like to say that the recruitment practice has no direct impact on women career development because there are no ‘benefits’ or perks attached specifically to women interested in furthering their education and hopefully getting promotions like the men. It is all based on an individual’s drive to go for more training, etc. (Interviewee A)

Interviewee B, however, disagrees with the above position and put it that:

The BOU is an equal opportunity employer. The internal recruitment practice has not been tailored to specifically affect women career development. Career development opportunities are given to staff in general and not targeted to females. (Interviewee B)
The above interview findings attest to a common position that, whereas procedural equality was expected where women and men were expected to compete on an equal footing, there was no gender affirmative action disadvantaging women and needing special consideration to match their male counterparts. What is also worrying is that different understandings regarding the BOU’s gender policy exist.

The extent to which women safety practice influenced women career development in the BOU

The second objective of the study was to establish the extent to which women safety practice influenced women career development in the BOU. Women safety practice was one of the dimensions of gender practices and had two indicators of protection from sexual harassment and bullying, measured using 11 items scored on a five-point Likert scale. To test the relationship between the women safety practice and women career advancement, Pearson’s correlation analysis was conducted at the 2-tailed level and the findings are presented below.

Table 3: Correlation results between women safety practice and women career advancement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women safety</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women career advancement</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.687**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

P<0.05

Source: Primary data.

Table 3 shows Pearson’s correlation coefficient r = 0.687** and p = 0.000 between women safety practice and women career advancement in the BOU, suggesting that there was high positive significant relationship between the women safety practice and women career advancement. The practice implication was that strengthening, monitoring and taking action on workplace sexual harassment and bullying practice by the management of the Bank will foster women career advancement in the BOU.

To establish the extent to which women safety practice influenced women career advancement, a regression analysis was conducted using the ANOVA techniques of adjusted $R^2$ values, standardised beta values, t-values and the significance measured at 0.05 levels. The results are tabulated in Table 4.

Table 4: Regression results between women safety practice and women career advancement
The regression model in Table 4 shows an adjusted $R^2$ value of 0.466 between women safety practice, suggesting that women safety practice alone predicted 46.6% of the variance in women career advancement. This also could be interpreted as the adherence to protection of women from sexual harassment and bullying would contribute to about 5 in every 10 women in BOU career advancement and vice versa. The adjusted $R^2 = 0.466$, $t = 9.008$, $F = 81.147$ and significance 0.000 suggest that the women safety practice was a significant predictor of the variance in the women career advance.

The study therefore accepts the hypothesis that women safety practice influences women career development.

The extent to which work-family balance practice influenced women career development in the BOU

The third objective of the study was to establish the extent to which work-family practice influenced women career development in the BOU. Work-family balance practice is one of the dimensions of gender practices and has two indicators, namely, work flexibility and employee assistance programmes. To test the relationship between the work-family practice and women career advancement, Pearson’s correlation analysis was conducted at the 2-tailed level and the findings are presented in Table 5.

**Table 5: Correlation results between work-family balance practice and women career advancement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work-family balance</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women career advancement</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.609**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

P<0.05

Source: Primary data.
Table 5 shows Pearson’s correlation coefficient \( r = 0.609^{**} \) and \( p = 0.000 \) between work-family practice and women career advancement in the BOU, suggesting that there was high positive significant relationship between the work-family balance practice and women career advancement. The practice implication was that development of gender-sensitive work flexibility and employee welfare programmes focusing on work-family balance by the management of the Bank will foster women career advancement in the institution.

To establish the extent to which work-family balance practice influences women career advancement, a regression analysis was conducted using the ANOVA techniques of adjusted \( R^2 \) values, standardised beta values, t-values and the significance measured at 0.05 levels. The results are tabulated in the Table 6.

Table 6: Regression results between work-family balance practice and women career advancement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>( R )</th>
<th>( R ) square</th>
<th>Adjusted ( R ) square</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>F-constant</th>
<th>Sig</th>
<th>Std error of the estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.609*</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>.363</td>
<td>7.317</td>
<td>53.531</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Predictors: (Constant), women safety practice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary Data

The regression model in Table 6 shows an adjusted \( R^2 \) value of 0.363 between work-family balance practice, suggesting that work-family balance practice alone predicted 36.3% of the variance in women career advancement. This could also be interpreted as the development and provision of flexible forms of work and provision of employee assistance programmes targeting work-family balance will contribute to about 4 in every 10 women advancing in their career with the Central Bank. The adjusted \( R^2 = 0.363 \), \( t = 7.317 \), \( F = 53.531 \) and significance 0.000 suggest that the work-family balance practice was a significant predictor of the variance in the women career advance.

The study therefore accepts the hypothesis that work-family balance practice influences women career development.

SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

The purpose of the study was to establish the extent to which organisational gender mainstreaming practices influence women career advancement in the Bank of Uganda. Gender practices were conceptualised to include three dimensions of internal recruitment, women safety and work-family balance practices in the BOU. A multiple regression was conducted to establish the extent to which the gender practices influence women career advance. The multiple regression analysis
also helps identify which among the independent variables is a more significant predictor of the variance in the dependent variable. The findings of the multiple regression analysis are shown in Table 7, which summarises the study.

Table 7: Multiple regression model between gender practices and women career advance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adjusted $R^2 = 0.581$</th>
<th>Unstandardised coefficients</th>
<th>Standardised coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>Std error</td>
<td>eta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal recruitment practice</td>
<td>.262</td>
<td>.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women safety practice</td>
<td>.324</td>
<td>.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work family balance</td>
<td>.366</td>
<td>.096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Dependent variable: female career advancement
b. Predictors: internal recruitment, female safety and work-family balance policies

Source: Primary data.

Table 7 shows an adjusted $R^2$ value of 0.581 between gender practices and women career advancement, suggesting that gender practices are related in internal recruitment, women safety, and work-family predicted 58.1% of the variance in women career advancement, while other variables predicted the remaining 41.9% of the variance in the women career advancement. The work-family balance practice had the strongest influence on women career advancement ($\beta = 0.366$, $t = 3.792$, and significance 0.000) followed by female safety practice ($\beta = 0.324$, $t = 3.255$, and significance 0.002) and internal recruitment considerations of procedural equity and affirmative action ($\beta = 0.262$, $t = 2.333$, and significance 0.022). The implication was that, in enhancing women career advancement, the Central Bank should give priority to work-family balance practice by developing more flexible work forms and offering more employee assistance programmes that help women balance their work and family demands since work-family balance had the highest impact. Second, priority should be given to protection of women from sexual harassment and bullying. The third consideration should be given to adherence to procedural equity and commitment to affirmative action on consideration of women for internal promotion.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The study concluded that the problem of women career advancement in the BOU prevailed and was highly associated with procedural inequality in internal recruitment and lack of an adequate gender affirmative action in internal promotion process. The women career advancement was equally perpetuated by the lack of awareness of the available internal recruitment practice provisions and a low level of management commitment to gender affirmative action in internal recruitment (Chenevert & Tremblay, 2002). It is thus recommended that to foster women career advancement and contribute to achievement of the MDG 3 the management of the BOU should evaluate and strengthen the internal recruitment practices to make them gender-sensitive. The use of affirmative action by gender mainstreaming in the internal recruitment process should be adopted in the identification of talents for development to take up future managerial positions. Hosting of gender equality forums and workshops in the internal recruitment practices should be carried out by the human resource department as this will go a long way towards promoting awareness and implementation of gender-responsive internal recruitment practices in the BOU.

It has also been concluded that although the sexual harassment practice reasonably protects women employees of the Bank from sexual harassment, there is a need to create awareness of the sexual harassment practice, as some staff are not fully aware of its existence and its details. However, the study also inferred that bullying of women in the form of verbal, physical, psychological, intimidation and victimisation prevails in the Bank and these forms of bullying significantly inhibit women career advancement. The study recommends that the BOU management should strengthen the sexual harassment policies and anti-bullying practices through awareness building and taking of adverse disciplinary action in proven cases. This will need support from senior management and the opening up of more communication channels within work units to prevent the occurrence of workplace verbal, physical and psychological aggression (Berdahl, 2007).

Third, the study concluded that although the BOU had undertaken to put in place work-family balance practice provisions through some forms of work flexibility for some category of staff and provision of employee assistance programmes, the work-family balance practice has not been adequately developed to enable women to balance their work and family demands and to foster women career advancement (Berdahl & Moore, 2006). The study recommends that the BOU management should continuously exploit and adopt flexible work forms by encouraging women to innovate on how they could deliver on their work demands as expected, while balancing family or domestic obligations. The above should be complemented by provision of adequate employee assistance programmes such as day care centres and facilities, sabbatical leave and sick leave (Ballout, 2008).
The study makes contributions to women career advancement policy and managerial styles that the management of the BOU could adopt if the productivity of women and their contribution to achievement of the MDG 3 are to be achieved. Similarly, by establishing that gender mainstreaming practices of internal recruitment, women safety and work-family balance predicted 58.1% of the variance in women career advancement, the study has also helped cover literature gaps on the extent to which gender mainstreaming practices influence women career development in a government parastatal. Gender mainstreaming practices related to internal recruitment, women safety and work-family balance all contributed to 58.1% of the variance in the women career advancement while other variables predicted the remaining 41.9% of the variance in women career advancement. Other studies need to examine the extent to which organisational culture, which is a set of beliefs, values and norms, could have influenced women career development in the Bank.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


BOU Strategic Plan, 2012-2015.


Catalyst 2001.*The next generation: Today’s professionals, tomorrow’s leaders*. New York, NY: Catalyst


Equal employment and Opportunities Commission (EEOC), 2004.


Employment Act. 2006. Section 7(4). Every employer with over 25 employees is required to have in place measures to prevent sexual harassment occurring at their workplace.


Lyness, K. & Heilman, M. 2006. When fit is fundamental: Performance


OECD Employment Outlook. 2002. Women at work: Who are they and how are they faring? OECD


HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA: REFLECTIONS ON ITS ROLE AND CHALLENGES IN THE GAS AND OIL SECTOR

F.J. Mateng’e
Dar es Salaam University College of Education,
University of Dar es Salaam

ABSTRACT

Tanzania is one of the most resource-rich countries of the world yet, it remains one of the world’s poorest nations. The inability to effectively manage the vast natural resources for the nation’s welfare may partly be attributed to the neglect of what in the 1960s was known as ‘administration development’. As a result, there has been minimal attention paid to the role of human resource development (HRD) in creating the required human resource capital with the necessary competences (knowledge, skills and abilities) for effective public policy management. In an effort to address the competence shortages in the areas of gas and oil, for example, and enhance the capacity of the administrative machinery, the government of Tanzania has recently started awarding scholarships to Tanzanians specialising in the fields of natural gas and oil to pursue studies at bachelor and master’s degree levels locally and abroad. This article, while acknowledging these interventions, argues that unless a comprehensive and gestalt national HRD system is adopted, the interventions will remain reactive, fragmented and unlikely to produce meaningful long-term national benefits.

INTRODUCTION

The United Republic of Tanzania (URT) achieved her independence in 1961. According to the country’s National Census 2012, Tanzania has a population of 44.9 million (URT, 2013). Tanzania may be described as both rich and poor. It is rich in that it has plenty of natural resources including minerals. For example, it has a variety of mineral resources including gas, diamond, gold, coal, Tanzanite, cobalt, nickel, iron ore, uranium, phosphate, gypsum, just to name a few. Despite these resources, the majority of the people of Tanzania are poor. In 2007, while the GDP average growth rate stood at 7 per cent per annum, a significant proportion of Tanzania’s population continued to survive below the poverty line. For example, 33.6 per cent of households, which is one-third of the Tanzanian population, were
below the poverty line. Yet by 2010 only 47.9 per cent of the rural population had access to water supply services, falling short of the MKUKUTA\(^8\) target of 65 per cent during the same year (URT, 2012). The majority (80 per cent) of Tanzanians live in rural areas. Although Tanzania has made a great deal of effort to attract foreign direct investments following the country's adoption of a free market economy over the past three decades, the majority of its workforce still faces acute shortage of competences. According to the President's Office Planning Commission (POPC), “only three per cent of the Tanzanian working population could be classified as high-skilled, with the majority (84 per cent) of the working population being low skilled” (URT, 2011). This has often constrained participation of the local workforce in productive sectors of the economy.

One of the sectors that have serious deficits in terms of local workforce competences in Tanzania is the gas and oil sector. Recognising the potential contribution of this sector to the country's economy, the government set a four-year plan to address the competence shortages in the areas of gas and oil. The plan (Marshall Plan on Capacity Building and Development in Oil and Gas Industry 2012-2016) was launched in 2012. The intervention is meant to develop the human resource capacity through provision of scholarship awards to Tanzanians specialising in the fields of natural gas and oil to pursue studies at various levels locally and abroad. This article, while acknowledging government's initiatives, examines the efficacy of these interventions and identifies the main challenges or limitations facing HRD in unleashing the potential presented by the discovery of gas, oil and mineral resources. The article argues that unless a comprehensive and gestalt national HRD system is adopted, the interventions will remain reactive, fragmented and unlikely to produce meaningful long-term national benefits. The article is mainly based on data and information obtained through a review of relevant literature on HRD, including HRD books, journal articles, and government reports in both soft and print forms.

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

A review of the literature suggests that the term HRD was first proposed by Harbison and Myers in 1964 (Wang & McLean, 2007). Several efforts have been made to define HRD (Weinberger, 1998), but one of the most contentious issues related to it has been its definition. There is no universal agreement among scholars and practitioners on the meaning of HRD (McGoldrick & Stewart, 1996). Diverse perspectives have emerged in respect of exactly what HRD means. Interestingly, some have even refused to define HRD on grounds that it is either practically unfeasible or philosophically undesirable (Lee, 2001). Others have focused their definitions on either performance (Swanson, 1995) or learning (Watkins, 1991).

---

\(^8\) MKUKUTA is an acronym for ‘MkakatiwaKukuzaUchuminaKupunguzaUmaskini Tanzania’, which is a Swahili name for Tanzania's National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP).
Swanson (2001), on the one hand, defines HRD as “a process of developing and/or unleashing human expertise through organization development (OD) and personnel training and development (T&D) for the purpose of improving performance” (p. 304). Defined this way, HRD is viewed as a means by which organisational performance can be enhanced. De Simone, Werner and Harris (2002), on the other hand, define HRD as “a set of systematic and planned activities designed by an organization to provide its members with the opportunities to learn necessary skills to meet current and future job demands”. Their emphasis is on the developmental aspects of individual employees as reflected in HRD (Garavan, McGuire & O’Donnell, 2004).

McLean and McLean offer a more expanded view of HRD beyond an organisational context. They define HRD as any process or activity that, either initially or over the long term, has the potential to develop … work-based knowledge, expertise, productivity and satisfaction, whether for personal or group/team gain, or for the benefit of an organisation, community, nation, or, ultimately, the whole of humanity (McLean & McLean, 2001:322).

Despite the apparent lack of definitional consensus, it is imperative for this article to adopt a guiding definition. Accordingly, HRD is considered as the process of developing the human expertise and capacities through organisation development (OD), training and development (T&D) and career development (CD) for the purpose of creating and sustaining a pool of human capital for national development. This definition accommodates both organisational and national contexts of HRD. The national HRD takes a far broader context than that of individual or organisational boundaries (McLean, 2004). “The boundaries of HRD relate to the system hosting HRD. In most instances, this is an organisation such as a business, industry, government, or non-profit agency. In some instances, the host organisation for HRD could be a geo-political region or a nation (Swanson & Holton, 2009:100). Viewed from this context, national human resource development simply refers to “developing human resources at the national level” (Alagaraja & Wang, 2012:413).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework upon which this article’s discussion is based is the system’s theory of HRD. The choice of this theory is influenced by its ability to capture the relationship between HRD and other organisational processes at various levels, be they national or subnational. Underlying the systems theory is the proposition that systems are made up of interrelated parts each contributing to the whole to produce some results (Swanson & Holton III, 2009; Yawson, 2012). The systems perspective of HRD is guided by the assumption that a country’s HRD interventions need to be linked with other systems, informed by national HRD policies and vision. Thus, the systems theory treats the HRD function as a subsystem that influences and is influenced by other organisational subsystems at the national level.
The foregoing reiterates the view that a nation’s efforts in developing its human resources need to be designed and implemented in a way that supports its national vision (mission and vision for the future, core values, goals and objectives, and strategies) in line with the country’s defined development direction and the expectations of its people (Wan, 2007; Youndt, Subramaniam & Scott, 2004; Rastogi, 2000). The national HRD subsystem, according to the systems view, ought to be supported by national structures, policies, strategies and these interact with other subsystems such as the formal education system, the private sector, just to name a few. Using the systems theory, this article sets out to examine the efficacy of government HRD interventions in the oil and gas sector. The most important question is: how effective are the interventions likely to be, in the absence of an integrated system of HRD at the national level? But first let us examine the importance of a national HRD.

WHY IS A NATIONAL HRD IMPORTANT?

An economist, Marshall (1986) observed “developed, educated, motivated people are an unlimited resource ... [whereas] undeveloped, uneducated, unmotivated people are a monumental drag on an economy in the internationalized information era” (in McLean, 2004:273). Likewise, Briggs (1987), also an economist, concludes “while economists in general and policy makers in particular have focused upon physical capital as the explanation for long-term economic growth, it has actually been human resource development that has been the major contributor” (in McLean:273). What the preceding observations underscore is the importance of investing in human capital.

The early 1990s saw increasing government lethargy in committing the available scarce resources to advancing many activities previously done by the state, including HRD, mainly due to pressure from neo-liberal thought which perceived HRD initiatives to be more of a liability than an investment. At that time more emphasis was put on cost reduction with lip service paid to HRD initiatives. Only a decade later, did the World Bank’s position seem to have changed when it began to underscore the criticality of human capital. In one of its publications, the World Bank attributes Africa’s future development to the continent’s ability to unleash the human potential. It notes: “Africa’s future lies in its people ... Africa’s future economic growth will depend less on its natural resources, which are being depleted ... and more on its labour skills” (World Bank, 2000:103).

From the foregoing, it is clear that while international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank, among others, have continued to advance free market ideas, they also value the perspective for transition economies of state-led initiatives to develop human capital (UNDP, 1990; World Bank, 1997). Likewise, Myint (1971) and Meir and Stiglitz (2001) contend
that “… a deficiency in knowledge is a more pervasive barrier to development than the scarcity of any other necessary resources” (in Mosha, 2006:11).

In order to answer the question why NHRD is important, specifically for Tanzania, this article will provide three basic reasons. First, Tanzania, like other countries, wants to increase productivity in several sectors including industry and agriculture. Agriculture is the main source of income for the majority of Tanzanians (84%) and is considered to be “the best option for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction in Tanzania” (Wangwe & Charle, 2005:11). So modernisation of agriculture and raising its productivity is a goal accorded high priority in the nation’s short-term and long-term plans including the National Development Plan, Vision 2025, the Poverty Reduction Strategy – MKUKUTA, the NFYDP 2011-2016, the Rural Development Strategy, and a host of others. Modernisation of agriculture and scaling up its contribution to national development, however, may not be achievable if HRD is not accorded the importance it deserves at the national level. This means that if NHRD policy is not in place to provide a framework for capacity building for peasants and/or farmers in terms of enhancing their knowledge and skills for effective participation in agriculture, the agricultural modernisation strategy will degenerate into a political mantra.

Secondly, an effective NHRD has the potential for sustaining the country’s stability. It is an empowerment tool that helps unleash the youth’s potential and skills to effectively participate in economic and social development of their country, thereby mitigating possible effects of frustration and despair likely to result from unemployment and marginalisation.

Thirdly, as the world is pushing further for borderless economic interactions and competition, which allows powerful poor-resource nations to compete with weak rich-resource nations, the notion of knowledge economy increasingly becomes eminent. In a globalised world, only nations whose people have the required human capital in terms of expertise and skills will be able to use their competitive advantage to take up opportunities presented by globalisation; the others will be onlookers. NHRD is one approach to create and/or transform a workforce into active and competent participants in the global economy for individual and national gain.

**HRD INTERVENTIONS IN TANZANIA AND THE CHALLENGES**

HRD as an academic area of inquiry is still not popular among scholars in Tanzania today. Not a single university or college in Tanzania has a programme at any level (undergraduate or postgraduate) that specialises in HRD. It is therefore not surprising that even some academic members specialising in public administration in universities are still not familiar with the term HRD. To some, HRD is a synonym for training. As such, ‘capacity building’ would appear more appealing, as HRD is seen as narrowly focused and may not generate doctoral research. In one
encounter, one member counselled: “HRD is too narrow for a PhD project; it would rather be fine if one had considered capacity building because capacity building is a more accommodative concept …”. Here the same thing is presented in two different ‘languages’. One is talking about enhancing the capacity of human resources under the banner of HRD and the other is using capacity building to mean precisely the same thing. The first challenge for HRD in Tanzania is to assert its disciplinary identity and establish itself as an area of academic and research inquiry among scholars.

It should be noted that, as an area of practice, HRD has been around for several decades, albeit with different labels. Immediately after independence, Tanzania adopted a policy of Africanisation of the civil service. The Africanisation policy aimed at, inter alia, replacing non-citizen employees with citizen employees in the civil service. It was this time that the terms ‘manpower planning’ and ‘manpower training’ gained currency, with training and development subsumed and being used as synonyms of HRD. This was an era during which greater effort was made by both the government of Tanzania and donors to enhance the capacity of the administrative systems through redressing the acute shortage of qualified personnel to man the civil service so as to improve public service delivery.

The term that was in common use among public administration scholars and practitioners at the time was ‘administration development’. It was not until the 1990s and early 2000s that a number of government initiatives and documents began making reference to HRD. Several documents including the National Vision 2025, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), the National Five-Year Development Plan 2011/12-2015/16 have specific mentions on either human capital development or HRD. These initiatives have, however, tended to be fragmented and duplicative in Tanzania. As the systems perspective suggests, it has increasingly become imperative that these initiatives adopt a “unified, synthesized approach” (McLean, 2004:269) to developing the nation’s human resources.

In 2012, the Ministry for Minerals and Energy launched its Marshall Plan on Capacity Building and Development in the Oil and Gas Industry 2012-2016. The plan aims at, among other things, producing experts in the area of oil and gas. Presenting his Ministry's budget estimates for the 2013/14 financial year at the National Assembly, the Minister, Prof. Sospeter Muhongo noted that his ministry, in collaboration with the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC), had started human resource development initiatives within the framework of the Marshall Plan. Under the initiative, about 122 Tanzanians have received government sponsorship to pursue studies in the fields of oil and gas at certificate, diploma, degree and master’s levels in various institutions in Tanzania, including the University of Dodoma (10 – Degree Certificate), the Mineral Resources Institute of Dodoma (30 – Full Technician Certificate), Vocational Education Training Authority (VETA) in Lindi (64) and Mtwara (50) at certificate levels. He further
noted that plans were being finalised to send 10 and 20 others to Brazil and China respectively for Master’s and PhD studies in oil and gas (URT, 2013).

As a starting point, this initiative seems to be in the right direction because it is a manifestation of government’s commitment to support HRD initiatives. In the long run, however, a more integrated HRD system at the national level will be required rather than a reactive approach. Experience from other countries shows that an effective NHRD system is not only a result of functional structures, strategies and processes, but also the government’s commitment to invest in developing the human capital for long-term economic development (Alagaraja & Wang, 2012). The UK government, for example, has been a strong proponent of HRD through establishment of several structures including the National Advisory Group for Continuing Education and Lifelong Learning to promote a culture of lifelong learning and widening participation. It also created the Learning and Skills Council in 2001, and established Sector Skills Councils in 2003 to align training with labour market needs (Winterton, 2007:328).

Many Asian economies have given serious attention to HRD through extensive national programmes for developing human capital. These economies include Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia; the latter introduced a Human Resource Development Act in 1992 (Ashton, Sung & Turbin, 2002). In addition, the Middle East, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Emirates all have national HRD programmes (UNDP, 2003). Similarly, South Africa passed a Skills Development Act in 1998 as part of its Programme of Reconstruction and Development (Winterton, 2007:332). As for Tanzania, while the country has its national vision, National Development Vision 2025, which envisages becoming a middle-income nation by 2025, as well as an HRD division in the President’s Office, Public Service Management, there is no national HRD system that integrates structures, strategies, policies and processes into one coherent unified approach to developing its human capital. Such integrated national approach to HRD seems to be too far from being attained as the ensuing discussion shows.

Although some notable achievements in attempting to create a pool of experts in oil and gas are beginning to emerge, a lot more still needs to be done. Some public universities and colleges in Tanzania have recently introduced new degree programmes in the areas of oil and gas. Programmes such as petroleum geology, petroleum chemistry and petroleum engineering have been introduced at the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM), BSc. in Oil and Gas at the University of Dodoma (UDOM), and diploma and certificates in oil and gas at the Mineral Resources Institute (MRI). The Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT) is also considering starting diploma and degree programmes in oil and gas.

In January 2013, the UDSM signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Augustino Neto University of Angola and the Norwegian University of Science and Technology under the aegis of the Angolan, Norwegian and Tanzanian Higher
Education Initiative (ANTHEI), whose aim, inter alia, is to promote academic and cultural exchanges in the areas of natural sciences, petroleum engineering and petroleum geosciences (Martin, 2013). All these efforts are meant to bridge the gap between growing demands for experts in the field of oil and gas and those available. It follows that in order for these programmes to generate expected results on a sustainable basis, the universities and colleges will depend, inter alia, on the quality and quantity of graduates they receive from secondary schools.

One of the challenges that needs serious thought, in the context of national HRD, is the declining quality of education at both primary and secondary school levels (Hamilton, Wilson, Mateng’e & Machumu, 2010; Mkumbo, 2012; Kamugisha & Mateng’e, 2014). Hamilton et al., for example, attribute such decline in the quality of education to resource constraints facing the education system amid rapid expansion. These authors argue that “the quality of education has suffered, in large part due to the incapacity (i.e., limited resources) of the educational system to meet the increased demand as these programmes have been implemented” (Hamilton et al.:4). Given the inherent interdependence of the system components and between the system and its operating environment, failure of one part to function properly will affect the functioning of the entire system. If the education system cannot provide quality education at pre-university levels, the quality of university education is likely to degenerate as well. Since national HRD concerns itself with the development of the nation’s human capital for the country’s sustainable competitiveness in the global market, the quality of education has a bearing on the effectiveness of HRD interventions.

Quality of education is a function of many factors. Nonetheless, research has shown that the first and most critical input into quality education is the teacher (Manzoor & Carron, 1989, in Ocheng, 2004). However, by 2007 the supply of science education teachers in Tanzania was far below requirements. The critical shortage of science and mathematics teachers in Tanzania is one of the troubling issues facing science education as revealed in Table 1 below:

**Table 1: Number of students and availability of science teachers in 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Streams</th>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Teachers available</th>
<th>Teachers needed</th>
<th>Shortage</th>
<th>Shortage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biology</td>
<td>976,423</td>
<td>24,411</td>
<td>97,642</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>5,139</td>
<td>3,672</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td>983,225</td>
<td>24,581</td>
<td>98,323</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>5,175</td>
<td>3,705</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>998,200</td>
<td>24,955</td>
<td>149,730</td>
<td>2,016</td>
<td>7,881</td>
<td>5,865</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>990,122</td>
<td>24,753</td>
<td>99,012</td>
<td>1,324</td>
<td>5,212</td>
<td>3,888</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By 2010 the availability of qualified science education teachers had not changed much. According to a UNESCO study conducted in 2010, covering ten regions of Tanzania, the situation was still very similar to that of 2007. For example, findings from eight districts suggested that the shortage of teachers in mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology stood at 75 per cent, 72 per cent, 70.4 per cent and 64.9 per cent respectively (Hamilton et al., 2010).

These shortages in the number of qualified teachers in science and mathematics have profound implications not only for the quality of education in the country, but also for the national HRD system as a whole in the following ways: first, there has been a consistent trend of failure rates in the National Form IV Examinations in science and mathematics over the years. For example, the failure rates in mathematics in 2004, 2005 and 2006 were at 70 per cent, 77 per cent and 76 per cent respectively. The failure rates in physics, chemistry and biology stood at 43, 35, 45 per cent and 45, 35, 43 per cent in the years 2003 and 2004 respectively (URT, 2008b). According to data collected from the National Examinations Council of Tanzania (NECTA), while the pass rates for the National Form four examination results in mathematics were about 31, 24 and 18 per cent in 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively, the pass rates for chemistry and biology fell from 62 per cent and 46 per cent in 2008 to 57 percent and 43 per cent in 2009, respectively (NECTA, 2007, 2009, 2010). This implies that the education system at pre-university level produces very few science candidates who qualify to be admitted into universities.

Secondly, since HRD interventions can be effective only when they are integrated into other systems, dysfunctions in the education system directly affect the national HRD system. The massive failures in science and mathematics have a bearing on human resource capacity enhancement initiatives geared towards creating a pool of experts in specialised areas such as oil and gas for national development. Science education is a foundation that must be firmly integrated into the national HRD system. Unfortunately, such national HRD system with the required structures, policies, and strategies does not exist to spearhead and coordinate national HRD plans, strategies and processes and link these with other national interventions. A good example of important processes through which a national HRD system can serve present and future needs of the labour market is skills gap analysis. This process is important in that it helps determine and project national human resource needs in terms of knowledge, skills and competences required for present and future national development. Given their interdependence, these components need to be integrated to form a gestalt (of the national HRD system). Lack of an integrated national HRD system implies that current HRD initiatives in the area of gas and oil that are reactive, fragmented and implemented on an ad hoc and ‘stand alone’ basis are unlikely to produce significant results.

CONCLUSION

HRD is important in that it creates the necessary human capacities that, if
effectively applied, can help nations, organisations and individuals attain their development aspirations. To be able to deliver these benefits, however, HRD needs a proactive and comprehensive approach. Such an approach to national HRD may entail an integrated system of national HRD policy, structures, strategies, and processes that operate at the national level in a way that continuously enhances the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the nation’s human resources. An educational system that effectively produces quality graduates in many areas including science, technology, policy analysis, law, engineering, medicine, and the like would be a subsystem of the nation’s HRD system. While other countries such as the Republic of Korea (South Korea), New Zealand, Kenya, Singapore, India, South Africa and several others, have developed a unified approach to NHRD, Tanzania’s approach to national HRD is reactive, fragmented and lacks coherence. Unless an integrated HRD system is adopted and guided by a national HRD framework that helps to shape HRD interventions for national interests, the majority of Tanzanians will continue to be less active in their country’s economy.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


International Union of Operating Engineers, the U.S. Department of Labour, and Cornell University, Albany, NY.


